By Ethiopian Tribune columnist E. Frashie

On 17th January, the announcement of the Amhara Fano National Movement (AFNM) did more than consolidate disparate militias under a single command structure. In the movement’s own triumphalist language, it has taken “a historic decision that will close the valley through which the Prosperity Party group…draws its breath.” Stripped of revolutionary bombast, this means something simpler but no less significant: it called the bluff of Ethiopia’s political establishment. For 22 months, the government of Abiy Ahmed has refused to negotiate with Fano on the grounds that the movement was too fragmented to engage meaningfully. That excuse, threadbare even when first deployed, has now been comprehensively demolished. The movement now operates under “one leader, one organization” precisely what the government claimed was necessary for dialogue. The question is whether Addis Ababa, and its intellectual enablers, will acknowledge this reality or continue retreating into ever more baroque conspiracy theories about foreign manipulation.

The unification deserves serious analysis, not reflexive dismissal. Yet the response from government-aligned commentators, exemplified by Dr Dagnachew Assefa’s recent Andafta interview, reveals an intellectual poverty that augurs poorly for Ethiopia’s prospects. When a political movement you’ve spent nearly two years fighting suddenly presents you with the interlocutor you claimed to want, the appropriate response is not to insist they must be puppets of Eritrea, Egypt, and the TPLF. Such arguments insult the intelligence of observers and, more seriously, foreclose any possibility of the political settlement Ethiopia desperately needs.

The Mechanics of Unification: More Sophisticated Than Acknowledged

The Reyot Media discussion of 26th January provides crucial context absent from government narratives. The merger addresses three specific operational deficiencies that had plagued Fano since the conflict’s inception in April 2023:

First, the propaganda disadvantage. As Reyot’s journalist and his guest note, the fragmentation between entities like the Amhara Fano National Force (AFNF) and Amhara Fano Popular Organisation (AFPO), colloquially referred to as “AFAD” and “AFAB” respectively, allowed the Prosperity Party to portray the movement as disorganised rabble incapable of coherent political thought. This wasn’t merely rhetorical. It provided justification for refusing dialogue whilst pursuing military solutions, and it deterred international engagement.

Second, the diplomatic impasse. Without a single leadership structure or unified political programme, external actors, whether potential mediators or sympathetic diaspora communities, faced a coordination nightmare. Whom does one negotiate with when four regional commands operate independently? Which political document represents Fano’s actual demands? The new structure, with its 13-member central command, resolves this ambiguity.

Third, operational inefficiency. Logistics in insurgencies are difficult enough without duplicated efforts and competing resource claims. The Reyot discussion highlights how support networks were “confused” about where to direct assistance, leading to waste whilst fighters in the field faced shortages.

The leadership structure itself reflects careful balancing:

• Chairman: Zemene Kassie (Gojjam faction)
• First Vice-Chairman: Meketaw Mamo (Gondar faction)
• Vice-Chairman for Military Affairs: Habte Wolde (field commander)
• Vice-Chairman for Political Affairs: Henok Addis (political strategist)
• Military Commander: Brigadier General Tefera Mamo (professional military background)
• Public Relations: Asres Mare (communications strategy)
• Foreign Affairs: Brook Shileshi (international engagement)

Notably, the organization has assigned Eskinder Nega to the “Policy & Strategy Directorate” rather than a top-tier position a placement we shall examine shortly.

This is not, pace Dr Dagnachew, the product of “totalisation” imposed by foreign patrons. It is a deliberate institutional design meant to represent major factional interests whilst establishing clear lines of authority. The inclusion of both military commanders (Habte, Tefera) and political figures (Henok, Brook) suggests an organisation preparing for both continued armed struggle and eventual negotiation.

More revealing is the ideological framework the movement has adopted. In its 17th January statement, AFNM explicitly declares “Amhara nationalism” as its guiding worldview: “the ideological framework through which we will struggle, beginning with winning the current existential struggle and, in the long term, by securing the survival and identity of our people and safeguarding their rights and interests.” This framing of an “existential threat” requiring a “new Amhara revolution” positions the movement not as insurgents pursuing tactical objectives but as a people engaged in survival struggle.

The statement’s rhetoric is uncompromising: “Indeed, the Amhara are a people facing annihilation…we now find ourselves stripped of our country, made stateless, and placed under the dire threat of destruction amid a state-led genocide.” Whether one accepts this characterisation or not, it signals that AFNM sees itself fighting not for policy concessions but for collective survival a maximalist framing that complicates potential negotiations whilst explaining the movement’s resilience.

The Eskinder Nega Puzzle: Strategic Placement, Not Rejection

The case of Eskinder Nega, veteran journalist, political prisoner under the EPRDF, and prominent Fano political figure illuminates the movement’s internal dynamics more than any external analysis could.

The AFNM statement assigns Eskinder to the “Policy & Strategy Directorate” rather than one of the four top positions (Chairman, First Deputy, Military Affairs Deputy, Political Affairs Deputy). The Reyot Media discussion reported he had declined a specific politburo position, generating speculation about exhaustion or temperamental incompatibility with committee structures.

Yet the official statement’s acknowledgement that “entrenched divisive tendencies, interference by opportunistic interest groups, and the poisonous hands of the enemy constituted the principal challenges” in achieving unity suggests a different interpretation. The “repeated efforts” to establish “a single Fano organization” faced internal obstacles likely including Eskinder’s own political base and ideological positions. His placement in Policy & Strategy, rather than a rejection, may represent a calculated compromise: leveraging his intellectual contributions whilst avoiding the power-sharing complications a top-tier position would create.

The Reyot discussion offers two interpretations, neither of which involves foreign manipulation:

The exhaustion hypothesis: After nearly two years in the field, including periods of intense combat, Eskinder may simply lack the physical stamina for the grinding administrative work a politburo position entails. Armed struggle is not romantic; it involves disease, malnutrition, constant displacement, and the psychological toll of sustained violence. That a 56-year-old intellectual might choose to contribute without accepting formal leadership responsibilities is entirely comprehensible.

The temperamental hypothesis: Eskinder’s political career has been characterised by uncompromising principle and individualistic style. He spent years in Kaliti Prison rather than moderate his criticisms of the EPRDF. Such figures often struggle within committee structures that require consensus-building and tactical compromise. As Reyot’s analysts observe, his “uncompromising” nature may make rigid organisational hierarchies uncomfortable, even when he supports the broader cause.

Critically, Eskinder did not bolt to form a rival organisation, the predictable move for someone prioritising personal ambition over collective goals. The statement’s gratitude to “all leaders of the two organizations: especially for the leadership and determination you demonstrated during this unity process” implicitly acknowledges that achieving merger required mutual concessions. Eskinder’s acceptance of a directorate position, contributing without demanding a top seat, actually demonstrates the unification’s strength. It suggests that factional leaders recognise the movement’s survival depends on unity, even when this requires personal sacrifice.

Yet Dr Dagnachew’s narrative has no room for such nuance. In his telling, any organisational changes within Fano must reflect external manipulation rather than internal political processes. This analytical framework cannot explain Eskinder’s decision except through conspiracy a methodology that substitutes innuendo for evidence.

What Unification Actually Changes: The Strategic Landscape

The operational implications of AFNM’s formation are substantial and deserve acknowledgement even from critics:

Military coordination: For the first time, operations across Gojjam, Gondar, Wollo, and Shewa can be synchronised under unified command. This isn’t merely administrative tidiness; it fundamentally alters battlefield dynamics. Where previously government forces could exploit gaps between factional territories, they now face an adversary capable of coordinated multi-front operations.

AFNM claims significant military success under the previous decentralised structure: “The victories achieved through the determined sacrifice of life of our forces under a decentralized organisational structure dismantled the regime’s defense forces, the main source of its power, and reduced the regime to a mere insurgent confined to Arat Kilo [the Presidential Palace].” The statement continues: “We have turned the regime’s generals, forgetting their military command, into mere cadres left only with their tongues.”

This is revolutionary rhetoric, not sober military assessment. Yet even accounting for triumphalism, the September 2025 operations around Woldiya, Mekane Selam, and Gashena whether fully successful or partially exaggerated demonstrate capacity for significant operations after 22 months of government military pressure. The AFNM’s confidence that “with the first phase of the struggle concluding in victory and the regime’s army disintegrating, it became necessary for Fano to grow into a successor force” suggests they believe they’ve achieved strategic parity, if not superiority, in the Amhara region.

Narrative control: The proliferation of Fano-affiliated media channels (Anchor, Roha TV, Ethio 360, Amhara Fano TV) has created messaging chaos, with different outlets promoting different commanders and occasionally contradictory political lines. A single public relations structure under Asres Mare allows coherent messaging that can counter government propaganda more effectively. This matters in modern conflicts where information warfare runs parallel to kinetic operations.

AFNM’s Expansive Vision: From Amhara Survival to Pan-Ethiopian Liberation

The movement’s 17th January statement reveals ambitions extending far beyond Amhara regional concerns. In a passage that should alarm anyone hoping for quick negotiated settlement, AFNM frames its struggle as the salvation of all Ethiopians:

“Given the current reality facing our country, we do not believe there is any Ethiopian community that has not been subjected, openly or implicitly, to genocidal violence or an existential threat. Every people’s survival is at risk. Ethiopia stands on the edge of a cliff. Accordingly, the Fano struggle represents a decisive political solution not only for the survival of the Amhara people but also for the political salvation of other Ethiopian peoples. An Amhara victory is a victory for the Gurage, the Tigrayan, the Oromo, the Gumuz, the Afar, the Somali, the Wolayta, the Sidama, the Gamo, and other peoples as well.”

