By Professor Girma Berhanu

Introduction

The ongoing violence directed against Christian Amhara communities in the Arsi Zone raises serious concerns regarding the protection of vulnerable populations in Ethiopia. Recent reports indicate an intensification of targeted attacks, including killings, abductions, and the destruction of civilian property, particularly in districts such as Shirka, Guna, and Aseko. Investigations by the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission have documented incidents since late 2025 in which armed groups carried out attacks that resulted in deaths, injuries, and displacement of local residents, severely undermining the security and basic rights of affected communities.

These developments must be understood within the broader context of Ethiopia’s complex and evolving conflict dynamics. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights has documented widespread human rights violations in multiple regions of the country, including Oromia and Amhara. In 2023 alone, thousands of civilians were killed in violent incidents across these regions, while thousands were subjected to abuses such as arbitrary detention, torture, and forced displacement. Such patterns indicate that the current violence is not an isolated phenomenon but part of a broader cycle of armed conflict and intercommunal tensions orchestrated by the system.

Historically, Amhara communities living in parts of Oromia have periodically faced episodes of mass violence and forced displacement. Several documented incidents—including massacres targeting civilians identified as ethnically Amhara—illustrate the recurring nature of such attacks. One example occurred in 2020 in western Oromia, where hundreds of Amhara civilians were killed in an attack widely reported by international media and human rights observers. These events underscore the vulnerability of minority communities residing outside their region of ethnic majority.

In recent months, observers and human-rights organizations have expressed concern over what appears to be a renewed escalation in violence. Reports describe killings, kidnappings, and large-scale displacement in parts of Oromia, with civilians caught between insurgent groups, local militias, and government forces. The insurgency involving the Oromo Liberation Army has contributed to a deteriorating security environment in which civilians are frequently exposed to abuses by multiple actors. However, the group claimed the violence aimed to fracture collective opposition by pitting communities against one another, including along Oromo–Amhara and Christian–Muslim lines. The OLA further stated that “whether in uniform or without, whether carrying a gun or a pen,” any actor who “weaponizes innocent civilians for political ends” would be considered its enemy, adding that it would confront such forces decisively.

Despite the gravity of these developments, the international response has often been perceived as limited compared with the scale of the humanitarian and human rights concerns involved. Scholars and policy analysts have noted that Ethiopia’s overlapping conflicts—spanning regions such as Tigray, Amhara, and Oromia—have complicated international engagement and reduced sustained attention to localized patterns of violence against minority communities.

Given these conditions, the situation warrants sustained monitoring, systematic documentation, and deeper international engagement. Strengthening mechanisms for independent investigation, accountability, and civilian protection remains essential for mitigating further violence and ensuring that vulnerable communities are afforded the protections guaranteed under international human rights and humanitarian law.

Atrocities in Arsi: A Human Rights Crisis in Ethiopia’s Oromia Region

The country of Ethiopia has been engulfed in war, massacres, and displacement at an alarming rate since Prime Minister Abiy came to power. The victims are mostly Amharas, particularly those who belong to the Orthodox Church. Such incidents have become increasingly common in the Oromia region. The perpetrators are often described as state-sponsored paramilitary groups and the so-called OLF, with each side blaming the other. This situation has continued for approximately eight years. Millions of people have lost their lives, properties have been destroyed, and displacement has become a defining feature of the new Ethiopia. The crimes being committed against Ethiopia and the defenseless Amharas are unbelievably horrifying and multifaceted. Yet both national actors and the international community remain largely silent.

The current spree of massacres in Arsi is telling. It took now over 6 months unabated. Many known media and newspapers have reported the atrocities. A good gesture is that three major Ethiopian religious bodies condemned the killing of 21 civilians in Shirka Woreda, East Arsi, urging swift investigations, accountability and stronger protection to prevent further inter-religious tensions. The Permanent Synod of the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church, the Inter-Religious Council of Ethiopia, and the Ethiopian Islamic Affairs Supreme Council have each issued statements condemning the killing of 21 civilians in Shirka Woreda, East Arsi Zone of Oromia Region. They urged authorities to take immediate action to bring the perpetrators to justice and strengthen protection for residents. In their statements, the religious institutions denounced the attack and called for swift, transparent investigations, warning against attempts to exploit the incident to incite further violence. The known Borkena news outlet has reported the massacres continuously.

Violence in Arsi Zone and Competing Narratives

The Oromo Liberation Army has accused what it described as “mercenaries” of moving through the Arsi Zone and deliberately targeting Orthodox Christian civilians in order to inflame inter-religious and inter-ethnic tensions. The group has denied responsibility for attacks against civilians and instead alleged that unidentified armed actors are attempting to provoke conflict between communities.

In a statement dated 1 March 2026, the Permanent Synod of the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church reported that it had received information from its dioceses indicating that at least 21 civilians were killed in an attack in East Arsi. According to the statement, several survivors were abducted and their whereabouts remain unknown, while homes and property belonging to more than ten households were burned. The Synod emphasized that the victims were Orthodox Christians with no involvement in any armed conflict and stated that perpetrators who invoke religion to justify violence do not represent the teachings of any faith tradition. It further warned that such attacks risk creating divisions among religious communities that have historically coexisted in relative harmony and called upon Muslim and Christian leaders to jointly condemn the violence.

The Ethiopian Islamic Affairs Supreme Council similarly expressed deep sorrow over the killings of what it described as innocent Orthodox Christian civilians in Shirka Woreda. In its statement, the council stressed that the attack does not represent any religious teaching and warned that such incidents threaten long-standing traditions of inter-religious coexistence and mutual respect. Independent reporting and advocacy sources have also highlighted the severity of the violence in the region. According to reports cited by the media outlet Borkena, districts including Shirka, Merti, Guna, and Holonto have experienced repeated attacks in which civilians were killed or injured, property was destroyed, and communities were displaced. These reports characterize the situation as a significant escalation of violence in the Arsi Zone.

The Ethiopian Human Rights Commission (EHRC) has documented a pattern of attacks affecting civilians in the area in its March 2026 reporting. According to the commission, recent incidents resulted in dozens of deaths, including multiple killings in Shirka and Merti districts, alongside cases of injury, abduction, and missing persons. The EHRC also noted broader patterns of insecurity in parts of Oromia since 2025, where recurring attacks on civilians have contributed to a wider humanitarian and human rights crisis. Eyewitness accounts collected by investigators and journalists describe highly coordinated attacks in which armed assailants targeted households and villages, leading to civilian deaths and widespread displacement. These testimonies indicate that communities have been subjected to intimidation, destruction of homes, and forced migration, contributing to a deteriorating humanitarian situation in the region.

At the same time, responsibility for the violence remains contested. Federal and regional authorities have repeatedly attributed many attacks to the Oromo Liberation Army, while the OLA has denied involvement and accused government forces or affiliated militias of staging or exploiting violence in order to justify security operations. This cycle of mutual accusations has complicated efforts to establish accountability and has hindered independent verification of events on the ground. The resulting climate of uncertainty underscores the need for impartial investigation. Without credible and transparent inquiries into the perpetrators of these attacks, the persistence of violence risks normalizing impunity and further undermining social cohesion in Ethiopia’s ethnically and religiously diverse society. Strengthening mechanisms for independent investigation, civilian protection, and accountability therefore remains critical to preventing further atrocities and restoring trust between communities.

Borkena. (2022, September 27). Ethiopia: Attack in Horo Guduru Wollega, Oromia region. https://borkena.com/2022/09/27/ethiopia-horo-guduru-wollega-oromo-region/

The ‘New Auschwitz’? Mass Violence and the Targeting of Civilians in Arsi Zone

Many years ago, I visited the Auschwitz-Birkenau Memorial and Museum, located on the grounds of the former Auschwitz concentration camp, the largest Nazi concentration and extermination camp during World War II. Several years later, I also visited a Jewish cultural center and museum in Riga, Latvia, which similarly commemorates the persecution and destruction of Jewish communities during the Holocaust. Today, Auschwitz-Birkenau and other Holocaust memorial institutions serve as powerful sites of remembrance, preserving the memory of immense human suffering and reminding visitors of the catastrophic consequences of hatred, discrimination, and systematic dehumanization.

The Auschwitz-Birkenau Memorial and Museum provides a detailed historical account of the camp complex and the atrocities committed there. It stands as a solemn warning about what can occur when prejudice, exclusion, and ideological extremism are allowed to escalate unchecked. The enduring message of such memorials was eloquently articulated by Ellen Germain during the 75th anniversary of the museum on 13 July 2022. She emphasized the responsibility of future generations to safeguard historical truth:

“We must safeguard your testimony, their testimony, so that truth will never die. The world must never forget. The world must never deny. The world must never downplay the Holocaust. We must remain ever on guard, and we must do far more to teach the lessons of the Holocaust and apply them in our own time. We must counter hate and lies with tolerance and truth. And we must stand up for human dignity and freedom wherever they are imperiled.”

These reflections underline a critical principle: remembrance is not solely about honoring the victims of the past, but also about recognizing warning signs in the present. The lessons of the Holocaust compel societies to remain vigilant when patterns of discrimination, dehumanization, and targeted violence begin to emerge. When communities are singled out because of their identity—whether ethnic, religious, or cultural—the risk of escalating persecution becomes real.

It is within this broader moral and historical framework that contemporary reports of violence against civilians in the Arsi Zone must be considered. While historical contexts differ, the persistence of attacks against vulnerable populations raises urgent questions about protection, accountability, and the international community’s responsibility to respond when civilians become targets of systematic violence.

More than seventy-five years after the crematoria ceased their inhuman work, the Auschwitz-Birkenau Memorial and Museum continues to preserve the former camp complex as a permanent site of memory. The preservation of this Holocaust memorial serves an essential purpose: to help future generations understand the consequences of hatred, racism, and systematic violence, and to ensure that such atrocities are never repeated. The site also stands as enduring evidence against those who attempt to deny or distort the historical reality of the Holocaust.

Yet the lessons of these memorials are not confined to the past. The warning they convey—that societies must remain vigilant against hatred, persecution, and mass violence—remains deeply relevant today. Reports from several contemporary conflicts suggest that civilians continue to face grave abuses, including in the ongoing war in Ukraine and in parts of Ethiopia.

Particularly troubling are reports of attacks against civilians in the Arsi Zone of the Oromia Region. Accounts from religious institutions, local sources, and human-rights observers describe killings, abductions, and the destruction of homes affecting vulnerable communities. These reports raise serious concerns about the protection of civilians and the ability of affected populations to seek safety during episodes of violence. While historical contexts differ greatly from those of the Holocaust, the recurrence of violence against civilians underscores the enduring importance of remembering past atrocities and applying their lessons to contemporary crises. Memorials such as Auschwitz remind the world that indifference to suffering, denial of abuses, and failure to protect vulnerable populations can have devastating consequences. Ensuring accountability and safeguarding human dignity therefore remain essential responsibilities for governments, civil society, and the international community alike.

Violence, Silence, and Moral Responsibility

Reports emerging from parts of Oromia Region, particularly in areas such as Arsi Zone and Wollega, describe widespread violence against civilians, including killings, displacement, and the destruction of homes and livelihoods. Observers and advocacy groups have raised concerns that armed actors operating in the region have targeted vulnerable communities and that humanitarian access has at times been restricted, making independent verification and relief efforts extremely difficult. Allegations have also surfaced that bodies of victims have been burned and that attacks on civilians have been carried out with extreme brutality—imagery that evokes memories of some of the darkest chapters of twentieth-century violence.

This paper seeks to draw attention to what many observers describe as a deeply underreported humanitarian tragedy unfolding in these regions. While the historical contexts differ greatly from those of the Nazi concentration camps, the scale of civilian suffering and the persistence of violence raise urgent moral and political questions. Reports indicate that armed groups operating in the region, sometimes in environments where security institutions have failed to provide adequate protection, have created conditions in which communities live under constant fear of attack. As a result, thousands of civilians have reportedly been displaced and forced to flee their homes, creating a growing humanitarian crisis.

The failure of state institutions to adequately protect citizens exacerbates this tragedy. When attacks occur repeatedly without credible investigation or accountability, communities lose confidence in the ability of authorities to safeguard their security and basic rights. Observers have therefore called for independent investigations into allegations of mass killings, human rights abuses, and other violations in order to establish the facts and ensure that perpetrators are held accountable under the rule of law.

Ethiopia today faces immense human suffering and a profound national crisis. Many citizens feel that the country’s political future is increasingly shaped by competing ethno-nationalist movements and armed actors. In such an environment, atrocities—including killings, arrests, and the mistreatment of civilians—risk becoming normalized. The silence of political leaders, humanitarian actors, and international institutions in the face of such reports has raised troubling questions among many Ethiopians about whether the suffering of their communities is receiving adequate attention.

Religious and moral leaders may have an especially important role to play in such circumstances. Ethiopia is a deeply religious society in which spiritual institutions often serve as sources of moral guidance and social cohesion. Leaders from all faith traditions—Christian, Muslim, and indigenous spiritual traditions—can help promote reconciliation and emphasize the shared humanity of all Ethiopians. Their voices are particularly important in reminding communities that violence committed in the name of religion or ethnicity contradicts the ethical principles that faith traditions claim to uphold.

Periods of national crisis also highlight the importance of collective moral responsibility. Philosophical discussions of responsibility emphasize that institutions and leaders bear a duty to prevent harm when they possess the power to do so (Risser, 1996). Silence in the face of injustice can enable further abuses, while moral leadership can help mobilize societies toward peace and accountability. As the writer Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn warned in The Gulag Archipelago, ignoring evil allows it to grow and ultimately undermines the foundations of justice.

Understanding why societies sometimes fail to respond to mass atrocities has also been explored by scholars. Psychologist Paul Slovic describes the phenomenon of “psychic numbing,” in which large-scale human suffering paradoxically leads to reduced emotional engagement and weaker public action (Slovic, 2007). People often respond strongly to the suffering of a single identifiable victim, yet become increasingly indifferent when confronted with statistics describing thousands of victims. This dynamic may help explain why some humanitarian crises fail to receive sustained international attention.

Political scientists have also highlighted how ethnic identity can be mobilized by political elites in ways that intensify violence. According to James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, ethnic violence is frequently linked to strategic political mobilization in which elites frame conflicts in ethnic terms in order to consolidate power or mobilize supporters (Fearon & Laitin, 2000). Such narratives can generate fear, deepen divisions, and ultimately legitimize violence against perceived out-groups.

These dynamics underscore the importance of resisting propaganda, rejecting narratives that dehumanize other communities, and reaffirming the shared dignity of all citizens. Throughout history, attempts to manipulate ethnic identity for political purposes have produced devastating consequences. Divide-and-rule strategies and discourses of ethnic superiority can create cycles of resentment and retaliation that undermine national cohesion and long-term stability.

Ethiopia’s future therefore depends on a renewed commitment to accountability, justice, and reconciliation. Independent investigations, protection of civilians, and responsible leadership are essential steps toward breaking cycles of violence. Equally important is the willingness of citizens, community leaders, and institutions to confront injustice openly and to reject the normalization of cruelty and hatred.

As writer E. A. Bucchianeri observed, “It’s not unpatriotic to denounce an injustice committed on our behalf; perhaps it’s the most patriotic thing we can do.” Speaking out against violence and defending the dignity of all human beings is not an act of division—it is a necessary foundation for a just and peaceful society.

In conclusion, I argue that the Abiy regime’s leadership incompetence, systemic cruelty, and moral vacuum have directly fueled Ethiopia’s current crises—the result of a leadership class lacking fundamental moral intelligence. Beheshtifar, Esmaeli, and Moghadam (2011) define moral intelligence as the “central intelligence for all humans,” distinct from both cognitive and emotional intelligence. Lennick and Kiel, the architects of this concept, identify its four pillars as integrity, responsibility, forgiveness, and compassion. Ethiopian ethnonationalists, particularly Oromo extremists, exhibit a profound deficit in these competencies—a legacy of moral decay inherited from their TPLF predecessors. For those lacking this essential intelligence, deception and malice become the standard, creating a pervasive political pathology that defines the current era.

References

Beheshtifar, M., Esmaeli, Z., & Moghadam, M. N. (2011). Effect of moral intelligence on leadership. European Journal of Economics, Finance and Administrative Sciences, 43, 6–11.

Cohen, S. (2013). States of denial: Knowing about atrocities and suffering. Polity Press.

Eurasia Review. (2021, May 16). The logic behind events in Ethiopia (Op-ed). https://www.eurasiareview.com/16052021-the-logic-behind-events-in-ethiopia-oped/

Eurasia Review. (2022, April 13). Victims and victimization in Ethiopian politics: Targeting the Amhara on three fronts (Op-ed). https://www.eurasiareview.com/13042022-victims-and-victimization-in-ethiopian-politics-targeting-the-amhara-on-three-fronts-oped/

Eurasia Review. (2022, July 26). Oromummaa unchained: Ethnic apartheid and territorial expansion in Ethiopia (Op-ed). https://www.eurasiareview.com/26072022-oromummaa-unchained-ethnic-apartheid-and-territorial-expansion-in-ethiopia-oped/

Fearon, J. D., & Laitin, D. D. (2000). Violence and the social construction of ethnic identity. International Organization, 54(4), 845–877.

