By Sewasew Teklemariam

There is something almost tragicomic about watching great powers rediscover Ethiopia every few decades, dusting off the same old script: brave ally, reliable troops, convenient geography. One might be forgiven for thinking that somewhere in Washington, a filing cabinet labelled “Break Glass in Case of Unpopular War” contains a single index card reading: “Try Ethiopia.”

And so here we are again. Seventy-four years after Ethiopian soldiers froze in Korean trenches defending a principle called “collective security,” Addis Ababa finds itself courted once more, this time for Gaza, that graveyard of diplomatic ambition and geopolitical vanity. The Americans, it seems, have run out of takers. The Arabs are squeamish. The Europeans are preoccupied. Enter Ethiopia: loyal, militarily competent, and crucially still returning phone calls.

One almost admires the symmetry.

Let us begin with an uncomfortable fact that tends to disappear from polite diplomatic conversation: Ethiopia earned its stripes as an international actor not through hashtag solidarity or conference-room grandstanding, but by sending young men to die in someone else’s war. Between 1951 and 1954, over 6,000 Ethiopian troops served in Korea under the United Nations Command, personally authorised by Emperor Haile Selassie. The Kagnew Battalions fought at Pork Chop Hill, Old Baldy, and other places whose names now exist only in military histories and fading monuments. They earned a distinction almost quaint by today’s standards: not a single Ethiopian soldier was left behind or captured. Not one (United Nations Command historical records; US Army Center of Military History).

This was not theatre. It was war, and Ethiopia bled for it. The casualty figures, whilst modest by Korean War standards, were significant for a country of Ethiopia’s size and resources. Ethiopian field hospitals treated wounded Americans, Britons, and Turks alongside their own. Ethiopian officers coordinated with UN commanders in conditions that would test any alliance. And when the armistice was signed in 1953, Ethiopia remained in Korea for another year, because that was what collective security demanded.

Why? Because Haile Selassie, having watched the League of Nations abandon his country to Mussolini’s poison gas in 1936, believed, perhaps naively, that multilateralism might actually mean something if smaller nations upheld it. Ethiopia, he reasoned, must defend collective security abroad so that collective security might one day defend Ethiopia. It was a wager on principle over pragmatism, idealism over cynicism, the sort of bet that history tends to punish with exquisite cruelty.

It didn’t, of course. But more on that shortly.

The Korean deployment was not merely military. It was deeply symbolic. Here was an African nation, barely a decade removed from Italian occupation, standing shoulder to shoulder with the West not as a supplicant or protectorate, but as an equal partner in defence of international law. Ethiopian diplomats at the United Nations made much of this. So did American officials, who found Ethiopia’s participation useful for demonstrating that the Korean intervention was a truly international effort, not merely Western imperialism in multilateral drag.

Yet even then, cracks were visible. Ethiopian requests for military aid and modernisation assistance were met with warm words and modest gestures, but nothing approaching the largesse showered on more strategically located allies. The message, subtle but unmistakable, was clear: Ethiopia’s contribution was valued, but not valuable enough to fundamentally alter the transactional calculus of Cold War patronage.

Fast forward to December 2025. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi arrives in Addis Ababa, all smiles and Memoranda of Understanding. Bilateral relations are elevated to a “Strategic Partnership” that most elastic of diplomatic phrases, meaning everything and nothing simultaneously. There is talk of customs cooperation, digital infrastructure, peacekeeping training, and G20 debt relief (Government of India press briefings; Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs statements). All very modern. All very multilateral. The optics are impeccable: two ancient civilisations, both asserting themselves on the global stage, forging bonds of South-South cooperation untainted by colonial baggage.

Then, almost on cue, the other shoe drops.

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, according to the Times of Israel, has asked Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed to consider contributing Ethiopian troops to a proposed International Stabilisation Force for Gaza (Times of Israel, 19 December 2025). Not a UN mission, mind you. Not even a particularly coherent coalition. Just a hastily assembled fig leaf for President Trump’s latest ceasefire plan, which Arab and Muslim states are treating like a radioactive briefcase (Reuters, 17 December 2025).

Pakistan has demurred. Indonesia is dodging calls. Saudi Arabia is suddenly very interested in Yemen again. Egypt, despite its own security concerns in Sinai, has made its discomfort plain. Jordan, normally America’s most reliable Arab partner, is keeping a careful distance. Even the Gulf states, usually amenable to American security requests when sufficiently incentivised, have found reasons to be elsewhere.