This is either magnificent delusion or sophisticated political positioning perhaps both. It reframes Fano from ethnic militia to pan-Ethiopian liberation movement, claiming to fight not just for Amhara but for all Ethiopia’s peoples. The statement explicitly calls on “all political groups and elites” to “stand together and struggle for a shared destiny, as remaining a bystander leads to sequential attacks and destruction.”

More provocatively, AFNM extends its solidarity regionally: “Abiy is the sharp horn of the Horn of Africa, piercing everyone, drawing blood from all, and trampling the homes of the region’s peoples with both hands and feet. For this reason, removing the genocidal Abiy Ahmed regime requires cooperation not only among Ethiopians but also among regional forces. All collaborations aimed at removing this regime and stabilising the region are fully legitimate.”

Read carefully, this passage pre-emptively legitimises precisely the external cooperation Dr Dagnachew accuses them of pursuing. “All collaborations” for regime removal are “fully legitimate” including, presumably, with Eritrea, Egypt, or any regional actor sharing the objective. Whether this reflects existing arrangements or creates political cover for future ones, it demonstrates political sophistication belying the “foreign puppet” narrative.

The message to the international community is equally telling. AFNM calls for ending “support to the anti-people and anti-peace Prosperity regime” whilst applying “necessary pressure to deprive the regime of its destructive capacity.” They request support for “cooperation among Fano and other anti-regime struggle forces” and humanitarian access.

This is the language of a political movement positioning itself as government-in-waiting, not an insurgent group seeking negotiated settlement. The statement nowhere offers compromise, nowhere acknowledges government legitimacy, nowhere proposes power-sharing. The objective, stated plainly, is regime removal.

Governance potential: If the movement genuinely controls substantial territory, their claim of 75% of the Amhara region is unverified but not implausible given government forces’ concentration in urban centres, it requires administrative structures beyond military command. A politburo with designated portfolios provides the institutional foundation for nascent governance, however rudimentary.

These are not trivial developments. They represent the maturation of what began as spontaneous local defence militias into something approaching a conventional armed movement with political structures. That this occurred through Ethiopian agency, drawing on Ethiopia’s own historical examples (the Reyot discussion explicitly references the Quara Covenant’s symbolism, invoking Emperor Tewodros II’s unification struggles), should command respect rather than dismissal.

Deconstructing Dr Dagnachew’s Conspiracy Theory

Dr Dagnachew Assefa’s 26th January Andafta interview represents a genre increasingly common in Ethiopian political discourse: the unfalsifiable conspiracy theory dressed in academic credentials. His central claim, that Zemene Kassie’s prominence results from coordination between Eritrea, Egypt, and the TPLF warrants detailed examination.

The evidentiary vacuum:

Dr. Dagnachew offers zero documentation for this grand conspiracy he’s busy stitching together. No intercepted calls, no shadowy bank transfers, no trembling witnesses, not even a misplaced diplomatic Post-it note. Instead, he serves us a buffet of “must be,” “had to,” and “surely”the academic equivalent of seasoning thin soup with wishful thinking.

According to him, Fano “had to” rely on Shabiya for logistics, Egypt “must be” wiring the cash, and TPLF somehow “benefits from” Fano’s actions. These aren’t facts; they’re hypotheses dressed up in borrowed authority, strutting around like they own the place.

And then, because every weak argument needs a celebrity cameo, he starts dropping names like the former deputy PM, all while clacking his bargain-bin denture like a metronome of insecurity. You can practically hear the click-click as he rushes to reinvent and redraft his flimsy narrative, popping that denture back into place every time it threatens to escape mid-sentence. The poor thing is working harder than his evidence.

The logical incoherence: Why would the TPLF, which lost territory and political dominance partly due to Amhara mobilisation during the Tigray war, now support an armed Amhara movement? Dr Dagnachew’s answer that TPLF seeks to destabilise the federal government, ignores that TPLF has returned to participation in federal politics, holding ministerial positions and pursuing its interests through constitutional channels. Supporting Fano would undermine this strategy whilst risking renewed conflict on TPLF’s southern border.

Similarly, whilst Eritrea has historical grievances with Ethiopia and Egypt has Nile disputes, the notion that these states would coordinate with TPLF Eritrea’s bitter enemy during the Tigray war strains credulity. Dr Dagnachew asks us to believe that three actors with fundamentally opposed interests have formed an alliance whose sole purpose is elevating Zemene Kassie. This is not geopolitical analysis; it is fantasy.

The denial of agency: Most pernicious is the framework’s complete denial of Ethiopian, specifically Amhara, agency. In Dr Dagnachew’s narrative, Amhara cannot organise politically except through foreign manipulation. They cannot unite except through external pressure. They cannot resist government policies except as proxies. This Orientalist perspective presenting Ethiopians as passive objects of external forces rather than subjects of their own history, is intellectually bankrupt.

The “just war” sophistry: Dr Dagnachew invokes just war theory to argue Fano’s struggle has become illegitimate because it now pursues “regime change” rather than self-defence. This argument would carry more weight if the Ethiopian government had not spent 22 months:

• Conducting drone strikes on civilian gatherings (East Gojjam, 17th April 2025: 100+ killed at a primary school)
• Massacring civilians during house-to-house searches (Merawi, 30th January 2024: 89 dead; Birakat, 31st March 2025: 40+ dead)
• Implementing mass arrests based on ethnicity (thousands detained in Addis Ababa)
• Maintaining telecommunications blackouts preventing documentation of abuses
• Refusing all dialogue whilst insisting Fano is too fragmented to negotiate

When a government conducts systematic atrocities against an ethnic population whilst refusing political engagement, what precisely is the “just” response? Continued submission? Dr Dagnachew’s just war framework holds insurgents to standards he conspicuously avoids applying to state forces.

The Welkait canard: His claim that attributing Welkait’s capture to Fano “plays into TPLF narratives” is particularly revealing. Welkait, administratively part of Tigray but demographically mixed and historically contested, was indeed taken from TPLF control during the Tigray war but by whom? Federal forces certainly participated, but so did Amhara regional forces and local militias. Dr Dagnachew’s insistence that only federal and regional special forces deserve credit erases the role of irregular forces, essentially demanding that Fano write themselves out of their own history to avoid offending TPLF sensibilities. Why should Amhara fighters who participated in Welkait’s capture deny their role to accommodate TPLF propaganda? The absurdity is self-evident.

The Territorial Expansion Question: Real Grievances, Cynical Exploitation

The Consortium of Ethiopian Civil Associations’ (CECA) March 2025 statement about Oromo territorial expansion, particularly following the February OLF-OFC Elilly Hotel meeting, touches genuine issues whilst drawing questionable conclusions.

The OLF-OFC joint statement did indeed demand recognition of Addis Ababa (Finfinnee) as Oromia’s capital and claimed territories including Wollo, Metekel, Dire Dawa, Moyale, and Harar. These demands rest on contested historical narratives about pre-existing Oromo settlement patterns versus administrative boundaries imposed under previous regimes.

The legitimate concern: When such demands are articulated whilst Amhara civilians face documented atrocities, the timing appears deliberately provocative. Whether intended or not, it reinforces Amhara perceptions of coordinated assault military operations by government forces combined with territorial claims by Oromo political organisations. CECA’s alarm is comprehensible.

The dishonest framing: CECA characterises this as a “Prosperity Party-led Oromummaa project” involving “hatred, separation, and expansion,” suggesting government orchestration. Yet the evidence for government initiation is thin. The OLF and OFC are opposition parties; their maximalist territorial claims likely reflect internal political positioning rather than government coordination. Indeed, such demands complicate rather than assist government strategy by inflaming ethnic tensions.

Moreover, CECA’s invocation of “Orthodox Christian unity” (የተዋሕዶ) alongside territorial integrity reveals its own ethnic-religious particularism. Why should Orthodox Christianity be relevant to territorial disputes in a constitutionally secular state? This framing excludes Ethiopia’s Muslims (approximately 34% of the population), Protestants, and traditional religionists from the imagined political community CECA claims to represent.

The deeper problem: Ethiopia’s ethnic federal system has structurally incentivised zero-sum territorial competition. When political power, resource allocation, and cultural recognition all flow through ethnically-defined regional states, boundary disputes become existential rather than administrative. The constitution provides no clear mechanism for resolving these disputes beyond potentially violent referenda.

Both Oromo maximalist claims (Addis Ababa as Oromia’s capital) and Amhara maximalist claims (Welkait as eternally Amhara) rest on selective historical narratives that ignore centuries of population mixing, administrative changes, and demographic shifts. There is no neutral historical baseline to which Ethiopia can “return” only competing visions of which historical moment should be privileged.

This doesn’t mean all territorial claims are equally valid or that violence is inevitable. It means the constitutional framework itself requires fundamental reform precisely what CECA gestures towards in demanding a “new democratic constitutional order.” Yet CECA undermines this potentially productive call by framing it through explicitly Amhara-Orthodox particularism rather than genuinely pluralist principles.

