ኢትዮጵያን ትሪቢውን – Ethiopian Tribune

The Genetic Architecture of Adaptations to High Altitude in Ethiopia: The Amhara People as a Case Study

Ethiopian Tribune editor — Sat, 25 Jul 2026 06:12:04 +0000

Read Time:7 Minute, 22 Second

Editor’s Foreword

The Blood That Never Thickened

On Professor Girma Berhanu’s review of the genetic architecture of high-altitude adaptation in Ethiopia — what the highland body records, and what it cannot be made to say.

At three thousand metres above the sea, the air is still one-fifth oxygen. The proportion never changes; the pressure does. Every breath drawn on the Simien escarpment delivers fewer molecules to the blood than the same breath drawn on the Red Sea littoral, and the body must make up the difference or fail. Most bodies, arriving suddenly, make it up badly. The marrow floods the circulation with red cells, the blood thickens, the heart labours, and the newcomer acquires — sometimes permanently — the cluster of afflictions that mountain medicine calls chronic mountain sickness.

The farmer walking to market above Debark does not acquire it. His haemoglobin is, by the standards of the physiology textbooks, unremarkable. His arterial oxygen saturation is likewise unremarkable. By every measure that ought to declare him a highlander he reads as a man at sea level — and yet he is not at sea level, and he is not ill. That is the puzzle Professor Girma Berhanu’s review sets out to survey, and the answer the literature supplies is that the peoples of the Ethiopian highlands appear to have solved the problem of thin air by a route no other high-altitude population took.

There are, on current evidence, three great natural experiments in human hypoxic adaptation: the Andes, the Tibetan plateau, and the Ethiopian highlands. Andean populations carry elevated haemoglobin. Tibetans carry comparatively low haemoglobin with reduced saturation and a well-characterised genomic signal. Ethiopians, as Cynthia Beall and her colleagues reported in 2002, display neither compensation and no evident cost — a third solution, arrived at independently. The genomics followed a decade later, when two 2012 studies identified candidate loci among Amhara highlanders that are largely distinct from the Tibetan signal while sitting, in part, within the same oxygen-sensing pathway. This is convergent evolution in its textbook form: separate roads to the same summit.

It is worth noticing how late this arrived. The Andes and Tibet have been studied for the better part of a century; Ethiopia entered the genomic literature only in the past fifteen years. That lateness is not a fact about Ethiopian bodies. It is a fact about where laboratories are built and whose questions get funded, and it is the reason this Tribune takes an interest in a review that might otherwise belong solely to the journals.

A genome is not a title deed. It records that people lived here, and endured. It confers nothing.

Professor Berhanu does not conceal the argument that moved him to write, and we would not permit him to. He is answering a claim now in wide circulation: that the Amhara are not a people but a residue — a miscellany of origins fused by an administrative language, invented late and by decree. He finds this claim in uneasy company with itself. The same discourse that declares the Amhara never to have existed as a community identifies them with great precision when they are counted among the dead.

The Tribune publishes this review, and publishes it with a stated boundary. Professor Berhanu draws that boundary himself, in his own third paragraph, and it is the most important sentence in the manuscript: genetics can illuminate ancestry and continuity, but cannot by itself determine when an ethnic identity came into being. Long habitation of the highlands is a question of evidence, and the evidence is strong. The formation of a self-conscious Amhara community is a question of history, and history is where it must be argued. A reader who comes to these pages hoping to find a biological warrant for a political claim will not find one. The author has taken some care that he should not.

The same caution applies, doubled, to the review’s passages on the brain. Professor Berhanu engages the literature that once proposed cold climates as engines of intelligence and dismisses it as methodologically and conceptually unsound, which is the settled view and the correct one. He then asks the open question — whether long ecological demand shapes cognition at all — and answers that the evidence is insufficient. We would put it more flatly. Nothing in this literature licenses the ranking of Ethiopia’s peoples against one another, and any reader who extracts such a ranking from it has misread it deliberately.

One figure deserves to be carried out of the manuscript and held up on its own. When researchers compared Amhara and Oromo highlanders in 2012, the genome-wide divergence between the two populations measured 0.0098 — a number so small it means, in plain terms, that they are very nearly the same people. Their physiological differences are real and appear to track how long each community has lived in thin air, not how far apart they stand. In a country where difference is the working currency of politics, that decimal is the most eloquent line in the paper.

The highland body keeps a record older than any chronicle, written in vessels rather than in Ge’ez. It says only that people were here, for a very long time, and that they endured. That is not a small thing to know. It is also not a licence for anything at all.

— The Editor, The Ethiopian Tribune

Synopsis

The Genetic Architecture of Adaptations to High Altitude in Ethiopia: The Amhara People as a Case Study. Girma Berhanu, Professor, Department of Education and Special Education, University of Gothenburg. A review of the literature.

Point of Departure

The review opens by separating two propositions frequently conflated in Ethiopian debate: the antiquity of human occupation in the highlands, which the archaeological, genetic and physiological record supports strongly, and the historical emergence of Amhara ethnic identity, which the author holds to be a question for historians and linguists rather than geneticists. He states the political provocation openly — the contention that the Amhara are a recent linguistic assemblage rather than an indigenous community — and answers it with the documentary record of highland settlement while conceding that admixture, migration and intermarriage are universal and diminish nothing.

The Physiology of Thin Air

Falling atmospheric pressure, not falling oxygen concentration, produces chronic hypoxia at altitude. Populations resident for many generations show adaptations in chest morphology, lung volume, vascular regulation and metabolism — but not identical ones. Elevated haemoglobin, long treated as the signature of successful adaptation, carries costs in blood viscosity and cardiovascular strain. Ethiopian highlanders, the review argues, largely avoid that trade-off.

The Ethiopian Pattern

Drawing on Beall and colleagues (2002), Cheong and colleagues (2017) and Getu (2022), the review sets out the distinctive Ethiopian profile: normal haemoglobin concentration with maintained arterial oxygen saturation and no chronic mountain sickness. The proposed mechanism is vascular rather than haematological, involving nitric oxide and cyclic GMP signalling that improves vasodilation and tissue oxygen delivery without recourse to excess red cell production. Notably, the pattern is not uniform within Ethiopia: Oromo highlanders from Bale have shown greater erythropoietic response than Amhara populations of the Simien.

The Genomic Evidence

Genome-wide work by Scheinfeldt and colleagues (2012) identified candidate loci — CBARA1, VAV3, ARNT2 and THRB — associated with hypoxic adaptation among Amhara highlanders, largely distinct from Tibetan and Andean signals though partly convergent within the hypoxia-inducible factor pathway. Alkorta-Aranburu and colleagues (2012) compared Amhara and Oromo participants born and raised at comparable elevations and found divergent adaptive phenotypes against negligible genome-wide differentiation (mean F_ST = 0.0098), proposing duration and intensity of highland residence rather than separate evolutionary histories as the likelier explanation.

Brain, Cognition and the Limits of Inference

The review surveys neuroimaging findings on chronic hypoxia — structural change in the insula, anterior cingulate, prefrontal and motor cortices — and stresses that outcomes depend on exposure duration, developmental history, nutrition, health and degree of adaptation. It examines and rejects the racial-IQ tradition on methodological and empirical grounds, treats the animal literature on high-elevation problem-solving as suggestive but not transferable, and concludes that no present evidence establishes permanent cognitive differences between human populations attributable to altitude.

Conclusion

Ethiopia’s highlands constitute one of the world’s most significant and least studied laboratories of human adaptation. Multiple pathways to hypoxic tolerance exist among neighbouring and closely related populations, which the author reads as an argument against hierarchy rather than for it. Existing work concentrates on Bale, Arsi, Welega, Shewa and the northern highlands; its findings cannot be extended to Afar, Somali or other lowland communities, and the author calls for research spanning Ethiopia’s full ecological range.

Professor Berhanu’s full review, with complete citations and the discussion in his own words, follows below: Read the full article ↓the-genetic-architecture-of-adaptations-to-high-altitude-in-ethiopia.docx

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Unparalleled Outstanding Leadership: The Case of Atse Menelik II, Emperor of Ethiopia

Ethiopian Tribune editor — Tue, 21 Jul 2026 02:30:09 +0000

Read Time:3 Minute, 8 Second

20 July 2026

Editor’s Note

Weighing the Emperor

A foreword and synopsis to Professor Girma Berhanu’s defence not of Menelik II, but of the standard by which any nineteenth-century ruler should be judged.

Editorial Foreword

Few names in Ethiopian public life can empty a room or fill it with argument as quickly as that of Menelik II. He is summoned as founder and as conqueror, as the architect of a modern state and as the author of its deepest wounds — frequently in the same breath, and frequently by people who are certain about a record they have never read. It is into this charged terrain that Professor Girma Berhanu steps, not to end the quarrel but to insist that it be conducted honestly.

The essay that follows is, at heart, an argument about standards. Its central move is deceptively simple: before we ask whether Menelik was a good ruler, we must first agree on the measure — and then apply that same measure to his contemporaries. Judged by the yardsticks of twenty-first-century democracy, or through the lens of present-day ethnonational narrative alone, any nineteenth-century sovereign will be found wanting. Judged against the men who actually shared his age — Bismarck, Alexander III, the reformers of Meiji Japan, the Ottomans in retreat — a different figure emerges: a statesman who preserved his country’s sovereignty in the one decade when nearly every other African kingdom lost theirs.

The Tribune publishes this piece not as a verdict but as a discipline.

Professor Girma does not ask readers to look away from the conquest of the south and west, the redistributed land, the imperial administration that displaced local authority, or the grievances that outlived the man. He asks, instead, that these be weighed rather than wielded — set beside the achievements rather than used to erase them, and beside the conduct of other expanding states rather than examined in isolation. Where he is most provocative, he turns the question back on the present: why is one expansion remembered as nation-building and another condemned, and who profits from keeping the memory raw?

Readers will disagree with him. Some will feel he grants the emperor too much grace; others will feel the essay concedes too readily what should be defended. Both responses are welcome, because both accept the terms the author is really arguing for — that our past be studied critically, honestly, and in context, and that history be neither romanticised nor weaponised. On that, if on nothing else, this publication stands with him.

Synopsis

Responding to readers who felt his earlier essay had praised Menelik II too warmly, Professor Girma Berhanu returns not to defend the emperor uncritically but to defend a method. The right question, he argues, is not whether Menelik was hero or monster, but by what standard we judge him — and whether we would apply that same standard to the rulers who shared his era.

Set against the age of Bismarck, Meiji Japan, Tsarist Russia and the Scramble for Africa, Menelik emerges as a consequential statesman: the sovereign who defeated Italy at Adwa, modernised the army, introduced railways, telegraph, banking and ministries, and kept Ethiopia independent when only Liberia did the same across an entire continent. Yet the essay refuses to look past the cost — the conquest of southern and western regions, the unequal incorporation of peoples, the legacies of grievance that shape Ethiopia still.

Its most searching turn is toward the present: why some expansions are remembered as nation-building and others as unhealed wounds, and why Ethiopia remains unable to agree on the meaning of its own history. The answer, Professor Girma suggests, lies less with Menelik than with us.

Read the full article — unparalleled-outstanding-leadership.docx

by Professor Girma Berhanu.

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Hirut Befikadu: The Woman Who Gave Africa Its Voice

Ethiopian Tribune editor — Mon, 22 Jun 2026 22:48:02 +0000

Read Time:7 Minute, 27 Second

Obituary · A Son’s Tribute

Hirut Befikadu: The Woman Who Gave Africa Its Voice

She helped give the Organisation of African Unity its public voice, built the institution’s first Women’s Division, and carried Africa’s case from Addis Ababa to Beijing and into the shattered districts of wartime Sierra Leone. She was a mother of three — and a figure of quiet instruction to a great many more.

By Endex · Chief Editor, The Ethiopian Tribune · 22 June 2026

The Tribune’s Chief Editor writes of his mother.

She belonged to the small, formidable company of Ethiopians who did not merely live through the making of modern Africa but helped to assemble it — patiently, precisely, one briefing and one document at a time. For the better part of thirty-four years, Hirut Befikadu served the Organisation of African Unity, the body founded in Addis Ababa in 1963 to speak for a continent finding its own voice. It fell to her, more than to almost anyone, to make that voice intelligible to the world.

The Voice of a Young Continent

Hirut joined the OAU in its earliest, improvised days, having begun her working life at the newly established Ethiopian Tourism Organisation in 1963. Within a year she had moved to the fledgling continental secretariat, where the work was relentless and the stakes were continental. Assigned to the Information and Protocol Division, she rose to lead it, serving for seventeen years as Head of Information.

The task was unforgiving. A new organisation, charged with shaping Africa’s political, social and economic course, had to be explained — persuasively, accurately, and often under pressure — to journalists and researchers who gave her no rest. To answer them she first had to know, which meant a discipline of constant reading that never left her. She travelled the length and breadth of the continent, and there was scarcely a country she did not visit in the service of introducing the OAU to Africa and the wider world. In the veteran Ethiopian journalist Gedamu Abraha she found a mentor who helped her master the craft.