And so Washington, in its infinite resourcefulness, has turned to Ethiopia: that reliable old warhorse, still standing after everyone else has bolted from the stable. One might call it flattering, if it weren’t so depressingly familiar.

To be fair, Ethiopia is a serious peacekeeping nation. It currently ranks among the top global contributors to UN missions, with troops in Abyei, Darfur, and Somalia (UN Department of Peace Operations data). Ethiopian soldiers are disciplined, experienced, and, unlike certain Western contingents, unlikely to flee at the first whiff of cordite. They have earned respect in some of Africa’s most challenging environments, operating in conditions that would give European defence ministers nightmares and human rights lawyers apoplexy.

But Gaza is not Darfur. And the proposed ISF is not a UN mission.

It is a politically contested, regionally explosive, militarily ambiguous intervention in one of the world’s most volatile theatres. Trump’s ceasefire framework explicitly links stabilisation to Hamas disarmament, a condition that Hamas rejects, Arab states won’t enforce, and no serious analyst believes can be achieved without catastrophic escalation (Reuters; public statements by Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar, November 2025). The very premise of the mission is contested. The rules of engagement are undefined. The exit strategy is non-existent. The political legitimacy is questionable at best.

In other words, it’s a deathtrap wrapped in a press release. And Ethiopia is being asked to walk into it.

The parallel to Korea is instructive, but not in the way American officials might hope. Korea, whatever its horrors, was a UN-mandated mission with broad international support, clear opposing forces, and a defined military objective. Gaza would be none of these things. It would be an occupation masquerading as stabilisation, a political arrangement imposed by force and sustained by the presence of foreign troops whom neither side particularly wants. Ethiopian soldiers would find themselves policing a ceasefire that nobody believes in, enforcing a disarmament that cannot be achieved, and serving as convenient targets for any faction seeking to demonstrate its resistance credentials.

Then there is Egypt, which watches all of this with the cold attentiveness of a creditor studying a debtor’s new car. Relations between Addis Ababa and Cairo are hardly warm. The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam remains a source of existential anxiety for Egypt, which views Ethiopian control over Nile waters the way Britain once viewed German control of the Channel: intolerable.

Ethiopian troops in Gaza, right on Egypt’s doorstep, would be read in Cairo not as burden-sharing, but as triangulation. Ethiopia securing American goodwill in the Middle East whilst remaining immovable on the Nile. Geopolitical judo. Egypt might publicly welcome the assistance, might even offer logistical support and coordinated border security. Privately, it would seethe. And mistrust, once entrenched, is devilishly difficult to dislodge. Every Ethiopian patrol near Rafah would be interpreted through the prism of Nile politics. Every American commendation of Ethiopian reliability would be seen as a subtle rebuke to Egyptian inflexibility on GERD.

The broader Arab world would face similar contradictions. How does one explain to a restive population that African troops are being deployed to stabilise Gaza when Arab armies stood aside? The optics are appalling. The politics worse. Ethiopian participation, however well-intentioned, risks becoming a symbol not of international cooperation but of Arab impotence and Western manipulation.

To understand why many Ethiopians regard these American overtures with the enthusiasm one reserves for unsolicited timeshare presentations, one must confront an inconvenient historical truth: the West has form. The overthrow of Ethiopia’s monarchy in 1974 was not merely a domestic revolution. It was Cold War opportunism dressed in Marxist rhetoric. Haile Selassie, having served as a steadfast American ally, hosting Kagnew Station, America’s largest communications facility in Africa, supporting Western positions at the UN, maintaining open trade and diplomatic channels, found that loyalty evaporated the moment his utility did.

Western powers, suddenly squeamish about imperial anachronism and distracted by Vietnam, Watergate, and oil shocks, stood aside. The Soviets, delighted, moved in with advisors, weapons, and ideological support (Bahru Zewde, A History of Modern Ethiopia; declassified US and Soviet Cold War records). What followed was not liberation, but systematic dismantling. Ethiopia’s historical state structure was replaced by a Derg regime whose brutality matched its incompetence, and then by an ethno-federal system whose long-term consequences are still being violently litigated in Tigray, Oromia, and Amhara.

The lesson? Loyalty rewarded when convenient. Sovereignty negotiable when inconvenient.