What the Government Should Do (But Won’t)

The AFNM unification creates a genuine opportunity for political settlement, if the government possessed the wisdom to seize it:

Immediate confidence-building measures:

• Declare a unilateral 30-day ceasefire
• Release political prisoners, particularly high-profile detainees like Christian Tadele and Yohannes Buayalew.
• Restore telecommunications in conflict zones to allow documentation and communication
• Permit international humanitarian access to assess civilian conditions
• Establish an independent commission to investigate atrocities by all parties

Structured dialogue framework:

• Acknowledge AFNM as a legitimate interlocutor for negotiations
• Establish a neutral mediation structure, potentially involving African Union facilitation
• Develop a clear negotiating agenda addressing security sector reform, regional autonomy, constitutional amendments, and transitional justice
• Set realistic timelines with measurable milestones

Constitutional reform process:

• Initiate broad national dialogue on ethnic federalism’s future
• Consider models from other multi-ethnic federations (Switzerland, Belgium, Canada) that don’t rely on strict territorial ethnic separation
• Develop mechanisms for resolving boundary disputes without violence
• Strengthen federal institutions to provide arenas for interethnic cooperation

None of this will happen. The government’s response will likely follow predictable patterns: dismiss AFNM’s legitimacy using conspiracy theories about foreign manipulation; continue military operations whilst claiming to seek peace; make tactical concessions without strategic shifts; and hope that internal AFNM divisions will eventually re-emerge, allowing a return to the “too fragmented to negotiate” excuse.

This approach has two problems: it’s not working militarily, and it’s destroying the country politically.

The Military Stalemate Nobody Acknowledges

After 22 months of conflict, the military situation has reached equilibrium though AFNM insists the conflict has actually lasted “30 months” (counting from April 2023), suggesting their timeline includes earlier confrontations before the April 2023 state of emergency. Neither side admits stalemate:

Government forces control major urban centres, main highways, and critical infrastructure. They possess overwhelming advantages in heavy weaponry, air power, and logistics. Yet they cannot pacify the countryside, cannot prevent AFNM operations, and cannot restore civilian administration outside fortified positions. The September 2025 operations around Woldiya, Mekane Selam, and Gashena whether fully successful or partially exaggerated demonstrate that AFNM can still mount significant operations despite sustained government military pressure.

AFNM forces apparently control substantial rural territory (their claim that the regime is “reduced to a mere insurgent confined to Arat Kilo” is hyperbolic, but government territorial control is clearly limited), can operate across multiple zones, and maintain popular support sufficient to sustain operations. Their appeal to “uniformed forces and militias” reveals strategic thinking: “It is no secret to you that the regime’s source of power is not the people, but the blood of uniformed forces. Nor is it hidden from you that, for as long as the regime prolongs its grip on power, it has no regard for your lives…Understanding that your death is not for your country but for a regime that cannot be satisfied without human blood; we call on you to join the Fano struggle.”

This is sophisticated psychological warfare targeting the Ethiopian National Defence Force’s (ENDF) morale suggesting AFNM recognises it cannot defeat the ENDF militarily but might undermine it politically. Yet AFNM has not captured major cities, cannot hold territory against determined government assaults, and shows no capacity to march on Addis Ababa. Their strategy appears to be creating ungovernable space whilst waiting for political opportunities, a classic insurgent approach but one that implies protracted conflict rather than imminent victory.

This is the definition of stalemate. Neither side can achieve decisive military victory, yet both continue pursuing military solutions. The result is accumulating civilian suffering without strategic progress:

• Documented civilian deaths: Hundreds in specific incidents (Merawi 89, East Gojjam 100+, Birakat 40+), likely thousands overall
• Displacement: Tens of thousands from conflict zones
• Economic disruption: Agricultural production disrupted, markets closed, investment fled
• Humanitarian crisis: Limited access for aid organisations, potential famine conditions
• Generational trauma: Children witnessing atrocities, families fractured, communities destroyed

Dr Dagnachew’s just war question about proportionality should be directed not only at Fano but at the government prosecuting this unwinnable conflict. What political objective justifies drone-striking a primary school? What strategic necessity requires massacring civilians in house-to-house searches? What national interest is served by maintaining a stalemate that bleeds the country whilst foreclosing political solutions?

The International Dimension: Rhetoric versus Reality

Both AFNM statements and government-aligned narratives invoke international actors, though with opposite valuations:

AFNM’s claims: The movement accuses the government of coordinating with the UAE for drone strikes and receiving support from regional actors opposed to Amhara interests. The UAE connection is plausible, the country has sold military drones to Ethiopia and maintains significant economic investments. Whether this constitutes active “coordination” for anti-Amhara operations or simply arms sales to a recognised government is debatable.

Government claims: As articulated by Dr Dagnachew and others, Fano is supposedly coordinated with Eritrea, Egypt, and TPLF. We’ve addressed the evidentiary and logical problems with this narrative. Eritrea and Egypt certainly have interests in Ethiopian instability, Eritrea due to border disputes and authoritarianism’s fear of Ethiopian democratisation; Egypt due to Nile water concerns. Whether these interests translate into active Fano support is unproven.

The actual international position: External actors the African Union, United States, European Union, neighbouring states have shown limited engagement with Ethiopia’s internal conflicts post-Tigray war. The November 2022 Pretoria Agreement ending the Tigray conflict consumed enormous diplomatic capital; international appetite for mediating another Ethiopian civil war appears limited.

Interestingly, AFNM’s unity process itself involved external observers, though Ethiopian rather than international. The statement thanks “the observers’ team, comprising seven members, including Ambassador Birhane Meskel Nega and Major Dawit Wolde-Giyorgis, led by His Highness Asfawossen Asrate Kassa, for following the process impartially and for providing solutions whenever requested by the technical committee.”

The inclusion of Asfawossen Asrate Kassa first cousin of Emperor Haile Selassie and claimant to the defunct imperial throne, is symbolically loaded. It signals AFNM’s conscious connection to pre-revolutionary Ethiopian state traditions, positioning the movement within a narrative of historical continuity rather than revolutionary rupture. Whether this reflects genuine monarchist sympathies or tactical use of traditional legitimacy symbols, it demonstrates political sophistication in deploying cultural capital.

The 2026 elections present a potential inflection point, but early indications suggest international observers will be restricted (per CECA’s warnings about new civil society legislation) and legitimacy will be contested regardless of results.

Dr. Dagnachew, who now parades around calling himself Fitawrari as though he’s auditioning for a historical drama no one asked for, treats geopolitics like a village gossip session conducted under a flickering lightbulb. He invokes President Trump’s description of Ethiopia’s premier as a “strong man,” blissfully unaware that in American political snob-speak this is a polite way of saying “dictator” without having to commit to the word. But nuance has never been Dr. Dagnachew’s strong suit; he handles nuance the way a toddler handles a crystal vase.

He then drags the Trump administration’s past rhetoric on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam into his argument, as if name-dropping global powers will magically inflate the credibility of his claims. Trump’s off‑the‑cuff remark that Egypt might “blow up” the dam caused widespread alarm, even though his administration’s actual policies were far less dramatic. But in Dr. Dagnachew’s retelling, this becomes a prophetic omen, a coded message, a geopolitical horoscope anything except what it actually was: Trump being Trump.

He goes on to warn that a second Trump administration, sworn in on 20 January 2025, could pressure Ethiopia over the Nile, perhaps leaning toward Egyptian interests. Fair enough; that’s within the realm of diplomatic possibility. But then he leaps from “could apply diplomatic or economic pressure” to “might be secretly arming insurgencies,” as though international relations operate on the same logic as his YouTube comment section.

This is where the idiocracy reaches its peak. Dr. Dagnachew treats speculation as scripture, inference as evidence, and his own imagination as a classified intelligence briefing. He delivers these pronouncements with the solemnity of a man convinced he’s unveiling state secrets, even as his arguments wobble like his self-proclaimed title and his sense of historical proportion.

In the end, his analysis isn’t analysis at all, it’s cosplay. A man playing Fitawrari with cardboard epaulettes, waving around geopolitical hypotheticals like plastic swords, hoping no one notices that the emperor of evidence has no clothes.

The reality: International actors are unlikely to resolve Ethiopia’s conflicts. The solutions, if they come, will be Ethiopian. This makes the domestic political stalemate, where government refuses dialogue and opposition pursues maximalist demands more dangerous. Without external pressure for compromise, internal dynamics tend toward escalation.

Conclusion: Unification as Ultimatum, Not Invitation

The formation of the AFNM should force a reckoning in Ethiopian political discourse. For 22 months, the government has hidden behind Fano’s fragmentation to avoid negotiations. That excuse is gone. Yet the movement’s 17th January statement reveals why the government might hesitate to engage: AFNM isn’t offering negotiation, it’s demanding capitulation.

The statement’s message to national struggle forces makes this explicit: the necessity is “shifting from resisting a genocidal war to strategic offensive action, in order to remove the regime.” Not reform the regime, not negotiate with the regime, not power-share with the regime remove the regime. The strategic objective is stated plainly throughout: “eliminating this peoples, national, and regional danger” by deposing Abiy Ahmed’s government.

This maximalism creates a paradox. AFNM has structured itself precisely as the unified interlocutor the government claimed to want. It has designated foreign affairs leadership (Brook Shileshi), established clear command hierarchy, and articulated political objectives beyond military operations. Yet those political objectives include regime change making genuine negotiation nearly impossible under standard frameworks where governments don’t negotiate their own dissolution.