The Platform at Beijing

If the Information Division made her name, it was the Women’s Division that became her legacy. Hirut was charged not only with establishing the OAU’s Women’s Division but with leading it. When Africa prepared its case for the United Nations’ Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995, it was Hirut who coordinated the drafting of the “African Platform for Action”, distilling the views of women gathered from across the continent, and who helped organise the participation of nearly ten thousand African women delegates at the conference. It was, by any measure, one of the largest acts of continental coordination on behalf of African women in the organisation’s history.

Addis, Asmara and Florence

She had been formed for such work long before she chose it. Educated at the Sandford English School in Addis Ababa, at Haile Selassie Secondary School in Asmara, and at Kokebe Tsibah — where she was one of the first two young women to graduate — she went on to read social and political science at Haile Selassie I University, among its first graduates after it became a university, and took a master’s degree in international relations at the University of Florence.

Hers was a household steeped in the wider world. Her father, German-educated, served as a provincial governor, as chief of protocol at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and ultimately as Ethiopia’s ambassador to the United Kingdom; her mother, too, was educated in Europe. The eldest of six children, Hirut moved from city to city and country to country, and where she could not follow her parents she lived with an aunt rather than break her schooling.

Her ancestry ran the length of the country. She was descended from Hakim Workneh Eshete, the pioneering Ethiopian physician and statesman, and from Ras Gobena Dacche, the formidable nineteenth-century general — a lineage joining the north of Ethiopia to the south, as her own life and labour would. And hers was a family that seemed to bring forth remarkable women in every generation: the great educator Adey Befikadu; her sister Rosemary; the late journalist Elenee Mekuria; and the late Rachel Mekuria, who pioneered broadcasting education in Ethiopia, headed the Educational Television Production Division and served as board president of the Young Women’s Christian Association. Hirut belonged to that company, and enlarged it.

She came to believe there was something to learn from every person she met — a conviction earned, not inherited.

Two influences marked her above all. There was a meticulous, beautifully turned-out father who could not abide disorder, from whom she inherited an eye for elegance and an ear for language. And there was her maternal grandmother, Qetselawork Tulu, whose intelligence and resilience she revered — a woman who had married an England-educated doctor, moved to India, and worked at his side as a nurse. A shy child, Hirut taught herself courage through drama, public debate and the university debating club, until the girl who had once shunned attention made her living by commanding it.

Sierra Leone

Her continental service did not end with the OAU. For six years she served as spokesperson and policy adviser to the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) — a charge entrusted to her by Kofi Annan, then Secretary-General of the United Nations, who knew her conviction and chose her for it. She carried her gift for clear, careful information into one of West Africa’s hardest conflicts, and into its most desperate hours. When hundreds of United Nations peacekeepers were seized and held hostage by rebel forces for seventy-five days, she was among those who laboured to win their release — and it was her voice, in the end, that carried the news of their freedom to the world. In the United Nations’ own record of those years she appears again and again, steadying the account through the mission’s most dangerous passages — the same discipline of fact she had practised in Addis Ababa, now exercised under fire.

A Mother, and a Mentor

In retirement she described herself simply as a community volunteer. It was characteristically modest. I write these lines not only as this newspaper’s editor but as her son — one of the three boys she raised, who like everyone who loved her called her Abaye — and so I may say what an obituary alone would not: that the rigour and grace she carried to a continent she carried first, and most fully, into her own home.

Her husband of a lifetime, the engineer Getachew Abebe, had gone before her; she leaves their three sons — Samuel, Daniel, and the one who writes these words. But the family she leaves is larger than that — the colleagues she trained, the women whose place at the table she helped to secure, and the many of us who took her, without hesitation and without blood, as a mother of our own.

She loved a difficult task and hated defeat. Africa was, for thirty-four years, her difficult task. She did not run from it. She faced it — and she gave it words.

When the family last gathered around her, in November 2024, she surprised us, as she always could. Late in a life that had never stopped facing forward, she took delivery of her first car — and chose an electric one, because the future, to her mind, was a thing to be embraced rather than feared. We were delighted, and we made her promises about the cleaner, braver world we meant to help build. It was entirely like her: the woman who had introduced a young continent to the world, still reaching, even then, toward what came next.

Samuel, her firstborn, reached her after her first surgery and was with her as she recovered. Daniel and I were to follow in July. We did not reach her in time. These last months had taken from her, one after another, others she loved; and in the end, it seems, she chose to go on to those who had gone ahead of her — her husband among them — rather than wait for us. We would have crossed any distance for that visit. We make it now, in these words.

Today the words are mine, and they are not enough. Rest now, Abaye. We were proud beyond saying to be yours.

In the faith that shaped the whole of her life, she was christened Hirute Silassie. We ask all who knew her, and all who did not, to hold her in their prayers — that by the grace and the glory of God she be granted rest, and life everlasting.

እግዚአብሔር ነፍሷን ይማር።

May God remember His servant Hirute Silassie, and grant her soul eternal peace.

❦

Hirut Befikadu — Hirute Silassie. Pioneering officer of the Organisation of African Unity. Died 22 June 2026.

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ሁለት ደኖች፣ አንድ ሒሳብ

Ethiopian Tribune editor — Sun, 21 Jun 2026 11:06:49 +0000

Read Time:10 Minute, 39 Second

ሁለት ደኖች፣ አንድ ሒሳብ — The Ethiopian Tribune

ሁለት ደኖች፣ አንድ ሒሳብ

የአረንጓዴ አሻራ ትዕይንት ለካሜራ ይተክላል፤ የራሱንም ስኬት ራሱ ይቆጥራል። ገንዘቡ ግን የሚገኘው ካሜራዎቹ ፈጽሞ በማይዞሩበት ቦታ ነው — እና ጦርነትን ተቋቁሞ ሙሉ ሆኖ የተረፈው ብቸኛው የመልሶ ማልማት ሥራ፣ ከሠሩት ሰዎች በቀር ማንም ያልያዘው ነው።

በ E. Frashie · ዘ ኢትዮጵያን ትሪቡን

በየክረምቱ ሪፐብሊኩ አንድ ዓይነት ሥርዓተ-ቅዳሴ ያከናውናል። ጠቅላይ ሚኒስትሩ — በስለላ መዋቅር ውስጥ አልፎ፣ በቀድሞው ኢሕአዴግ ማሽን አድጎ፣ ቀጥሎም ራሱንና መንግሥቱን በአረንጓዴ ዕድሳት ቀለም ያደሰው ለዘብተኛ-ቃል ሌተና ኮሎኔል — ችግኝና ሥነ-ሥርዓታዊ አካፋ ይይዛል፤ ከኋላውም ሚኒስትሮች፣ ዲፕሎማቶችና ጎብኚ የመንግሥት መሪዎች ተመሳሳዩን ያደርጋሉ። የድሮን ምስሎች አሉ። የሚሰበር ሪከርድ አለ። በ2019 ለዓለም የቀረበው አኃዝ በአንድ ቀን 350 ሚሊዮን ችግኞች ነበር — የህንድን የቀድሞ ሪከርድ ያደቀቀ፣ እና በመላው ዓለም — ብዙ ጊዜ ያለ ጥያቄ — የተዘገበ አኃዝ። የዘንድሮው ሥነ-ሥርዓት የተከፈተው የናይጄሪያ ምክትል ፕሬዚዳንት በተገኙበት ነበር፤ መሪ-ቃሉ “በመትከል ዕድሳት” የሚል ሲሆን፣ ጠቅላይ ሚኒስትሩም ዘመቻው ሲጠናቀቅ ኢትዮጵያ ዳግመኛ የምግብ እርዳታ እንደማትቀበል ቃል ገብተዋል። እንደ ትዕይንት፣ በእውነት አስደናቂ ነው። ይህ ጋዜጣ የሚያሳስበው ግን ካሜራዎቹ ከታጠፉ በኋላ ምን እንደሚሆን ነው — እና ይበልጥ ደግሞ፣ ማን ይጠቀማል፣ ማን ይቆጥራል፣ እና ከአገሪቱ ሁለት ተፎካካሪ ደኖች የትኛው በትክክል እውን ነው የሚለው።

ምክንያቱም ሁለት ናቸው። ከመሬት በላይ ያለ ደን አለ፦ ችግኞቹ፣ የመትከያ ቀኖቹ፣ የተበሰሩት ቢሊዮኖች — እንደ የትኛው ይፋዊ ቆጠራ እንደሚወሰድ፣ ከ25 እስከ 40 ቢሊዮን የሚደርሱ — እና ብሔራዊ የደን ሽፋን በ2019 ከነበረበት 17.2 በመቶ ዛሬ ወደ 23.6 በመቶ ከፍ ብሏል የሚለው ይገባበታል። ከመሬት በታች ያለ ደንም አለ፦ በመንደርተኞች፣ በግብርና ባለሙያዎችና በጥቂት መንግሥታዊ ያልሆኑ ድርጅቶች የተከናወነው ቀርፋፋ፣ ጸጥ ያለ፣ ለካሜራ የማይመች የመልሶ ማልማት ሥራ — በብዙ ጊዜ አንድም ችግኝ ሳይተክሉ፣ ትዕይንቱ ካስገኘው በላይ ዘላቂ ውጤት ያስገኙ። የአረንጓዴ አሻራን ፖለቲካ ለመረዳት ሁለቱንም ደኖች በአንድ ጊዜ ማየት ያስፈልጋል — መንግሥት የቱን እንደሚያሳይህ፣ የቱንም በጥልቀት እንዳትመለከት እንደሚፈልግ ማስተዋልም ይገባል።

መንግሥት በትክክል የሚያገኘው ምንድን ነው

ቅጠላ ቅጠሉን ስታነሳ፣ ለመንግሥት የሚገኘው ጥቅም በሦስት ክፍሎች ይከፈላል፤ ከእነዚህም አንዱ ብቻ ነው አካባቢያዊ የሆነው። የመጀመሪያው የአገር ውስጥ ህጋዊነት ነው። የእርስ በርስ ጦርነት፣ ሰፊ መፈናቀልና የተንኮታኮተ ምንዛሬ የመራ መንግሥት፣ ለመትከያ ቀን ያህል ጊዜ፣ በዚያ ፈንታ ሚሊዮኖች ዜጎች — መንግሥት እንደሚለው ሀያ ሚሊዮን — እንደ አንድ የሚሳተፉበትን የአገር ዕድሳት ምስል ሊመራ ይችላል። ሁለተኛው የውጭ ጉዳይ ፖሊሲ ነው። አረንጓዴ አሻራ የኢትዮጵያ እጅግ ወደ ውጭ የሚላክ የለዘብተኛ-ኃይል ምርት ነው — አዲስ አበባን ከኬንያ፣ ሩዋንዳና ጋና ጋር በአንድ ዓረፍተ-ነገር የሚያስቀምጥ፣ ጎብኚ ባለሥልጣናትን ወደ ፎቶው የሚስብ፣ እና አገሪቱ በሌላ ጊዜ እንደ ለማኝ በምትቀርብበት የአየር ንብረት ጉባኤዎች ላይ አድናቆት የሚያስገኝ የፓን-አፍሪካ ብራንድ። “በሚቀጥለው ዓመት” የምግብ እርዳታን የማቆም ቃል-ኪዳን፣ ቀጥታ ለዚህ ታዳሚ የተሰነዘረ ነው።

ሦስተኛው ክፍል ገንዘብ ነው፤ የሕዝብ ግንዛቤ እጅግ የቀጠነውም እዚሁ ጋ ነው — በከፊል ሆን ተብሎ። ታዋቂው ግምት የመትከያ ቀኖቹ ራሳቸው፣ በሆነ መንገድ፣ ወደ ጥሬ ገንዘብ ይቀየራሉ የሚል ነው፦ ቢሊዮኖቹን ትከል፣ ካርቦኑን ሽጥ፣ ገቢውን አስቀምጥ። ነገሩ እንዲህ አይደለም የሚሠራው፤ በምን እንደሚታሰበውና በትክክል እንዴት እንደሚሠራ መካከል ያለው ልዩነትም ስለ መላው ሥራ ከሁሉ የበለጠ ገላጭ ነገር ነው።