Nor did the post-Cold War era offer correction. Instead, Ethiopia became a laboratory for externally endorsed political engineering, celebrated when stable, condemned when fractured. Critics argue, with some justice, that the international community prioritised short-term manageability over long-term cohesion, tolerating governance models that institutionalised division whilst ignoring their destabilising effects. Western donors pumped billions into Ethiopia during the Meles Zenawi years, praising “African Renaissance” and “developmental state” whilst carefully averting their gaze from political repression and ethnic manipulation.

When the system finally collapsed into civil war in 2020, those same donors expressed shock, shocked!that such instability could emerge from a framework they had spent decades endorsing. It is within this historical memory that fears of a “second disintegration” must be understood, not as paranoia, but as pattern recognition.

If Ethiopia commits troops to Gaza without a clear UN mandate, defined rules of engagement, and regional consensus, it risks becoming once again, the geopolitical equivalent of a hired extra: visible in the frame, expendable in the edit. The question is not whether Ethiopia can contribute to global peace. Korea answered that. The question is whether selective internationalism, driven by great-power convenience, will once again leave Ethiopia holding the bag whilst others collect the applause.

There is also the domestic dimension to consider. Ethiopia is hardly in a position of domestic tranquillity from which to project military power abroad. The Tigray conflict may have formally ended, but its political, economic, and humanitarian consequences continue to reverberate. Ethnic tensions remain acute. The economy is strained. The military itself has been stretched thin by years of internal conflict. Deploying thousands of troops to Gaza whilst Amhara and Oromia simmer would be the diplomatic equivalent of reorganising the deck chairs whilst the hull takes on water.

Ethiopia’s history, from Korea to Cold War abandonment, from peacekeeping leadership to domestic fragmentation, offers a lesson that extends beyond Addis Ababa. It is a lesson about the limits of loyalty in an international system that rewards power and punishes principle. Strategic partnerships grounded in development and mutual respect, such as the one recently signed with India, strengthen sovereignty because they assume equality of agency and mutuality of benefit. Security arrangements imposed by geopolitical necessity do not, because they assume hierarchy and instrumentality.

If there is to be another chapter in Ethiopia’s long record of international service, it must be written with historical memory as strategy, not sentiment. The Kagnew Battalions deserve better than to be remembered as a cautionary tale of loyalty unrequited. Ethiopia’s current generation deserves better than to repeat their predecessors’ mistakes in a different desert, under a different flag, for similarly nebulous reasons.

The filing cabinet remains open. The index card remains tempting. But perhaps this time, Ethiopia might politely suggest that someone else take a turn. After all, there are plenty of nations who have benefited from American patronage over the decades. Perhaps it’s their turn to demonstrate that special relationships involve actual reciprocity, not just convenient deployment schedules.

History, as they say, doesn’t repeat itself. But it does rhyme. And Ethiopia has heard this particular verse before.

Key Sources:
United Nations Command & UN Department of Peace Operations historical records; US Army Center of Military History (Korean War archives); Times of Israel, 19 December 2025; Reuters, 17 December 2025; Government of India and Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs press releases; Bahru Zewde, A History of Modern Ethiopia

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Inter-state or international summits are important for setting agendas, carrying out constructive discussions and coming up with amicable agreements.

In the case of Africa, however, we have not been able to enjoy those equal terms. The ongoing US-Africa Summit does not seem to be any exception. The agenda is set by the US Administration. This is mainly because Africa is forced to succumb to offers comming from the East, especially China, in terms of soft loans, construction of the infrastructure, etc.

This is because the Westerners constantly fail to learn from their past bitter legacies of slavery, colonialism and neocolonialism.

China thus came in and controlled the balance. But she didn’t come for a charity but for her own self interest.

However, be it Western or Eastetn domination is not a solution. Currently we are not in a position to exert influence. We are busy kiling each other and displacing each other, forcing outmigration. That makes us lose our pride and influence.

The solution is in developing democracy and cooperation in Africa in similar spirits initiated in the early 1960s that were sabotaged by colonialists and some internal saboteurs. Given democracy and peace, Africa has more than the necessary natural resources to feed her children.
Bekele Gessesse, Dr.

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Successfully demobilizing and reintegrating rebels could help Ethiopia avoid further conflict, research shows

Sally Sharif

Ethiopia reached a peace agreementwith the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) rebels this month. The Nov. 2 deal follows two years of fighting that killed about 500,000 people and displaced 3 million from Tigray, a region in northern Ethiopia.