Lind, G. (2008). The meaning and measurement of moral judgment competence: A dual-aspect model. In D. Fasko Jr. & W. Willis (Eds.), Contemporary philosophical and psychological perspectives on moral development and education (pp. 185–220). Hampton Press.

Risser, D. T. (1978). Power and collective responsibility. Kinesis, 9(1), 23–33.

Risser, D. T. (1996). The social dimension of moral responsibility: Taking organizations seriously. Journal of Social Philosophy, 27(1), 189–207.

Slovic, P. (2007). “If I look at the mass I will never act”: Psychic numbing and genocide. Judgment and Decision Making, 2(2), 79–95.

The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. (n.d.). Collective moral responsibility. http://www.iep.utm.edu/collecti/

The New Yorker. (2022, October 3). Did a Nobel Peace Laureate stoke a civil war? https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2022/10/03/did-a-nobel-peace-laureate-stoke-a-civil-war

The Washington Post. (2022, July 18). Ethiopian genocide commands attention. https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/07/18/ethiopian-genocide-commands-attention/

White, J. R. (2005). Auschwitz: A new history. History: Reviews of New Books, 34(1), 19. https://doi.org/10.1080/03612759.2005.10526737

The views, arguments, and conclusions expressed in this article are solely those of the author, Professor Girma Berhanu, and do not represent the editorial position of the Ethiopian Tribune. Readers are encouraged to consult multiple sources when forming their own judgments on the complex and evolving situation described.

Contact information:

Girma Berhanu

Department of Education and Special Education (Professor) University of Gothenburg

Box 300, SE 405 30

Göteborg, Sweden

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Our columnist Sewasew Teklemariam exposes systematic distortion of growth figures and cost-of-living data in parliamentary address

Addis Ababa — When Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed stood before parliament on 3rd February to deliver his government’s mid-year performance report, he painted a picture of economic triumph. Ethiopia, he declared, was experiencing 9.3 per cent growth according to both the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Utilities, he assured legislators, were cheaper than in neighbouring countries. It was a masterclass in political theatre and, according to our columnist Sewasew Teklemariam’s damning forensic analysis, a masterclass in statistical manipulation.

The reality, as Teklemariam meticulously documents, tells a starkly different story. Behind the veneer of technocratic credibility lies what he characterises as “selective endorsement,” “decontextualisation,” and the systematic omission of inconvenient truths, all designed to construct a narrative of progress whilst obscuring the grinding economic difficulties facing ordinary Ethiopians.

At the heart of the Prime Minister’s economic case lies a figure that sounds impressively precise: 9.3 per cent GDP growth. Mr Abiy attributed this projection to both the IMF and the World Bank, lending his government’s performance the imprimatur of international financial orthodoxy. The problem, as our columnist meticulously documents, is that it simply isn’t true.

The World Bank never projected 9.3 per cent growth for Ethiopia. Their January 2026 Global Economic Prospects report clearly states 7.2 per cent for calendar year 2026. That’s not a rounding error, it’s a 2.1 percentage point discrepancy that represents tens of billions of birr in economic activity. Development economists who have followed Ethiopia’s trajectory note that this difference is enormously significant in real-world terms.

The IMF did indeed project 9.3 per cent growth, but only after its fourth review under the Extended Credit Facility arrangement a programme through which the Fund provides financial support conditional on reform implementation. The IMF’s forecast is made within the context of a funded programme. It’s inherently more optimistic because it assumes the government will deliver on its commitments. The World Bank’s independent assessment, by contrast, incorporates risks like ongoing conflict, climate shocks, and elevated public debt precisely the factors that would temper any growth outlook.

The Ethiopian government’s own projection, quietly revealed by Mr Abiy during the session, goes even further: 10.2 per cent. What emerges, Teklemariam argues, is a hierarchy of optimism. The government produces the rosiest figure, then publicly anchors the debate to the IMF’s high but more credible projection, whilst conveniently erasing the World Bank’s more cautious view. It’s statistically sophisticated narrative construction, designed to manufacture consensus where significant disagreement actually exists.

Yet even if one accepts the highest growth projections at face value, economists warn that the figure obscures as much as it reveals. Ethiopia’s economic expansion has historically been driven by state-led infrastructure investment vast dam projects, railway construction, and industrial parks financed through debt. Whilst such capital expenditure shows up handsomely in GDP statistics, its impact on ordinary livelihoods is far less clear.

The crucial question isn’t whether Ethiopia is growing, but who benefits from that growth. If the expansion comes primarily from building Chinese-financed railways that employ relatively few people and don’t immediately generate income for smallholder farmers or urban informal workers who together represent the vast majority of Ethiopians then that 9 per cent growth figure becomes somewhat abstract for the average family struggling to afford teff and cooking oil.

The World Bank’s own report, cited in Teklemariam’s analysis, explicitly flags “elevated public debt, domestic conflicts, and climate shocks” as dampening factors. These are not minor footnotes but fundamental structural challenges that question the sustainability and inclusiveness of any headline growth figure. Mr Abiy’s parliamentary address, however, contained no such caveats. The narrative presented was one of unalloyed triumph, validated by international institutions speaking with one voice except they weren’t.

If the growth claim represents distortion through conflation, the Prime Minister’s assertion about utility prices demonstrates decontextualisation of an altogether more brazen variety. His claim that electricity, water, and fuel costs are “cheaper” in Ethiopia than in Kenya, Somalia, and Tanzania appears designed to counter domestic frustration over cost-of-living pressures. Our columnist’s statistical analysis dismantles it entirely.

Teklemariam deploys Consumer Price Index data for housing, water, electricity, and fuel, the most reliable cross-country comparison available. Ethiopia’s CPI for this category stood at 300.7 in June 2023, using a 2015/16 base of 100. This means costs had tripled in roughly seven years. Tanzania’s equivalent index, by contrast, stood at 118.3, and Somalia’s at 149.5 increases of 18 per cent and 50 per cent respectively, albeit from different base years.

Even accounting for methodological differences, the scale of the divergence is extraordinary. Ethiopian households have experienced vastly steeper historical increases in utility costs than their regional counterparts. To now claim that utilities are “cheaper” requires ignoring this inflationary history entirely. It’s rather like boasting that your house is affordable because you’ve forgotten to mention that the price has tripled since you bought it.

The inflation context compounds the problem. As of December 2025, Ethiopia’s general inflation rate stood at 9.7 per cent more than double Tanzania’s 3.6 per cent and Kenya’s 4.4 per cent. When inflation is running at nearly 10 per cent, even a nominally static price is effectively rising in real terms. Households must allocate an ever-larger share of stagnant or slowly growing incomes just to maintain the same consumption level. The purchasing power of ordinary Ethiopians is being steadily eroded, even if the nominal birr price on their electricity bill remains unchanged.

Yet the most glaring omission in Mr Abiy’s utility comparison, Teklemariam observes, is the one factor that determines whether a price is genuinely “affordable”: income. A kilowatt-hour of electricity might theoretically cost fewer birr in Addis Ababa than shillings in Nairobi, but if the average Ethiopian earns a fraction of what the average Kenyan does, the relative economic burden could be far heavier.

This is basic comparative economics. Price without reference to purchasing power is a meaningless datapoint. The Prime Minister presented a nominal price comparison as if it were a valid measure of living standards. It’s a category error, and one that appears entirely deliberate. Obtaining consistent, comparable income data across the region is notoriously difficult, given vast informal economies and differing statistical methodologies. The Ethiopian government provided no such data to contextualise its claim—a fact our columnist highlights as indicative of the assertion’s fundamental intellectual dishonesty.

It’s a classic populist move. You make a claim that sounds specific and factual—“our utilities are cheaper”—knowing that ordinary citizens can’t easily verify prices in Dar es Salaam or Mogadishu. It creates a perception of competent custodianship whilst diverting attention from domestic failures. The claim doesn’t need to withstand rigorous scrutiny; it merely needs to sound plausible enough to shape the immediate political narrative.

What makes the statistical engineering particularly striking is the contrast with other elements of Mr Abiy’s parliamentary performance. The same session that featured optimistic growth projections and utility comparisons also included an unprecedented admission: that Eritrean troops had committed massacres in the Tigrayan town of Axum during the devastating civil war. This was a significant, if belated, acknowledgement of atrocities that the government had long deflected or denied.

There is an extraordinary duality at work here, Teklemariam argues. On matters of geopolitical blame and historical violence, the Prime Minister can be remarkably candid—perhaps because it deflects responsibility onto an external actor. But on socioeconomic metrics where his government’s competence is directly being judged, the discourse shifts to obfuscation, conflation, and selective omission. One can admit to Eritrean massacres because the culpability lies elsewhere; one cannot admit to economic mismanagement because that responsibility is unavoidably internal.

Yet perhaps the most troubling moment in the parliamentary session came when Mr Abiy addressed the ongoing conflict in the Amhara region. When questioned about the government’s approach to the Fano militia—armed groups that emerged initially to defend Amhara communities but have since become a significant insurgent force the Prime Minister declared his willingness to engage in dialogue. “We are ready to discuss with anyone who wants peace,” he stated, adding that his government would consider talks with armed groups if they demonstrated genuine commitment to resolving the conflict peacefully.

On the surface, this sounds like statesmanship, a leader extending an olive branch to end bloodshed. But our columnist identifies a deeply cynical calculus at work. This is the same government that has repeatedly refused meaningful dialogue with Amhara political figures, that has imprisoned journalists and activists from the region, and that has conducted military operations resulting in civilian casualties. The offer of talks with “armed insurgents” comes only after conventional political channels have been systematically closed, after peaceful dissent has been criminalised, and after communities have been pushed into armed resistance as their only remaining avenue for political expression.

“The offer to negotiate with those who take up arms whilst simultaneously crushing those who seek peaceful political change sends a chilling message,” Teklemariam writes. “It tells Ethiopians that violence, not constitutional politics, is the pathway to being taken seriously by this government. It validates the gun over the ballot box.”

The timing is particularly revealing. The Amhara conflict has proven far more intractable than the government anticipated. Fano groups control significant rural territory, the regional economy is paralysed, and federal forces have struggled to reassert control despite months of military operations. The offer of dialogue comes not from strength or genuine reconciliation, but from military stalemate. It’s the same pattern observed in Tigray-talk peace only when you cannot impose military victory.

Moreover, the framing of potential interlocutors as “armed insurgents” rather than representatives of legitimate Amhara grievances is itself instructive. It strips the conflict of its political context the controversial dissolution of regional special forces, the perceived marginalisation of Amhara interests in federal politics, the unresolved questions of territorial administration. By reducing complex political disputes to a security problem requiring negotiation with “armed groups,” the government avoids accountability for the policies that created the crisis in the first place.

Our columnist notes the bitter irony: a government that came to power promising to open political space and embrace dialogue has instead created conditions where Ethiopians increasingly see armed resistance as more effective than peaceful opposition. The ruling Prosperity Party faces virtually no meaningful challenge in parliament, where it holds an overwhelming majority. Independent media has been shuttered or intimidated into self-censorship. Civil society operates under constant surveillance and threat. In this environment, Mr Abiy’s offer to talk with those who’ve taken up arms is less magnanimity than recognition that force has achieved what constitutional politics could not the government’s attention.

“This is how democracies die,” Teklemariam observes. “Not with a single coup, but with the gradual erosion of peaceful political competition until violence becomes the only language the state understands. The Prime Minister’s offer to negotiate with armed groups in Amhara would be laudable if it were accompanied by genuine opening of political space. Instead, it’s a tactical response to military pressure, one that will likely result in a temporary ceasefire that addresses none of the underlying political grievances.”

Opposition MP Dr Abebaw Desalegn’s pointed criticism during the session, highlighting the “pervasive lack of peace” and ongoing human rights violations underscores the broader context in which these economic claims and political manoeuvres are being made. Ethiopia remains a country navigating post-war trauma, regional instability in Amhara and Oromia, severe foreign exchange shortages, and diplomatic isolation following the deterioration of relations with Eritrea. In such an environment, projecting economic competence and conflict resolution becomes an existential political imperative. The government cannot afford to appear as though it is failing on all fronts simultaneously.

The sophistication of the Prime Minister’s rhetorical strategy should not be underestimated. By invoking the IMF and World Bank, institutions whose technical credibility exceeds that of any political actor, Mr Abiy wraps his narrative in what Teklemariam calls “a technocratic seal of approval.” The selective nature of that invocation is easy to miss in the moment but devastating upon scrutiny.

This is how modern governments with authoritarian tendencies operate in an age of information abundance. They don’t crudely fabricate numbers from whole cloth, that’s too easily disproven in the digital era. Instead, they cherry-pick from legitimate sources, conflate where convenient, and omit context. The result is a narrative that sounds data-driven and can survive a casual fact-check, but collapses under rigorous examination. It’s statistical sophistication in service of political survival.

The strategy reveals a broader pattern identified across developing economies attempting to balance reform commitments to international lenders with domestic political survival. The IMF programme requires Ethiopia to demonstrate progress. But delivering painful reforms, subsidy cuts, currency devaluation, liberalisation, creates immediate political backlash. The urban poor feel the pinch when fuel subsidies are withdrawn; businesses struggle when the currency weakens and imports become expensive. So the government amplifies the positive indicators the IMF generates whilst downplaying the conditionalities and risks the World Bank emphasises. It’s a delicate dance between satisfying international creditors and placating domestic constituencies.

For Ethiopian citizens, the implications extend beyond academic critique of governmental rhetoric. If parliament theoretically the premier forum for executive accountability, cannot effectively interrogate statistical claims, the democratic check on executive power is fundamentally weakened. What our columnist’s analysis demonstrates is the vital importance of independent verification. A functioning democracy requires a free press that can access and interpret World Bank reports, opposition MPs with research capacity, and academic economists who can unpick CPI data and identify discrepancies. Without these institutional counterweights, the government’s narrative simply becomes “the truth” by default.

International partners face a similar reckoning. Western donors and multilateral institutions that continue to support Ethiopia, despite its recent conflicts and democratic backsliding, rely heavily on economic metrics to justify continued engagement. If those metrics are being systematically spun, the basis for that support becomes questionable. The IMF and World Bank need to be far more explicit about the divergences in their assessments. When their figures are being weaponised in domestic political discourse, silence or diplomatic discretion isn’t neutral, it becomes complicity in misrepresentation.

At its core, Teklemariam identifies what he terms an “ontological tension” in Ethiopian governmental communication: the struggle between acknowledging profound challenges and maintaining an unwavering narrative of progress. This tension produces the paradoxes evident in Mr Abiy’s parliamentary performance bold admissions on Eritrean atrocities coexisting with rose-tinted economic claims and cynical offers of dialogue with armed groups whilst peaceful opposition is crushed. It’s a form of compartmentalisation, common in individuals and institutions under extreme stress. You can acknowledge failure in one domain because it’s externalised Eritrea’s fault, Fano militants’ fault, not ours whilst rigidly defending competence in another domain where responsibility is unavoidably internal.

The question facing Ethiopia is whether this compartmentalised discourse can be sustained indefinitely. Economic realities—inflation, unemployment, foreign exchange shortages, the simple difficulty of putting food on the table—are lived experiences that no amount of statistical reframing can fully obscure. Similarly, political realities—the growing armed resistance, the shuttered media, the imprisoned activists—cannot be wished away through selective offers of dialogue. When the gap between narrative and reality becomes too wide, political legitimacy erodes. Citizens may tolerate being told that growth is robust when their own experience suggests stagnation, but only for so long. Eventually, the cognitive dissonance becomes untenable.

Our columnist’s forensic deconstruction of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s parliamentary claims offers more than a fact-check. It provides a case study in how governments in fragile states use data not merely to inform but to construct reality itself a reality designed to legitimise, to reassure, and ultimately to survive. The conflation of IMF and World Bank growth projections, the decontextualised utility price comparisons, the systematic omission of contradictory evidence, the tactical offer to negotiate with armed insurgents whilst denying space to peaceful opposition, these are not mere rhetorical flourishes but calculated strategies of narrative control. They reveal a government acutely aware that in the modern information environment, statistical authority and strategic concessions can substitute for democratic accountability.

For Ethiopia, the stakes could not be higher. A nation emerging from civil war, grappling with regional instability, and facing profound economic challenges needs honest reckoning, not statistical theatre. The country’s ability to attract genuine investment, to rebuild trust with international partners, and to foster social cohesion amongst its deeply fractured population depends on credible governance, and credibility begins with truthfulness.

As Teklemariam concludes, the health of Ethiopian democracy depends on “rigorous, sceptical, and unwavering commitment to discursive accountability.” This means citizens who demand evidence, journalists who investigate claims, opposition politicians who challenge narratives, and international partners who refuse to accept convenient fictions. It means building and protecting the institutional capacity to say, loudly and clearly, when the emperor’s statistical clothes don’t quite fit, and when his offers of peace ring hollow against the backdrop of systematic political repression.