የካርቦን ገንዘብ፣ በዝርዝር

ዋነኛው የካርቦን ፋይናንስ የሚመነጨው ጠቅላይ ሚኒስትሩ በካሜራ ፊት ከሚተክላቸው ችግኞች አይደለም። የሚፈሰው “የኦሮሚያ ደናማ መልክዓ-ምድር መርሐ-ግብር” (Oromia Forested Landscape Programme) በተባለ የተለየ፣ ቴክኒካዊ፣ ሆነ ብሎ ያልተዋበ መሣሪያ በኩል ነው — መላውን የኦሮሚያ ክልል የሚሸፍን፣ ከ2017 ጀምሮ ከዓለም ባንክ ጋር የተዘጋጀ የጁሪስዲክሽን REDD+ ዕቅድ። ፌብሩዋሪ 9 ቀን 2023፣ የፌዴራል መንግሥትና የዓለም ባንክ የባዮካርቦን ፈንድ እስከ 40 ሚሊዮን የአሜሪካ ዶላር የሚደርስ “የልቀት ቅነሳ ግዢ ስምምነት” (ERPA) ተፈራረሙ — እስከ 2030 ድረስ ለሚቀርብ ወደ 4 ሚሊዮን ቶን ለሚጠጋ የካርቦን-ዳይኦክሳይድ-አቻ ቅነሳ የሚከፈል።

ይህን ስልት በጥንቃቄ አንብበው፤ ምክንያቱም ማታለያው በዝርዝሩ ውስጥ ይኖራል። REDD+ ለምትተክላቸው ዛፎች አይከፍልም። የሚከፍለው ላስቀረኸው ልቀት ነው — ላልተፈጸመ የደን ጭፍጨፋ፣ ለቀዘቀዘ የደን መመናመን፣ ቆሞ ለቀረ የካርቦን ክምችት — በመላው ጁሪስዲክሽን፣ ከመነሻ መለኪያ አንጻር። የእሴት መለኪያው በፎቶ ላይ ያለ ችግኝ አይደለም፤ ይልቁንም ገለልተኛ ሦስተኛ-ወገን ኦዲተር በባንኩ ስልት መሠረት ወደ ከባቢ አየር አልገባም ብሎ የሚያረጋግጠው አንድ ቶን ካርቦን ነው። የመርሐ-ግብሩ የመጀመሪያ የክትትል ሪፖርት፣ ይህ በሚጻፍበት ጊዜ፣ በትክክል በዚያው የውጭ ማረጋገጫ ሂደት ላይ ይገኛል፤ የመጀመሪያው ክፍያም በ2026 መጀመሪያ እንደሚፈጸምና በተደራደረ የጥቅም ክፍፍል እቅድ መሠረት እንደሚከፋፈል ይጠበቃል።

ገንዘቡ የሚገኘው በትክክል ካሜራዎች በሌሉበት ቦታ ነው። ትዕይንቱ ማስታወቂያ ነው፤ REDD+ ግን ደረሰኝ ነው — ደረሰኙም መንግሥት በማይቆጣጠረው ወገን ይመረመራል።

ይህ መንግሥት ሊያስተዋውቀው የማይቸኩልበትን ጸጥ ያለ ምፀት ይፈጥራል። ከመላው ሕንጻ እውነተኛ የውጭ ምርመራ የተደረገበት ብቸኛው ክፍል — የካርቦን ሒሳቡ — በስፋት ከሚመሰገንበት የመትከያ ትዕይንት ፈጽሞ የተለየ ነገርን ይለካል። የመንግሥት መገናኛ ብዙኃን በተናጠል ከካርቦን ንግድ በአጠቃላይ 70 ሚሊዮን ዶላር ገደማ ተገኝቷል ብለዋል — ይህ የተለያዩ የሁለትዮሽና የብዝሃ-ወገን ዝግጅቶችን አጣምሮ የያዘ ጥቅል አኃዝ ሲሆን፣ እንደ ተረጋገጠ እውነታ ሳይሆን እንደ መንግሥት ይገባኛል ሊወሰድ ይገባል። ሊረጋገጥ የሚችለው መሣሪያ የ40 ሚሊዮን ዶላሩ የኦሮሚያ ስምምነት ሲሆን፣ የሚሸልመውም ቆሞ ያለውን ደን የማቆየት አሰልቺ ግን ዘላቂ ሥራ ነው — የሪከርድ-ሰባሪ የመትከያ ቀን ጩኸትን አይደለም።

የተባለው የአረንጓዴ አሻራ ችግኝ (2019–2025)25–40 ቢሊዮን

የተባለ ብሔራዊ የደን ሽፋን፣ 2019 → 202517.2% → 23.6%

የኦሮሚያ REDD+ ERPA (ዓለም ባንክ፣ 2023)እስከ $40ሚ / ~4 ሚ.ቶን CO₂e

የሚሸለመውየተቀረ የደን ጭፍጨፋ እንጂ መትከል አይደለም

ካርቦኑን ማን ያረጋግጣልገለልተኛ ሦስተኛ ወገን

የመትከል ቆጠራውን ማን ያረጋግጣልመንግሥት ራሱ

ስንት ዛፎች ጸደቁ — እና ማን ይቆጥራል?

ይህ ትዕይንቱ ሊያስቀረው የተዘጋጀለት ጥያቄ ነው። የመንግሥት አቋም ወጥ ነው፦ የመጽደቅ ምጣኔ ከ80 በመቶ በላይ፣ አንዳንዴም 85። ከጁላይ 2022 እስከ ጁላይ 2023 ተተከሉ ለሚላቸው 7.5 ቢሊዮን ችግኞች፣ ይፋዊው የመጽደቅ አኃዝ 85 በመቶ ነበር። ችግሩ ግን ከመንግሥት ውጭ ያለ ማንም እንዲያረጋግጠው አለመፈቀዱ ነው፤ ለመሞከር የሞከሩ ሁሉ ማለት ይቻላል ዝቅ ያለ አኃዝ ላይ ደርሰዋል።

በኢትዮጵያ ራሷ የአካባቢ ኮሚሽን ውስጥ ያሉ ምንጮች ለአንድ ምርመራ እንደተናገሩት ለዚያ ስብስብ እውነተኛው የመጽደቅ ምጣኔ 50 በመቶ ላይበልጥ ይችላል። የተባበሩት መንግሥታት የመስክ መረጃ በአማራና በትግራይ ደጋማ አካባቢዎች መጽደቅን በቅደም ተከተል 55 እና 58 በመቶ ገደማ አስቀምጧል — በሙቀት፣ በቀጭን ዝናብና በተከታይ እንክብካቤ መጥፋት የተበላሸ። አንድ በአቻ-ምሁራን የተገመገመ የአስተዳደር ጥናት ይበልጥ ግልጽ ነበር፦ እነዚህ ዘመቻዎች በመደበኛ መንገድ አይከታተሉም፤ የመስክ ምልከታም ከይፋዊው ይገባኛል በእጅጉ ዝቅ ያለ መጽደቅን ያመለክታል። ታሪካዊው መዝገብም ብዙ ማጽናኛ የለውም — ከ1970ዎቹ እስከ 1990ዎቹ የነበሩ የኢትዮጵያ የመትከያ መርሐ-ግብሮች ከ20 በመቶ በታች መጽደቅ መዝግበዋል — ዓለም አቀፉ ዝንባሌም የከፋ ነው፦ ሰፋፊ የመትከያ ዘመቻዎች በመደበኛነት ከ60 እስከ 90 በመቶ ይከሽፋሉ። የቱርክ ዝነኛው የ11 ሚሊዮን ዛፍ ቀን በ2019፣ በራሱ የደን ባለሙያዎች ማኅበር ግምት፣ በወራት ውስጥ እስከ ዘጠኝ-አስረኛውን አጥቶ ነበር።

መሠረታዊው ችግር ዛፎች መሞታቸው አይደለም፤ ዛፎች ሁልጊዜ በተወሰነ መጠን ይሞታሉ። ችግሩ በአረንጓዴ አሻራ ሞዴል ውስጥ አንድ ተዋናይ ግቡን ያስቀምጣል፣ መትከሉን ያስተባብራል፣ ቆጠራውን ይፈጽማል፣ ውጤቱን ያውጃል፣ ቀጥሎም ለዓለም ያስተዋውቀዋል። ግልጽ የሆነ የሕዝብ መከታተያ ሥርዓት የለም። ከቢሊዮኖቹ ስንቱ ጠንካራ ሀገር-በቀል ዝርያ እንደነበረ፣ ስንቱም ባህር ዛፍ — የተራቆተ መሬት የሚተነፍስለትን የውሃ ሽፋን የሚመጥጥ ያ ጥም-ያለው የቅኝ-ግዛት አስመጪ ዝርያ — እንደነበረ የታተመ ዝርዝር የለም። መንግሥት ፎቶውንም ያነሳል፣ መግለጫውንም ይጽፋል። በመላው ሥርዓቱ ውስጥ ብቸኛው የውጭ ኦዲተር፣ እንዳየነው፣ የካርቦን-ፋይናንስ አረጋጋጩ ነው — እሱም በመላው ኦሮሚያ የተቀረ የደን ጭፍጨፋን ይለካል እንጂ ሚኒስትሩ በጁላይ መሬት ውስጥ የጨመረው ችግኝ በዲሴምበር ሕያው ይሁን አይሁን አይለካም። የትዕይንቱ መጽደቅ፣ በመጨረሻም፣ በራስ-የተረጋገጠ ነው።

ቀድሞውኑ የነበረው ደን

አሁን ሌላውን ደን አስብ — ለካሜራ የማይመቸውን። በትግራይ ደጋማው የደሳ አካባቢ፣ ወደ ዳናክል በሚወርደው ገደል ጫፍ ላይ፣ ከተዘጋ ጣራው ወደ 40 በመቶ ያህል ያጣ ደረቅ የአፍሮ-ተራራማ ደን መልሶ እያገገመ ነው። WeForest የተባለው ድርጅት፣ በ2019 ከክልሉ ግብርና ቢሮ ጋር በተፈረመ የመግባቢያ ሰነድ መሠረት በ38,000 ሄክታር ገደማ እየሠራ፣ የመትከያ ዘመቻዎች ፈጽሞ የማያደርጉትን አደረገ፦ ማንኛውንም ነገር መሬት ውስጥ ከመጨመሩ በፊት መሬቱን አስተካከለ። መንደርተኞች የመስመር ቦይዎችንና የውሃ ማስረጊያ ጉድጓዶችን ቆፈሩ፣ በመቶዎች የሚቆጠሩ ኪሎ ሜትሮችን የድንጋይ እርከኖችንም በእጅ ደረደሩ — ፕሮጀክቱ “ዝናብን መትከል” ብሎ የጠራው። በመላው ትግራይ ማኅበረሰቦች ወደ አንድ ሚሊዮን ሄክታር መሬት ለመመለስ በእጅ 90 ሚሊዮን ቶን ገደማ አፈርና ድንጋይ አንቀሳቅሰዋል — በዘመናዊ የአፍሪካ ታሪክ ከታዩት ትልልቅ በእጅ-የተሠሩ የምህንድስና ሥራዎች አንዱ፣ እና ከአገሪቱ ውጭ ማንም ያልሰማው።

ሁለተኛው እርምጃ ይበልጥ እንግዳ ነበር። በዚህ መልክዓ-ምድር ብዙ ክፍል ደኑ ሞቶ አያውቅም — ከመሬት በታች ነበር። ሀገር-በቀል ጥዶችና ወይራዎች፣ መቶ ጊዜ ተግጠው ተቃጥለው፣ እንደ ሕያው ስርወ-ግንድ — ከመሬት በታች የሚጠብቁ ጥንታዊ ባዮሎጂያዊ ባትሪዎች — ሆነው ይተርፋሉ። እነዚህን መልሰው ወደ ላይ የማውጣት ስልት — ከችግኝ ጣቢያ ችግኝ ገዝቶ ከመትከል ይልቅ ካለ ስርወ-ግንድ ጠንካራ ቡቃያዎችን መከርከም — “በገበሬ የሚመራ የተፈጥሮ ዳግም ማገገም” (FMNR) ይባላል። አውስትራሊያዊው የግብርና ባለሙያ ቶኒ ሪናውዶ ይህን በ1983 በኒጀር አበጀው — ከዓመታት የከሸፈ መትከል በኋላ፣ በመንገድ ዳር ያለን “ቁጥቋጦ” በቅጡ ለመመልከት ቆም ብሎ፣ ስሩ አሁንም ሕያው የሆነ የተቆረጠ ዛፍ ጫፍ መሆኑን ሲረዳ። በ2018 የ Right Livelihood ሽልማትን — አማራጩን ኖቤል — ተቀበለ። በኒጀር ብቻ ስልቱ አምስት ሚሊዮን ሄክታርና 200 ሚሊዮን ገደማ ዛፎችን መልሶ አረንጓዴ አድርጓል፣ ሁለት ነጥብ አምስት ሚሊዮን ሰዎችንም ተጠቃሚ አድርጓል፣ በሄክታር ሀያ ዶላር ገደማ ወጪ።