Dr Dagnachew’s conspiracy theories represent one dishonest response to this reality: denying AFNM’s legitimacy through unfalsifiable claims of foreign manipulation. But the government’s likely alternative continuing military operations whilst claiming to seek peace is equally dishonest. Both approaches foreclose the difficult political work Ethiopia actually needs.

What that work entails: Acknowledging that AFNM represents genuine Amhara grievances whilst recognising that regime removal via armed struggle will likely fail militarily but succeed in destroying what remains of the Ethiopian state. The Ethiopian National Defence Force, despite losses, retains superiority in conventional capabilities; AFNM cannot march on Addis Ababa and hold it. Yet the government cannot pacify the Amhara countryside or restore functional administration. The result is indefinite low-intensity warfare, precisely the outcome both sides claim to oppose.

The path not taken would require:

For AFNM: Moderating from regime removal to genuine power-sharing demands. Articulating specific constitutional reforms, security sector arrangements, and accountability mechanisms that would address Amhara grievances without requiring government dissolution. Acknowledging that pan-Ethiopian liberation rhetoric, whilst politically useful, overstates their actual support base beyond Amhara areas.

For the government: Acknowledging AFNM as a legitimate political actor representing genuine grievances rather than dismissing them as foreign puppets. Opening negotiations without demanding prior disarmament. Accepting that ethnic federal arrangements have failed Amhara (and others) and require fundamental reform rather than military enforcement. Most critically, accepting accountability for documented atrocities the drone strikes, massacres, and mass arrests that transformed localised resistance into sustained insurgency.

For both sides: Recognising that their maximalist positions, regime removal versus insurgent destruction, cannot be achieved militarily and that continued pursuit guarantees accumulating civilian suffering without strategic progress.

None of this will happen. AFNM’s statement reveals a movement convinced of impending victory, appealing to uniformed forces to defect and calling international actors to abandon the government. The government, for its part, shows no inclination toward political compromise, having spent 22 months pursuing military solutions that demonstrably haven’t worked.

The Reyot Media discussion, whatever its own biases, at least treats Fano as a genuine political phenomenon worthy of analysis rather than a foreign puppet show. It examines internal dynamics, strategic calculations, and leadership decisions as products of Ethiopian political processes. This is the minimum standard for productive discourse.

Yet even Reyot’s enthusiastic coverage missed the implications of AFNM’s maximalist framing. The movement hasn’t created an interlocutor for negotiations; it has created a more efficient vehicle for prosecuting regime removal. Whether one applauds or deplores this depends on one’s assessment of the Abiy Ahmed government’s legitimacy. What should be undeniable is that this makes political settlement of the power-sharing, constitutional reform, transitional justice variety far more difficult.

Ethiopia cannot afford continued intellectual dishonesty from either side. The country faces genuine challenges: ethnic federal contradictions, territorial disputes, security sector reform, economic crisis, and regional instability. None of these can be addressed whilst government supporters deny AFNM legitimacy through conspiracy theories and AFNM pursues regime change through military means.

The AFNM exists. It has structure, leadership, popular support, and military capacity. It also has maximalist political objectives that cannot be achieved through armed struggle alone. Whether the government engages with this reality or continues fantasies about Eritrea, Egypt, and TPLF pulling strings will determine whether Ethiopia stumbles toward eventual political settlement or slides further into state collapse.

The choice should be obvious. That it apparently isn’t, that both sides prefer their respective myths to the difficult work of compromise, tells you everything about Ethiopia’s current political bankruptcy. AFNM’s unification hasn’t opened a pathway to peace. It has consolidated the forces prosecuting war more effectively. Until both sides recognise this, congratulations are premature.

E. Frashie is a columnist for the Ethiopian Tribune specialising in conflict analysis and political economy. The views expressed are his own.

About Post Author

Ethiopian Tribune editor

editor@ethiopiantribune.com

https://ethiopiantribune.com

Happy

0 0 %

Sad

0 0 %

Excited

0 0 %

Sleepy

0 0 %

Angry

0 0 %

Surprise

0 0 %

A Dialogue Between Two Minds

By Ms Leeshan Kuratey, Ethiopian Tribune Columnist

In an Ethiopian coffee house just off Bole Road, the air carries the familiar rich scent of roasted beans, mixed with the faint diesel fumes from the traffic outside. The jebena has been refilled twice already this morning. Two old men sit across from one another, not as adversaries in conflict, at least not today, but as companions in a long intellectual journey.

They are Dr Bira Hodu and Professor Akalu Merew. Though both are septuagenarians, their conversations are lively, sometimes acerbic, always thoughtful. What they share today is not just coffee but a deeper attempt to understand Ethiopia’s evolving strategic position a nation with growing aerial capabilities, deep internal fissures, and an enduring aspiration to regain access to the sea.

I. Two Men and a Question of Power

Dr Bira Hodu, an Oromo activist in his early seventies, has been an ardent voice in diasporic Oromummaa circles. In earlier conferences across Europe and North America, he argued passionately for the dismantling of the Ethiopian state in order to invent an independent Oromia. These days, he is a devoted supporter of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed. His social media accounts are awash with government videos, patriotic manifestos, and paeans to Ethiopia’s rising military capabilities.

Professor Akalu Merew , Amhara by ethnicity but cosmopolitan in outlook, is a retired economist. He served as a consultant to the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the United Nations over several decades. He supports a modern, democratic Ethiopia where all ethnic groups, including Amharas, are treated as full citizens, not villains in a teleological narrative of oppression.

Today, their conversation part dialogue, part intellectual sparring revolves around a set of strategic questions:

What does it mean for Ethiopia to pursue air dominance? How do external powers exploit states that hold such dominance without internal consensus? And crucially, what happens when a landlocked nation aspires to reach the sea?

II. Deterrence, Hegemony, and the Sky Above

Bira stirs his coffee, eyes gleaming with the certainty that has characterised his recent writings.

“Look at us now,” he says with unrestrained pride. “Ethiopia controls its airspace. Drones, satellites, advanced aircraft, we are no longer begging. No longer passive. We are powerful.”

Professor Akalu leans back, hands folded. There is a moment’s pause a pause born not of disagreement but of depth of thought.

“Air dominance,” Akalu begins gently, “is not, in itself, a guarantee of stability. It is a capability. What transforms it into strategy is how it is embedded in politics and consensus.”

Bira’s response is immediate, confident: “Deterrence. Simple as that. No one will dare attack us.”

But Akalu’s point is more nuanced. “Deterrence assumes symmetry,” he replies. “It assumes there is a rival with enough capability to pose a threat. Yet, look around our region. Eritrea, fractured; Somalia, fragile; Sudan, fractured; Kenya, cautious. When one state dominates the skies across a region without peer competitors, others stop asking, ‘Will you strike us?’ and start asking, ‘What will you permit?’”

In other words, air dominance has the potential to become not merely deterrence but hegemony, a structural condition where Ethiopia becomes the default reference point for regional security calculations.

Bira, in characteristic fashion, counters that this is precisely the point: a strong Ethiopia that imposes no mischief but commands respect. But Akalu sees what Bira does not yet concede: strength in the sky does not automatically translate to political coherence on the ground. The key difference lies between vertical power (force from above) and horizontal consensus (consent from within).

III. Power Before Unity: The Fragile Architecture

The conversation deepens as the jebena is refilled yet again. Akalu gently presses his point.

“Vertical power, air dominance, is seductive,” he says. “It feels decisive, clean, controlled. But political legitimacy grows sideways through shared consent, mutual recognition, social contracts. When you build dominance in the air before you build unity across your society, you create a fragile structure: powerful externally but brittle internally.”

He goes on, without rancour, to expand the idea: “A state that expands its aerial capabilities without settling its internal political differences creates not deterrence, but suspended conflict. It freezes contestation without resolving it.”

Bira listens, and for the first time in their discussion, his expression softens rather than defends. “You speak as if strength is the problem.”

“No,” Akalu replies, looking into the dark coffee. “Strength without restraint is the problem and restraint is not technical, it is political.”

The distinction matters. Ethiopia’s pursuit of drones, satellites, and advanced aircraft could place it on par with mid-tier global powers in terms of technology. But technology does not reconcile narratives; it does not mend historical grievances. It does not solve issues of identity, memory, or legitimacy. In fact, without political consensus, these technologies can magnify grievances rather than diminish them.

IV. The Sea Aspiration: Renewal or Risk?

Bira brightens. The subject shifts to Ethiopia’s enduring aspiration to regain access to the sea an aspiration older than either man.

“All this talk is academic,” he says, leaning forward. “The real issue is the sea. Ethiopia must regain access. It is not just economic it is historical and existential. We were a maritime civilisation once. Why should we be landlocked forever?”

Akalu nods. “I agree on the importance of sea access. But I disagree on the timing.”

This is where their conversation becomes especially rich and complex.

Bira sees urgency in sea access as a strategic imperative: to reduce dependence on neighbours’ ports; to lower trade costs; to assert Ethiopia’s rightful place in East African commerce. The logic sounds compelling: a strong Ethiopian state should control its destiny, including access to the sea.

Akalu, however, warns of a geopolitical and strategic paradox: urgency is the most exploitable weakness in international relations.

V. Urgency as Leverage: A Quiet Mechanism of Power

“Ethiopia’s need for sea access,” Akalu explains carefully, “is well understood internationally. But international actors do not care about Ethiopia’s urgency in the same way Ethiopia does. When a state signals it cannot wait, it invites mediation, brokerage, and, ultimately, leverage.”