Whether that commitment can be sustained, in parliament, in the press, and amongst citizens, may well determine not just the accuracy of the government’s numbers, but the trajectory of the nation itself. Ethiopia stands at a crossroads. Down one path lies genuine reform, painful honesty about challenges, the opening of real political space, and the slow reconstruction of trust. Down the other lies increasingly sophisticated narrative management, tactical negotiations that preserve power whilst avoiding structural change, a widening gap between claim and reality, and the eventual collapse of credibility. The choice, ultimately, rests with those in power, and with those willing to hold them to account. Our columnist has done his part. The question is whether anyone with the power to act is listening.​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​

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በጋሻው አደመ

ኢትዮጵያ ልዕልናዋን፣ ክብሯን፣ ህልው ምግባሯን በጀግኖቿ ተጋድሎና በመስዋዕትነት ያጸናች ሀገር ናት።

ኢትዮጵያ ከታሪካዊ ጠላቶቿ መንጋጋ የወጣችባቸው የዘመን ሽራፊ አሻራዎች እንደሚነግሩን በየጊዜው ጊዜ የማይሽረው የታሪክ ጉልላት መሠራቱን ነው።

የድል ታሪኮቿ ኹሉ በ‘ዕድል’ የተገኙ ሳይኾኑ ኢትዮጵያዊነት ወኔንና ጀግነትን በታጠቁ ክንደ-ብርቱ ልጆቿ የተገኙ ስለመኾናቸው ታሪክ ምስክር ነው።

የጥቁር ሕዝቦች ኹሉ የነጻነት መስታዎት የዓድዋ ጦርነት የነጻነት ድል ታሪክ፣ እብሪተኛው ዚያድ ባሬ ድል የተደረገበት የካራማራው ጦርነት የድል ታሪክ የተገኘው በዕድል አልነበረም።

ፋሽስት ጣሊያን በ1888 ዓ.ም አድዋ ተራሮች ስር እርም በልታ ብትመለስም ከ40 ዓመታት በኋላ ግን እረመ-ቢስ ኾና የበቀል ስሌት ሰንዳ ለዳግም ወረራ መጣች። የሽንፈት ካባዋን ልታወልቅ፣ የበቀል በትሯን አነሳች። እኒያን የአድዋ ልጆች አደብ ልታስገዛ፣ ያችን የጥቁር ሕዝቦች ኹሉ ተምሳሌት ሀገር ልትረግጥ ወረራ ፈጸመች፤ በ1928 ዓ.ም።

ይኽ ድርጊቷም ቀድሞውንም በሀገራቸው ኅልውና ሰንፈው የማያውቁት ጀግኖችን ለሀገር ክብርና ልዕልና ተጋድሎ ቀሰቀሰ፤ የአርበኝነቱ ምዕራፍ ተጀመረ።

በዚያ የአርበኝነት ዘመን እነማን ነበሩ?

ጣሊያን በዳግም ወረራዋ ኢትዮጵያ ላይ ጦርነት ስትከፍት የሀገርን ኅልውናና ልዕልና ለማስጠበቅ ወኔ የከዳው አልነበረም ማለት ይቻላል።

ስለ የኢትዮጵያውያን አርበኝነት ገድል ስናወሳ የሴት አርበኞችን ሚና ማስታወስ ተገቢ ነው።

በእውቀቱ ስዩም ከአሜን ባሻገር መጽሐፉ “ሴቶች በዋሉበት” በሚል አርእስት ባሰፈረው ሃሳብ የሴቶችን በየዘመኑ ኹሉን አቀፍ አበርክቶ አብራርቷል።

በእውቀቱ እንደሚለው የሴቶች የድል በረከት “ከጓዳ እስከ አውደ ግንባር” ሚዛኑ ከባድ ነው። ሴቶች በጦርነት ወቅት ምግብ ያቀርባሉ፣ ሃሳብ ያቀርባሉ፤ ወኔ ያስታጥቃሉ፤ ጥይት ያቀብላሉ፤ ታጥቀው ያዋጋሉ፤ ይዋጋሉ። በዚኽም ለሀገር ክብርና ልእልና በሚደረግ ተጋድሎ ያስቀመጡት አሻራ ታሪክ የሚዘነጋው አይደለም።

“…እናንተም ወዲህ ኑ እኛም
እንመጣለን
አረበረከቴ ላይ እንገናኝ፡፡ …

ምናባቱ ፋሽስት፣
ፋሽስት ምናባቱ፣
እንወጋዋለን በገዛ ብረቱ፤”

ይህ ግጥም ጀግኖችን የፈጠረ፣ የይቻላል ስነ-ልቦናን የገነባ፣ የጀግና ደንቡን ጥሪ ያስተጋባ፣ የቁርጥ ቀን አለኝታዎችን ያሰባሰበ፣ የጀግኖች አርበኞች ድምጽ በመኾን አገልግሏል።

በአርበኝነት ዘመኑ የተጋድሎ ታሪክ ሲወሳ ስማቸው ከፍ ብሎ የሚነሳ እልፍ ጀግኖች አሉ።

የጎጃሙን አባ ኮስትር በላይ ዘለቀን ስናነሳ – የሸዋዋን ቅምጥል ሸዋረገድ ገድሌን አንዘነጋም። የሸዋውን አይደፈሬ ራስ አበበ አረጋይን ስናወሳ – “አምሳለ- ጣይቱ” የሚባልላትን አርበኛዋን ልዕልት ከበደች ሥዩምን አንዘነጋም።

በሰሜን የማይጨው ግንባር ከዘመቱት ሴቶች መካከል ከአርሶ አደር ቤተሰብ እስከ ልዕልቶቱ ይገኙባቸዋል፡፡

“አፍሪካና ሁለተኛው የዓለም ጦርነት” በሚል ርዕስ በአሜሪካ ካምብሪጅ ፕሬስ በታተመ የጥናት መድበል ውስጥ ዶክተር ኀይሉ ሀብቱ ፋሽስቱን የተዋጉ የኢትዮጵያ ሀገር ወዳድ ጀግና ሴችን የቃኙበት ጥናት ተጠቃሽ ነው።

በዚህ ጥናታዊ ዳሰሳ ከተጠቀሱ ሴቶች መካከልም ወይዘሮ ዘነበች ወልደየስ ባለቤታቸውን ተከትለው የዘመቱት አርበኛ ከአርሶ አደር ቤተሰብ የተገኙ ናቸው ይሉናል።

ሌላዋ ዘማች ልዕልት ሮማንወርቅ ኃይለሥላሴ ከባለቤታቸው ከባሌው ገዢ ጋር አብረው ዘምተዋል።

ከባላቸውና ከልጃቸው ጋር የዘመቱት አርበኛዋ ወይዘሮ ልክየለሽ በያን በፋሺስት ጣሊያን ወረራ ጊዜ ባለቤታቸው ሰማዕትነትን ሲቀበሉ ያዩትንና እሳቸው የፈጸሙትን ጀብዱ ደግሞ ፀሐይ ብርሃነ ሥላሴ “ኖርዝኢስት አፍሪካን ስተዲስ” ባሳተመው መድብል ውስጥ “ሽምቅ ተዋጊ ሴቶች” በሚለው መጣጥፋቸው ገልጸውታል፡፡

አርበኝነት በየዘርፉ

ፋሽት ጣሊያን ባሕር ተሻግሮ ድምበር ጥሶ የኢትዮጵያን ሉዓላዊነት ሲዳፈር ጀግና ሀገር ወዳድ ሁሉ ግምባር የዘመተው በየፊናው ነበር።

ከትጥቅ እስከ ስንቅ፣ ከሥነ-ልቦና ግንባታ እሰከ ሕክምና ሴቶችም ተሳትፈዋል።

ጦር ግንባር ድረስ በመሄድ ተዋጊው የሀገር ጀግና በቆሰለ ጊዜ ደሙን አጥበው፣ የተገኘውን የሀገር ባሕል መድኃኒት አድርገው፣ መግበውና ውኃ አጠጥተው ያድናሉ፡፡

በሕክምናው በኩል ወይዘሮ ስንዱ ገብሩ እና ወይዘሮ ጽጌ መንገሻ ተጠቃሽ መኾናቸውን ታሪክ ሰንዷል፡፡

ለዚኽም ‹‹ኢጣልያ በኢትዮጵያ – ከወልወል እስከ ጎንደር›› የተሰኘውን የተድላ ዘገየን መጽሐፍ ልብ ይሏል።

ክብር ለኢትዮጵያ አርበኞች!

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About Post Author

Ethiopian Tribune editor

editor@ethiopiantribune.com

https://ethiopiantribune.com

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Sourced by Asrat keregne

ጠቅላይ ሚኒስትር ጸሐፌ ትዕዛዝ አክሊሉ ኃብተወልድ ፣ በአለም የፖለቲካ መድረክ ኢትዮጵያን በከፍተኛ ደረጃ ያስተዋወቁ ፣ ብሔራዊ ጥቅሟንና የግዛት ሉአላዊነቷን ያስጠበቁ ፣ ከነበሩን ትላልቅ ነፍሳት መሀከል አንዱ ነበሩ። ምሥጋና ላይ በአያሌው ቁጥብ መሆናቸው የሚነገርላቸው ፕሮፌሰር መስፍን ፣ መጨረሻ ባሳተሙት መጽሐፋቸው “…ከ 1960 ዓ.ም በሁዋላ ያለውን የኢትዮጵያ ታሪክ አቅጣጫ የለወጡ አንድ ጸሐፊ ትእዛዝ አክሊሉ ኃብተወልድ ናቸዉ።

አክሊሉ ኃብተወልድ የውጭ ጉዳይ ሚኒስትር ፣ ጠቅላይ ሚኒስትር ፣ ጸሐፌ ትእዛዝ ነበሩ። ከሁሉም በላይ በነጮች ዘረኛነት ዘመን ፣ የጥቁር ድምጽ በማይሰማበት ወቅት በተባበሩት መንግሥታት ጉባኤ የማይደፈሩትን ነጮች በሙግት እያሳፈሩ ቀልባቸውን ሲገፉ የነበሩ ሰዉ ናቸው…” በማለት ምስክርነታቸውን ሰጥተዋል።

በዚያን ሰሞን አሮጌ መጽሔቶች ሳገላብጥ “የመጨረሻው ኑዛዜ… !” በሚል ርዕስ እኚህ ታላቅ ሰው ለሀገራቸው የፈጸሙትን ታላቅ ገድል የሚያወሳ ጽሑፍ አገኘሁ። እሥር ላይ ሆነው ከመሞታቸው በፊት በማስታወሻ መልክ ያኖሩት አስገራሚ ታሪክ ነው።

አፋምቦን ከፈረንሳይ ፣ ጋምቤላን ከእንግሊዝ እጅ ፈልቅቀው ወደ ቀድሞ እናት ግዛታቸው ኢትዮጵያ የቀላቀሉበት የዲፕሎማሲያዊ ጥበብ በእጅጉ ያስደምማል።

“….ውጪ ጉዳይ እንደገባሁ ኢትዮጵያ ከሌሎች ሀገራት ጋር ያላትን ወሰን በኢንተርናሽናል ውል መሠረት በትክክል መወሰን ዋና ጉዳይ አድርጌ ነበር ያየሁት ።….ትንሽ መንግሥት እንደመሆናችን መጠን የተከበብነው ያን ግዜ በነኛው በቅኝ ገዥዎች ስለሆነ ‘አጥራችንን ደህና አድርጎ ማጠር አስፈላጊ ነበር። ብዙ ግዜ ከአጼ ሚኒልክ ጋር የተደረገው ውል ግልጽ ያልሆነ ነበር። ኢትዮጵያ ከመወረሯ በፊት (1935) ካንድ ሀገር ጋር ብቻ ነበር ወሰናችን የተካለለው (ከእንግሊዝ ሶማሌ) በዚህ ምክንያት ነው ከጎረቤት ሀገራት ጋር በየጊዜው የድንበር ግጭት የነበረን…” በማለት ከባዱን የዲፕሎማሲያዊ ሥራ እንዴት እንደተያያዙት ጸሐፊ ትእዛዝ ያወሳሉ።

እስኪ ጋምቤላ ወደ ኢትዮጵያ እንዲመለስ (ከ 1954 — 1955 ዓ.ም) ያደረጉትን ትግል እንይ ፤ ጠቅላይ ሚኒስትር እንደገለጹት ኢትዮጵያ ዙሪያዋን በቀኝ ገዥዎች የተከበበች ብቸኛ ነጻ ሀገር ነበረች። እንዲህ እንዳሁኑ በዘርና በጎሳ ተከፋፍለን ፣ በጦርነት እርስ በእርስ ስንተላለቅ ፣ አጋጣሚውን በመጠቀም ቅኝ ገዢዎች በመስፋፋት ድንበራችንን ጥሰው በመግባት ብዙ ቦታዎችን ይዘውብን ነበር። በኃይል ከተያዙብን ሥፍራዎች አንዱ ጋምቤላ ነበር።

የኢትዮጵያና የሱዳን ድንበር የሚወሰነው በአጼ ምኒልክና በእንግሊዞች መካከል በተፈረመው ውል መሠረት ነበር። እዚህ ውል ላይ “…ጋምቤላ በእንግሊዞች እጅ ይቆያል ፣ ይኸውም እንግሊዝ ሱዳንን እስከያዘች ድረስ ነው ….”የሚል ነበረበት።

በ 1954 ዓ.ም ንጉሠ ነገሥት ግርማዊ ቀዳማዊ ኃይለሥላሴ እና ጸሐፊ ትእዛዝ አክሊሉ እንግሊዝን ይጎበኛሉ። አጋጣሚውን በመጠቀም ብልሁ አክሊሉ “..ሱዳን በቅርብ ግዜ ነጻ መሆኗ አይቀርም ፣ ስለዚህ በውሉ መሠረት አሁኑኑ ጋምቤላን ብታስረክቡን? ” ብለው የእንግሊዙን ጠቅላይ ሚኒስትር ኤደንን ይጠይቃሉ ኤደንም “..የሱዳን ነጻነት ገና ነው።
ቢያንስ ሁለትና ሦስት አመት ይወስዳል። በውሉ መሠረት ሱዳንን እስክንለቅ መጠበቅ አለባችሁ.. !”በማለት ኮስተር ብሎ ይመልሳል። "...ይሄማ አይሆንም! ሱዳን ነጻ መንግሥት እስክትሆን ጠብቀን በሁዋላ ከሱዳን ወንድሞቻችን ጋር ጋምቤላን አስረክቡን ብለን መጣላት አንፈልግም ስለዚህ አሁኑኑ ጋምቤላን አስረክቡን "በማለት አክሊሉ አጥብቀው ይጠይቃሉ። ከብዙ ክርክር በሁዋላ በአይበገሬው ኢትዮጵያዊ ጽናት አንድ ስምምነት ላይ ይደርሳሉ። ይህም "...ሱዳን ነጻ ከመውጣቷ ከሦስት ወር በፊት ጋምቤላን ለማስረከብ ሁለቱ መንግሥታት ተነጋግረው እንዲረካከቡ..."የሚል ነው።

ግን እንግሊዝ ውሉን ችላ ብላና ቃሏን አጥፋ ሦስት ወር ባልሞላ ግዜ ውስጥ ለሱዳን ነጻነቷን የምትመልስ መሆኗን በሬድዮ ታውጃለች። እንግሊዝ ጋምቤላን ሳታስረክብ ሱዳንን ለቃ መውጣቷ በኢትዮጵያና በሱዳን መሀከል ጦርነት መጫር ፈልጋ መሆኑን ለመረዳት አክሊሉ ግዜ አልወሰደባቸውም። ዜናውን እንደሰሙ በፍጥነት ማስታወሻ አዘጋጅተው በኢትዬጵያ የእንግሊዙን አምባሳደር ጠርተው ማስታወሻውን ይሰጡታል። የማስታወሻው ቃል "...በውሉ መሠረት ጋምቤላን እንግሊዞች የሚይዙት ሱዳን እስካለ ድረስ ነው። አሁን እንግሊዞች በድንገት ሱዳንን ስለሚለቁ ፣ በተስማማነው መሠረት ከሰኞ ጀምሮ (ከሁለት ቀን በሁዋላ) ኢትዮጵያ ጋምቤላን ትይዛለች ...!" የሚል ቆፍጠን ያለ መልእክት የያዘ ነበር። አምባሳደሩም ሀሳቡን ተቃውሞ መልእክቱን ግን ለሀገሩ መንግሥት እንደሚያስተላልፍ ተናገረ።