ያንን የመጨረሻ አኃዝ ከትዕይንቱ ራሱ ሒሳብ ጋር አስቀምጠው። በመንግሥት መገናኛ ብዙኃን በተዘገበና ለመነሻ ኮሚቴው ራሱ በተሰጠ ወጪ መሠረት፣ አረንጓዴ አሻራ በአንድ ችግኝ ሀያ ዶላር ገደማ ሲያወጣ ቆይቷል። ያ አኃዝ በመጠኑም ቢሆን ትክክል ከሆነ፣ ያው ሀያ ዶላር ወይ የመጽደቅ ዕድሉ እንደ ሳንቲም-መወርወር የሆነ አንድ ለካሜራ የሚመች ችግኝ ይገዛል፣ አሊያም ቀድሞውኑ መሬት ውስጥ ካለ ስር ሙሉ አንድ ሄክታር ደን ይመልሳል — በሚገባ በሚተዳደሩ የዳግም ማገገም ፕሮጀክቶች ከ90 በመቶ የሚበልጥ የመጽደቅ ምጣኔ። ይህ የመላው ጽሑፍ ክርክር በአንድ ንጽጽር የተጨመቀ ነው።

“መሬቱ ሞቶ አያውቅም። እኛ ብቻ ማዳመጥ አቆምን።”

ቀጥሎም ማንኛውም የፖሊሲ ጽሑፍ ሊቀርጸው የማይችለው ፈተና መጣ። በኖቬምበር 2020 ጦርነት ትግራይን ሲውጥ፣ ዓለም አቀፍ ድርጅቶች ለቀቁ፣ ፋይናንሱ ፈረሰ፣ ቴክኒካዊ ድጋፉ ጠፋ። በክልሉ የሚገኙ አብዛኞቹ በውጭ-የሚደገፉ ፕሮጀክቶች በቀላሉ ቆሙ። የደሳ ሥራ ግን አልቆመም። ቦይዎቹ አሁንም ተቆፈሩ፣ እርከኖቹ አሁንም ተጠገኑ፣ ስርወ-ግንዶቹም አሁንም ተከረከሙ — ምክንያቱም በዚያን ጊዜ ምን ማድረግ እንዳለበት ያለው ዕውቀት ከአንድ መንግሥታዊ-ያልሆነ ድርጅት ወይም ሚኒስቴር ጋር አልነበረም። በመሬቱ ላይ ከሚኖሩ ሰዎች ጋር ነበር። ከጦርነቱ በኋላ የተደረገ ግምገማ እንዳመለከተው፣ ብዙዎቹ በይበልጥ የለሙ አካባቢዎች ጦርነቱን ከመትረፍ አልፈው፣ ያለ ምንም የውጭ ድጋፍ በጦርነቱ ውስጥም መሻሻላቸውን ቀጥለዋል። በማኅበረሰብ የተያዘ የመልሶ ማልማት ሥራ ከሁለት ዓመት ጦርነት ይበልጥ ዘላቂ ሆነ። ይህ የአረንጓዴ አሻራ ትዕይንት፣ በሁሉም ቢሊዮኖቹ ቢሆን፣ ስለ ራሱ ሊጽፈው የማይችለው ዓረፍተ-ነገር ነው።

እውነተኛው ሒሳብ

ይህ ሁሉ አረንጓዴ አሻራን ከንቱ አያደርገውም፤ ትሪቡንም ይህን አያስመስልም። ዘመቻው፣ በአስተዋይነት፣ ማኅበረሰቦችን ቀጥታ ወደሚከፍለው የፍራፍሬና የመኖ ግብር-ደን ተሸጋግሯል፤ የገጠር ሥራ ፈጥሯል፤ መትከል በእውነት ለሚያስፈልጋት አገር ለሕዝብ ግንዛቤም እውነተኛ መልካም ነገር አድርጓል። የኦሮሚያ መርሐ-ግብሩ ራሱ ከ350 በላይ የማኅበረሰብ ህብረት ሥራ ማኅበራትና በተከታታይ መንግሥታዊ-ያልሆኑ ድርጅቶች — Farm Africa፣ World Vision፣ የእርጥብ-መሬት ማኅበር — በኩል ይሠራል፤ ይህም መንግሥትና የማኅበረሰብ ሞዴል ሁልጊዜ ጠላቶች አለመሆናቸውን ያሳያል። በአዲስ አበባ የተደረጉ የሀገር-በቀል ዝርያ ሙከራዎች፣ ማልች ማድረግ፣ ውሃ ማጠጣትና መከላከል የተባለው አሰልቺ ሥራ በትክክል ሲሠራ፣ ከ82 እስከ 96 በመቶ መጽደቅ መዝግበዋል። ነጥቡ ትዕይንቱ ምንም አያስገኝም ማለት አይደለም። ነጥቡ ከሁሉ በተሻለ በሚተገብርበት ቦታ ከሁሉ ባነሰ የሚመረመር፣ ከሁሉ በተሻለ በሚመረመርበት ቦታ ደግሞ ከሁሉ ባነሰ የሚተገብር መሆኑ ነው።

ስለዚህ ይህ የሁለት ደኖች ታሪክ ነው፤ እኩልም እውን አይደሉም። አንዱ በመግለጫዎች፣ በመትከያ-ቀን ሪከርዶችና በጎብኚ ዲፕሎማቶች መገኘት ይለካል፤ መጽደቁ በመንግሥት ቃል ይታመናል፤ ካርቦኑም፣ በሚመች ሁኔታ፣ ፈጽሞ በሌላ ቦታ ይታሰባል። ሌላው በሠላሳ ደረቅ ዓመታት በኋላ መልሰው በፈሰሱ ምንጮች፣ ወደ ዳሰሳ መዝገብ በተመለሱ ወፎች፣ ከራሱ ስር ወጥቶ ጦርነትን በተቋቋመ ደን ይለካል። ጥልቁ ምፀት መንግሥት ሊሰበስበው እጅግ የሚጓጓለት የካርቦን ገንዘብ በመጨረሻ በሁለተኛው ደን አመክንዮ ላይ የተመረኮዘ መሆኑ ነው — እውነተኛ ቆሞ ያለ ዛፍ፣ እውነተኛ የተቀረ ኪሳራ፣ በውጪ ሰው የተረጋገጠ — ማስታወቂያው ግን የመጀመሪያውን ቢሸልምም። መሬቱ፣ በደሳ የሚኖር አንድ አዛውንት ለአንድ ጋዜጠኛ እንደነገሩት፣ ሞቶ አያውቅም። የሪፐብሊኩ የቀረው ተግባር ያ አዛውንት የሰየሙት ነው፦ ትዕይንትን አቁሞ፣ ማዳመጥ መጀመር።

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ምንጮች የዓለም ባንክ የባዮካርቦን ፈንድ / ISFL (የኦሮሚያ ደናማ መልክዓ-ምድር መርሐ-ግብርና የፌብሩዋሪ 2023 ERPA)፣ Dialogue Earth፣ በ Frontiers in Sustainable Food Systems የተዘገበ የተባበሩት መንግሥታት የመስክ መረጃ፣ በኢትዮጵያ የዛፍ-መትከል ላይ የተደረገ በአቻ-ምሁራን የተገመገመ የአስተዳደር ጥናት (Kassa et al.)፣ የ Right Livelihood ፋውንዴሽን፣ እና ስለ WeForest ደሳ መርሐ-ግብርና ስለ FMNR የተደረጉ ዘገባዎችን ያካትታሉ። ለአረንጓዴ አሻራ ኢኒሼቲቭ የተሰጡ አኃዞች — የችግኝ ብዛት፣ የደን-ሽፋን መቶኛና የአንድ-ችግኝ ወጪን ጨምሮ — የመንግሥት ይገባኛሎች ሲሆኑ እንደዚያው ቀርበዋል፤ የመትከል ቆጠራዎቹ ገለልተኛ ማረጋገጫ፣ በአሁኑ ጊዜ፣ የለም።

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The Witness Expelled: Tsimdo, Tigray, and the Geometry of Addis Ababa’s Silence

Ethiopian Tribune editor — Sun, 14 Jun 2026 11:46:03 +0000

Read Time:8 Minute, 31 Second

By E. Frashie | Ethiopian Tribune Columnist

On 11 June, Augustine Passilly La Croix‘s 30-year-old Horn of Africa correspondent, resident in Ethiopia since 2023 boarded a departure flight from Addis Ababa under compulsion. She had not resigned. She had not completed her assignment. Ethiopian authorities had revoked both her press accreditation and her residence permit, valid until September 2026, and issued an exit visa that expired within the week. What preceded that departure was a sequence of actions that illuminates, with unusual clarity, the architecture of information control that Abiy Ahmed’s government has constructed around the Tigray theatre and why it has become structurally essential to maintain it.

Passilly had travelled to Shire, in Tigray, between 3 and 6 June, covering growing resident anxiety about the prospect of renewed conflict amid escalating political and military tensions in the region. On 4 June, while still in Shire, she was contacted by a representative of the Ethiopian Media Authority and ordered to return to Addis Ababa immediately. The next available flight was not until the 6th. She complied. Back in Addis, she was summoned to the EMA, where she met with four officials including Director General Haymanot Zeleke and Deputy Director General Yonatan Tesfaye. Officials questioned her decision to have travelled to Tigray amid the political and security tensions that have persisted since the TPLF reinstated the pre-war Tigray regional administration on 5 May. Her accreditation was suspended pending investigation. Two days later, the Immigration and Citizenship Services revoked both accreditation and residency. She departed Ethiopia on 11 June.

No formal charge. No public explanation. A journalist basing her travel on a region officially accessible to foreign correspondents — access to Tigray, which had been restricted during parts of the post-war period, was reopened to foreign correspondents in 2024 was nonetheless expelled for using it. The message is structural, not procedural: the right to access and the exercise of that right are not the same thing, and the government reserves the right to punish the latter regardless of what its own regulations say about the former.

What She Was Covering — and Why It Matters

To understand the expulsion, one must understand what is happening in Tigray and what Addis Ababa most fears being reported from Shire.

The 2022 Pretoria Agreement between the government and the TPLF has unravelled in recent weeks. The TPLF has moved to restore its regional authority by reconstituting the pre-war legislative council, subsequently electing party chairman Debretsion Gebremichael as regional president. This followed the federal government unilaterally renewing the term of interim regional administration president General Tadesse Worede. During early May 2026, the TPLF replaced the interim post-Tigray War administration in Mekelle a development that has significantly heightened tensions with the federal government, as the TPLF’s attempt to reassert control over Tigray is being seen as a direct challenge to Abiy Ahmed’s rule.

It is within this context of a shattered peace framework and a contested regional government that Passilly arrived in Shire on the eve of the federal snap election of 1 June, from which Tigray was again excluded. Despite both the government and the TPLF not favouring a formal return to war, the risks of renewed conflict are significant. The TPLF’s unilateral assertion of regional authority leaves little room for the federal government to back down without appearing weak. Shire, sitting close to Tigray’s northern and western perimeters, is precisely where the geography of potential conflict converges. A French correspondent asking residents about the prospect of war in that location was, from Addis Ababa’s vantage point, not doing journalism. She was mapping the edges of a secret.

Tsimdo: The Coalition Abiy Cannot Name Aloud

The deeper reason why the Tigray theatre has become so ferociously guarded from foreign press is the emergence of what the Ethiopian government has labelled the Tsimdo alliance a coalition of forces increasingly coordinating against the Prosperity Party government and, by extension, against Abiy Ahmed personally.

The TPLF has reinforced relationships with Eritrea and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), both of which have strained relations with the Ethiopian government. Eritrean forces operate in Tigray, and Eritrea provides the TPLF with its only accessible allied border. Tigrayan fighters based in eastern Sudan have fought alongside the SAF. A recent coordination meeting in Port Sudan brought together Ethiopian opposition groups with pro-SAF Sudanese and Eritrean participants.

Ethiopia’s government sees this ‘Tsimdo’ alliance as a threat, concerned about the risk to its border areas with Eritrea and Sudan, including Western Tigray known as Welkait by the Amhara and Benishangul-Gumuz. ENDF officials warned the foreign diplomatic community that any attempt to operationalise the Tsimdo initiative would face retaliation from Ethiopia, describing it as a threat to national sovereignty linked to opposition.

The geometry here is significant. Tsimdo is not a formal military structure with a unified command. It is better understood as an alignment of adversarial interests: the Debretsion-led TPLF, Eritrea under Isaias Afwerki whose own strategic calculations have been in flux and the Sudanese Armed Forces, which has been fighting Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces in a civil war that has drawn in, on the other side, both Ethiopia and the UAE. These actors are more widely aligned with Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Turkey, and have sought to counter the growing regional influence of the UAE and Israel, who count Ethiopia and Somaliland among their partners.

The alliance is held together not by ideological coherence but by a shared opposition to Abiy’s regional project and, more broadly, to the UAE-anchored economic and security architecture that Addis Ababa has been building since the Abraham Accords era. To report from Shire to talk to residents about what they fear and what they know is to potentially document the operational texture of this coalition. That is what the EMA moved to prevent.