Here he outlines a pattern that has recurred throughout history: states that exhibit urgency in securing strategic goals whether territorial, economic, or military often do so at the cost of sovereignty over the terms of those goals.

In diplomatic terms, Akalu says, this is called asymmetric need. The Ethiopian state needs sea access more than any external power needs Ethiopia to have it. This asymmetry creates leverage for the latter. Rather than imposing terms directly, external powers offer facilitated access with conditions attached. These conditions can range from port management arrangements to security guarantees and intelligence-sharing frameworks.

“It is not that others are hostile,” Akalu continues. “They are not. But they are not neutral either. Every facilitator expects something in return.”

Bira’s initial discomfort at this observation gives way to contemplation. He had assumed that Ethiopia’s growing aerial capabilities would strengthen its negotiating position for maritime access. Akalu suggests the opposite: air dominance raises regional anxiety, and anxiety invites external management.

Suddenly, the sea once a symbol of sovereign aspiration feels more like a diplomatic minefield.

VI. Maritime Access: Pathways and Their Consequences

Akalu outlines three general pathways Ethiopia might pursue to gain maritime access, and the strategic implications of each:

1. Multilateral, Regional, Rules‑Based Access

In this pathway, Ethiopia negotiates access through regional agreements that are open, inclusive, and governed by treaty. The purpose is to avoid exclusive deals with any single power, and to emphasise cooperation among neighbours.

Advantages:

Preserves greater autonomy Encourages shared ownership of outcomes Reduces the risk of dependency on a single external actor

Challenges:

Requires time and deep political negotiation Depends on internal consolidation before external engagement May delay tangible access but strengthens sovereignty

2. Facilitated Access via a Great‑Power Broker

This involves negotiating a port lease or security arrangement with the assistance of a major power for example, the United States, China, or a coalition thereof. The facilitator acts as a guarantor of stability and may provide military backing.

Advantages:

Faster access Security backing Large investment potential

Risks:

Access becomes tied to the strategic interests of the broker Sovereignty over port usage may be compromised Ethiopia’s foreign policy flexibility could be constrained

3. Coercive or Quasi‑Coercive Drift

Here, Ethiopia’s urgency, combined with regional competition, leads to a situation where neighbours and external powers impose solutions that suit their own interests and Ethiopia is left with minimal say in the terms.

Outcomes:

Loss of strategic autonomy Port access under foreign control or heavy influence Erosion of sovereignty over time

Akalu stresses that urgency is the trigger that moves a situation from voluntary cooperation (Pathway 1) to managed or mediated access (Pathways 2 and 3). The more Ethiopia signals that it must have access immediately, the more external parties believe they can and should shape the terms.

VII. The Interaction of Air Power and Maritime Ambition

What makes this particularly complex and consequential is the interaction between Ethiopia’s aerial ambitions and its maritime aspirations.

Air dominance gives a state the illusion of freedom of action. The skies, whether through drones, satellites, or advanced fighters, feel like a domain that belongs to the state itself. It is sovereign space.

But control of airspace does not insulate a landlocked state from strategic dependencies. The sea and access to it, is governed by different physics: geography, logistics, and regional dynamics. These domains cannot be conquered; they must be negotiated.

Akalu puts it simply:

“Air power scares neighbours. Maritime dependence invites management.”

It is one thing to deter a hypothetical military threat from above. It is another to walk a diplomatic tightrope between neighbours, external powers, and economic imperatives to secure a port that functions on Ethiopia’s terms.

Moreover, urgency exacerbates this tension: while air power can be showcased and argued as deterrent or stabilising, the need for the sea is tangible, measurable, and time‑sensitive. External actors capitalise on that urgency.

VIII. Internal Consensus as a Pillar of Sovereignty

Bira listens intently as Akalu moves into what feels like the core of his argument: internal political consensus is the anchor on which all external negotiating power ultimately rests.

“The greatest vulnerability in Ethiopian strategy,” Akalu asserts, “is not air dominance, nor landlocked geography. It is political incompleteness.”

By this he means:

Deep unresolved divisions between ethnic groups Narratives that reduce complex histories into simple culprits and victims Weak mutual trust among communities Centralised governance that has yet to build robust democratic legitimacy

Without such consensus, external powers do not see a unified partner; they see a set of interests that can be balanced against each other.

“In diplomacy,” Akalu explains, “others do not negotiate with potential. They negotiate with certainty. They do not trust a state they believe cannot trust itself.”

For Bira, who has spent much of his life critiquing the Ethiopian state as oppressive and illiberal, especially towards Oromo communities,this is a challenging idea. His journey from advocating state dismantlement to supporting the current government is personal as well as ideological. But Akalu’s argument is structural, not tribal: a state that lacks internal consensus is vulnerable to external influence, regardless of its ethnic composition.

Importantly, Akalu also rejects narratives that vilify any one ethnic group as the singular source of oppression. He insists that Ethiopia’s future depends on integrating identities, not extracting blame. This idea resonates less forcefully with Bira at first, but over the course of their conversation, it becomes harder for him to dismiss.

IX. Ethiopia at the Crossroads: Sovereignty, Access, and Patience

Akalu’s final point, the most sobering , is that sovereignty cannot be rushed. It must be earned, not demanded. This is not a call to delay progress indefinitely, but rather to sequence strategy intelligently.

He offers a final framing:

Consolidate internal political consensus Build trust across regions and identities Strengthen democratic institutions Clarify how power is shared and defended Build economic alternatives Enhance land‑based trade corridors Strengthen internal infrastructure Reduce reliance on single routes Negotiate maritime access from confidence, not desperation Avoid signalling urgency Use internal resilience as leverage Engage neighbours in transparent frameworks

This sequence, Akalu argues, transforms Ethiopia into a state that is prepared, not pressured. Prepared states shape terms. Pressured states accept them.

Bira, for all his habitual confidence, admits this challenges his assumptions. There is a moment of real reflection, not defensiveness, as he considers the possibility that Ethiopia’s strength is not simply a matter of technology or symbolic assertion, but of patience and strategic timing.

X. The Silence After Words

The jebena is empty for the final time. Outside, Addis Ababa continues its restless rhythm, indifferent to the high ideas discussed within the coffee house.

Bira and Akalu rise from their seats. They have debated aerial dominance, maritime aspiration, urgency as leverage, and the necessity of internal consensus without rancour, without simplification.

As they depart in opposite directions into the bustle of the city, their conversation lingers in the air like the last wisp of coffee smoke: Ethiopia stands between the sky and the sea, and its future belongs not to those who shout the loudest, but to those who understand time, patience, and the art of negotiation.

Epilogue: Strategy Before Sovereignty

In Ethiopian politics and, indeed, in the politics of most states with complex internal identities the rush to assert power too quickly often precedes the very thing it seeks to secure.

The central insight of this dialogue is not pessimistic; it is structural:

Power without consent is brittle; urgency without resilience invites leverage.

Air power can deter external foes.

Maritime access can transform economies.

But internal consensus a shared sense of belonging, legitimate governance, and mutual trust is the only foundation on which true sovereignty can be built.

Ms Leeshan Kuratey, is Investigative Journalist, Writer, and Poet. The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author, Ms. Leeshan Kuratey, and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of any publication, organisation, or institution. This piece is a work of political commentary, intended to provoke thought and dialogue regarding contemporary Ethiopian politics and diplomacy. 

About Post Author

Ethiopian Tribune editor

editor@ethiopiantribune.com

https://ethiopiantribune.com

Happy

0 0 %

Sad

0 0 %

Excited

0 0 %

Sleepy

0 0 %

Angry

0 0 %

Surprise

0 0 %

YJ’s “Shaka Shaka” Is Diaspora Rap’s Defining Moment and a Call to Action

By Ethiopian Tribune | October 1, 2025

In a music industry often driven by spectacle and short-lived virality, “Shaka Shaka” by YJ (Yeabsra Justice) arrives as something deeper, a lyrical reckoning wrapped in rhythm and draped in heritage. The official music video, now streaming on YouTube, is a must-watch. Not just for its sonic polish or visual flair, but for the moment it captures: YJ, walking through London’s streets, proudly wearing the Ethiopian flag. It’s not a costume. It’s a covenant. Green, gold, and red wrapped around his shoulders like a birthright.

Born at just 26 weeks premature in Barnet Hospital, YJ’s life began with uncertainty. His father, Mr. Aynalem Mebratu, a respected electrical engineer and pillar of the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church (EOTC) community in London recalls the three-month hospital stay and the fragile hope that defined those early days. His mother, described as a “strong mom,” nurtured him through it all. Diagnosed with autism from birth, YJ now calls his condition a “superpower” a source of tenacity, vision, and creative fire. Raised in Enfield, his family remained in the UK for years due to ongoing medical needs, delaying Mr. Aynalem’s return to Ethiopia.

But while YJ was growing into his voice, his father was building foundations literally. Mr. Aynalem has been instrumental in organizing fundraising efforts for two major EOTC churches in London: Debretsion of St Mary and Debre-Genet Holy Trinity. Both buildings are now owned by the EOTC Synod, thanks to the tireless work of community leaders like him. His dedication to faith, heritage, and collective uplift is now mirrored in his son’s artistic rise. The reward is generational: spiritual legacy meets sonic legacy.