ወዲያው ለሱዳን የውስጥ አስተዳደር ባለስልጣናት በአቶ መለስ አምዶም (በወቅቱ የኢትዮጵያ አገናኝ ሁዋላም በግብጽ አምባሳደር በነበሩት) በኩል ቴሌግራም ይልካሉ።
“..ለነጻነታችሁ መልካም ምኞታችን ነው። ወደፊት እንደ ወንድማማቾች አብረን እንድንሠራ ጋምቤላ በቅኝ ገዢዎች በኃይል ተይዞብን ስለነበር ከሰኞ ጀምረን መያዛችን…. ወዳጅነታችንን የማይነካና የሱዳንም ቆንሲላ ማናቸውም ቤትና ንብረት ቢኖር ለግዜው መቆየት ይችላል… “የሚል ሀሳብ በመልእክቱ ተካቷል። አክሊሉ እንዳቀዱት ሰኞ እለት የኢትዮጵያ የፖሊስ ኃይል ጋምቤላ ገብቶ የኢትዮጵያን ባንዲራ ሰቀለ። አስተዳደሩንም ሙሉ በሙሉ ያለምንም ችግር ተቆጣጠረ። ሱዳኖች በወቅቱ በነጻነታቸው ተደስተው በጎ ምላሽ የሰጡ ቢሆንም.. ፣ ዘግይተው ሀሳባቸውን ለውጠዋል። ከሦስት ወር በሁዋላ በምክትል የውጭ ጉዳይ ሚኒስትር የሚመራ ልዑክ ጋምቤላ ስላላቸው ንብረት ለመነጋገር አዲስ አበባ ይገባል። በስብሰባ ወቅት በቁጣ "..ለእንግሊዞች የፈቀዳችሁትን ጋምቤላን ለምን ለእኛ አፍሪካውያን ትነፍጉናላችሁ? ጋምቤላን መልሱልን.. !"በማለት ጠይቀዋል።

አክሊሉም “…እኛ ወደን የሰጠናቸው አይደለም! የእንግሊዝ ቀኝ ገዥዎች አፍሪካን ሲከፋፈሉ በኃይል የወሰዱብን ነው። አሁን ቅኝ ግዛት ሀገራት ነጻ ይውጡ ሲባል.. እንዴት እናንተ እንዲህ አይነት ጥያቄ ትጠይቃላችሁ? ! ይልቅ በሰላማዊና በወንድማማች መንፈስ የምትወስዱትን እቃ ዝርዝር ብንነጋገር ይሻላል። ወደዚህ የመጣችሁበትና የተስማማንበት ጉዳይ ይህ ነው!ከዚህ ውጪ በሌላ ጉዳይ ለመነጋገር የተስማማንበት ሥርአት አይፈቅድም.. !” አሏቸው። ሱዳኖችም ተቆጥተው ስብሰባውን ጥለው ወጡ። ጸሐፊ ትእዛዝ በማስታወሻቸው እንደሚዘክሩት "..በሌላ ጉዳይ ካልሆነ በቀር ከዚያን ግዜ አንስቶ የጋምቤላ ጉዳይ በሱዳኖች ተነስቶ አያውቅም.. !" ይሉናል።

“ክብር ኢትዮጵያን ከነ ነፃነቷ ላስረከቡን ጀግኖች አባቶቻችንና እናቶቻችን ይሁን🙏

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Ethiopian Tribune editor

editor@ethiopiantribune.com

https://ethiopiantribune.com

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By Ethiopian Tribune columnist E. Frashie

On 17th January, the announcement of the Amhara Fano National Movement (AFNM) did more than consolidate disparate militias under a single command structure. In the movement’s own triumphalist language, it has taken “a historic decision that will close the valley through which the Prosperity Party group…draws its breath.” Stripped of revolutionary bombast, this means something simpler but no less significant: it called the bluff of Ethiopia’s political establishment. For 22 months, the government of Abiy Ahmed has refused to negotiate with Fano on the grounds that the movement was too fragmented to engage meaningfully. That excuse, threadbare even when first deployed, has now been comprehensively demolished. The movement now operates under “one leader, one organization” precisely what the government claimed was necessary for dialogue. The question is whether Addis Ababa, and its intellectual enablers, will acknowledge this reality or continue retreating into ever more baroque conspiracy theories about foreign manipulation.

The unification deserves serious analysis, not reflexive dismissal. Yet the response from government-aligned commentators, exemplified by Dr Dagnachew Assefa’s recent Andafta interview, reveals an intellectual poverty that augurs poorly for Ethiopia’s prospects. When a political movement you’ve spent nearly two years fighting suddenly presents you with the interlocutor you claimed to want, the appropriate response is not to insist they must be puppets of Eritrea, Egypt, and the TPLF. Such arguments insult the intelligence of observers and, more seriously, foreclose any possibility of the political settlement Ethiopia desperately needs.

The Mechanics of Unification: More Sophisticated Than Acknowledged

The Reyot Media discussion of 26th January provides crucial context absent from government narratives. The merger addresses three specific operational deficiencies that had plagued Fano since the conflict’s inception in April 2023:

First, the propaganda disadvantage. As Reyot’s journalist and his guest note, the fragmentation between entities like the Amhara Fano National Force (AFNF) and Amhara Fano Popular Organisation (AFPO), colloquially referred to as “AFAD” and “AFAB” respectively, allowed the Prosperity Party to portray the movement as disorganised rabble incapable of coherent political thought. This wasn’t merely rhetorical. It provided justification for refusing dialogue whilst pursuing military solutions, and it deterred international engagement.

Second, the diplomatic impasse. Without a single leadership structure or unified political programme, external actors, whether potential mediators or sympathetic diaspora communities, faced a coordination nightmare. Whom does one negotiate with when four regional commands operate independently? Which political document represents Fano’s actual demands? The new structure, with its 13-member central command, resolves this ambiguity.

Third, operational inefficiency. Logistics in insurgencies are difficult enough without duplicated efforts and competing resource claims. The Reyot discussion highlights how support networks were “confused” about where to direct assistance, leading to waste whilst fighters in the field faced shortages.

The leadership structure itself reflects careful balancing:

• Chairman: Zemene Kassie (Gojjam faction)
• First Vice-Chairman: Meketaw Mamo (Gondar faction)
• Vice-Chairman for Military Affairs: Habte Wolde (field commander)
• Vice-Chairman for Political Affairs: Henok Addis (political strategist)
• Military Commander: Brigadier General Tefera Mamo (professional military background)
• Public Relations: Asres Mare (communications strategy)
• Foreign Affairs: Brook Shileshi (international engagement)

Notably, the organization has assigned Eskinder Nega to the “Policy & Strategy Directorate” rather than a top-tier position a placement we shall examine shortly.

This is not, pace Dr Dagnachew, the product of “totalisation” imposed by foreign patrons. It is a deliberate institutional design meant to represent major factional interests whilst establishing clear lines of authority. The inclusion of both military commanders (Habte, Tefera) and political figures (Henok, Brook) suggests an organisation preparing for both continued armed struggle and eventual negotiation.

More revealing is the ideological framework the movement has adopted. In its 17th January statement, AFNM explicitly declares “Amhara nationalism” as its guiding worldview: “the ideological framework through which we will struggle, beginning with winning the current existential struggle and, in the long term, by securing the survival and identity of our people and safeguarding their rights and interests.” This framing of an “existential threat” requiring a “new Amhara revolution” positions the movement not as insurgents pursuing tactical objectives but as a people engaged in survival struggle.

The statement’s rhetoric is uncompromising: “Indeed, the Amhara are a people facing annihilation…we now find ourselves stripped of our country, made stateless, and placed under the dire threat of destruction amid a state-led genocide.” Whether one accepts this characterisation or not, it signals that AFNM sees itself fighting not for policy concessions but for collective survival a maximalist framing that complicates potential negotiations whilst explaining the movement’s resilience.

The Eskinder Nega Puzzle: Strategic Placement, Not Rejection

The case of Eskinder Nega, veteran journalist, political prisoner under the EPRDF, and prominent Fano political figure illuminates the movement’s internal dynamics more than any external analysis could.

The AFNM statement assigns Eskinder to the “Policy & Strategy Directorate” rather than one of the four top positions (Chairman, First Deputy, Military Affairs Deputy, Political Affairs Deputy). The Reyot Media discussion reported he had declined a specific politburo position, generating speculation about exhaustion or temperamental incompatibility with committee structures.

Yet the official statement’s acknowledgement that “entrenched divisive tendencies, interference by opportunistic interest groups, and the poisonous hands of the enemy constituted the principal challenges” in achieving unity suggests a different interpretation. The “repeated efforts” to establish “a single Fano organization” faced internal obstacles likely including Eskinder’s own political base and ideological positions. His placement in Policy & Strategy, rather than a rejection, may represent a calculated compromise: leveraging his intellectual contributions whilst avoiding the power-sharing complications a top-tier position would create.

The Reyot discussion offers two interpretations, neither of which involves foreign manipulation:

The exhaustion hypothesis: After nearly two years in the field, including periods of intense combat, Eskinder may simply lack the physical stamina for the grinding administrative work a politburo position entails. Armed struggle is not romantic; it involves disease, malnutrition, constant displacement, and the psychological toll of sustained violence. That a 56-year-old intellectual might choose to contribute without accepting formal leadership responsibilities is entirely comprehensible.

The temperamental hypothesis: Eskinder’s political career has been characterised by uncompromising principle and individualistic style. He spent years in Kaliti Prison rather than moderate his criticisms of the EPRDF. Such figures often struggle within committee structures that require consensus-building and tactical compromise. As Reyot’s analysts observe, his “uncompromising” nature may make rigid organisational hierarchies uncomfortable, even when he supports the broader cause.

Critically, Eskinder did not bolt to form a rival organisation, the predictable move for someone prioritising personal ambition over collective goals. The statement’s gratitude to “all leaders of the two organizations: especially for the leadership and determination you demonstrated during this unity process” implicitly acknowledges that achieving merger required mutual concessions. Eskinder’s acceptance of a directorate position, contributing without demanding a top seat, actually demonstrates the unification’s strength. It suggests that factional leaders recognise the movement’s survival depends on unity, even when this requires personal sacrifice.

Yet Dr Dagnachew’s narrative has no room for such nuance. In his telling, any organisational changes within Fano must reflect external manipulation rather than internal political processes. This analytical framework cannot explain Eskinder’s decision except through conspiracy a methodology that substitutes innuendo for evidence.

What Unification Actually Changes: The Strategic Landscape

The operational implications of AFNM’s formation are substantial and deserve acknowledgement even from critics:

Military coordination: For the first time, operations across Gojjam, Gondar, Wollo, and Shewa can be synchronised under unified command. This isn’t merely administrative tidiness; it fundamentally alters battlefield dynamics. Where previously government forces could exploit gaps between factional territories, they now face an adversary capable of coordinated multi-front operations.

AFNM claims significant military success under the previous decentralised structure: “The victories achieved through the determined sacrifice of life of our forces under a decentralized organisational structure dismantled the regime’s defense forces, the main source of its power, and reduced the regime to a mere insurgent confined to Arat Kilo [the Presidential Palace].” The statement continues: “We have turned the regime’s generals, forgetting their military command, into mere cadres left only with their tongues.”

This is revolutionary rhetoric, not sober military assessment. Yet even accounting for triumphalism, the September 2025 operations around Woldiya, Mekane Selam, and Gashena whether fully successful or partially exaggerated demonstrate capacity for significant operations after 22 months of government military pressure. The AFNM’s confidence that “with the first phase of the struggle concluding in victory and the regime’s army disintegrating, it became necessary for Fano to grow into a successor force” suggests they believe they’ve achieved strategic parity, if not superiority, in the Amhara region.

Narrative control: The proliferation of Fano-affiliated media channels (Anchor, Roha TV, Ethio 360, Amhara Fano TV) has created messaging chaos, with different outlets promoting different commanders and occasionally contradictory political lines. A single public relations structure under Asres Mare allows coherent messaging that can counter government propaganda more effectively. This matters in modern conflicts where information warfare runs parallel to kinetic operations.

AFNM’s Expansive Vision: From Amhara Survival to Pan-Ethiopian Liberation

The movement’s 17th January statement reveals ambitions extending far beyond Amhara regional concerns. In a passage that should alarm anyone hoping for quick negotiated settlement, AFNM frames its struggle as the salvation of all Ethiopians:

“Given the current reality facing our country, we do not believe there is any Ethiopian community that has not been subjected, openly or implicitly, to genocidal violence or an existential threat. Every people’s survival is at risk. Ethiopia stands on the edge of a cliff. Accordingly, the Fano struggle represents a decisive political solution not only for the survival of the Amhara people but also for the political salvation of other Ethiopian peoples. An Amhara victory is a victory for the Gurage, the Tigrayan, the Oromo, the Gumuz, the Afar, the Somali, the Wolayta, the Sidama, the Gamo, and other peoples as well.”

This is either magnificent delusion or sophisticated political positioning perhaps both. It reframes Fano from ethnic militia to pan-Ethiopian liberation movement, claiming to fight not just for Amhara but for all Ethiopia’s peoples. The statement explicitly calls on “all political groups and elites” to “stand together and struggle for a shared destiny, as remaining a bystander leads to sequential attacks and destruction.”

More provocatively, AFNM extends its solidarity regionally: “Abiy is the sharp horn of the Horn of Africa, piercing everyone, drawing blood from all, and trampling the homes of the region’s peoples with both hands and feet. For this reason, removing the genocidal Abiy Ahmed regime requires cooperation not only among Ethiopians but also among regional forces. All collaborations aimed at removing this regime and stabilising the region are fully legitimate.”

Read carefully, this passage pre-emptively legitimises precisely the external cooperation Dr Dagnachew accuses them of pursuing. “All collaborations” for regime removal are “fully legitimate” including, presumably, with Eritrea, Egypt, or any regional actor sharing the objective. Whether this reflects existing arrangements or creates political cover for future ones, it demonstrates political sophistication belying the “foreign puppet” narrative.

The message to the international community is equally telling. AFNM calls for ending “support to the anti-people and anti-peace Prosperity regime” whilst applying “necessary pressure to deprive the regime of its destructive capacity.” They request support for “cooperation among Fano and other anti-regime struggle forces” and humanitarian access.

This is the language of a political movement positioning itself as government-in-waiting, not an insurgent group seeking negotiated settlement. The statement nowhere offers compromise, nowhere acknowledges government legitimacy, nowhere proposes power-sharing. The objective, stated plainly, is regime removal.

Governance potential: If the movement genuinely controls substantial territory, their claim of 75% of the Amhara region is unverified but not implausible given government forces’ concentration in urban centres, it requires administrative structures beyond military command. A politburo with designated portfolios provides the institutional foundation for nascent governance, however rudimentary.

These are not trivial developments. They represent the maturation of what began as spontaneous local defence militias into something approaching a conventional armed movement with political structures. That this occurred through Ethiopian agency, drawing on Ethiopia’s own historical examples (the Reyot discussion explicitly references the Quara Covenant’s symbolism, invoking Emperor Tewodros II’s unification struggles), should command respect rather than dismissal.

Deconstructing Dr Dagnachew’s Conspiracy Theory

Dr Dagnachew Assefa’s 26th January Andafta interview represents a genre increasingly common in Ethiopian political discourse: the unfalsifiable conspiracy theory dressed in academic credentials. His central claim, that Zemene Kassie’s prominence results from coordination between Eritrea, Egypt, and the TPLF warrants detailed examination.

The evidentiary vacuum:

Dr. Dagnachew offers zero documentation for this grand conspiracy he’s busy stitching together. No intercepted calls, no shadowy bank transfers, no trembling witnesses, not even a misplaced diplomatic Post-it note. Instead, he serves us a buffet of “must be,” “had to,” and “surely”the academic equivalent of seasoning thin soup with wishful thinking.

According to him, Fano “had to” rely on Shabiya for logistics, Egypt “must be” wiring the cash, and TPLF somehow “benefits from” Fano’s actions. These aren’t facts; they’re hypotheses dressed up in borrowed authority, strutting around like they own the place.

And then, because every weak argument needs a celebrity cameo, he starts dropping names like the former deputy PM, all while clacking his bargain-bin denture like a metronome of insecurity. You can practically hear the click-click as he rushes to reinvent and redraft his flimsy narrative, popping that denture back into place every time it threatens to escape mid-sentence. The poor thing is working harder than his evidence.

The logical incoherence: Why would the TPLF, which lost territory and political dominance partly due to Amhara mobilisation during the Tigray war, now support an armed Amhara movement? Dr Dagnachew’s answer that TPLF seeks to destabilise the federal government, ignores that TPLF has returned to participation in federal politics, holding ministerial positions and pursuing its interests through constitutional channels. Supporting Fano would undermine this strategy whilst risking renewed conflict on TPLF’s southern border.

Similarly, whilst Eritrea has historical grievances with Ethiopia and Egypt has Nile disputes, the notion that these states would coordinate with TPLF Eritrea’s bitter enemy during the Tigray war strains credulity. Dr Dagnachew asks us to believe that three actors with fundamentally opposed interests have formed an alliance whose sole purpose is elevating Zemene Kassie. This is not geopolitical analysis; it is fantasy.