Article 6 of the agreement lays out the terms for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of the TPLF combatants. But these types of programs fail almost half the time. Will the Ethiopian peace agreement hold — and can Ethiopia avoid another conflict?

The peace agreement is a necessary first step in ending the two-year conflict. But my research suggests a lasting peace will require demobilization and reintegration plans that ensure the economic and social well-being of rebel commanders and combatants.

What helps demobilization succeed?

Disarming, demobilizing and reintegrating rebels (DDR) is one of the most important factors for post-conflict peace. But the Ethiopian accord only pays lip service to DDR. Article 6 lays out a stringent timeline for disarming the rebels within 30 days, without a specific demobilization plan or program to reintegrate fighters into society. And the accord recognizes that Ethiopia has only one defense force. There is no plan for security sector changes, and TPLF fighters will not be incorporated into the country’s armed forces. Article 6 also specifies that the program will be designed and implemented according to Ethiopia’s constitution, without any international support.

What happens to rebel fighters is one of the most expensive post-conflict interventions — and the stakes are high when it comes to reconciling rebels with civilians and promoting long-term peace. Since this approach began in the 1980s, 73 DDR programs have been implemented across the world. My research shows that these programs fail almost 50 percent of the time, with rebels rearming to continue the fight.

How Ethiopia tackled previous disarmament attempts

Ethiopia has already managed two demobilization programs, from 1991-1995 and 2000-2005. The first program targeted the Derg regime’s soldiersafter rebel victory and was a partial success. Peace failed for a short period when the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) withdrew from the transitional government in 1992 and rearmed. Some of the Derg soldiers assembled in demobilization camps became unhappy with the reintegration program, and also joined OLF. The rebellion was soon crushed and OLF combatants were sent to demobilization camps. Following this episode, Ethiopia successfully demobilized over 500,000 combatants.

The first program provided veterans with temporary financial support, as well as skills training, formal education, land and job opportunities, costing a total of about $196 million. Due to lack of funds, the Ethiopian government depended on donor support to reintegrate the half a million fighters. A World Bank survey found that ex-combatants were socially accepted into civilian communities and were not poorer than the general rural population.

The second DDR program targeted 148,000 Ethiopian army soldiers after the war with Eritrea. The program extended to six years due to lack of funds: Ex-combatants were promised financial and technical support that failed to materialize. The program’s total cost was $174 million, with less than $3.1 million paid by the Ethiopian government. The World Bank lent Ethiopia $170 million to implement the DDR program.

This program was a success in that the soldiers did not rearm or join insurgents. Social reintegration also happened smoothly. But ex-fighters’ assets deteriorated gradually, according to a World Bank surveyafter the program ended.

In both DDR programs, detailed program design and funding, as well as international funding, determined eventual success. But the government of Ethiopia has accrued a burgeoning foreign debt since the end of the last DDR program. In 2021, it owed foreign lenders 57 percent of its national income. National debt stood at about 40 percent during previous DDR programs. Considering the government’s current economic performance, affording a costly demobilization and reintegration program is wishful thinking. Without such a program, peace will remain elusive.

Can Ethiopia avoid further fighting?

For Ethiopia, that’s a big question. The African Union lauded the peace negotiations, which excluded representatives from the Global North and the United Nations, as providing “African solutions to African problems.” But the DDR program is unlikely to succeed without technical support and funding from international organizations.

Successful DDR programs, the research shows, require a plan of action with a detailed timeline, secure funding and technical support for reintegration of rebel forces. In Ethiopia, this would mean building demobilization camps for TPLF fighters and training the group’s commanders in managing their combatants after conflict formally ends.

Typically, the standard U.N. practicefor ensuring rebels do not rearm involves breaking the rebel wartime command-and-control structure after disarmament. This would mean separating TPLF commanders from the rank-and-file combatants.

In Ethiopia’s civil war, violence against civilians is eroding support for the government

But my research suggests that for rebel groups with a strong command-and-control structure — like the TPLF — DDR is more likely to succeed if the government assembles combatants in demobilization camps and provides them with educational opportunities, vocational training and prospects for employment. This temporary period during which active combatants are assigned to camps for processing, discharging and disarmament is called “cantonment.”

The TPLF has deep roots among the 7 million Tigrayans. Some TPLF commanders are former high-ranking Ethiopian military officers or political leaders who once held top positions in the federal government. Sidelining them from the demobilization and reintegration program is likely to create adverse incentives for rearmament.