A Pattern, Not an Incident

The Passilly case is not an aberration. It is the latest instalment in a systematic effort to deny international media access to the conflict zones that would most embarrass Addis Ababa.

In February 2026, an accredited AFP journalist was barred from boarding a flight from Addis Ababa to Shire after airport security personnel said he lacked authorisation from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. That restriction followed Ethiopia’s decision not to renew the accreditation of three Reuters journalists after the agency published a report alleging the presence of a training base for Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces on Ethiopian territory. The Reuters story was not a rumour: Ethiopia has reportedly facilitated support to the SAF’s enemies in Sudan the RSF and SPLM-N and has, according to Reuters and Yale’s Humanitarian Research Lab, provided a military training camp for the RSF in the Benishangul-Gumuz border region. Stripping Reuters of accreditation was not a rebuttal. It was an eviction.

The Committee to Protect Journalists described the Reuters accreditation revocations as a violation of press freedom and documented what it called increasing restrictions targeting international media in Ethiopia. In December 2024, local journalists working for Deutsche Welle were permanently suspended. Accreditation renewals for BBC correspondents were denied. And in February 2026, Addis Standard and Wazema Radio had their licences revoked.

Addis Standard, the most credible independent Anglophone outlet covering Ethiopian affairs is currently engaged in active legal proceedings before the Federal Court over the EMA’s regulatory conduct, with the case adjourned to 24 June. The Passilly expulsion lands in this context not as an isolated administrative decision but as a statement of intent: the government will protect the Tigray information environment from scrutiny at any cost, using whatever regulatory mechanism is available.

The Logic of the Blackout

There is an internal logic to all of this that deserves to be stated plainly.

Abiy Ahmed is seeking an election victory that enables his ruling Prosperity Party to reaffirm its mandate. It has also been suggested that an electoral victory could offer Abiy a route to enacting constitutional reforms that would strengthen central authority including creating an executive presidency and altering Ethiopia’s ethnic federal structure. A return to war in Tigray, or the exposure of Ethiopia’s proxy activities in Sudan, would undermine the international legitimacy that makes that reform project viable. The EU has recently resumed direct budgetary support to Ethiopia. The United States has softened its arms export ban. These are the diplomatic dividends Abiy is spending and which documented atrocities, visible military escalation, or RSF training footage would instantly revoke.

The blackout over Tigray is therefore not primarily about military secrecy. It is about protecting a political economy built on selective international engagement. Augustine Passilly was expelled not because she had done something wrong under Ethiopian law. She was expelled because she had gone somewhere that the government cannot afford to have witnessed.

What the Ethiopian Tribune Holds

For those of us who cover this region, the Passilly case carries a specific resonance. The La Croix correspondent was not doing anything we would not do. She travelled to a tense northern town to ask residents whether they were afraid of another war. That is the irreducible minimum of journalism in a conflict zone.

The expulsion of a foreign correspondent a French citizen, accredited, resident, legally present represents the clearest possible statement that Addis Ababa intends to manage the Tigray narrative unilaterally, and that it is willing to burn diplomatic goodwill with European partners to do so. That the EMA has not yet offered a public explanation only deepens the signal: they do not feel compelled to justify themselves.

The Tsimdo alliance, whether or not it fully materialises as a military coalition, has already achieved one thing: it has forced the Ethiopian government into a defensive posture so rigid that a 30-year-old reporter covering civilian anxiety in Shire is considered a threat to national sovereignty. When a state reaches that point, the thing it is protecting is not security. It is impunity.

News and reports compiled from available online sources, including Addis Standard, The Eastleigh Voice, Chatham House, the Committee to Protect Journalists, Al Jazeera, and the Europe External Programme with Africa (EEPA). All sourced material has been independently verified where possible.

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Commission’s ‘Farce’ of a Report Claims Only Three Dead; Aseko Church Condemns Outrageous Erasure

Ethiopian Tribune editor — Tue, 09 Jun 2026 05:00:39 +0000

Read Time:1 Minute, 57 Second

The Aseko District Church has utterly rejected the casualty figures released by the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission (EHRC) regarding the brutal militant attacks in Arsi Zone, Oromia, on Ginbot 23 & 24, 2018 EC
While the Commission seems content to play down the bloodshed, His Grace Abune Elisa, Archbishop of the Arsi and Somali Region Jigjiga Dioceses of the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church, had already confirmed the grim reality at the time: 13 Orthodox Christians slaughtered, over 280 faithful displaced, and a century-old church reduced to ashes.
Local residents speaking to Borkena went further, placing the death toll at well over 50, with numerous others still missing.
Yet, in a staggering display of detached reporting last night, the EHRC claimed the fatalities amounted to a grand total of “three” conveniently categorised as two Christians and one Muslim. They also noted damage to the perimeter wall of Sheikh Mustafa Mosque, alongside the destruction of the Seleta St. Gabriel Church.

“We Were on the Ground!! They Wiped Out Scores”

Speaking on condition of anonymity following the EHRC’s whitewash, a senior official from the Aseko District Church Diocese didn’t mince words:

“We actually went to the massacre sites. The number of dead is massive.”

The official clarified that while one Muslim resident was tragically among the casualties, the total number of murdered victims exceeds 50.
“282 homes and a church were torched,” the official added, noting that recent assessments show the number of displaced people has now skyrocketed past 2,500. “As for the property destroyed? It is simply beyond measure.”

The Blatant Disconnect

When challenged on the glaring discrepancy between the Commission’s claim of “three” dead and the Church’s figure of “over 50,” the local church official shut down the EHRC’s narrative completely.
He confirmed that the diocese had explicitly provided the Commission with the exact figure of 52 dead and over 2,500 displaced.
“We didn’t rely on hearsay,” the official snapped. “We compiled hard data directly from the displaced survivors—we know exactly how many children they lost, and how many of their family members were butchered.”

The official completely dismissed the EHRC’s report as an offensive fabrication:
“It is completely detached from reality. It is erroneous, unconscionable, and flat-out wrong. Even government officials came to the site and saw the truth with their own eyes.”

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Why should innocent people perish? Why should the motherland die?

Ethiopian Tribune editor — Tue, 09 Jun 2026 04:14:33 +0000

Read Time:3 Minute, 48 Second

Bekele Gesesse (PhD), June 2026

First and foremost, I would like to express my deepest condolences regarding the utterly shameful and barbaric massacre recently committed against the church and the faithful in Arsi. May the Lord our God rest the souls of the deceased, and may He bring His judgement upon the murderers and the destroyers of the church.

1st/ Who is Ethiopia? What has she contributed?

Ethiopia is a holy country that has existed for thousands of years, created by the Lord our God who endowed her with everything in abundance.
She is a unique country where Orthodox and Muslim followers have coexisted with mutual respect and love. It was a nation where various ethnic groups and tribes intermarried, cooperated, and lived together in peace. She is deeply hospitable.
When foreign invasions threatened her, she united through the power of God, repelled the forces, and preserved her independence. She is an honoured nation that contributed immensely to liberating Africa from slavery and colonialism. She was Africa’s sole member of the League of Nations and a founding member of the United Nations. She played a monumental role in the establishment of the Organisation of African Unity.
For these reasons, she became the seat of the African Union and various international branch organisations.

2nd/ Why have her enemies multiplied?

a) Historical foreign enemies harbour grudges against us.

Emperor Tewodros did not surrender to the British invading forces at Maqdala.
We made history by defeating Italy at Adwa.
During the second invasion at Maychew, we resisted poison gas and modern weaponry, safeguarding our independence after five years of bitter struggle.
As mentioned above, Ethiopia contributed immensely to the liberation of African countries from slavery and colonialism. Because the Amhara people and the Orthodox faith played a major role in this achievement, enemies wish to destroy them, dismantle Ethiopia, and return Africa to subjugation.
b) The role of internal slaughterers and secessionist forces
It was expected that the Italians would be completely cleared out after their defeat at Adwa. Instead, they retreated to the Bahre Negash (the maritime province) and occupied it, changing its name to Eritrea. Eventually, Eritrea reunited with its motherland through a federation. When that federation was dissolved, the ELF (Eritrean Liberation Front) rose up to reverse it. Subsequently, the EPLF was formed. Due to external backing and internal weaknesses, the question shifted from federation to secession.
The military Derg regime, after seventeen years of weakening the country by slaughtering numerous leaders, generals, and intellectuals, handed over power to the EPLF and TPLF forces and fled abroad. When the TPLF took power, they quickly facilitated Eritrea’s secession. They introduced an ethnically divisive constitution. Through fabricated narratives, they framed the Amhara people, in particular, as the public enemy.
After twenty-seven years of exploitation, a weakened TPLF handed power over to Oromo forces and retreated to Mekelle.

3rd/ The ongoing massacres and the campaign to destroy the country

The situation has rapidly deteriorated, particularly since the establishment of Abiy’s Oromuma administration.
The following explicit crimes are actively being perpetrated:

The massacre of the Amhara people,
The massacre of Orthodox Christians,
Attacks on churches,
The closure of schools,
The denial of medical treatment,
The displacement of people,
The destruction of heritage and looting of property,
The stripping away of stability,
The destruction of the economy,
Causing the nation to be despised in the eyes of Africa and the world,
Dismantling the country,
And so forth.
Why? Why? Why?

4th/ Conclusion

Do we all equally understand the catastrophic dangers mentioned above? If so, why have we failed to form a grand alliance to swiftly bring about a change that benefits everyone? What more are we waiting for???
The TPLF’s dream of annexing fertile Amhara land to establish a Tigray nation is sheer madness. Similarly, the dream of the Oromuma forces to build an Oromo nation by slaughtering the Amhara, Orthodox Christians, and others is equally mad. It would be far better, especially for the Tigray and Oromo public, to wake up quickly and stand with others for unity, peace, and sustainable development.
Others, realising that tomorrow it could be them, must stand shoulder to shoulder with the Fano, who are currently fighting for their very survival.
If foreign powers believe they will benefit from the dismantling of Ethiopia, they are mistaken. They would do well to learn from their past errors and refrain from their malicious actions.
May the Lord our God stand by our innocent, impoverished citizens, break the arm of the murderous and destructive forces, and send down His peace. Amen.

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ባለው አስከፊ ሁኔታ ስለምርጫ ማሰብ አይቻልም

Ethiopian Tribune editor — Fri, 29 May 2026 09:53:26 +0000

Read Time:2 Minute, 49 Second

በቀለ ገሠሠ (ዶ/ር)

፩ኛ/ መንደርደሪያ፣

ብዙ ዓለማት ዞረን ዐይተናል። እግዚአብሔር አምላካችን ኢትዮጵያን የፈጠራት ሁሉን ነገር አሟልቶ ነው። የምድሯን ስፋትና ለምነት፣ የወንዞችና ሃይቆችዋን ብዛት፣ ንጹህ አየር፣ ደጋግ ህዝብ፣ ወዘተ ስንመለከት እጅግ በጣም ሃብታም አገር መሆን ነበረባት።

አልታደለችምና ዛሬ የምትገኝበትን የባሰ ሁኔታ ስንመለከት እጅግ በጣም እናዝናለን።

ጎሣን ከጎሳ ያጋጫሉ። የአማራ ህዝብ የትግሬ፣ የኦሮሞና የማንም ጎሣ ጠላት ሆኖ አያውቅም። ደጋግና እንግዳ ተቀባይ ህዝብ ነው። በማንኛውም ሥርዓት ሥር ጥሮ ግሮ ከመኖር በስተቀር ያገኘው አንዳችም ልዩ ጥቅም አልነበረም። ዛሬ ግን በገዛ ቀዬው እንኳን እንዳይኖር፣ አርሶ ነግዶ ልጆቹን እንዳያሳድግ ዘመቻ ሲካሄድበት ይታያል። ትምህርት ቤቶች ይዘጋሉ፣ የእምነት ቦታዎች ይደፈራሉ።

እነዚህን ከባድ ችግሮች እንደመቅረፍ ፈንታ ስለውሸት ምርጫ ሲወራ መስማት በጣም ያሳዝናል፣ ያሳፍራል።

፪ኛ/ የነፃ ምርጫ አስፈላጊነት፣

የኢትዮጵያ ህዝብ ነፃ አገራዊ ምርጫን ሲጠማ ነው የኖረው።

የዲሞክራሲ ሥርዓት ምሶሶ ነፃ ምርጫ እንደሆነ ግልፅ ነው። ነፃ ምርጫ ከሌለ አምባገነንነት ይንሰራፋል፣ በውድ አገራችን ሲፈጸሙ የቆዮት አረመኔያዊ ጭፍጨፋዎች፣ ማፈናቀሎችና ዝርፊያዎች በዲሞክራሲ ሥርዓት እጦት ምክንያት ነው።

፫ኛ/ የነፃ ምርጫ ቅድመ ሁኔታዎች፣

እውነተኛ ምርጫ ለማካሄድ፣

ሰላም ምስፈን አለበት፣
ነፃ የምርጫ ቦርድ መቋቋም አለበት፣
በየምርጫው ኬላ ላይ ገለልተኞች የሆኑ አገራዊና የውጪ ታዛቢዎች መገኘት አለባቸው።

፬ኛ/ አሁን ምን መደረግ አለበት?