YJ began making music in 2019 at Wesley, a special school, treating it as a hobby. But a talent show performance at Leicester Square rough, raw, and unexpectedly viral changed everything. Instead of retreating, YJ leaned in. Artists like KSI reached out. The internet didn’t break him. It built him.

His breakout single “No Diddy”, released in August 2024, was born from emotional urgency and strategic beat selection. It led to performances at London’s O2 Arena-twice. YJ credits his stage comfort to childhood acting, including Shakespeare plays like Romeo and Juliet and The Tempest. His father shares that YJ spends up to 16 hours a day immersed in music and fan feedback. This isn’t a hobby anymore. It’s a calling.

Managed by Unexpected Media a team that first defended him from online bullying and includes a manager with low-functioning autism, YJ’s career is built on empathy, structure, and resilience. He’s not chasing fame. He’s building demand, carefully avoiding exploitation. Negative comments don’t faze him. He turns discomfort into humor, overthinking into art.

“Shaka Shaka”, released in late September 2025, is his latest and most personal offering. The lyrics are a tapestry of self-reliance, emotional reflection, and quiet defiance. “I survive all alone and I had to grab the bag on my own,” he raps, distilling years of struggle into a single line. He speaks of betrayal “I really can’t believe that she lied” and loneliness: “Sometimes I cry alone, sometimes I smile alone and go solo.” There’s healing too, through music and metaphor: “Let me feel it while I’m healing, let me feel the effects of the drink I’m sipping on.” And there’s self-worth, quietly asserted: “I don’t need to seek the attention I already got from my friends and my lover.”

Last year, YJ appeared on EBS’s Seyfu Show, and has since been featured across multiple online platforms, building a loyal fanbase among Ethiopian Gen Z and diaspora youth. His music is loved, shared, and quoted. He’s not just known he’s cherished.

And now, the moment demands more. Shaka Shaka isn’t just a release it’s a rallying cry. Ethiopian artists, producers, and performers especially those in the diaspora are called to stand up against autism and disability discrimination. Collaboration isn’t just creative it’s political. By working with artists like YJ, the community can build inclusive stages, amplify unheard voices, and create opportunities that reflect the full spectrum of Ethiopian talent.

This is a call to Kassmasse, whose lyrical militancy has shaped a generation. To Wogdawit, whose poetic fire burns through every verse. To Lij Michael, whose revolutionary cadence electrifies stages. And to Abel Tesfaye AKA “The Weeknd” whose global mystique proves that Ethiopian artistry knows no borders. YJ is not asking for validation. He’s offering a bridge.

At 21, YJ stands at a crossroads armed with streaming momentum, radio recognition, and a fiercely loyal digital community. His team says only “big things” lie ahead. The rest, they say, is “up to God.” But if “Shaka Shaka” is any indication, YJ isn’t just next, he’s necessary.

Watch the clip. Feel the rhythm. Read the flag. The future of diaspora rap is wrapped in it.

Artist Profile
Name: YJ (Yeabsra Justice)
Born: September 28, 2004
Base: Enfield / Barnet, London
Heritage: Ethiopian
Streaming Platforms: Spotify, Apple Music, YouTube
TikTok: @yeabsrajustice
Instagram: @yeabsrajustice
Snapchat: Yeppyjustice
Inquiries: yj@dlaworld.com
Management: Unexpected Media

Family Tribute:
Mr. Aynalem Mebratu, father of YJ, is a respected electrical engineer and community leader. He has played a key role in fundraising and securing permanent buildings for Debretsion of St Mary and Debre-Genet Holy Trinity Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Churches in London—both now owned by the EOTC Synod. His dedication to faith and community is reflected in his son’s rising artistic legacy.

About Post Author

Ethiopian Tribune editor

editor@ethiopiantribune.com

https://ethiopiantribune.com

Happy

1 20 %

Sad

0 0 %

Excited

4 80 %

Sleepy

0 0 %

Angry

0 0 %

Surprise

0 0 %

An Ethiopian Tribune Investigation

As Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed touches down in Brazil for the BRICS summit and holds meetings with Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, serious allegations have emerged in certain quarters comparing Ethiopia’s Nobel Peace Prize-winning leader to some of Africa’s most notorious dictators. These claims, which suggest the Prime Minister has been hoarding billions of dollars worth of gold in the United Arab Emirates, warrant careful examination through the lens of evidence, historical precedent, and geopolitical context.

The Nature of the Allegations

The accusations paint a stark picture: that PM Abiy Ahmed has been systematically transferring vast quantities of Ethiopian gold to the UAE as part of an elaborate “exit strategy,” reminiscent of tactics employed by Uganda’s Idi Amin Dada and Ethiopia’s own Mengistu Haile Mariam. These are not merely political accusations but allegations of grand theft on a scale that would dwarf most historical examples of kleptocracy.

To understand the gravity of these claims, one must first examine the broader context of Africa’s gold trade and the UAE’s role as a destination for both legitimate and illicit precious metals.

The UAE Gold Pipeline: A Regional Reality

The foundation upon which these allegations rest is not entirely without merit when viewed through the prism of regional gold trafficking patterns. According to comprehensive research by the Swiss NGO Swissaid, the scale of illicit gold movement from Africa to the UAE is staggering. Their June 2025 report revealed that over 400 tonnes of African gold, valued at approximately $30.7 billion, were smuggled out of Africa in 2022 alone, with the majority entering the UAE.

Even more concerning is the decade-long pattern: between 2012 and 2022, an estimated 2,569 tonnes of gold—worth roughly $115 billion—entered the UAE from Africa without corresponding export declarations from the originating countries. This represents a systematic failure of regulatory oversight that has created an environment where such illicit transfers could theoretically occur.

The UAE’s position as the leading recipient of illicit African gold is well-documented, with significant portions originating from artisanal and small-scale mining operations that often operate outside official channels. Despite stated commitments to combat money laundering and illicit trade, implementation of regulations has been notably lacking, with some UAE gold refineries facing suspensions for anti-money laundering violations.

Ethiopia’s Gold Boom: Reform or Ruse?

Against this backdrop, Ethiopia’s recent gold export surge presents a complex picture. The country has experienced a remarkable transformation in its official gold trade, with exports increasing from 4 tonnes to 37 tonnes year-on-year, raising revenues from $300 million to $3.5 billion. The Ministry of Mining reported that total revenue from mining exports reached $2.57 billion during the past ten months, with over 29,396 kilograms of gold delivered to the National Bank of Ethiopia.

This dramatic increase is attributed to macroeconomic reforms designed to narrow the gap between formal and black market forex prices, encouraging small-scale and traditional miners to sell gold directly to the National Bank. Officially, Ethiopia’s top gold export destinations include the UAE, Switzerland, and India, confirming that the UAE is indeed a legitimate destination for Ethiopian gold.

However, the question remains: does this surge in official exports mask more sinister activities, or does it represent genuine economic reform?

Historical Precedents: The Amin and Mengistu Playbook

To assess the likelihood of these allegations, one must examine the historical precedents of African leaders who have indeed engaged in systematic asset stripping.

Idi Amin Dada’s reign in Uganda (1971-1979) was characterised by economic destruction on a massive scale. Amin expelled the country’s entire Asian population, confiscated their businesses and properties, and systematically looted Uganda’s resources. His regime’s financial dealings were largely conducted through intermediaries and shell companies, with assets transferred to accounts in Switzerland and other financial havens. However, Amin’s looting was more opportunistic than systematic, and his methods were crude compared to the sophisticated allegations levelled against PM Abiy.

Mengistu Haile Mariam’s approach was more methodical. During his rule (1977-1991), the Derg systematically appropriated private property and resources under the guise of socialist transformation. When his regime faced collapse, Mengistu fled to Zimbabwe, where he has remained since 1991. However, investigations have never uncovered evidence of massive personal wealth accumulation comparable to the billions allegedly stashed by PM Abiy.

The Mitigating Factors

Several factors argue against the likelihood of PM Abiy engaging in such systematic looting:

The Nobel Factor: As the 2019 Nobel Peace Prize winner, PM Abiy operates under unprecedented international scrutiny. Notably, he has already deposited his Nobel Prize winnings, demonstrating a pattern of financial transparency that contradicts the secretive behaviour typical of kleptocratic leaders.

Reform Trajectory: Unlike Amin or Mengistu, who consolidated power through violence and authoritarian measures, PM Abiy initially came to power on a reform platform. His early initiatives included releasing political prisoners, allowing exiled opposition groups to return, and implementing economic liberalisation measures.

Institutional Constraints: Ethiopia’s contemporary political landscape, whilst troubled, includes multiple power centres and international oversight mechanisms that were absent during the Amin and Mengistu eras. The African Union’s headquarters in Addis Ababa alone ensures a level of international presence that would make large-scale asset stripping extremely difficult to conceal.

Economic Logic: The scale of the allegations—billions of dollars in gold—would require the systematic diversion of a significant portion of Ethiopia’s gold production. Given the country’s current economic challenges and the government’s stated commitment to increasing foreign exchange earnings, such massive diversions would be economically counterproductive and politically dangerous.

The Burden of Evidence

What remains absent from these allegations is credible, independently verified evidence. While the broader context of illicit gold trade from Africa to the UAE is well-documented, and Ethiopia has increased its official gold exports to the UAE, there is no confirmed link between these legitimate trade patterns and any personal accumulation of wealth by PM Abiy.