The denial of agency: Most pernicious is the framework’s complete denial of Ethiopian, specifically Amhara, agency. In Dr Dagnachew’s narrative, Amhara cannot organise politically except through foreign manipulation. They cannot unite except through external pressure. They cannot resist government policies except as proxies. This Orientalist perspective presenting Ethiopians as passive objects of external forces rather than subjects of their own history, is intellectually bankrupt.

The “just war” sophistry: Dr Dagnachew invokes just war theory to argue Fano’s struggle has become illegitimate because it now pursues “regime change” rather than self-defence. This argument would carry more weight if the Ethiopian government had not spent 22 months:

• Conducting drone strikes on civilian gatherings (East Gojjam, 17th April 2025: 100+ killed at a primary school)
• Massacring civilians during house-to-house searches (Merawi, 30th January 2024: 89 dead; Birakat, 31st March 2025: 40+ dead)
• Implementing mass arrests based on ethnicity (thousands detained in Addis Ababa)
• Maintaining telecommunications blackouts preventing documentation of abuses
• Refusing all dialogue whilst insisting Fano is too fragmented to negotiate

When a government conducts systematic atrocities against an ethnic population whilst refusing political engagement, what precisely is the “just” response? Continued submission? Dr Dagnachew’s just war framework holds insurgents to standards he conspicuously avoids applying to state forces.

The Welkait canard: His claim that attributing Welkait’s capture to Fano “plays into TPLF narratives” is particularly revealing. Welkait, administratively part of Tigray but demographically mixed and historically contested, was indeed taken from TPLF control during the Tigray war but by whom? Federal forces certainly participated, but so did Amhara regional forces and local militias. Dr Dagnachew’s insistence that only federal and regional special forces deserve credit erases the role of irregular forces, essentially demanding that Fano write themselves out of their own history to avoid offending TPLF sensibilities. Why should Amhara fighters who participated in Welkait’s capture deny their role to accommodate TPLF propaganda? The absurdity is self-evident.

The Territorial Expansion Question: Real Grievances, Cynical Exploitation

The Consortium of Ethiopian Civil Associations’ (CECA) March 2025 statement about Oromo territorial expansion, particularly following the February OLF-OFC Elilly Hotel meeting, touches genuine issues whilst drawing questionable conclusions.

The OLF-OFC joint statement did indeed demand recognition of Addis Ababa (Finfinnee) as Oromia’s capital and claimed territories including Wollo, Metekel, Dire Dawa, Moyale, and Harar. These demands rest on contested historical narratives about pre-existing Oromo settlement patterns versus administrative boundaries imposed under previous regimes.

The legitimate concern: When such demands are articulated whilst Amhara civilians face documented atrocities, the timing appears deliberately provocative. Whether intended or not, it reinforces Amhara perceptions of coordinated assault military operations by government forces combined with territorial claims by Oromo political organisations. CECA’s alarm is comprehensible.

The dishonest framing: CECA characterises this as a “Prosperity Party-led Oromummaa project” involving “hatred, separation, and expansion,” suggesting government orchestration. Yet the evidence for government initiation is thin. The OLF and OFC are opposition parties; their maximalist territorial claims likely reflect internal political positioning rather than government coordination. Indeed, such demands complicate rather than assist government strategy by inflaming ethnic tensions.

Moreover, CECA’s invocation of “Orthodox Christian unity” (የተዋሕዶ) alongside territorial integrity reveals its own ethnic-religious particularism. Why should Orthodox Christianity be relevant to territorial disputes in a constitutionally secular state? This framing excludes Ethiopia’s Muslims (approximately 34% of the population), Protestants, and traditional religionists from the imagined political community CECA claims to represent.

The deeper problem: Ethiopia’s ethnic federal system has structurally incentivised zero-sum territorial competition. When political power, resource allocation, and cultural recognition all flow through ethnically-defined regional states, boundary disputes become existential rather than administrative. The constitution provides no clear mechanism for resolving these disputes beyond potentially violent referenda.

Both Oromo maximalist claims (Addis Ababa as Oromia’s capital) and Amhara maximalist claims (Welkait as eternally Amhara) rest on selective historical narratives that ignore centuries of population mixing, administrative changes, and demographic shifts. There is no neutral historical baseline to which Ethiopia can “return” only competing visions of which historical moment should be privileged.

This doesn’t mean all territorial claims are equally valid or that violence is inevitable. It means the constitutional framework itself requires fundamental reform precisely what CECA gestures towards in demanding a “new democratic constitutional order.” Yet CECA undermines this potentially productive call by framing it through explicitly Amhara-Orthodox particularism rather than genuinely pluralist principles.

What the Government Should Do (But Won’t)

The AFNM unification creates a genuine opportunity for political settlement, if the government possessed the wisdom to seize it:

Immediate confidence-building measures:

• Declare a unilateral 30-day ceasefire
• Release political prisoners, particularly high-profile detainees like Christian Tadele and Yohannes Buayalew.
• Restore telecommunications in conflict zones to allow documentation and communication
• Permit international humanitarian access to assess civilian conditions
• Establish an independent commission to investigate atrocities by all parties

Structured dialogue framework:

• Acknowledge AFNM as a legitimate interlocutor for negotiations
• Establish a neutral mediation structure, potentially involving African Union facilitation
• Develop a clear negotiating agenda addressing security sector reform, regional autonomy, constitutional amendments, and transitional justice
• Set realistic timelines with measurable milestones

Constitutional reform process:

• Initiate broad national dialogue on ethnic federalism’s future
• Consider models from other multi-ethnic federations (Switzerland, Belgium, Canada) that don’t rely on strict territorial ethnic separation
• Develop mechanisms for resolving boundary disputes without violence
• Strengthen federal institutions to provide arenas for interethnic cooperation

None of this will happen. The government’s response will likely follow predictable patterns: dismiss AFNM’s legitimacy using conspiracy theories about foreign manipulation; continue military operations whilst claiming to seek peace; make tactical concessions without strategic shifts; and hope that internal AFNM divisions will eventually re-emerge, allowing a return to the “too fragmented to negotiate” excuse.

This approach has two problems: it’s not working militarily, and it’s destroying the country politically.

The Military Stalemate Nobody Acknowledges

After 22 months of conflict, the military situation has reached equilibrium though AFNM insists the conflict has actually lasted “30 months” (counting from April 2023), suggesting their timeline includes earlier confrontations before the April 2023 state of emergency. Neither side admits stalemate:

Government forces control major urban centres, main highways, and critical infrastructure. They possess overwhelming advantages in heavy weaponry, air power, and logistics. Yet they cannot pacify the countryside, cannot prevent AFNM operations, and cannot restore civilian administration outside fortified positions. The September 2025 operations around Woldiya, Mekane Selam, and Gashena whether fully successful or partially exaggerated demonstrate that AFNM can still mount significant operations despite sustained government military pressure.

AFNM forces apparently control substantial rural territory (their claim that the regime is “reduced to a mere insurgent confined to Arat Kilo” is hyperbolic, but government territorial control is clearly limited), can operate across multiple zones, and maintain popular support sufficient to sustain operations. Their appeal to “uniformed forces and militias” reveals strategic thinking: “It is no secret to you that the regime’s source of power is not the people, but the blood of uniformed forces. Nor is it hidden from you that, for as long as the regime prolongs its grip on power, it has no regard for your lives…Understanding that your death is not for your country but for a regime that cannot be satisfied without human blood; we call on you to join the Fano struggle.”

This is sophisticated psychological warfare targeting the Ethiopian National Defence Force’s (ENDF) morale suggesting AFNM recognises it cannot defeat the ENDF militarily but might undermine it politically. Yet AFNM has not captured major cities, cannot hold territory against determined government assaults, and shows no capacity to march on Addis Ababa. Their strategy appears to be creating ungovernable space whilst waiting for political opportunities, a classic insurgent approach but one that implies protracted conflict rather than imminent victory.

This is the definition of stalemate. Neither side can achieve decisive military victory, yet both continue pursuing military solutions. The result is accumulating civilian suffering without strategic progress:

• Documented civilian deaths: Hundreds in specific incidents (Merawi 89, East Gojjam 100+, Birakat 40+), likely thousands overall
• Displacement: Tens of thousands from conflict zones
• Economic disruption: Agricultural production disrupted, markets closed, investment fled
• Humanitarian crisis: Limited access for aid organisations, potential famine conditions
• Generational trauma: Children witnessing atrocities, families fractured, communities destroyed

Dr Dagnachew’s just war question about proportionality should be directed not only at Fano but at the government prosecuting this unwinnable conflict. What political objective justifies drone-striking a primary school? What strategic necessity requires massacring civilians in house-to-house searches? What national interest is served by maintaining a stalemate that bleeds the country whilst foreclosing political solutions?

The International Dimension: Rhetoric versus Reality

Both AFNM statements and government-aligned narratives invoke international actors, though with opposite valuations:

AFNM’s claims: The movement accuses the government of coordinating with the UAE for drone strikes and receiving support from regional actors opposed to Amhara interests. The UAE connection is plausible, the country has sold military drones to Ethiopia and maintains significant economic investments. Whether this constitutes active “coordination” for anti-Amhara operations or simply arms sales to a recognised government is debatable.

Government claims: As articulated by Dr Dagnachew and others, Fano is supposedly coordinated with Eritrea, Egypt, and TPLF. We’ve addressed the evidentiary and logical problems with this narrative. Eritrea and Egypt certainly have interests in Ethiopian instability, Eritrea due to border disputes and authoritarianism’s fear of Ethiopian democratisation; Egypt due to Nile water concerns. Whether these interests translate into active Fano support is unproven.

The actual international position: External actors the African Union, United States, European Union, neighbouring states have shown limited engagement with Ethiopia’s internal conflicts post-Tigray war. The November 2022 Pretoria Agreement ending the Tigray conflict consumed enormous diplomatic capital; international appetite for mediating another Ethiopian civil war appears limited.

Interestingly, AFNM’s unity process itself involved external observers, though Ethiopian rather than international. The statement thanks “the observers’ team, comprising seven members, including Ambassador Birhane Meskel Nega and Major Dawit Wolde-Giyorgis, led by His Highness Asfawossen Asrate Kassa, for following the process impartially and for providing solutions whenever requested by the technical committee.”

The inclusion of Asfawossen Asrate Kassa first cousin of Emperor Haile Selassie and claimant to the defunct imperial throne, is symbolically loaded. It signals AFNM’s conscious connection to pre-revolutionary Ethiopian state traditions, positioning the movement within a narrative of historical continuity rather than revolutionary rupture. Whether this reflects genuine monarchist sympathies or tactical use of traditional legitimacy symbols, it demonstrates political sophistication in deploying cultural capital.

The 2026 elections present a potential inflection point, but early indications suggest international observers will be restricted (per CECA’s warnings about new civil society legislation) and legitimacy will be contested regardless of results.

Dr. Dagnachew, who now parades around calling himself Fitawrari as though he’s auditioning for a historical drama no one asked for, treats geopolitics like a village gossip session conducted under a flickering lightbulb. He invokes President Trump’s description of Ethiopia’s premier as a “strong man,” blissfully unaware that in American political snob-speak this is a polite way of saying “dictator” without having to commit to the word. But nuance has never been Dr. Dagnachew’s strong suit; he handles nuance the way a toddler handles a crystal vase.

He then drags the Trump administration’s past rhetoric on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam into his argument, as if name-dropping global powers will magically inflate the credibility of his claims. Trump’s off‑the‑cuff remark that Egypt might “blow up” the dam caused widespread alarm, even though his administration’s actual policies were far less dramatic. But in Dr. Dagnachew’s retelling, this becomes a prophetic omen, a coded message, a geopolitical horoscope anything except what it actually was: Trump being Trump.

He goes on to warn that a second Trump administration, sworn in on 20 January 2025, could pressure Ethiopia over the Nile, perhaps leaning toward Egyptian interests. Fair enough; that’s within the realm of diplomatic possibility. But then he leaps from “could apply diplomatic or economic pressure” to “might be secretly arming insurgencies,” as though international relations operate on the same logic as his YouTube comment section.

This is where the idiocracy reaches its peak. Dr. Dagnachew treats speculation as scripture, inference as evidence, and his own imagination as a classified intelligence briefing. He delivers these pronouncements with the solemnity of a man convinced he’s unveiling state secrets, even as his arguments wobble like his self-proclaimed title and his sense of historical proportion.

In the end, his analysis isn’t analysis at all, it’s cosplay. A man playing Fitawrari with cardboard epaulettes, waving around geopolitical hypotheticals like plastic swords, hoping no one notices that the emperor of evidence has no clothes.

The reality: International actors are unlikely to resolve Ethiopia’s conflicts. The solutions, if they come, will be Ethiopian. This makes the domestic political stalemate, where government refuses dialogue and opposition pursues maximalist demands more dangerous. Without external pressure for compromise, internal dynamics tend toward escalation.

Conclusion: Unification as Ultimatum, Not Invitation

The formation of the AFNM should force a reckoning in Ethiopian political discourse. For 22 months, the government has hidden behind Fano’s fragmentation to avoid negotiations. That excuse is gone. Yet the movement’s 17th January statement reveals why the government might hesitate to engage: AFNM isn’t offering negotiation, it’s demanding capitulation.

The statement’s message to national struggle forces makes this explicit: the necessity is “shifting from resisting a genocidal war to strategic offensive action, in order to remove the regime.” Not reform the regime, not negotiate with the regime, not power-share with the regime remove the regime. The strategic objective is stated plainly throughout: “eliminating this peoples, national, and regional danger” by deposing Abiy Ahmed’s government.

This maximalism creates a paradox. AFNM has structured itself precisely as the unified interlocutor the government claimed to want. It has designated foreign affairs leadership (Brook Shileshi), established clear command hierarchy, and articulated political objectives beyond military operations. Yet those political objectives include regime change making genuine negotiation nearly impossible under standard frameworks where governments don’t negotiate their own dissolution.

Dr Dagnachew’s conspiracy theories represent one dishonest response to this reality: denying AFNM’s legitimacy through unfalsifiable claims of foreign manipulation. But the government’s likely alternative continuing military operations whilst claiming to seek peace is equally dishonest. Both approaches foreclose the difficult political work Ethiopia actually needs.

What that work entails: Acknowledging that AFNM represents genuine Amhara grievances whilst recognising that regime removal via armed struggle will likely fail militarily but succeed in destroying what remains of the Ethiopian state. The Ethiopian National Defence Force, despite losses, retains superiority in conventional capabilities; AFNM cannot march on Addis Ababa and hold it. Yet the government cannot pacify the Amhara countryside or restore functional administration. The result is indefinite low-intensity warfare, precisely the outcome both sides claim to oppose.

The path not taken would require:

For AFNM: Moderating from regime removal to genuine power-sharing demands. Articulating specific constitutional reforms, security sector arrangements, and accountability mechanisms that would address Amhara grievances without requiring government dissolution. Acknowledging that pan-Ethiopian liberation rhetoric, whilst politically useful, overstates their actual support base beyond Amhara areas.

For the government: Acknowledging AFNM as a legitimate political actor representing genuine grievances rather than dismissing them as foreign puppets. Opening negotiations without demanding prior disarmament. Accepting that ethnic federal arrangements have failed Amhara (and others) and require fundamental reform rather than military enforcement. Most critically, accepting accountability for documented atrocities the drone strikes, massacres, and mass arrests that transformed localised resistance into sustained insurgency.

For both sides: Recognising that their maximalist positions, regime removal versus insurgent destruction, cannot be achieved militarily and that continued pursuit guarantees accumulating civilian suffering without strategic progress.

None of this will happen. AFNM’s statement reveals a movement convinced of impending victory, appealing to uniformed forces to defect and calling international actors to abandon the government. The government, for its part, shows no inclination toward political compromise, having spent 22 months pursuing military solutions that demonstrably haven’t worked.

The Reyot Media discussion, whatever its own biases, at least treats Fano as a genuine political phenomenon worthy of analysis rather than a foreign puppet show. It examines internal dynamics, strategic calculations, and leadership decisions as products of Ethiopian political processes. This is the minimum standard for productive discourse.

Yet even Reyot’s enthusiastic coverage missed the implications of AFNM’s maximalist framing. The movement hasn’t created an interlocutor for negotiations; it has created a more efficient vehicle for prosecuting regime removal. Whether one applauds or deplores this depends on one’s assessment of the Abiy Ahmed government’s legitimacy. What should be undeniable is that this makes political settlement of the power-sharing, constitutional reform, transitional justice variety far more difficult.

Ethiopia cannot afford continued intellectual dishonesty from either side. The country faces genuine challenges: ethnic federal contradictions, territorial disputes, security sector reform, economic crisis, and regional instability. None of these can be addressed whilst government supporters deny AFNM legitimacy through conspiracy theories and AFNM pursues regime change through military means.