My recent work shows that the bonds formed among combatants during war can be essential for successful rebel reintegration. Mid-level commanders, responsible for shaping wartime social bonds among combatants, are essential for allocating ex-combatant roles and redefining rebel-civilian relations.

For the November peace deal to hold, the Ethiopian government is most likely to succeed if it trains rebel commanders in peacebuilding. These efforts would include ensuring combatants’ security during cantonment through cooperation with the Ethiopian armed forces, providing economic opportunities, and starting reconciliation programs with civilians and victims of conflict.

@sally_sharif1) is the Simons Foundation Canada Postdoctoral Fellow at Simon Fraser University. She holds a PhD in political science from the City University of New York.

Source: https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics

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በብርሃኑ ጁላ፣በእኔና ታደሰ ወረደ መካከል በየቀኑና በየጊዜው የሚደረግ ግንኙነት ነበር። ስለዚህ ይህን እናድርግ ብለን ነው የተስማማነው። አሜሪካውያኖች ናቸው ያመቻቹትና ያገናኙን። የደረስንበትን ውሳኔም ነግረናቸዋል። ያውቃሉ። ስለዚህ የተኩስ ማቆሙ የተደረገው በዚህ አግባብ ነው።

(እነ ብርሃኑ ጁላን?) ሻዕቢያንና አማራን ውጡ ስትሏቸው አንወጣም ቢሉ ምንድን ነው የምታደርጉት ብለን ስንጠይቃቸው:-

ውጡ ካልናቸው ይወጣሉ፤ አቅም የላቸውም። እኛ ላይ ተንጠልጥለው ነው ያሉት እንጅ አቅም የላቸውም ያልናቸውን ይፈፅማሉ አሉን። (እዚህ ላይ audience ይስቃል)

ያላችኋቸውን የሚያደርጉ ከሆነ ጥሩ። ያላችኋቸውን የማይፈፅሙ ከሆነስ ምን ታደርጋላችሁ አልናቸው።
አይ ግድየለም አሉን።

እኛ ግን ሻዕቢያን በሚመለከት የሚሰሟችሁ ከሆነ ጥሩ ካልሆነ ግን እናንተ ብቻ ውጡ እንጅ ለእኛ አይቸግረንም ብለናቸዋል።

ስለዚህ እነሱ የሚያደርጉት ነገር ካለ ጥሩ ከሌለ ግን ሻዕቢያ ላይ የፈለግነውን ለማድረግ የሚከለክለን ስምምነት የለም። እነሱም( አሜሪካኖችም) ያውቃሉ።

ይህን officially እነግራችኋለሁ አሜሪካኖች አሁን ላይ የሻዕቢያ መንግስት ለአለማቀፍ ህግጋት የማይገዛ rogue state ነው ብለው ነው የመደቡት። ይህ ማለት የwar lords፣ የኮንትሮባንዲስት፣ ውሉ ለማይታወቅ ጥርቅም ፣ ሰላም ለማይፈልግ ስብስብ የቆመ መንግስት እንደሆነ ነው የምናምነው ብለው በግልፅ ነግረውናል። ሻዕቢያ የቀጠናው spoiler ነው ብለን ነው የምናምነው ብለውናል። ሶማሌ ውስጥ ችግር የሚፈጥር፣ ሱዳን ውስጥ ችግር የሚፈጥር፣ጅቡቲ ውስጥ ችግር የሚፈጥር፣ኢትዮጵያ ውስጥ ችግር የሚፈጥር ሻዕቢያ ነው ብለውናል።