The distinction between state-level trade relationships and personal enrichment is crucial. Ethiopia’s increased gold exports to the UAE, conducted through official channels and reported by government ministries, represent a different category of activity entirely from the clandestine personal asset transfers alleged by critics.

Contemporary Challenges and Contradictions

It is worth noting that PM Abiy’s leadership has faced significant challenges and criticisms. Some Ethiopian publications have drawn unflattering comparisons between Abiy Ahmed and historical figures like Idi Amin, citing concerns about his leadership style and controversial actions. There have been allegations of authoritarian tendencies, with some observers noting that Africa currently has 19 dictators and drawing parallels to the ruthless rule of Mengistu Haile Mariam.

However, these political criticisms, whilst significant, do not constitute evidence of the specific financial allegations under examination. The conflation of legitimate political opposition with unsubstantiated claims of massive gold hoarding serves neither the cause of accountability nor the interests of informed public discourse.

The BRICS Context

PM Abiy’s current participation in the BRICS summit in Brazil adds another layer to this analysis. The 17th BRICS Summit in Rio de Janeiro focuses on Global South cooperation, with discussions on bilateral relations, including trade and investment. His presence at this gathering of emerging economies suggests a leader engaged in legitimate international diplomacy rather than one preparing for exile.

The timing of these allegations, coinciding with Ethiopia’s increased engagement with BRICS nations, raises questions about their potential political motivations. Are these claims part of a broader information warfare campaign designed to undermine Ethiopia’s growing international partnerships?

Conclusion: The Verdict of Evidence

After careful examination of the available evidence, the allegations that PM Abiy Ahmed has stashed billions of dollars worth of gold in the UAE appear to be unsubstantiated. While the broader context of illicit gold trade from Africa to the UAE is well-documented, and Ethiopia has legitimate trade relationships with the UAE, there is no credible evidence linking the Prime Minister to personal accumulation of such vast wealth.

The historical comparisons to Idi Amin and Mengistu Haile Mariam, whilst politically provocative, fail to acknowledge the fundamentally different contexts in which these leaders operated. Unlike his predecessors, PM Abiy operates in an era of increased transparency, international oversight, and institutional constraints that would make such massive asset stripping extremely difficult to conceal.

This is not to suggest that PM Abiy’s leadership is beyond criticism or that questions about governance and accountability should not be asked. However, serious allegations require serious evidence, and the burden of proof for claims of this magnitude has not been met.

As Ethiopia continues its complex political and economic transformation, the focus should remain on verifiable facts, transparent governance, and the rule of law. In the absence of credible evidence, these allegations serve only to muddy the waters of legitimate political discourse and undermine the important work of holding leaders accountable through proper channels.

The gold question, it seems, remains more about the glitter of political rhetoric than the substance of financial reality.

This investigation was conducted using publicly available information and expert analysis. The Ethiopian Tribune remains committed to factual reporting and welcomes additional evidence that might shed further light on these important questions.

About Post Author

Ethiopian Tribune editor

editor@ethiopiantribune.com

https://ethiopiantribune.com

Happy

0 0 %

Sad

0 0 %

Excited

0 0 %

Sleepy

0 0 %

Angry

0 0 %

Surprise

0 0 %

Ethiopian Tribune – May 28, 2025

The city of Liverpool witnessed something truly extraordinary on May 26, 2025 – a celebration that brought together families from across the globe, including our own Ethiopian diaspora community, to witness Liverpool FC’s historic Premier League championship parade. What started as a joyous family reunion turned into an unforgettable day of triumph, challenges, and the unbreakable spirit of the Reds faithful.

A Long-Awaited Reunion

For many Ethiopian families living across the UK and beyond, the Liverpool FC championship parade became more than just a football celebration – it was a precious opportunity for family reunions. Brothers and sisters who hadn’t seen each other for months, children meeting their grandparents, and friends scattered across different continents all converged on this Merseyside city with one shared passion: celebrating Liverpool’s 20th Premier League title.

The atmosphere was electric from the early morning hours. Families arrived from Surrey, London, Birmingham, Manchester, and even from as far as Bermuda and Ethiopia, many wearing the iconic red jerseys alongside traditional Ethiopian scarves and flags. The diversity of the crowd reflected Liverpool FC’s global appeal – a testament to how football transcends borders and brings people together.

Following the Parade: A Day of Pure Joy

The parade began at 2:30 PM, with the team traveling on open-top buses along the traditional 10-mile route from Allerton Maze through the city center. What made this celebration particularly special was that it was the first time Liverpool fans could witness their team parade the Premier League trophy since 1990 – the COVID-19 pandemic had denied them this moment in 2020.

The estimated one million fans who lined the streets created an atmosphere unlike anything previously witnessed in Liverpool. Despite the persistent rain that dampened the streets but not the spirits, supporters sang traditional Liverpool anthems, danced, and celebrated with an energy that could be felt throughout the city. The sight of Calvin Harris DJing on the team bus, as arranged by captain Virgil van Dijk, added an extra layer of excitement to the festivities.

Ethiopian families found themselves swept up in the infectious joy, children meeting their football heroes for the first time, parents explaining the significance of this historic moment, and grandparents sharing stories of Liverpool’s past glories. The parade route became a tapestry of cultures, languages, and generations united by their love for the club.

The Incident That Cast a Shadow

The day’s celebrations took a tragic turn when a vehicle drove into a crowd of fans on Water Street near the Liver Building. Twenty-seven people were hospitalised, with two seriously injured, including a child. Police arrested a 53-year-old man and ruled out terrorism, believing the driver acted alone.

For many families, including ours, who were celebrating in different parts of the city, news of the incident only reached us through social media clips and worried phone calls from relatives. The immediate aftermath saw panic ripple through the celebration as mobile networks became jammed with concerned family members trying to reach their loved ones.

The Challenge of Getting Home

What followed the incident revealed both the best and worst of human nature. While the city’s shops, pubs, and restaurants continued to serve customers with warmth and fairness, transportation became a nightmare. Taxi ranks emptied instantly, Uber drivers began charging extortionate rates for short journeys, and public transportation ground to a halt under the weight of demand.

Many families found themselves stranded, with some missing flights and others facing hours-long waits for any form of transport. The usual 10-minute journey from Allerton Library to the city center, which had taken just 20 minutes during the parade, became an impossible reverse journey. Many chose to walk back through the rain – a journey that took over an hour but became an adventure in itself.

One family friend missed her international flight entirely, unable to secure any transport to the airport despite being willing to pay premium prices. Bus services disappeared from the streets, and train stations became overcrowded with frustrated travelers queuing for hours.

Finding Solutions Together

Yet it was in these challenging moments that the true spirit of the Liverpool community – and the visiting families – shone brightest. Strangers offered shelter, local businesses provided free charging stations for phones, and families who had just met began coordinating shared transportation solutions.

The Ethiopian families, like many others, turned these obstacles into opportunities for bonding. Children who might have complained about walking in normal circumstances found themselves on an unexpected adventure, parents shared umbrellas with strangers, and the elderly were looked after by the younger generation. What could have been a source of frustration became another layer of the day’s memories.

Golden Memories to Last a Lifetime

Despite the challenges – or perhaps because of them – every family member returned to their respective destinations with stories that will be told for generations. Children experienced their first major football celebration, parents witnessed their team’s historic achievement, and families created bonds strengthened by shared adversity and joy.

The Ethiopian community’s experience at Liverpool’s championship parade reflects the broader immigrant experience in the UK – finding belonging and joy in British traditions while maintaining their own cultural identity. The red scarves worn alongside Ethiopian flags, the traditional songs mixed with Liverpool chants, and the family structures that prioritize collective celebration over individual convenience all contributed to a uniquely multicultural celebration.

A Testament to Community Spirit

Looking back, May 26, 2025, will be remembered not just as the day Liverpool FC celebrated their Premier League triumph, but as a day that demonstrated the resilience and unity of communities. From the million fans who celebrated in the rain to the families who walked home together when transport failed, the day proved that the best human responses often emerge in the most challenging circumstances.

For the Ethiopian families who made the journey to Liverpool, the experience reinforced why football is called the beautiful game – not just for what happens on the pitch, but for how it brings people together, creates lasting memories, and builds communities that transcend geographical and cultural boundaries.

The golden memories created on that rainy day in Liverpool will be shared with children and grandchildren for decades to come, ensuring that this championship celebration becomes part of family folklore – a story of triumph, community, and the unbreakable bonds forged in the heart of Merseyside.

The Ethiopian Tribune extends its thoughts to all those affected by the incident during the parade and celebrates the resilience of the Liverpool community in the face of adversity.

About Post Author

Ethiopian Tribune editor

editor@ethiopiantribune.com

https://ethiopiantribune.com

Happy

1 33 %

Sad

0 0 %

Excited

2 67 %

Sleepy

0 0 %

Angry

0 0 %

Surprise

0 0 %

In a landmark move that could reshape international accountability for wartime atrocities, victims of the Tigray conflict have filed the first-ever criminal complaint in Germany against officials of the Ethiopian government. This unprecedented legal action challenges investigative reports that allege war crimes and implicate Ethiopian and Eritrean government and military officials in acts that may soon face scrutiny by the International Criminal Court (ICC).