The AFNM exists. It has structure, leadership, popular support, and military capacity. It also has maximalist political objectives that cannot be achieved through armed struggle alone. Whether the government engages with this reality or continues fantasies about Eritrea, Egypt, and TPLF pulling strings will determine whether Ethiopia stumbles toward eventual political settlement or slides further into state collapse.

The choice should be obvious. That it apparently isn’t, that both sides prefer their respective myths to the difficult work of compromise, tells you everything about Ethiopia’s current political bankruptcy. AFNM’s unification hasn’t opened a pathway to peace. It has consolidated the forces prosecuting war more effectively. Until both sides recognise this, congratulations are premature.

E. Frashie is a columnist for the Ethiopian Tribune specialising in conflict analysis and political economy. The views expressed are his own.

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A Dialogue Between Two Minds

By Ms Leeshan Kuratey, Ethiopian Tribune Columnist

In an Ethiopian coffee house just off Bole Road, the air carries the familiar rich scent of roasted beans, mixed with the faint diesel fumes from the traffic outside. The jebena has been refilled twice already this morning. Two old men sit across from one another, not as adversaries in conflict, at least not today, but as companions in a long intellectual journey.

They are Dr Bira Hodu and Professor Akalu Merew. Though both are septuagenarians, their conversations are lively, sometimes acerbic, always thoughtful. What they share today is not just coffee but a deeper attempt to understand Ethiopia’s evolving strategic position a nation with growing aerial capabilities, deep internal fissures, and an enduring aspiration to regain access to the sea.

I. Two Men and a Question of Power

Dr Bira Hodu, an Oromo activist in his early seventies, has been an ardent voice in diasporic Oromummaa circles. In earlier conferences across Europe and North America, he argued passionately for the dismantling of the Ethiopian state in order to invent an independent Oromia. These days, he is a devoted supporter of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed. His social media accounts are awash with government videos, patriotic manifestos, and paeans to Ethiopia’s rising military capabilities.

Professor Akalu Merew , Amhara by ethnicity but cosmopolitan in outlook, is a retired economist. He served as a consultant to the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the United Nations over several decades. He supports a modern, democratic Ethiopia where all ethnic groups, including Amharas, are treated as full citizens, not villains in a teleological narrative of oppression.

Today, their conversation part dialogue, part intellectual sparring revolves around a set of strategic questions:

What does it mean for Ethiopia to pursue air dominance? How do external powers exploit states that hold such dominance without internal consensus? And crucially, what happens when a landlocked nation aspires to reach the sea?

II. Deterrence, Hegemony, and the Sky Above

Bira stirs his coffee, eyes gleaming with the certainty that has characterised his recent writings.

“Look at us now,” he says with unrestrained pride. “Ethiopia controls its airspace. Drones, satellites, advanced aircraft, we are no longer begging. No longer passive. We are powerful.”

Professor Akalu leans back, hands folded. There is a moment’s pause a pause born not of disagreement but of depth of thought.

“Air dominance,” Akalu begins gently, “is not, in itself, a guarantee of stability. It is a capability. What transforms it into strategy is how it is embedded in politics and consensus.”

Bira’s response is immediate, confident: “Deterrence. Simple as that. No one will dare attack us.”

But Akalu’s point is more nuanced. “Deterrence assumes symmetry,” he replies. “It assumes there is a rival with enough capability to pose a threat. Yet, look around our region. Eritrea, fractured; Somalia, fragile; Sudan, fractured; Kenya, cautious. When one state dominates the skies across a region without peer competitors, others stop asking, ‘Will you strike us?’ and start asking, ‘What will you permit?’”

In other words, air dominance has the potential to become not merely deterrence but hegemony, a structural condition where Ethiopia becomes the default reference point for regional security calculations.

Bira, in characteristic fashion, counters that this is precisely the point: a strong Ethiopia that imposes no mischief but commands respect. But Akalu sees what Bira does not yet concede: strength in the sky does not automatically translate to political coherence on the ground. The key difference lies between vertical power (force from above) and horizontal consensus (consent from within).

III. Power Before Unity: The Fragile Architecture

The conversation deepens as the jebena is refilled yet again. Akalu gently presses his point.

“Vertical power, air dominance, is seductive,” he says. “It feels decisive, clean, controlled. But political legitimacy grows sideways through shared consent, mutual recognition, social contracts. When you build dominance in the air before you build unity across your society, you create a fragile structure: powerful externally but brittle internally.”

He goes on, without rancour, to expand the idea: “A state that expands its aerial capabilities without settling its internal political differences creates not deterrence, but suspended conflict. It freezes contestation without resolving it.”

Bira listens, and for the first time in their discussion, his expression softens rather than defends. “You speak as if strength is the problem.”

“No,” Akalu replies, looking into the dark coffee. “Strength without restraint is the problem and restraint is not technical, it is political.”

The distinction matters. Ethiopia’s pursuit of drones, satellites, and advanced aircraft could place it on par with mid-tier global powers in terms of technology. But technology does not reconcile narratives; it does not mend historical grievances. It does not solve issues of identity, memory, or legitimacy. In fact, without political consensus, these technologies can magnify grievances rather than diminish them.

IV. The Sea Aspiration: Renewal or Risk?

Bira brightens. The subject shifts to Ethiopia’s enduring aspiration to regain access to the sea an aspiration older than either man.

“All this talk is academic,” he says, leaning forward. “The real issue is the sea. Ethiopia must regain access. It is not just economic it is historical and existential. We were a maritime civilisation once. Why should we be landlocked forever?”

Akalu nods. “I agree on the importance of sea access. But I disagree on the timing.”

This is where their conversation becomes especially rich and complex.

Bira sees urgency in sea access as a strategic imperative: to reduce dependence on neighbours’ ports; to lower trade costs; to assert Ethiopia’s rightful place in East African commerce. The logic sounds compelling: a strong Ethiopian state should control its destiny, including access to the sea.

Akalu, however, warns of a geopolitical and strategic paradox: urgency is the most exploitable weakness in international relations.

V. Urgency as Leverage: A Quiet Mechanism of Power

“Ethiopia’s need for sea access,” Akalu explains carefully, “is well understood internationally. But international actors do not care about Ethiopia’s urgency in the same way Ethiopia does. When a state signals it cannot wait, it invites mediation, brokerage, and, ultimately, leverage.”

Here he outlines a pattern that has recurred throughout history: states that exhibit urgency in securing strategic goals whether territorial, economic, or military often do so at the cost of sovereignty over the terms of those goals.

In diplomatic terms, Akalu says, this is called asymmetric need. The Ethiopian state needs sea access more than any external power needs Ethiopia to have it. This asymmetry creates leverage for the latter. Rather than imposing terms directly, external powers offer facilitated access with conditions attached. These conditions can range from port management arrangements to security guarantees and intelligence-sharing frameworks.

“It is not that others are hostile,” Akalu continues. “They are not. But they are not neutral either. Every facilitator expects something in return.”

Bira’s initial discomfort at this observation gives way to contemplation. He had assumed that Ethiopia’s growing aerial capabilities would strengthen its negotiating position for maritime access. Akalu suggests the opposite: air dominance raises regional anxiety, and anxiety invites external management.

Suddenly, the sea once a symbol of sovereign aspiration feels more like a diplomatic minefield.

VI. Maritime Access: Pathways and Their Consequences

Akalu outlines three general pathways Ethiopia might pursue to gain maritime access, and the strategic implications of each:

1. Multilateral, Regional, Rules‑Based Access

In this pathway, Ethiopia negotiates access through regional agreements that are open, inclusive, and governed by treaty. The purpose is to avoid exclusive deals with any single power, and to emphasise cooperation among neighbours.

Advantages:

Preserves greater autonomy Encourages shared ownership of outcomes Reduces the risk of dependency on a single external actor

Challenges:

Requires time and deep political negotiation Depends on internal consolidation before external engagement May delay tangible access but strengthens sovereignty

2. Facilitated Access via a Great‑Power Broker

This involves negotiating a port lease or security arrangement with the assistance of a major power for example, the United States, China, or a coalition thereof. The facilitator acts as a guarantor of stability and may provide military backing.

Advantages:

Faster access Security backing Large investment potential

Risks:

Access becomes tied to the strategic interests of the broker Sovereignty over port usage may be compromised Ethiopia’s foreign policy flexibility could be constrained

3. Coercive or Quasi‑Coercive Drift

Here, Ethiopia’s urgency, combined with regional competition, leads to a situation where neighbours and external powers impose solutions that suit their own interests and Ethiopia is left with minimal say in the terms.

Outcomes:

Loss of strategic autonomy Port access under foreign control or heavy influence Erosion of sovereignty over time

Akalu stresses that urgency is the trigger that moves a situation from voluntary cooperation (Pathway 1) to managed or mediated access (Pathways 2 and 3). The more Ethiopia signals that it must have access immediately, the more external parties believe they can and should shape the terms.

VII. The Interaction of Air Power and Maritime Ambition

What makes this particularly complex and consequential is the interaction between Ethiopia’s aerial ambitions and its maritime aspirations.

Air dominance gives a state the illusion of freedom of action. The skies, whether through drones, satellites, or advanced fighters, feel like a domain that belongs to the state itself. It is sovereign space.

But control of airspace does not insulate a landlocked state from strategic dependencies. The sea and access to it, is governed by different physics: geography, logistics, and regional dynamics. These domains cannot be conquered; they must be negotiated.

Akalu puts it simply:

“Air power scares neighbours. Maritime dependence invites management.”

It is one thing to deter a hypothetical military threat from above. It is another to walk a diplomatic tightrope between neighbours, external powers, and economic imperatives to secure a port that functions on Ethiopia’s terms.

Moreover, urgency exacerbates this tension: while air power can be showcased and argued as deterrent or stabilising, the need for the sea is tangible, measurable, and time‑sensitive. External actors capitalise on that urgency.

VIII. Internal Consensus as a Pillar of Sovereignty

Bira listens intently as Akalu moves into what feels like the core of his argument: internal political consensus is the anchor on which all external negotiating power ultimately rests.

“The greatest vulnerability in Ethiopian strategy,” Akalu asserts, “is not air dominance, nor landlocked geography. It is political incompleteness.”

By this he means:

Deep unresolved divisions between ethnic groups Narratives that reduce complex histories into simple culprits and victims Weak mutual trust among communities Centralised governance that has yet to build robust democratic legitimacy

Without such consensus, external powers do not see a unified partner; they see a set of interests that can be balanced against each other.

“In diplomacy,” Akalu explains, “others do not negotiate with potential. They negotiate with certainty. They do not trust a state they believe cannot trust itself.”

For Bira, who has spent much of his life critiquing the Ethiopian state as oppressive and illiberal, especially towards Oromo communities,this is a challenging idea. His journey from advocating state dismantlement to supporting the current government is personal as well as ideological. But Akalu’s argument is structural, not tribal: a state that lacks internal consensus is vulnerable to external influence, regardless of its ethnic composition.

Importantly, Akalu also rejects narratives that vilify any one ethnic group as the singular source of oppression. He insists that Ethiopia’s future depends on integrating identities, not extracting blame. This idea resonates less forcefully with Bira at first, but over the course of their conversation, it becomes harder for him to dismiss.

IX. Ethiopia at the Crossroads: Sovereignty, Access, and Patience

Akalu’s final point, the most sobering , is that sovereignty cannot be rushed. It must be earned, not demanded. This is not a call to delay progress indefinitely, but rather to sequence strategy intelligently.

He offers a final framing:

Consolidate internal political consensus Build trust across regions and identities Strengthen democratic institutions Clarify how power is shared and defended Build economic alternatives Enhance land‑based trade corridors Strengthen internal infrastructure Reduce reliance on single routes Negotiate maritime access from confidence, not desperation Avoid signalling urgency Use internal resilience as leverage Engage neighbours in transparent frameworks

This sequence, Akalu argues, transforms Ethiopia into a state that is prepared, not pressured. Prepared states shape terms. Pressured states accept them.

Bira, for all his habitual confidence, admits this challenges his assumptions. There is a moment of real reflection, not defensiveness, as he considers the possibility that Ethiopia’s strength is not simply a matter of technology or symbolic assertion, but of patience and strategic timing.

X. The Silence After Words

The jebena is empty for the final time. Outside, Addis Ababa continues its restless rhythm, indifferent to the high ideas discussed within the coffee house.

Bira and Akalu rise from their seats. They have debated aerial dominance, maritime aspiration, urgency as leverage, and the necessity of internal consensus without rancour, without simplification.

As they depart in opposite directions into the bustle of the city, their conversation lingers in the air like the last wisp of coffee smoke: Ethiopia stands between the sky and the sea, and its future belongs not to those who shout the loudest, but to those who understand time, patience, and the art of negotiation.

Epilogue: Strategy Before Sovereignty

In Ethiopian politics and, indeed, in the politics of most states with complex internal identities the rush to assert power too quickly often precedes the very thing it seeks to secure.

The central insight of this dialogue is not pessimistic; it is structural:

Power without consent is brittle; urgency without resilience invites leverage.

Air power can deter external foes.

Maritime access can transform economies.

But internal consensus a shared sense of belonging, legitimate governance, and mutual trust is the only foundation on which true sovereignty can be built.

Ms Leeshan Kuratey, is Investigative Journalist, Writer, and Poet. The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author, Ms. Leeshan Kuratey, and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of any publication, organisation, or institution. This piece is a work of political commentary, intended to provoke thought and dialogue regarding contemporary Ethiopian politics and diplomacy. 

About Post Author

Ethiopian Tribune editor

editor@ethiopiantribune.com

https://ethiopiantribune.com

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When “Debt Relief” Means Bondholder Profits

By E Frashie
Ethiopian Tribune Commentary

Ethiopia’s struggle to restructure its sovereign debt has become more than a national economic crisis it has exposed fundamental flaws in how the international financial system treats distressed nations. As our government negotiates with private bondholders over a $1 billion Eurobond, the terms of the debate reveal an uncomfortable truth: the current global debt architecture is designed to protect creditor profits, not the wellbeing of people in debtor nations.

The Numbers Tell a Damning Story

Consider what Ethiopia proposed to its bondholders in mid-2024: a modest 15% reduction in principal, full repayment of all missed interest, and a generous 6.125% interest rate on the remaining debt. Independent analysis shows this rejected offer would have netted bondholders a 30% profit compared to risk-free US Treasury bonds. Original purchasers would have made 24% profit, while vulture funds that bought distressed Ethiopian debt on secondary markets stood to gain 38%.

These are not the returns of creditors taking a fair share of pain during a crisis. These are windfall profits extracted from a nation that spent more on debt service in 2022/23 and 2023/24 than it did on education, health, water, and energy combined.

Yet the bondholders including firms like VR Capital and Farallon Capital Management, rejected even this lucrative deal. Instead, they are demanding terms that would pay them over 50% more than bilateral government creditors receive. Most audaciously, they seek a share of Ethiopia’s future export revenues with no cap a provision that could grant them unlimited profits while shackling our economic future.

The Myth of “Comparability”

The G20 Common Framework, under which Ethiopia sought debt relief in 2021, promises “comparability of treatment” among creditors. This principle, that all creditor classes should share the burden equitably, sounds reasonable. In practice, it has proven toothless.

The framework provides no clear methodology to enforce comparability and no mechanism to compel private creditors to accept terms similar to those agreed by bilateral lenders. The result is predictable: private bondholders hold out, threatening litigation in UK courts to extract maximum value, while official creditors may end up accepting significantly less favorable terms just to close a deal that meets IMF sustainability targets.

This isn’t a bug in the system, it’s a feature. The Common Framework, despite its cooperative rhetoric, remains fundamentally creditor-centric. It grants enormous leverage to the most aggressive actors while leaving debtor nations with no tools beyond endless negotiation.

The Human Cost of Architectural Failure

While bondholders calculate profit margins, Ethiopians bear the real costs. Our foreign exchange reserves have been compressed by a yawning trade deficit, $17.7 billion in imports against just $3.6 billion in exports in 2023. Our public debt stands at nearly 50% of GDP, with over $7 billion in obligations due between 2023 and 2025.

Every birr diverted to service this debt is a birr not spent on schools, clinics, infrastructure, or climate resilience. In a nation facing the compound shocks of pandemic, civil conflict, drought, and global inflation, this is not an accounting problem, it is a humanitarian crisis manufactured by financial architecture.

The IMF classifies Ethiopia as facing a “high risk of debt distress,” yet the system designed to address such distress has delivered only delays and dysfunction. Since applying for treatment under the Common Framework in early 2021, Ethiopia has endured years of negotiations with little to show for it. We defaulted in December 2023 not by choice but by necessity.

What Must Change

Ethiopia’s experience illuminates the urgent need for systemic reform. The international community cannot continue patching a fundamentally broken architecture with voluntary frameworks that lack enforcement teeth.

First, financial centers like London and New York must pass legislation to prevent creditor litigation during good-faith restructuring negotiations. The threat of lawsuits gives holdout creditors disproportionate power to extract wealth from distressed nations.