ምዕራባውያን ቀጠናው ላይ ሰፊ የሆነ interest አላቸው። የኢኮኖሚ interest አላቸው። ሱዳን ውስጥ ባለው ጉዳይ ችግር እየፈጠረባቸው ነው ያለው። አወሳስቦባቸዋል። ስለዚህ የዚህ አካባቢ ዋና የሰላም ጠንቅ፣ ቀይ ባህር ላይ ሁከት የሚፈጥር ፣የአፍሪካ ቀንድ ላይ አለመረጋጋት የሚፈጥር ሻዕቢያ ነው የሚል መደምደሚያ እንዳላቸው ነው የነገሩን።
End T A(101), [Apr 22, 2022 at 23:40]
“ወደ ኮምቦልቻና ደሴ እንገባለን የሚል ሀሳብ አልነበረንም፤ መንገዱ አልጋባልጋ ሲሆንልን የመጣልን ሀሳብ ነው። እናስብ የነበረው በመደራደር የትግራይ ህዝብ ጥቅሙን ያስከብራል ብለን ነበር።
ደብረብርሃን እንደደረስን ብዙ ነገሮችን ማየት ይጠበቅብን ነበር። በተለይ የዲፕሎማሲው አለም ላይ ጥንቃቄ ያስፈልግ ነበር። ከዛ ውጭ ከትግራይም በላይ እንደ አገር ትልልቅ ችግሮች ገጠሙ።
የመጀመሪያው የኢኮኖሚ ችግር ነው። አብይ ጦርነቱን ተጣድፎ ሲጀምር የUAE የተወሰነ ቢሊዮን ዶላሮች ስለነበሩት የሚያልቅ አልመሠለውም ነበር። ከዛም እየዞረ እባካችሁ ዶላር ላኩልን እባካችሁ ዩሮ አበድሩን እያለ ነበር።
በመጨረሻም የገባው ደወ የኢትዮጵያና የትግራይ ህዝብ ያፈራቸውን አገራዊ ሀብቶች ወደመሸጥና ገበያ ማቅረብ ነው። የኢትዮጵያ ቴሌና አየር መንገድን ታቋቸዋላችሁ።
ይሄ የሁላችንም ችግር ነው። ትግራይ አገር አይደለችም፣ የኢትዮጵያ አካል ነች።

አቅማችንን አውቀውታል። officially ነው የምነግራችሁ አሜሪካኖቹ ቃል በቃል “የትግራይ ህዝብ የቀጠናው የሰላምና ደህንነት ዋልታና ማገር ነው በሚገባ recognize አድርገናችኋል። በቀይ ባህርና የአፍሪካ ቀንድ ቀጠና ችላ የማይባል ሃይል ነው” ብለውናል። የትግራይ ምድር በቀጣይ ለኢኮኖሚያዊ እድገት አሉታዊ ነገር አለው” ብለውናል።
ይሄ ከሃይል በተጨማሪ በዲፕሎማሲው የመጣ ለውጥ ነው። የምታይዋቸው HR6600 የሰኔቶቹ ማዕቀብ፣ የአውሮፓ ህብረት፣ UN ሁሉም ለኛ ድጋፍ አላቸው። ይሄ ለአብይ ከፍተኛ ጫና አድርሶበታል።
በከፍተኛ ወታደራዊ ስልጠናቸው ላይ የተወያዩበትና በኛ የወታደራዊ ስለላ ክፍል በተገኘው መረጃ ከፍተኛና ነባር አመራሮቹና ከባድ መሣሪያዎቹ ከ65-75 ከመቶ ከጥቅም ውጭ ሆነዋል።
አሁን ላይ እንደነ አዘርባጃን ካሉ አገራት የተወሰኑ መሳሪያ ቢሰበስብም በተለይ እንደ ድሮን አቅራቢ የነበሩ አገራት ችግራችሁን እዛው በሰላም ፍቱት ብለው አባረውታል።

በፖለቲካው በኩልም እያያችኋቸው ነው። ኦሮሞ በከፍተኛ ረብሻ ውስጥ ነው። የታጠቀውም ያልታጠቀውም ፍልሚያ ላይ ነው። የኦሮሞ ከፍተኛ ፖለቲከኞች ጋር ግንኙነት አለን፣ ኦነግ ሸኔ የሚያደርሰውን ጥፋት እያችሁት ነው፣ እዛው ስልጣን ውስጥ ያሉት ሁሉም በረብሻ ውስጥ ናቸው።
አማራም በከፍተኛ ግርግር ውስጥ ነው። በተለይ ውስጣዊ አንድነታቸው ተፈረካክሶ ልዩነታቸው ሰፍቷል ብዙ ክፍፍሎች አሉባቸው፣ የክፍፍል አጀንዳቸውንም ታቁታላችሁ።