መጀመሪያ ሁሉ-አቀፍ የሽግግር መንግሥት መቋቋም አለበት። ከፋፋዩ ሕገመንግሥ መለወጥ አለበት።
ወንጀለኞች ለፍርድ መቅረብ አለባቸው።

ከዚያ በኃላ ነፃና ፍትሐዊ ምርጫ ማካሄድ፣
ሰላም ማውረድና
እድገት ላይ ማተኮር ይኖርብናል።
እግዚአብሔር ይርዳን፣ ይታረቀን።

Given the Dire Situation, Thinking About Elections is Impossible

By Bekele Gessesse (PhD)

1. Introduction

We have travelled and seen much of the world. Almighty God created Ethiopia with everything she could possibly need. When looking at the vastness and fertility of her land, the abundance of her rivers and lakes, her clean air, and her generous people, she should have been an incredibly wealthy nation.

Unfortunately, she has been unlucky, and it is deeply saddening to witness the worsening conditions she finds herself in today.

They pit one ethnic group against another. The Amhara people have never been enemies of the Tigrayan, Oromo, or any other ethnic community. They are a kind and hospitable people. Under any regime, they have never received any special privileges, asking for nothing more than to live by working hard and honestly. Today, however, we see a campaign being waged against them, preventing them from even living in their own localities, or farming and trading to raise their children. Schools are being closed, and places of worship are being desecrated.

Instead of resolving these severe crises, it is deeply disheartening and shameful to hear talk of a sham election.

2. The Necessity of Free Elections

The people of Ethiopia have long thirsted for a free national election.

It is clear that free elections are the cornerstone of a democratic system. In the absence of free elections, tyranny flourishes. The barbaric massacres, displacements, and plundering that have been carried out in our beloved country are the direct result of a lack of a democratic system.

3. Preconditions for Free Elections

To conduct a genuine election:

Peace must be established across the country.

An independent electoral board must be set up.

Neutral national and international observers must be present at every polling station.

4. What Must Be Done Now?

First and foremost, an all-inclusive transitional government must be established. The divisive constitution must be amended, and criminals must be brought to justice.

Only after these steps are taken can we: Conduct a free and fair election, Restore peace, and Focus on development.

May God help us and grant us His reconciliation.

About Post Author

Ethiopian Tribune editor

editor@ethiopiantribune.com

https://ethiopiantribune.com

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The ‘New Auschwitz’? Targeted Atrocities against Orthodox Amharas in Arsi, Oromia, Ethiopia

Ethiopian Tribune editor — Fri, 20 Mar 2026 05:34:13 +0000

Read Time:17 Minute, 31 Second

By Professor Girma Berhanu

Introduction

The ongoing violence directed against Christian Amhara communities in the Arsi Zone raises serious concerns regarding the protection of vulnerable populations in Ethiopia. Recent reports indicate an intensification of targeted attacks, including killings, abductions, and the destruction of civilian property, particularly in districts such as Shirka, Guna, and Aseko. Investigations by the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission have documented incidents since late 2025 in which armed groups carried out attacks that resulted in deaths, injuries, and displacement of local residents, severely undermining the security and basic rights of affected communities.

These developments must be understood within the broader context of Ethiopia’s complex and evolving conflict dynamics. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights has documented widespread human rights violations in multiple regions of the country, including Oromia and Amhara. In 2023 alone, thousands of civilians were killed in violent incidents across these regions, while thousands were subjected to abuses such as arbitrary detention, torture, and forced displacement. Such patterns indicate that the current violence is not an isolated phenomenon but part of a broader cycle of armed conflict and intercommunal tensions orchestrated by the system.

Historically, Amhara communities living in parts of Oromia have periodically faced episodes of mass violence and forced displacement. Several documented incidents—including massacres targeting civilians identified as ethnically Amhara—illustrate the recurring nature of such attacks. One example occurred in 2020 in western Oromia, where hundreds of Amhara civilians were killed in an attack widely reported by international media and human rights observers. These events underscore the vulnerability of minority communities residing outside their region of ethnic majority.

In recent months, observers and human-rights organizations have expressed concern over what appears to be a renewed escalation in violence. Reports describe killings, kidnappings, and large-scale displacement in parts of Oromia, with civilians caught between insurgent groups, local militias, and government forces. The insurgency involving the Oromo Liberation Army has contributed to a deteriorating security environment in which civilians are frequently exposed to abuses by multiple actors. However, the group claimed the violence aimed to fracture collective opposition by pitting communities against one another, including along Oromo–Amhara and Christian–Muslim lines. The OLA further stated that “whether in uniform or without, whether carrying a gun or a pen,” any actor who “weaponizes innocent civilians for political ends” would be considered its enemy, adding that it would confront such forces decisively.

Despite the gravity of these developments, the international response has often been perceived as limited compared with the scale of the humanitarian and human rights concerns involved. Scholars and policy analysts have noted that Ethiopia’s overlapping conflicts—spanning regions such as Tigray, Amhara, and Oromia—have complicated international engagement and reduced sustained attention to localized patterns of violence against minority communities.

Given these conditions, the situation warrants sustained monitoring, systematic documentation, and deeper international engagement. Strengthening mechanisms for independent investigation, accountability, and civilian protection remains essential for mitigating further violence and ensuring that vulnerable communities are afforded the protections guaranteed under international human rights and humanitarian law.

Atrocities in Arsi: A Human Rights Crisis in Ethiopia’s Oromia Region

The country of Ethiopia has been engulfed in war, massacres, and displacement at an alarming rate since Prime Minister Abiy came to power. The victims are mostly Amharas, particularly those who belong to the Orthodox Church. Such incidents have become increasingly common in the Oromia region. The perpetrators are often described as state-sponsored paramilitary groups and the so-called OLF, with each side blaming the other. This situation has continued for approximately eight years. Millions of people have lost their lives, properties have been destroyed, and displacement has become a defining feature of the new Ethiopia. The crimes being committed against Ethiopia and the defenseless Amharas are unbelievably horrifying and multifaceted. Yet both national actors and the international community remain largely silent.

The current spree of massacres in Arsi is telling. It took now over 6 months unabated. Many known media and newspapers have reported the atrocities. A good gesture is that three major Ethiopian religious bodies condemned the killing of 21 civilians in Shirka Woreda, East Arsi, urging swift investigations, accountability and stronger protection to prevent further inter-religious tensions. The Permanent Synod of the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church, the Inter-Religious Council of Ethiopia, and the Ethiopian Islamic Affairs Supreme Council have each issued statements condemning the killing of 21 civilians in Shirka Woreda, East Arsi Zone of Oromia Region. They urged authorities to take immediate action to bring the perpetrators to justice and strengthen protection for residents. In their statements, the religious institutions denounced the attack and called for swift, transparent investigations, warning against attempts to exploit the incident to incite further violence. The known Borkena news outlet has reported the massacres continuously.

Violence in Arsi Zone and Competing Narratives

The Oromo Liberation Army has accused what it described as “mercenaries” of moving through the Arsi Zone and deliberately targeting Orthodox Christian civilians in order to inflame inter-religious and inter-ethnic tensions. The group has denied responsibility for attacks against civilians and instead alleged that unidentified armed actors are attempting to provoke conflict between communities.

In a statement dated 1 March 2026, the Permanent Synod of the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church reported that it had received information from its dioceses indicating that at least 21 civilians were killed in an attack in East Arsi. According to the statement, several survivors were abducted and their whereabouts remain unknown, while homes and property belonging to more than ten households were burned. The Synod emphasized that the victims were Orthodox Christians with no involvement in any armed conflict and stated that perpetrators who invoke religion to justify violence do not represent the teachings of any faith tradition. It further warned that such attacks risk creating divisions among religious communities that have historically coexisted in relative harmony and called upon Muslim and Christian leaders to jointly condemn the violence.

The Ethiopian Islamic Affairs Supreme Council similarly expressed deep sorrow over the killings of what it described as innocent Orthodox Christian civilians in Shirka Woreda. In its statement, the council stressed that the attack does not represent any religious teaching and warned that such incidents threaten long-standing traditions of inter-religious coexistence and mutual respect. Independent reporting and advocacy sources have also highlighted the severity of the violence in the region. According to reports cited by the media outlet Borkena, districts including Shirka, Merti, Guna, and Holonto have experienced repeated attacks in which civilians were killed or injured, property was destroyed, and communities were displaced. These reports characterize the situation as a significant escalation of violence in the Arsi Zone.

The Ethiopian Human Rights Commission (EHRC) has documented a pattern of attacks affecting civilians in the area in its March 2026 reporting. According to the commission, recent incidents resulted in dozens of deaths, including multiple killings in Shirka and Merti districts, alongside cases of injury, abduction, and missing persons. The EHRC also noted broader patterns of insecurity in parts of Oromia since 2025, where recurring attacks on civilians have contributed to a wider humanitarian and human rights crisis. Eyewitness accounts collected by investigators and journalists describe highly coordinated attacks in which armed assailants targeted households and villages, leading to civilian deaths and widespread displacement. These testimonies indicate that communities have been subjected to intimidation, destruction of homes, and forced migration, contributing to a deteriorating humanitarian situation in the region.

At the same time, responsibility for the violence remains contested. Federal and regional authorities have repeatedly attributed many attacks to the Oromo Liberation Army, while the OLA has denied involvement and accused government forces or affiliated militias of staging or exploiting violence in order to justify security operations. This cycle of mutual accusations has complicated efforts to establish accountability and has hindered independent verification of events on the ground. The resulting climate of uncertainty underscores the need for impartial investigation. Without credible and transparent inquiries into the perpetrators of these attacks, the persistence of violence risks normalizing impunity and further undermining social cohesion in Ethiopia’s ethnically and religiously diverse society. Strengthening mechanisms for independent investigation, civilian protection, and accountability therefore remains critical to preventing further atrocities and restoring trust between communities.

Borkena. (2022, September 27). Ethiopia: Attack in Horo Guduru Wollega, Oromia region. https://borkena.com/2022/09/27/ethiopia-horo-guduru-wollega-oromo-region/

The ‘New Auschwitz’? Mass Violence and the Targeting of Civilians in Arsi Zone

Many years ago, I visited the Auschwitz-Birkenau Memorial and Museum, located on the grounds of the former Auschwitz concentration camp, the largest Nazi concentration and extermination camp during World War II. Several years later, I also visited a Jewish cultural center and museum in Riga, Latvia, which similarly commemorates the persecution and destruction of Jewish communities during the Holocaust. Today, Auschwitz-Birkenau and other Holocaust memorial institutions serve as powerful sites of remembrance, preserving the memory of immense human suffering and reminding visitors of the catastrophic consequences of hatred, discrimination, and systematic dehumanization.

The Auschwitz-Birkenau Memorial and Museum provides a detailed historical account of the camp complex and the atrocities committed there. It stands as a solemn warning about what can occur when prejudice, exclusion, and ideological extremism are allowed to escalate unchecked. The enduring message of such memorials was eloquently articulated by Ellen Germain during the 75th anniversary of the museum on 13 July 2022. She emphasized the responsibility of future generations to safeguard historical truth:

“We must safeguard your testimony, their testimony, so that truth will never die. The world must never forget. The world must never deny. The world must never downplay the Holocaust. We must remain ever on guard, and we must do far more to teach the lessons of the Holocaust and apply them in our own time. We must counter hate and lies with tolerance and truth. And we must stand up for human dignity and freedom wherever they are imperiled.”

These reflections underline a critical principle: remembrance is not solely about honoring the victims of the past, but also about recognizing warning signs in the present. The lessons of the Holocaust compel societies to remain vigilant when patterns of discrimination, dehumanization, and targeted violence begin to emerge. When communities are singled out because of their identity—whether ethnic, religious, or cultural—the risk of escalating persecution becomes real.

It is within this broader moral and historical framework that contemporary reports of violence against civilians in the Arsi Zone must be considered. While historical contexts differ, the persistence of attacks against vulnerable populations raises urgent questions about protection, accountability, and the international community’s responsibility to respond when civilians become targets of systematic violence.

More than seventy-five years after the crematoria ceased their inhuman work, the Auschwitz-Birkenau Memorial and Museum continues to preserve the former camp complex as a permanent site of memory. The preservation of this Holocaust memorial serves an essential purpose: to help future generations understand the consequences of hatred, racism, and systematic violence, and to ensure that such atrocities are never repeated. The site also stands as enduring evidence against those who attempt to deny or distort the historical reality of the Holocaust.