Second, the Common Framework must be operationalized with clear, transparent guidelines for assessing comparability of treatment and mechanisms to compel participation from all creditor classes, especially private lenders who currently face no consequences for refusing to participate.

Ultimately, the solution lies in creating a new multilateral legal framework, perhaps a UN Framework Convention on Sovereign Debt, that is rules-based, independent of creditor influence, and includes automatic payment standstills and majority-binding restructuring agreements. Only such a system can resolve the coordination failures that allow minority creditors to sabotage collective solutions.

A Test of Principles

The upcoming Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development presents a critical opportunity. The international community can continue down the current path, where debt restructuring serves primarily to maximize creditor recoveries at the expense of human development. Or it can finally build a system that prioritizes sustainable development, human rights, and economic stability over speculative profits.

For Ethiopia, the stakes could not be higher. Our fiscal space, our capacity to invest in our people, and our economic sovereignty hang in the balance. But our crisis is not unique, it is a preview of struggles that other developing nations will face as climate shocks, pandemics, and economic volatility become the new normal.

The bondholders demanding massive profits from Ethiopian “debt relief” are not villains, they are rational actors operating within a system that rewards their behavior. It is the system itself that must change.

The question is whether the architects of global financial governance have the political will to reform it before the next crisis, and the next, and the next. Ethiopia is watching. The world should be too.

The views expressed in this commentary are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official position of the Ethiopian Tribune.

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Ethiopian Tribune editor

editor@ethiopiantribune.com

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ከመምህር ዘመድኩን በቀለ

“…ትናንት አርሲ መርቲ ጀጁ ወረዳ ከቦሌ ወደ አቦምሳ ሲጓዝ የነበረን የትራንስፖርት መኪና አስቁመው የኦሮሞ ወሀቢይ እስላሚስቶቹ ተሳፋሪዎቹን እና ረዳቱን ይዘው ሲሄዱ ሹፌሩን እዚያው ማረዳቸው ተነግሯል። ሌላም ሀንቀሎ ዋቤ ወረዳ ሃታት ቀበሌም ላይ አንድ ኦርቶዶክሳዊ መተራዱም ተሰምቷል። ጭፍጨፋው እንደቀጠለ ነው።

“…ይሄንን የኦርቶዶክሳውያን የእርድ እና የዘር ጭፍጨፋ አጀንዳ ለመቀልበስ፣ ለማስቀየስም ሲባል የኦሮሞ ብልግና ፓርቲ ቀድሞውኑ የነዳጅ ጭማሪውን አጀንዳ ለማስቀየስ እና ሕዝቡን በአጀንዳ ለማጇከብ ሲሉ ውኃ በማያነሣ ክስ ራቁታቸውን ከወጡ ቲክቶከሮች ጋር አጃምለው ያሰሩትን ካናዳዊውን የሰግጥ ፈምስ፣ ደድብ ባለቤት ቲክቶከር አዶናይን ዛሬ ምሽቱን ከእስር ቤት ፈትተው ለቀውታል። ያውም በጭለማ 😂

“…ቲክቶከሩ ፍርድ ቤት ቀርቦ በፍርድ ቤት ፖሊስ የ14 ቀን የጊዜ ቀጠሮ ጠይቆበት የነበረ እና ፍርድቤቱም ፖሊስ የጠየቀውን የ14 ቀን ጊዜ ቀጠሮ ፈቅዶለት የነበረ ቢሆንም በመሃል ግን በዛሬው ዕለት የኦሮሞ አባ ገዳዎች ነን ያሉ የምሥራቅ አሩሲ ኗሪ አባ ገዳዎች መኪና ሞልተው ወደ አዲስ አበባ በመምጣት የኦሮሙማ መንግሥታቸውን በገዳ ሥርዓት መሠረት ሽምግልና ጠይቀው ከፍርድ ቤት ቀጠሮ በፊት ዛሬ ምሽት ከፖሊስ ጣቢያ አማላጅ ሆነው፣ በዚያውም የገዳ ሥርዓት ማስታወቂያ ተሠርቶለት ተጠርጣሪው ከእስር እንዲወጣ መደረጉ ነው የተሰማው።

“…አሁን ምሽቱን በቲክቶክ መንደር የሰግጥ መፈታት የፌስቡኩንም ሰፈር በሰበር ዜና እንዲጥለቀለቅ ተደርጓል። አዳሜና ሔዋኔ ከምሥራቅ አሩሲ ክርስቲያኖች ከሚታረዱበት ምድር የመጡና ከፍርድ ቤት በላይ ሆነው ለወጉ ያህል እንኳ የፍርድ ሂደቱን አክብረው ለማሳየት ትእግስት ያጣው ቡድን ማኖ ነክቶ ሲምበጫበጭ አክቲቪስቱና ቲክቶከሩ ሁላ ደግሞ “የገዳ ሥርዓት ፍቅር ነው” እያለ ነው። የትግሬ አክቲቪስትና የቲክቶከሩ አድናቂዎች ፌሽታ ላይ ናቸው። ሲጀመር ልጁን ያሰሩት ለነዳጅ ጭማሪው ማስቀየሻ አጀንዳ ብለው ነበር እናም ይፈቱታል የልጁ እስርም አሳማኝ አይደለም ብለን አስቀድመን የተናገርነው ነው ዛሬ ምሽት የተፈጸመው። ነውርን አስሮ ማጀገን ነበር የተፈለገው። አድርገውታል ልጁ ግን ከዚህ በኋላ አዲዮስ ከሽፏል።

“…በኋላኛው ዘመን የዘመኑ ፍጻሜም በደረሰ ጊዜ በነፃ ዝውውር የትግሬዎቹ አክቲቪስት ወደ መሆን የተሸጋገረው፣ መቀሌ ድረስ በመሄድም የተሸለመው የሀረርጌው መራታ ደሩ ዘሀረሩ እና ሌሎችም የኦሮሞ አክቲቪስቶች የተናገሩትን አስምሩበት። እንዲህ ነው ያሉት። “…ሕወሓቶች አዶናይን ልክ እንደ ሀጫሉ ሁንዴሳ ገድለው የተበታተነውን የትግሬ ፖለቲካ እና ፖለቲከኛ ወደ አንድነት ሊያመጡበት አቅደው ነበር። ብልፅግና ያ መረጃ ስለደረሰው ነው ልጁን በቶሎ ይዞ ያሰረው” በማለት ነበር ሲናገሩ የነበረው። እዚህ ጋር ያዙልኝ።

“…ስለዚህ ቲክቶከሩ ከሰማ ይመከር። እንደኔ እንደኔ ልጁ በዜግነት ካናዳዊ ነው። እኛ የማናውቀው ነገር ኖሮ ወደ ካናዳ ለመመለስ የማያስችለው እና ኢትዮጵያ የሚያስቀረው ጉዳይ ከሌለ በቀር ቶሎ ቢነካው መልካም ነው ባይ ነኝ። ያውም ከፍርድ ቤት ቀጠሮ ውጪ የፍርድ ቤትን መብትና ክብር ጥሰው፣ የሕግ የበላይነትን ደፍጥጠው ሲያበቁ ከምሥራቅ አሩሲ፣ ከሻሸመኔ በመጡ አባ ገዳዎች፣ በእነ ማይኮ ቲክቶከር እና በባልየው ማንትስ ቢሊየነር አማካኝነት አስቀድመው በማይኮ በኩል ሲዝቱበት የቆዩትን ቲክቶከር ዛሬ ደግሞ በአንደዜ ተለውጠው ሽማግሌም ሆነው ያስወጡትን ሰዎች ብዙም ባያምናቸው ጥሩ ነው ባይ ነኝ። ቲክቶሩ ከተቻለው በዜግነት ካናዳዊ ነውና በቶሎ ወደ እናት ሀገሩ ካናዳ ቢመለስ መልካም ነው ባይ ነኝ። ያለበለዚያ ሁለቱም ወያኔም ኦህዴድ ኦነግም ቁማር ነው የሚጫወቱበት። ወያኔ ሀውዜን ላይ ደርግ በጀቴ ሕዝቡን እንዲጨፈጭፍ አስደርጋ ትግሬን ከጎኗ እንዳሰለፈች፣ ኦህዴድም ወለጋ ላይ ዐማራን አርዶ፣ ፓርላማ ጠርቶ፣ ዐማሮችን አስለቅሶ፣ በወያኔ ላይ ሀገሩን ሁሉ አሰልፎ፣ እነሀጫሉን ሰውተው ፖለቲካ እንደሠሩት አዶናይንም ጭዳ እንዳያደርጉት እሰጋለሁ። ለሀጫሉ ያልራሩ ለዚህ ይራራሉ የሚል እምነት የለኝም። ምክር ነው። ምክሬ ይደብራል፣ ይጎመዝዛል፣ ነገር ግን ጨክኖ ምክሬን መዋጥ ፈውስ ይሰጣል።

“…በሌላ በኩል ሰሞኑን የብሔራዊ መታወቂያ ፕሮግራም እና ብሔራዊ ባንክ እስከ ሚያዚያ 30 በግዳጅ እንዲተገበር ባወጡት action plan መሠረት ሁሉም ባንክ የሚጠቀሙ ደንበኞች ሒሳባቸውን በፋይዳ ዲጅታል መታወቂያ ካላዘመኑ ሒሳባቸውን መጠቀም እንዳይችሉ ጥብቅ መመሪያ አስተላልፏል። ባንኮችም ጥብቁን መመሪያ እየተገበሩት ይገኛሉ።

“…አሳሳቢው ነገር ለቴሌና ሳፋሪኮም የተሰጠው ጥብቅ ትእዛዝ ነው። ይኼውም መመሪያ የእያንዳንዱ ሰው ስልክ ቁጥር በፋይዳ እንዲተሳሰር እና በተጠቀሰው ጊዜ ውስጥ ካልተሳሰረ አገልግሎቱ እንዲቋረጥ ማዘዙ ነው። በተለይ በተለይ በዚህ ደግሞ የዐማራ ፋኖ እና የፋኖ ደጋፊ የመረጃ ሰዎች ከባድ ችግር ይገጥማቸዋል ተብሎ ይሰጋል። ፋኖዎችም እንደ ዋትስአፕ እና መሠል የማኅበራዊ ሚዲያ አፖችን ለግኑኘት ካልተጠቀሙ በቀር ከባድ ይሆናል። ይኼም ቢሆን የኔትወርክ ችግር ሊኖር ስለሚችል ውጤታማ ላያደርጋቸው ይችላል። ስለሆነም ዘመዴ ምናልባት ይሄ መልእክት እንደ መረጃ ከጠቀማቻው መልእክቱን ብታጋራቸው እና ከወዲሁ ሌላ አማራጮችን እንዲያስቡ ቢደረግ መልካም ነው የሚል መረጃን ወፎቼ አድርሰውኛል። ይሄ መረጃ አስቀድሞ የደረሳቸው የጎጃም ፋኖዎችም መግለጫ አውጥተው አይቻለሁ። ምንአልባትም ከዚህ በኋላ ፋኖም ባንኮችን ሳይነካ መጠበቁ ቀርቶ ልክ እንደ ኦነግ ሸኔ ለዘረፋ እንዳይነሳሳ እሰጋለሁ። በመጨረሻም መልእክቴ አንድና አንድ ነው።

• እኔ በበኩሌ አጀንዳ አልቀይርም ‼

• በአሩሲ የኦርቶዶክሳውያን ጭፍጨፋ ይቁም‼

መምህር ዘመድኩን በቀለ ብዙ ተከታይ ያፈራ ተፅእኖ ፈጣሪ እና ብሮድካሰተር ነው። ከላይ የተገከፁት አሰተዉሎዎች የተወሰዱት በፀሐፊው ተዘጋጅቶ ከቀረበው ከቴሌግራም ቻነሉ ነው። The views expressed are his own.

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As Ethiopia joins BRICS and Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed cultivates closer ties with the UAE and Gulf powers, two Ethiopian scholars debate whether American silence on Amhara suffering reflects deliberate policy or the cold arithmetic of geopolitical necessity

Addis Ababa — On a windy afternoon in the Ethiopian capital, Dr Alemayehu Gebre spreads declassified State Department cables across a café table near Meskel Square. The political historian has spent years tracing what he sees as a pattern in American engagement with the Horn of Africa, one that stretches from Henry Kissinger’s Cold War doctrines to today’s cautious statements about ongoing violence in Ethiopia’s Amhara region.

When American diplomats pose for photographs with Ethiopian officials, or when passionate statements emerge from Washington about atrocities in Tigray but near silence on mass killings in Amhara communities, Alemayehu sees more than negligence. “This isn’t accident,” he says, his voice measured but insistent. “It’s architecture. From Kissinger onwards, there’s been a structural willingness to sacrifice Ethiopian communities, particularly Amhara, on the altar of what they call ‘regional stability’.”

Across the table, Dr Senait Woldemichael shakes her head. The two colleagues have been having this argument for months, their disagreement capturing a broader debate amongst Ethiopian intellectuals about whether the Amhara, historically associated with Ethiopian statehood and once dominant in the country’s politics, are victims of deliberate marginalisation or simply caught in the ruthless arithmetic of superpower strategy.

“The Americans aren’t plotting against anyone,” Senait argues, her tone frank. “They’re doing what great powers always do pursuing interests, not principles. That’s damning enough without inventing elaborate schemes.” She pauses to sip her macchiato. “But to understand where we are now, you have to understand where this started.”

The roots of today’s American approach to Ethiopia lie in the Cold War era, both scholars agree. Declassified documents from the 1950s through the 1970s, available through the US Office of the Historian, paint an unromantic picture of American engagement with imperial Ethiopia under Haile Selassie. Washington’s support centred on anti-Soviet containment, access to communications facilities like Kagnew Station in Eritrea, and securing a reliable African partner in international forums. Ethiopia mattered because it served American interests, not because policymakers harboured affection for its ancient civilisation or unity.

“They valued Ethiopia as an anti-Soviet asset,” Alemayehu explains, photocopied documents now scattered between coffee cups. “The minute that calculation changed after 1974, their commitment evaporated. The Ethiopian state strongly identified with Amhara elites then was disposable.” Nowhere in those documents does one find romantic attachment to Ethiopian unity or Amhara civilisation. Instead, the language speaks of “assets”, “alliances”, and “influence”.

Senait counters that this merely reflects how alliance politics function. “The British didn’t maintain their empire out of love either. Criticising realism for being realistic is pointless. The question is whether current US policy actively harms Amhara, or merely ignores them.” After the Derg’s 1974 revolution tilted Ethiopia towards Moscow, US military aid dried up and the Horn became a proxy battlefield. American policy didn’t fundamentally shift in character, Alemayehu argues it simply reversed the roles, viewing Somalia and other regional actors as counterweights rather than Ethiopia itself.

What both scholars note as absent from these documents is any principled concern for Ethiopia’s territorial integrity or any specific community. That absence, Alemayehu insists, becomes increasingly significant as the decades progress. With the Soviet Union’s collapse, Ethiopia’s strategic value transformed. The 1990s brought a new framework: counter-terrorism and regional stability under the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front, dominated by the Tigray People’s Liberation Front.

US policy documents from this era emphasise Ethiopia’s role as an African peacekeeping powerhouse and counter-terrorism partner against groups like al-Shabaab, whilst providing substantial development assistance in health, agriculture, and governance. “The rhetoric was democracy and human rights,” Senait observes. “The practice was backing an authoritarian system because it delivered security cooperation. That’s hypocrisy, certainly, but it’s not targeted at Amhara specifically.”

Alemayehu disagrees sharply. During EPRDF rule, Amhara dissent was met with violence and repression, yet American aid flowed regardless. In US texts, Ethiopia was treated as a unitary partner even as the government implemented what many saw as ethnocratic policies. “That erasure is itself a form of targeting,” he insists. The starkest divergence in their analysis concerns recent events, particularly the shifting geopolitical landscape that has emerged since Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed came to power in 2018.

Ethiopia’s entry into BRICS in January 2024, alongside Egypt, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates, has complicated Washington’s calculus in ways both scholars find significant, if for different reasons. The expanded bloc now represents nearly half the world’s population and accounts for roughly 30% of global GDP, creating what some analysts describe as a “non-Western” rather than explicitly “anti-Western” counterweight to established international institutions.

“Ethiopia’s BRICS membership came at a crucial moment,” Alemayehu notes. “After the Tigray war left the country under Western pressure, Abiy turned to China, Russia, and Gulf nations. Washington watched him cultivate these relationships and recalibrated.” The Ethiopian government, facing billions of dollars in war damage and international sanctions including removal from the African Growth and Opportunity Act, had few alternatives. BRICS membership offered access to development finance, technology transfer from China and India, and a platform for Global South solidarity that didn’t come with Western human rights conditionality.

Yet what concerns Alemayehu most isn’t BRICS membership itself, but what he sees as Washington’s selective engagement with the forces now shaping Ethiopian politics. The relationship between Abiy Ahmed’s Prosperity Party and the United Arab Emirates has become particularly close since 2018, raising questions about how external influences affect both Ethiopian domestic policy and American responses to it.