The complaint, lodged on March 20, 2025, marks a significant departure from previous legal actions concerning international conflicts. Drawing on the principle of universal jurisdiction—a legal doctrine that permits national courts to try cases of severe human rights abuses regardless of where the crimes occurred—the victims contend that their suffering merits a platform for justice. German authorities have previously invoked this principle in cases from Syria, The Gambia, and Iraq, setting a robust precedent for addressing international atrocities.

Universal Jurisdiction in Action

Universal jurisdiction has long been a tool for pursuing accountability when local judicial systems are unable or unwilling to prosecute heinous crimes. In this case, the victims of the Tigray conflict argue that Germany’s legal framework, which has a proven record in prosecuting crimes against humanity, provides an appropriate venue to examine the allegations. Legal experts suggest that if the investigation moves forward, it will not only mark the first instance of its kind in Germany but may also pave the way for similar legal challenges globally.

Implications for International Law

This filing intensifies ongoing debates over both the reach of universal jurisdiction and the responsibilities of nations in upholding human rights. The complaint underscores an evolving international legal landscape where victims are increasingly empowered to demand justice beyond the borders of their home countries. It also raises complex questions regarding state sovereignty, diplomatic relations, and the balance between national and international law.

Critics of the move argue that such cases could politicize judicial processes, while proponents insist that it is a necessary step to ensure accountability for those who have suffered the brunt of the conflict. The outcome of this legal challenge could have far-reaching implications, potentially inspiring similar actions in other jurisdictions where war crimes have been committed.

As the investigation unfolds, legal analysts and human rights advocates will be watching closely. A favorable decision could validate the claims of the victims and set a significant precedent for international justice, emphasizing that even state officials are not immune from accountability. Conversely, a setback may fuel further debates about the limitations and politicization of universal jurisdiction.

The world now waits to see whether this groundbreaking complaint will indeed open a new chapter in the fight against impunity for war crimes. For the victims of Tigray, this legal action represents not just a quest for justice, but also a powerful assertion that the international community must not turn a blind eye to suffering and abuse.

About Post Author

Ethiopian Tribune editor

editor@ethiopiantribune.com

https://ethiopiantribune.com

Happy

0 0 %

Sad

0 0 %

Excited

0 0 %

Sleepy

0 0 %

Angry

0 0 %

Surprise

0 0 %

Review: A Compelling Look at Chinese Influence in Eastern Africa

By Murtada Elfadl

Popular on Variety 

Colorful characters and rebel workers collide in directors Xinyan Yu and Max Duncan’s Ethiopia-focused documentary.

In “Made in Ethiopia,” directors Xinyan Yu and Max Duncan take the macro issue of China’s influence in Africa and present it provocatively through the micro lens of its effect on a few Chinese and Ethiopian individuals striving for a better life. The film is set at a Chinese industrial complex in Dukem, a small town southeast of Ethiopia’s capital, Addis Ababa. It follows an ambitious Chinese businesswoman trying to expand the complex with the help of Ethiopian bureaucrats and the consequences this expansion has on a factory worker and a farming family that lives nearby.

The businesswoman is Motto Ma, a delusionally ambitious outsider who says things like, “The industrial complex is a tourist hotspot. We are considering selling tickets.” She makes up the lie, believes and then hypes it. Motto (the film refers to all the subjects with just their first names) is both charming and wily, the type of person who would sing at her company’s function despite not having any talent. At one point, she announces to the camera, “I starved myself to death for two days to fit this dress.” She’s willing to cajole, threaten and push anyone to get what she wants. She thinks she understands what Ethiopians need, but she’s all hubris. All of this makes her the perfect subject for a documentary.

Motto is such a loud and colorful character that she overshadows her Ethiopian counterparts. Contrasting Motto is Betelihem “Beti” Ashenafi, a quiet factoryworker with modest dreams. Motto claims that her work would make Ethiopians realize their dreams within their lifetime. Something unattainable without her industrial complex expansion. But in Beti, we see how wrong and far-fetched those claims are. Despite working hard and trying to elevate herself, she’s stuck in a never-ending circle of thwarted aspirations. However, because Motto dominates most of the film, Beti’s story comes through as an afterthought.

Providing a stronger counterpoint to Motto is Workinesh Chala and her family. They are farmers whose land was taken by the government so the Chinese industrial complex can expand. They were promised replacement land which they never received. As “Made in Ethiopia” unspools, Workinesh and her young daughter Rehoboth give the film its most compelling scenes. As Rehoboth describes the source of her mother’s resilience, “Made in Ethiopia” gets to show the Ethiopian side of this complicated quandary clearly. With this family’s story, the film finally demonstrates how cultural differences and power imbalance can impede even the most generous of intentions.

“Made in Ethiopia” is ostensibly a film about clash and conflict, and it doesn’t disappoint in that regard. Indeed, it presents an epic scene in which some of the Ethiopian factory workers rebel against the hard working conditions. The scene is deepened by focusing on Edae, the factory translator who mediates between the workers and their supervisor. Centering Edae shifts the narrative from a straight David and Goliath story with clear heroes and villains into a complicated morality tale of ever-changing priorities and loyalties.

The film includes many provocative images. While showing the wedding of a Chinese man and an Ethiopian woman, the camera pans to a stash of cash being presented on a silver tray to the bride’s parents. The filmmakers also show Beti and her friends feeding each other and the farmers praying under a huge tree for the rain to come. Since these are traditions and customs of Ethiopian people, in presenting them juxtaposed with a Western gaze, the film ends up exoticizing the same people it claims to realistically depict.

Despite an imbalance in perspectives, “Made in Ethiopia” ends up presenting a compelling narrative about how Chinese influence in Ethiopia impacts both expats and native people. The camera is patient and probing, and the story weaves in political and social context successfully. The film, recently was premiered in London on October 29th 2024. The author of the article sighted that the films was premiered at the Tribeca Film Festival, should be able to start many conversations about these topical issues.

Source: variety.com

About Post Author

Ethiopian Tribune editor

editor@ethiopiantribune.com

https://ethiopiantribune.com

Happy

0 0 %

Sad

0 0 %

Excited

0 0 %

Sleepy

0 0 %

Angry

0 0 %

Surprise

0 0 %

Happy Birthday again. Welcome to the families of the 70s that include me since last December.

It was a special day that brought me lots of memories that left me so emotional and speechless. This is mainly because I still can’t believe that we are still on an exile for such a very long time (over 40 years).

Special thanks to your wonderful children for organising such a very specisl event with full of surprises.

Many thanks also to our dearest Thehaye for everything since you met eachother.

It also gave us an opportunity to meet old friends, brothers and sisters at the historical building that was our Palace on exile while our parents and grandparents were fighting from the bushes, for five years until our eventual victory, after lots of sacrifices, including lives.

May Our Almighty God Be With Us and protect us, our beloved children and our beloved Country!

Bekele Gessesse (Dr)

About Post Author

Ethiopian Tribune editor

editor@ethiopiantribune.com

https://ethiopiantribune.com

Happy

0 0 %

Sad

0 0 %

Excited

0 0 %

Sleepy

0 0 %

Angry

0 0 %

Surprise

0 0 %

Some 50 aid workers have lost their lives while in line of humanitarian duty in Ethiopia in 2024, the United Nations World Food Program (WFP) has disclosed.

The WFP said, in an Ethiopia country brief published late Sunday, that insecurity situations are affecting its humanitarian operations in different parts of the East African country.

It said the latest of aid worker casualties was a driver of a WFP cooperating partner organization, who was recently shot and killed in Ethiopia’s Amhara region.

“The driver of Medical Teams International, a WFP cooperating partner, was shot and killed in Amhara region. He is one of the 50 aid workers who have lost their lives in line of humanitarian duty in Ethiopia in 2024,” it said.

WFP further said it continues to face supply chain disruptions across its activities due to insecurity, road blockage, and fuel shortage. “These issues have impacted WFP’s operational efficiency in resources and time,” it said.

In February this year, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) said that since 2019, 46 aid workers have lost their lives in Ethiopia, of whom 36 were related to conflicts in northern Ethiopia.

“Humanitarian partners are not targeted by weapon bearers, however, the volatility of the security situation and the multiplicity of armed actors involved, including local militias and armed civilians, pose a high risk for aid personnel and relief operations,” the UNOCHA said.

Meanwhile, the WFP in its latest brief further said funding gap is hampering its operations in Ethiopia. It appealed for urgent funding from international donors as it requires 374 million U.S. dollars to cover its response in Ethiopia for the next six months.

Source:english.news.cn

About Post Author

Ethiopian Tribune editor

editor@ethiopiantribune.com

https://ethiopiantribune.com

Happy

0 0 %

Sad

0 0 %

Excited

0 0 %

Sleepy

0 0 %

Angry

0 0 %

Surprise

0 0 %

Why Ethiopia’s $5 Billion Megadam Worries Egypt and Sudan

The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on the Blue Nile River is the largest ever built in Africa and promises to transform Ethiopia’s economy. But for countries downstream, like Egypt and Sudan, the dam is seen as a threat. Photo illustration: Rami Abukalam

By Wall Street Journal

Breaking Ground

Breaking Ground digs into megaprojects around the world, uncovering what these developments might mean for the surrounding region and the ultimate costs.

About Post Author

Ethiopian Tribune editor

editor@ethiopiantribune.com

https://ethiopiantribune.com

Happy

0 0 %

Sad

0 0 %

Excited

0 0 %

Sleepy

0 0 %

Angry

0 0 %

Surprise

0 0 %