Yet the lessons of these memorials are not confined to the past. The warning they convey—that societies must remain vigilant against hatred, persecution, and mass violence—remains deeply relevant today. Reports from several contemporary conflicts suggest that civilians continue to face grave abuses, including in the ongoing war in Ukraine and in parts of Ethiopia.

Particularly troubling are reports of attacks against civilians in the Arsi Zone of the Oromia Region. Accounts from religious institutions, local sources, and human-rights observers describe killings, abductions, and the destruction of homes affecting vulnerable communities. These reports raise serious concerns about the protection of civilians and the ability of affected populations to seek safety during episodes of violence. While historical contexts differ greatly from those of the Holocaust, the recurrence of violence against civilians underscores the enduring importance of remembering past atrocities and applying their lessons to contemporary crises. Memorials such as Auschwitz remind the world that indifference to suffering, denial of abuses, and failure to protect vulnerable populations can have devastating consequences. Ensuring accountability and safeguarding human dignity therefore remain essential responsibilities for governments, civil society, and the international community alike.

Violence, Silence, and Moral Responsibility

Reports emerging from parts of Oromia Region, particularly in areas such as Arsi Zone and Wollega, describe widespread violence against civilians, including killings, displacement, and the destruction of homes and livelihoods. Observers and advocacy groups have raised concerns that armed actors operating in the region have targeted vulnerable communities and that humanitarian access has at times been restricted, making independent verification and relief efforts extremely difficult. Allegations have also surfaced that bodies of victims have been burned and that attacks on civilians have been carried out with extreme brutality—imagery that evokes memories of some of the darkest chapters of twentieth-century violence.

This paper seeks to draw attention to what many observers describe as a deeply underreported humanitarian tragedy unfolding in these regions. While the historical contexts differ greatly from those of the Nazi concentration camps, the scale of civilian suffering and the persistence of violence raise urgent moral and political questions. Reports indicate that armed groups operating in the region, sometimes in environments where security institutions have failed to provide adequate protection, have created conditions in which communities live under constant fear of attack. As a result, thousands of civilians have reportedly been displaced and forced to flee their homes, creating a growing humanitarian crisis.

The failure of state institutions to adequately protect citizens exacerbates this tragedy. When attacks occur repeatedly without credible investigation or accountability, communities lose confidence in the ability of authorities to safeguard their security and basic rights. Observers have therefore called for independent investigations into allegations of mass killings, human rights abuses, and other violations in order to establish the facts and ensure that perpetrators are held accountable under the rule of law.

Ethiopia today faces immense human suffering and a profound national crisis. Many citizens feel that the country’s political future is increasingly shaped by competing ethno-nationalist movements and armed actors. In such an environment, atrocities—including killings, arrests, and the mistreatment of civilians—risk becoming normalized. The silence of political leaders, humanitarian actors, and international institutions in the face of such reports has raised troubling questions among many Ethiopians about whether the suffering of their communities is receiving adequate attention.

Religious and moral leaders may have an especially important role to play in such circumstances. Ethiopia is a deeply religious society in which spiritual institutions often serve as sources of moral guidance and social cohesion. Leaders from all faith traditions—Christian, Muslim, and indigenous spiritual traditions—can help promote reconciliation and emphasize the shared humanity of all Ethiopians. Their voices are particularly important in reminding communities that violence committed in the name of religion or ethnicity contradicts the ethical principles that faith traditions claim to uphold.

Periods of national crisis also highlight the importance of collective moral responsibility. Philosophical discussions of responsibility emphasize that institutions and leaders bear a duty to prevent harm when they possess the power to do so (Risser, 1996). Silence in the face of injustice can enable further abuses, while moral leadership can help mobilize societies toward peace and accountability. As the writer Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn warned in The Gulag Archipelago, ignoring evil allows it to grow and ultimately undermines the foundations of justice.

Understanding why societies sometimes fail to respond to mass atrocities has also been explored by scholars. Psychologist Paul Slovic describes the phenomenon of “psychic numbing,” in which large-scale human suffering paradoxically leads to reduced emotional engagement and weaker public action (Slovic, 2007). People often respond strongly to the suffering of a single identifiable victim, yet become increasingly indifferent when confronted with statistics describing thousands of victims. This dynamic may help explain why some humanitarian crises fail to receive sustained international attention.

Political scientists have also highlighted how ethnic identity can be mobilized by political elites in ways that intensify violence. According to James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, ethnic violence is frequently linked to strategic political mobilization in which elites frame conflicts in ethnic terms in order to consolidate power or mobilize supporters (Fearon & Laitin, 2000). Such narratives can generate fear, deepen divisions, and ultimately legitimize violence against perceived out-groups.

These dynamics underscore the importance of resisting propaganda, rejecting narratives that dehumanize other communities, and reaffirming the shared dignity of all citizens. Throughout history, attempts to manipulate ethnic identity for political purposes have produced devastating consequences. Divide-and-rule strategies and discourses of ethnic superiority can create cycles of resentment and retaliation that undermine national cohesion and long-term stability.

Ethiopia’s future therefore depends on a renewed commitment to accountability, justice, and reconciliation. Independent investigations, protection of civilians, and responsible leadership are essential steps toward breaking cycles of violence. Equally important is the willingness of citizens, community leaders, and institutions to confront injustice openly and to reject the normalization of cruelty and hatred.

As writer E. A. Bucchianeri observed, “It’s not unpatriotic to denounce an injustice committed on our behalf; perhaps it’s the most patriotic thing we can do.” Speaking out against violence and defending the dignity of all human beings is not an act of division—it is a necessary foundation for a just and peaceful society.

In conclusion, I argue that the Abiy regime’s leadership incompetence, systemic cruelty, and moral vacuum have directly fueled Ethiopia’s current crises—the result of a leadership class lacking fundamental moral intelligence. Beheshtifar, Esmaeli, and Moghadam (2011) define moral intelligence as the “central intelligence for all humans,” distinct from both cognitive and emotional intelligence. Lennick and Kiel, the architects of this concept, identify its four pillars as integrity, responsibility, forgiveness, and compassion. Ethiopian ethnonationalists, particularly Oromo extremists, exhibit a profound deficit in these competencies—a legacy of moral decay inherited from their TPLF predecessors. For those lacking this essential intelligence, deception and malice become the standard, creating a pervasive political pathology that defines the current era.

References

Beheshtifar, M., Esmaeli, Z., & Moghadam, M. N. (2011). Effect of moral intelligence on leadership. European Journal of Economics, Finance and Administrative Sciences, 43, 6–11.

Death Toll From Arsi Massacre Rise To 34 as killing Orthodox Christian Continues

Cohen, S. (2013). States of denial: Knowing about atrocities and suffering. Polity Press.

https://eastleighvoice.co.ke/ethiopia/304996/religious-leaders-condemn-killing-of-21-civilians-in-east-arsi-ethiopia

Eurasia Review. (2021, May 16). The logic behind events in Ethiopia (Op-ed). https://www.eurasiareview.com/16052021-the-logic-behind-events-in-ethiopia-oped/

Eurasia Review. (2022, April 13). Victims and victimization in Ethiopian politics: Targeting the Amhara on three fronts (Op-ed). https://www.eurasiareview.com/13042022-victims-and-victimization-in-ethiopian-politics-targeting-the-amhara-on-three-fronts-oped/

Eurasia Review. (2022, July 26). Oromummaa unchained: Ethnic apartheid and territorial expansion in Ethiopia (Op-ed). https://www.eurasiareview.com/26072022-oromummaa-unchained-ethnic-apartheid-and-territorial-expansion-in-ethiopia-oped/

https://impactpolicies.org/news/822/arsi-massacres-expose-ethnic-cleansing-by-paramilitary-forces-in-oromia

Fearon, J. D., & Laitin, D. D. (2000). Violence and the social construction of ethnic identity. International Organization, 54(4), 845–877.

Lind, G. (2008). The meaning and measurement of moral judgment competence: A dual-aspect model. In D. Fasko Jr. & W. Willis (Eds.), Contemporary philosophical and psychological perspectives on moral development and education (pp. 185–220). Hampton Press.

Risser, D. T. (1978). Power and collective responsibility. Kinesis, 9(1), 23–33.

Risser, D. T. (1996). The social dimension of moral responsibility: Taking organizations seriously. Journal of Social Philosophy, 27(1), 189–207.

Slovic, P. (2007). “If I look at the mass I will never act”: Psychic numbing and genocide. Judgment and Decision Making, 2(2), 79–95.

The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. (n.d.). Collective moral responsibility. http://www.iep.utm.edu/collecti/

The New Yorker. (2022, October 3). Did a Nobel Peace Laureate stoke a civil war? https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2022/10/03/did-a-nobel-peace-laureate-stoke-a-civil-war

The Washington Post. (2022, July 18). Ethiopian genocide commands attention. https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/07/18/ethiopian-genocide-commands-attention/

White, J. R. (2005). Auschwitz: A new history. History: Reviews of New Books, 34(1), 19. https://doi.org/10.1080/03612759.2005.10526737

The views, arguments, and conclusions expressed in this article are solely those of the author, Professor Girma Berhanu, and do not represent the editorial position of the Ethiopian Tribune. Readers are encouraged to consult multiple sources when forming their own judgments on the complex and evolving situation described.

Contact information:

Girma Berhanu

Department of Education and Special Education (Professor) University of Gothenburg

Box 300, SE 405 30

Göteborg, Sweden

About Post Author

Ethiopian Tribune editor

editor@ethiopiantribune.com

https://ethiopiantribune.com

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Ethiopia’s Statistical Smokescreen: How Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed Spun Numbers to Hide Economic Reality

Ethiopian Tribune editor — Wed, 04 Feb 2026 15:11:47 +0000

Read Time:15 Minute, 6 Second

Our columnist Sewasew Teklemariam exposes systematic distortion of growth figures and cost-of-living data in parliamentary address

Addis Ababa — When Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed stood before parliament on 3rd February to deliver his government’s mid-year performance report, he painted a picture of economic triumph. Ethiopia, he declared, was experiencing 9.3 per cent growth according to both the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Utilities, he assured legislators, were cheaper than in neighbouring countries. It was a masterclass in political theatre and, according to our columnist Sewasew Teklemariam’s damning forensic analysis, a masterclass in statistical manipulation.

The reality, as Teklemariam meticulously documents, tells a starkly different story. Behind the veneer of technocratic credibility lies what he characterises as “selective endorsement,” “decontextualisation,” and the systematic omission of inconvenient truths, all designed to construct a narrative of progress whilst obscuring the grinding economic difficulties facing ordinary Ethiopians.

At the heart of the Prime Minister’s economic case lies a figure that sounds impressively precise: 9.3 per cent GDP growth. Mr Abiy attributed this projection to both the IMF and the World Bank, lending his government’s performance the imprimatur of international financial orthodoxy. The problem, as our columnist meticulously documents, is that it simply isn’t true.

The World Bank never projected 9.3 per cent growth for Ethiopia. Their January 2026 Global Economic Prospects report clearly states 7.2 per cent for calendar year 2026. That’s not a rounding error, it’s a 2.1 percentage point discrepancy that represents tens of billions of birr in economic activity. Development economists who have followed Ethiopia’s trajectory note that this difference is enormously significant in real-world terms.

The IMF did indeed project 9.3 per cent growth, but only after its fourth review under the Extended Credit Facility arrangement a programme through which the Fund provides financial support conditional on reform implementation. The IMF’s forecast is made within the context of a funded programme. It’s inherently more optimistic because it assumes the government will deliver on its commitments. The World Bank’s independent assessment, by contrast, incorporates risks like ongoing conflict, climate shocks, and elevated public debt precisely the factors that would temper any growth outlook.

The Ethiopian government’s own projection, quietly revealed by Mr Abiy during the session, goes even further: 10.2 per cent. What emerges, Teklemariam argues, is a hierarchy of optimism. The government produces the rosiest figure, then publicly anchors the debate to the IMF’s high but more credible projection, whilst conveniently erasing the World Bank’s more cautious view. It’s statistically sophisticated narrative construction, designed to manufacture consensus where significant disagreement actually exists.

Yet even if one accepts the highest growth projections at face value, economists warn that the figure obscures as much as it reveals. Ethiopia’s economic expansion has historically been driven by state-led infrastructure investment vast dam projects, railway construction, and industrial parks financed through debt. Whilst such capital expenditure shows up handsomely in GDP statistics, its impact on ordinary livelihoods is far less clear.

The crucial question isn’t whether Ethiopia is growing, but who benefits from that growth. If the expansion comes primarily from building Chinese-financed railways that employ relatively few people and don’t immediately generate income for smallholder farmers or urban informal workers who together represent the vast majority of Ethiopians then that 9 per cent growth figure becomes somewhat abstract for the average family struggling to afford teff and cooking oil.