Reports from Ethiopian media outlets and regional analysts describe the UAE supplying drones to Abiy’s government during the civil war, whilst pursuing 115 major investment projects across Ethiopia. The relationship between Abiy and UAE President Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed has been characterised in some Ethiopian press as remarkably personal, with the two leaders referring to each other as “my brother”. One analysis suggested Abiy had performed a ritual declaring allegiance to the Emirati crown prince, though such claims remain difficult to verify.

What’s undeniable is the UAE’s expanding footprint in Ethiopia’s economy and infrastructure. When Abiy announced a $15 billion palace project in Addis Ababa and refused to reveal the funding source to parliament, speculation focused on Gulf money. The UAE’s interests extend beyond economics; some Ethiopian observers note Emirati lobbying regarding the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam negotiations with Egypt, another country now in both Ethiopia’s BRICS cohort and the UAE’s sphere of influence.

“This is where American silence on Amhara becomes particularly revealing,” Alemayehu argues. “Washington needs Abiy as a counter-terrorism partner and regional stabiliser. The UAE is a long-standing American ally in the Gulf, despite growing ties with China. Both are now deeply invested in Ethiopia’s trajectory. Acknowledging systematic violence against Amhara would force uncomfortable questions about who’s committing it and why American partners aren’t stopping it.”

Senait finds this analysis too conspiratorial. “The UAE is hedging its bets, joining BRICS whilst maintaining its defence partnership with America. Ethiopia is doing the same. That’s not a conspiracy against Amhara it’s small powers trying to navigate between competing great powers.” She points out that the UAE’s foreign minister explicitly stated that BRICS membership wouldn’t damage relations with the West, and that countries like Egypt and Ethiopia joined BRICS precisely because they want options, not because they’re abandoning Western engagement entirely.

During the 2020-2022 Tigray conflict, Washington issued explicit statements about Tigrayan suffering, imposed sanctions, and removed Ethiopia from preferential trade status. Recent reports document killings and displacement in Amhara areas, yet US State Department statements typically avoid ethnic specificity when discussing these incidents. “Tigrayans were recognised as victims of siege and starvation,” Alemayehu says. “Oromo political elites are engaged as reformers and necessary partners. But Amhara civilians, victims of massacres, displacement, and detention, are folded into vague language about ‘all communities’ and ‘all parties’. We’re never named.”

Senait acknowledges the disparity but attributes it to advocacy and media attention rather than deliberate policy. “Tigrayans had well-organised diaspora networks and strong media coverage. That’s not a conspiracy, it’s political mobilisation. Amhara communities need to build similar infrastructure.” She adds that the complexity of Ethiopia’s current situation, with the Prosperity Party trying to move away from ethnic federalism whilst Abiy balances relationships with the UAE, China, Russia, and the West, creates difficult choices for American policymakers.

“Washington doesn’t want Ethiopia to fragment Yugoslavia-style,” she explains. “They don’t want it tilting entirely toward China or becoming another Somalia. So they engage with whoever’s in charge, which right now is Abiy and the Prosperity Party. That means tolerating things they’d rather not tolerate.” That cold calculation, Alemayehu responds, is precisely the problem. “Whether you call it conspiracy or convenience, the result is the same. Amhara are dying in substantial numbers and Washington barely acknowledges it.”

Some Ethiopian commentators claim Kissinger authored explicit plans to dismantle Ethiopia and target Amhara as obstacles to Western interests. Alemayehu considers this emotionally powerful but analytically imprecise. “There’s no declassified directive saying ‘destroy Ethiopia’ or ‘attack Amhara’,” he concedes. “But Kissinger normalised something more insidious a framework where states are chess pieces, stability trumps human rights, and allies’ internal crimes are negotiable. Apply that logic across decades, and add in new complications like BRICS and UAE influence, and Amhara suffering becomes acceptable collateral.”

The framework manifests in practical ways. Afghans and Ukrainians received dedicated humanitarian programmes following conflicts; Tigrayans gained substantial attention to humanitarian corridors and asylum pathways. Amhara face no targeted protection despite documented risk. “Former TPLF figures received medical treatment and resettlement in Western countries,” Alemayehu notes. “They had networks and leverage built during decades when EPRDF was Washington’s preferred partner. Ordinary Amhara victims have neither. The system rewards connectivity, not justice.”

Senait agrees this reflects structural bias but resists ethnic framing. “It’s not ‘reward TPLF, punish Amhara’. It’s bureaucratic inertia favouring those with existing connections. That’s wrong, but it’s different from deliberate targeting.” Where Somalis have been demonised in American discourse as security threats, Amhara aren’t similarly vilified. But Alemayehu argues their situation may be worse. “Somalis are at least seen, even if as problems to be managed. Amhara aren’t granted the political dignity of recognition as distinct victims. We’re invisible casualties of someone else’s stabilisation plan.”

Current US policy towards Ethiopia, both scholars agree, prioritises state preservation and counter-terrorism cooperation over accountability. This manifests in continued engagement with the Prosperity Party despite concerns about democratic backsliding, acceptance of Ethiopia’s BRICS membership as fait accompli, and careful statements that avoid antagonising either Addis Ababa or key regional partners like the UAE. Where they differ is interpretation.

“Washington chooses erasure because recognising Amhara suffering would require admitting their stability partners are implicated in grave abuses,” Alemayehu argues. “It would mean asking hard questions about what the UAE gets for its billions of dollars of investment, or why BRICS membership makes Ethiopia less responsive to Western pressure. That’s structural complicity.” Senait counters that Washington doesn’t choose anything regarding Amhara specifically. “They’re not on the radar. The task isn’t exposing conspiracies but forcing attention through the same political mobilisation other groups have used successfully.”

Both scholars agree on concrete demands, even as they dispute underlying causes. Explicit naming of Amhara as a targeted community in official reports. Conditioning of non-humanitarian aid on independent investigations. Inclusion of Amhara voices in national dialogue from the design stage. Tailored protection pathways for at-risk civilians similar to those created for Afghans and Ukrainians. Support for evidence preservation and accountability mechanisms. “These aren’t favours,” Alemayehu insists. “They’re minimum ethical obligations consistent with the human rights language Washington claims to uphold.”

Senait nods. “On that, at least, we agree. But framing this as a grand conspiracy against Amhara identity will fail. Frame it as a gap in conflict response that needs filling that’s winnable.” She pauses, considering the broader landscape. “The problem is that as Ethiopia moves deeper into BRICS, as Abiy’s relationship with the UAE and Gulf states strengthens, Washington has fewer levers. They can’t threaten sanctions when China offers alternative financing. They can’t demand democratic reforms when the Prosperity Party points to Western hypocrisy in the Middle East.”

As evening descends on Addis Ababa and the call to prayer echoes across the city, the two academics gather their papers. They’ll continue this argument tomorrow, and the day after as will their students, colleagues, and the broader Ethiopian intellectual community. The geopolitical landscape has shifted dramatically since the Cold War cables Alemayehu first began studying. Ethiopia is no longer simply caught between East and West but actively navigating a multipolar order where BRICS membership offers alternatives to Western-dominated institutions, where Gulf money flows alongside Chinese infrastructure loans, and where small powers like the UAE punch far above their weight in regional affairs.

What remains constant, both scholars acknowledge with evident frustration, is the pattern they’ve been dissecting all afternoon. Whether during the Cold War, the War on Terror, or today’s competition between BRICS and Western institutions, Ethiopian communities continue to be treated as variables in someone else’s strategic equation. Amhara suffering continues largely unnamed in international policy discourse, whilst other groups’ pain has catalysed significant diplomatic response.

Whether that reflects calculated neglect, the grinding logic of realpolitik, or something more sinister may matter to historians and activists seeking to change policy. To the displaced and the dead, the distinction is academic. “How many more must disappear into statistics,” Alemayehu asks as we part, the lights of the capital flickering on around us, “before ‘stability’ loses its moral cover?” It’s a question Washington, Brussels, and increasingly Beijing and Abu Dhabi have yet to answer convincingly, and one that won’t fade simply because it’s inconvenient, or because Ethiopia has found new partners willing to ignore it.

The harder truth, which neither scholar quite wants to articulate, is that as Ethiopia diversifies its international relationships and reduces dependence on Western approval, Washington’s incentive to press uncomfortable questions about Amhara or any other community’s treatment diminishes further. If Kissinger’s framework treated states as chess pieces, the emerging multipolar order offers those states multiple boards on which to play. For communities without the organisational capacity, diaspora networks, or strategic value to force themselves onto any of those boards, the implications are stark.

Ethiopia joined BRICS alongside the UAE not as a rejection of the West but as insurance against Western pressure. That insurance policy, purchased with expanded ties to China, Russia, and the Gulf, may be the very thing that ensures Washington’s selective conscience remains selective and that Amhara remain in the shadows where great power politics casts its forgotten.

Scholars’ names have been changed to protect their security. Additional reporting contributed by correspondents in Washington and Abu Dhabi.

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By Endex, Ethiopian Tribune Chief Editor

On Friday 14 and Saturday 15 November 2025, over 200 participants gathered at Windsor Castle to mark Prince Alemayehu Remembrance Day, commemorating 146 years since the young Ethiopian royal died in exile on British soil. The date, poignantly aligned with his death in 1879, fell just a day after the birthday of poet Fahad Al-Amoudi, whose verses now carry the weight of ancestral grief and diasporic defiance. The Ethiopian Tribune was present to record this historic event.

Prince Alemayehu, son of Emperor Tewodros II, was taken from Ethiopia following the British expedition to Maqdala in 1868. After his father’s death, taking his life as last-act of defiance during the British assault, the orphaned prince was brought to England under the guardianship of Captain Tristram Speedy. Though presented as a gesture of protection, Alemayehu’s journey was one of displacement and spectacle. From the highlands of Ethiopia to the ports of India and finally to the manicured lawns of Windsor, his life became a tragic symbol of imperial possession. Queen Victoria took an interest in the boy, yet despite her patronage, Alemayehu suffered isolation, illness, and cultural estrangement. He died aged just 18, buried at St George’s Chapel, Windsor Castle, where his remains still lie despite repeated calls for repatriation.

On Friday 14 November, for the first time in 146 years, clergy from the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church (EOTC) led a remembrance prayer at Windsor Castle. Priest Alemayehu and Priest Dereje, joined by other EOTC members and the priest in charge of the chapel, conducted the solemn rite. The moment was historic, a spiritual reclamation of dignity long denied. The prayers echoed through the chapel, a liturgical balm for a wound that had never healed.

Among the participants on Saturday were three renowned writers whose presence lent the event a literary gravitas. Fahad Al-Amoudi, Lemn Sissay OBE, and Andrew Heavens each brought a distinct lens to the prince’s story, poetic, personal, and forensic.

Fahad Al-Amoudi, whose recent book When the Flies Come has been hailed as a masterwork of diasporic lament and resistance, read poems that braided personal memory with national mourning. His verses summoned the ghost of Alemayehu not as a relic, but as a living indictment of empire’s unfinished business. One poem, titled “unsent” imagined the prince’s final thoughts in Windsor Castle, his longing for the highlands, his mother’s voice, and the stolen dignity of a child paraded as a trophy. Al-Amoudi’s work, which blends lyrical satire with forensic historical detail, has become a touchstone for Ethiopian diaspora literature. His performance was met with ovation and quiet tears.

Lemn Sissay OBE, the celebrated British-Ethiopian poet and author of My Name Is Why, reflected on his own journey through the British care system, drawing parallels between his life and that of Prince Alemayehu. Both boys separated from their mothers, both raised in alien lands, both forced to perform gratitude while grieving. “Alemayehu was not just a prince,” Sissay declared. “He was a prisoner of spectacle. And so was I. We were both expected to smile for the empire’s camera.” Sissay’s presence was not ceremonial, it was confrontational, a poetic reckoning with Britain’s colonial amnesia. His words landed like thunderclaps, shaking the polite solemnity of the occasion into something rawer, more urgent.

Andrew Heavens, journalist and author of The Prince and the Plunder: How Britain Took One Small Boy and Hundreds of Treasures from Ethiopia, offered a visual and narrative retracing of Prince Alemayehu’s journey. His book, published in 2023 and now widely cited in discussions of imperial restitution, tells the full story of Alemayehu, from his early days in his father’s fortress on the roof of Africa to his new home across the seas, where he charmed Queen Victoria, chatted with Lord Tennyson, and travelled with his towering red-headed guardian Captain Speedy. During his presentation, Heavens showed slides of photographs documenting the prince’s journey globally, tracing his places of residency in the UK alongside school records and images of the young Black prince among his white schoolmates. The presentation laid bare the logistics of abduction disguised as rescue. “This is not just about bones,” he said. “It’s about the right to mourn properly. To bury our dead with dignity.” His research also traced the looted treasures of Maqdala, Ethiopia’s ‘Elgin Marbles’, to bank vaults, museum store cupboards, and a boarded-up cavity in Westminster Abbey.​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​

Other participants included members of the Ethiopian diaspora, historians, clergy, students, and activists. Many shared stories, reflections, and calls for justice. Among them was Dr. Tamiru Mihiretu, a psychiatrist living in UK, who spoke on the cultural erasure embedded in imperial narratives. “Alemayehu’s story is not unique,” he said. “It is emblematic of a pattern children taken, cultures silenced, grief institutionalised.”

The atmosphere was reverent but charged, a blend of mourning and mobilisation. The event was not merely a memorial, it was a reckoning. It asked Britain to confront its imperial past not with platitudes but with restitution. It asked the diaspora to remember not only with sorrow but with strategy.

Yet even as the event resonated with many, it was not without controversy. Some members of the Ethiopian community questioned the timing of the remembrance, arguing that it coincided with a period of acute suffering particularly among Amhara and Orthodox Christian communities affected by ongoing conflict in Ethiopia. For these critics, the solemnity of the occasion risked being overshadowed by the urgency of present-day atrocities.

Others raised concerns about inclusivity and transparency. Lij Mulugeta Asrate Kassa, a long-time advocate for the repatriation of looted Maqdala artefacts and a vocal campaigner for Prince Alemayehu’s return, expressed disappointment at not being formally or informally invited. “I have worked tirelessly on this cause for years,” he said. “To be excluded from such a pivotal moment is deeply disheartening.” The sting of exclusion was compounded by the fact that his older brother, a respected historian and scholar, was officially invited to attend and contribute to the event. This disparity created a moral vacuum, raising uncomfortable questions about recognition, legacy, and the politics of invitation.

Ato Tezera Asegu, who had initially been involved in early discussions around the event, stated that he removed himself from active service when he saw the call to cancel the event, issued by groups such as London Fano, was overruled by the majority. He took offence at the organisers’ decision to recognise a descendant of Atse Tewodros II as a dignitary and honoured guest. For Asegu, this gesture symbolised a selective reverence that ignored broader community sensitivities and historical complexities. His withdrawal underscored the emotional and political fault lines that continue to shape diaspora engagement.

The London Fano group, representing a segment of the diaspora aligned with Amhara resistance, issued a call to cancel the event altogether, citing the ongoing war and the perceived insensitivity of holding a remembrance at such a time. Their appeal, however, was not acknowledged by the organisers, further fuelling discontent.

These tensions underscore a broader challenge facing diaspora organising: how to honour historical memory without erasing present pain; how to build inclusive platforms that reflect the diversity of voices, experiences, and political positions within the community.

In light of these concerns, several suggestions have emerged:

• Establish a transparent organising framework for future events, with open calls for participation and clear criteria for speaker and guest selection.
• Create a community advisory council representing diverse regions, faiths, and political perspectives within the Ethiopian diaspora to guide commemorative planning.
• Acknowledge current crises in Ethiopia during historical events, ensuring that remembrance does not become detachment.
• Facilitate post-event forums where grievances can be aired constructively, and lessons learned can inform future initiatives.
• Promote a culture of invitation and recognition, especially for those who have laboured behind the scenes for years on issues of restitution, repatriation, and historical justice.

The Prince Alemayehu Remembrance Day was a powerful act of poetic and spiritual reclamation. But its legacy will depend not only on what was said and sung, but on how the community responds to the fractures it revealed. Healing, like remembrance, requires intention, humility, and the courage to listen.

The Ethiopian Tribune remains committed to documenting these moments, not only in celebration, but in critique, reflection, and hope for a more united diaspora future.

As the final poem echoed through the hall “Return Me to the Mountain” a silence fell. Not the silence of closure, but of awakening. Prince Alemayehu, the boy who died in exile, had spoken again. Through poets. Through witnesses. Through the unyielding memory of a people who refuse to forget.

The Ethiopian Tribune will continue to follow developments around the repatriation of Prince Alemayehu’s remains and the broader movement for cultural restitution. This article is part of the Diaspora Reckonings series, exploring the intersections of memory, empire, and cultural resistance.

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Ethiopian Tribune editor

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https://ethiopiantribune.com

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