The World Bank’s own report, cited in Teklemariam’s analysis, explicitly flags “elevated public debt, domestic conflicts, and climate shocks” as dampening factors. These are not minor footnotes but fundamental structural challenges that question the sustainability and inclusiveness of any headline growth figure. Mr Abiy’s parliamentary address, however, contained no such caveats. The narrative presented was one of unalloyed triumph, validated by international institutions speaking with one voice except they weren’t.

If the growth claim represents distortion through conflation, the Prime Minister’s assertion about utility prices demonstrates decontextualisation of an altogether more brazen variety. His claim that electricity, water, and fuel costs are “cheaper” in Ethiopia than in Kenya, Somalia, and Tanzania appears designed to counter domestic frustration over cost-of-living pressures. Our columnist’s statistical analysis dismantles it entirely.

Teklemariam deploys Consumer Price Index data for housing, water, electricity, and fuel, the most reliable cross-country comparison available. Ethiopia’s CPI for this category stood at 300.7 in June 2023, using a 2015/16 base of 100. This means costs had tripled in roughly seven years. Tanzania’s equivalent index, by contrast, stood at 118.3, and Somalia’s at 149.5 increases of 18 per cent and 50 per cent respectively, albeit from different base years.

Even accounting for methodological differences, the scale of the divergence is extraordinary. Ethiopian households have experienced vastly steeper historical increases in utility costs than their regional counterparts. To now claim that utilities are “cheaper” requires ignoring this inflationary history entirely. It’s rather like boasting that your house is affordable because you’ve forgotten to mention that the price has tripled since you bought it.

The inflation context compounds the problem. As of December 2025, Ethiopia’s general inflation rate stood at 9.7 per cent more than double Tanzania’s 3.6 per cent and Kenya’s 4.4 per cent. When inflation is running at nearly 10 per cent, even a nominally static price is effectively rising in real terms. Households must allocate an ever-larger share of stagnant or slowly growing incomes just to maintain the same consumption level. The purchasing power of ordinary Ethiopians is being steadily eroded, even if the nominal birr price on their electricity bill remains unchanged.

Yet the most glaring omission in Mr Abiy’s utility comparison, Teklemariam observes, is the one factor that determines whether a price is genuinely “affordable”: income. A kilowatt-hour of electricity might theoretically cost fewer birr in Addis Ababa than shillings in Nairobi, but if the average Ethiopian earns a fraction of what the average Kenyan does, the relative economic burden could be far heavier.

This is basic comparative economics. Price without reference to purchasing power is a meaningless datapoint. The Prime Minister presented a nominal price comparison as if it were a valid measure of living standards. It’s a category error, and one that appears entirely deliberate. Obtaining consistent, comparable income data across the region is notoriously difficult, given vast informal economies and differing statistical methodologies. The Ethiopian government provided no such data to contextualise its claim—a fact our columnist highlights as indicative of the assertion’s fundamental intellectual dishonesty.

It’s a classic populist move. You make a claim that sounds specific and factual—“our utilities are cheaper”—knowing that ordinary citizens can’t easily verify prices in Dar es Salaam or Mogadishu. It creates a perception of competent custodianship whilst diverting attention from domestic failures. The claim doesn’t need to withstand rigorous scrutiny; it merely needs to sound plausible enough to shape the immediate political narrative.

What makes the statistical engineering particularly striking is the contrast with other elements of Mr Abiy’s parliamentary performance. The same session that featured optimistic growth projections and utility comparisons also included an unprecedented admission: that Eritrean troops had committed massacres in the Tigrayan town of Axum during the devastating civil war. This was a significant, if belated, acknowledgement of atrocities that the government had long deflected or denied.

There is an extraordinary duality at work here, Teklemariam argues. On matters of geopolitical blame and historical violence, the Prime Minister can be remarkably candid—perhaps because it deflects responsibility onto an external actor. But on socioeconomic metrics where his government’s competence is directly being judged, the discourse shifts to obfuscation, conflation, and selective omission. One can admit to Eritrean massacres because the culpability lies elsewhere; one cannot admit to economic mismanagement because that responsibility is unavoidably internal.

Yet perhaps the most troubling moment in the parliamentary session came when Mr Abiy addressed the ongoing conflict in the Amhara region. When questioned about the government’s approach to the Fano militia—armed groups that emerged initially to defend Amhara communities but have since become a significant insurgent force the Prime Minister declared his willingness to engage in dialogue. “We are ready to discuss with anyone who wants peace,” he stated, adding that his government would consider talks with armed groups if they demonstrated genuine commitment to resolving the conflict peacefully.

On the surface, this sounds like statesmanship, a leader extending an olive branch to end bloodshed. But our columnist identifies a deeply cynical calculus at work. This is the same government that has repeatedly refused meaningful dialogue with Amhara political figures, that has imprisoned journalists and activists from the region, and that has conducted military operations resulting in civilian casualties. The offer of talks with “armed insurgents” comes only after conventional political channels have been systematically closed, after peaceful dissent has been criminalised, and after communities have been pushed into armed resistance as their only remaining avenue for political expression.

“The offer to negotiate with those who take up arms whilst simultaneously crushing those who seek peaceful political change sends a chilling message,” Teklemariam writes. “It tells Ethiopians that violence, not constitutional politics, is the pathway to being taken seriously by this government. It validates the gun over the ballot box.”

The timing is particularly revealing. The Amhara conflict has proven far more intractable than the government anticipated. Fano groups control significant rural territory, the regional economy is paralysed, and federal forces have struggled to reassert control despite months of military operations. The offer of dialogue comes not from strength or genuine reconciliation, but from military stalemate. It’s the same pattern observed in Tigray-talk peace only when you cannot impose military victory.

Moreover, the framing of potential interlocutors as “armed insurgents” rather than representatives of legitimate Amhara grievances is itself instructive. It strips the conflict of its political context the controversial dissolution of regional special forces, the perceived marginalisation of Amhara interests in federal politics, the unresolved questions of territorial administration. By reducing complex political disputes to a security problem requiring negotiation with “armed groups,” the government avoids accountability for the policies that created the crisis in the first place.

Our columnist notes the bitter irony: a government that came to power promising to open political space and embrace dialogue has instead created conditions where Ethiopians increasingly see armed resistance as more effective than peaceful opposition. The ruling Prosperity Party faces virtually no meaningful challenge in parliament, where it holds an overwhelming majority. Independent media has been shuttered or intimidated into self-censorship. Civil society operates under constant surveillance and threat. In this environment, Mr Abiy’s offer to talk with those who’ve taken up arms is less magnanimity than recognition that force has achieved what constitutional politics could not the government’s attention.

“This is how democracies die,” Teklemariam observes. “Not with a single coup, but with the gradual erosion of peaceful political competition until violence becomes the only language the state understands. The Prime Minister’s offer to negotiate with armed groups in Amhara would be laudable if it were accompanied by genuine opening of political space. Instead, it’s a tactical response to military pressure, one that will likely result in a temporary ceasefire that addresses none of the underlying political grievances.”

Opposition MP Dr Abebaw Desalegn’s pointed criticism during the session, highlighting the “pervasive lack of peace” and ongoing human rights violations underscores the broader context in which these economic claims and political manoeuvres are being made. Ethiopia remains a country navigating post-war trauma, regional instability in Amhara and Oromia, severe foreign exchange shortages, and diplomatic isolation following the deterioration of relations with Eritrea. In such an environment, projecting economic competence and conflict resolution becomes an existential political imperative. The government cannot afford to appear as though it is failing on all fronts simultaneously.

The sophistication of the Prime Minister’s rhetorical strategy should not be underestimated. By invoking the IMF and World Bank, institutions whose technical credibility exceeds that of any political actor, Mr Abiy wraps his narrative in what Teklemariam calls “a technocratic seal of approval.” The selective nature of that invocation is easy to miss in the moment but devastating upon scrutiny.

This is how modern governments with authoritarian tendencies operate in an age of information abundance. They don’t crudely fabricate numbers from whole cloth, that’s too easily disproven in the digital era. Instead, they cherry-pick from legitimate sources, conflate where convenient, and omit context. The result is a narrative that sounds data-driven and can survive a casual fact-check, but collapses under rigorous examination. It’s statistical sophistication in service of political survival.

The strategy reveals a broader pattern identified across developing economies attempting to balance reform commitments to international lenders with domestic political survival. The IMF programme requires Ethiopia to demonstrate progress. But delivering painful reforms, subsidy cuts, currency devaluation, liberalisation, creates immediate political backlash. The urban poor feel the pinch when fuel subsidies are withdrawn; businesses struggle when the currency weakens and imports become expensive. So the government amplifies the positive indicators the IMF generates whilst downplaying the conditionalities and risks the World Bank emphasises. It’s a delicate dance between satisfying international creditors and placating domestic constituencies.

For Ethiopian citizens, the implications extend beyond academic critique of governmental rhetoric. If parliament theoretically the premier forum for executive accountability, cannot effectively interrogate statistical claims, the democratic check on executive power is fundamentally weakened. What our columnist’s analysis demonstrates is the vital importance of independent verification. A functioning democracy requires a free press that can access and interpret World Bank reports, opposition MPs with research capacity, and academic economists who can unpick CPI data and identify discrepancies. Without these institutional counterweights, the government’s narrative simply becomes “the truth” by default.

International partners face a similar reckoning. Western donors and multilateral institutions that continue to support Ethiopia, despite its recent conflicts and democratic backsliding, rely heavily on economic metrics to justify continued engagement. If those metrics are being systematically spun, the basis for that support becomes questionable. The IMF and World Bank need to be far more explicit about the divergences in their assessments. When their figures are being weaponised in domestic political discourse, silence or diplomatic discretion isn’t neutral, it becomes complicity in misrepresentation.

At its core, Teklemariam identifies what he terms an “ontological tension” in Ethiopian governmental communication: the struggle between acknowledging profound challenges and maintaining an unwavering narrative of progress. This tension produces the paradoxes evident in Mr Abiy’s parliamentary performance bold admissions on Eritrean atrocities coexisting with rose-tinted economic claims and cynical offers of dialogue with armed groups whilst peaceful opposition is crushed. It’s a form of compartmentalisation, common in individuals and institutions under extreme stress. You can acknowledge failure in one domain because it’s externalised Eritrea’s fault, Fano militants’ fault, not ours whilst rigidly defending competence in another domain where responsibility is unavoidably internal.

The question facing Ethiopia is whether this compartmentalised discourse can be sustained indefinitely. Economic realities—inflation, unemployment, foreign exchange shortages, the simple difficulty of putting food on the table—are lived experiences that no amount of statistical reframing can fully obscure. Similarly, political realities—the growing armed resistance, the shuttered media, the imprisoned activists—cannot be wished away through selective offers of dialogue. When the gap between narrative and reality becomes too wide, political legitimacy erodes. Citizens may tolerate being told that growth is robust when their own experience suggests stagnation, but only for so long. Eventually, the cognitive dissonance becomes untenable.

Our columnist’s forensic deconstruction of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s parliamentary claims offers more than a fact-check. It provides a case study in how governments in fragile states use data not merely to inform but to construct reality itself a reality designed to legitimise, to reassure, and ultimately to survive. The conflation of IMF and World Bank growth projections, the decontextualised utility price comparisons, the systematic omission of contradictory evidence, the tactical offer to negotiate with armed insurgents whilst denying space to peaceful opposition, these are not mere rhetorical flourishes but calculated strategies of narrative control. They reveal a government acutely aware that in the modern information environment, statistical authority and strategic concessions can substitute for democratic accountability.

For Ethiopia, the stakes could not be higher. A nation emerging from civil war, grappling with regional instability, and facing profound economic challenges needs honest reckoning, not statistical theatre. The country’s ability to attract genuine investment, to rebuild trust with international partners, and to foster social cohesion amongst its deeply fractured population depends on credible governance, and credibility begins with truthfulness.

As Teklemariam concludes, the health of Ethiopian democracy depends on “rigorous, sceptical, and unwavering commitment to discursive accountability.” This means citizens who demand evidence, journalists who investigate claims, opposition politicians who challenge narratives, and international partners who refuse to accept convenient fictions. It means building and protecting the institutional capacity to say, loudly and clearly, when the emperor’s statistical clothes don’t quite fit, and when his offers of peace ring hollow against the backdrop of systematic political repression.

Whether that commitment can be sustained, in parliament, in the press, and amongst citizens, may well determine not just the accuracy of the government’s numbers, but the trajectory of the nation itself. Ethiopia stands at a crossroads. Down one path lies genuine reform, painful honesty about challenges, the opening of real political space, and the slow reconstruction of trust. Down the other lies increasingly sophisticated narrative management, tactical negotiations that preserve power whilst avoiding structural change, a widening gap between claim and reality, and the eventual collapse of credibility. The choice, ultimately, rests with those in power, and with those willing to hold them to account. Our columnist has done his part. The question is whether anyone with the power to act is listening.

About Post Author

Ethiopian Tribune editor

editor@ethiopiantribune.com

https://ethiopiantribune.com

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