በነዚህ ምክንያቶች ጠላቶቻችን ስለደከሙ ስለሰላም እንነጋገር ብለውን ወታደሮቻችንንም ሰብስበን እነሱም እንደኛ አድርገው ተገናኝተን ተነጋግርናል። በዚህም ሰብአዊ ድጋፎች ያለገደብ እንዲገቡ ተስማምተናል። ከአሜሪካና ከብልጽግና ወታደሮች ጋር።
በየእለቱ እንገናኛለን። ከኛ በኩል እኔና ታደሰ ወረደ ከነሱ እነ ብርሃኑ ጁላ በአሜሪካ አማካኝነት በተደጋጋሚ ተገናኝተናል። አሜሪካኖቹ ናቸው ወስደው ያገናኙን።
ጦርነት በማቆሙ ላይ ተስማምተናል። ጦራችሁን ዋጃና ጡሙጋ አንዲአርቃይ ላይ አቁሙ አሉን እሺ አልን። እኛም የአማራ ሃይሎች ከተነኮሱን ግን እንመታቸዋለን የኤርትራ ሃይላትም ከተነኮሱን እንወጋቸዋለን አልናቸው “እሺ” አሉን። ውጊያው በአፋርም እየመጣ ነው፣ እሱንም አንታገስም። እኛ በአፋር በኩል ካለን ታሪካዊ የህዝብ ዝምድና አንጻር መዋጋት አንፈልግም ነበር።

እኛ አማራንና ሻቢያን አስወጡልን(ከምዕራብ ትግራይ) ስንል እሺ ብለውናል። ቆይ አማራና ሻቢያ አንወጣም ቢሏችሁስ? አልናቸው። አይ ይወጣሉ፣ እኛን ተንጠልጥለው እንጂ እንደዚህ የሆኑት የምንላቸውን ይተገብራሉ’ አሉን። እኛም “እሺ እንደዚ ከሆነ ጥሩ፣ ካልሆነ ግን ሻቢያን በሚመለከት የፈለግነውን እርምጃ ለመውሰድ የሚከለክለን ህግ የለም ብለናቸዋል።
አሜሪካኖች ሻቢያን የአከባቢው የቀይ ባህርና የአፍሪካ ቀንድ የሁከት ምንጭ rogue state ብለው ነው የሚያምኑት። ሱዳን ፣ ጅቡቲ ሶማሊያ፣ ኢትዮጵያ …ሁሉ እየዞረ ችግር የሚፈጥር ሃይል ነው ብለዋል። አሁን ላይ የአፍሪካ ቀንድ የሰላም ሃይል እኛ እንደሆንን ነግረውናል፣ እንደሚያግዙንም ቃል ገብተውልናል።
እንዲደራደሩ ያደረግናቸው አስገድደን ነው በትግራይ ህዝብ ትግል ነው። አሁንም ውልፍት ካሉ ክንዳችንን ማሳየት ነው። ደብረሲና ስንደርስ የተከተሉን ወጣቶች ዛሬ ላይ ሰልጥነው ወታደሮች ህነዋል። የሃይል መሪዎች የጋንታ መሪዎችን አመራሮችን አሰልጥነናል አሁንም እያሰለጠንን ነው። ጠላቶቻችን ከኛ ጋር ሊደራደሩ የሚችሉት እምቢ ቢሉ በክንዳችን እንደምንጠመዝዛቸው ሲያውቁ ብቻ መሆኑን ልናውቅ ይገባል። (ለዚህ ነው በከፍተኛ ሁኔታ እያሠለጠንን ያለነው)። የሚሆነው ሁሉ በኛ በራሳችን ሃይልና ውስጣዊ አንድነት እንጂ ከውጭ አይደለም። የአለም ማህበረሰብም እያዘነልን ነው ልክ እንደ አገርም እያየን ነው። አአ የመጣ ዲፕሎማት መቀሌም መምጣት ጀመረዋል። የት እንደሚደርስ አናቅም ግን ፊታችን(ነጋችን) የሚወሰነው ባለን ሃይል ነው።
አንድ መታወቅ ያለበት ነገር የሰራዊታችን ጥንካሬ የሚወሰነው በውስጣችን ባለው ፖለቲካዊ ጥንካሬ ነው። እናንተ ስትጠነክሩ ሰራዊታችንም ይጠነክራል።

(ማስታወሻ ፣ ኦዲዮው ሙሉ ለሙሉ አላለቀም)
(የጻድቃን ሚስጥራዊ ንግግር ነው)

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– የህንፃው መሰረት ድንጋይ የተቀመጠው በሰኔ 20 ቀን 2007 ዓ/ም በወቅቱ የኢትዮጵያ ከፍተኛ ባለስልጣን በነበሩት በሚኒስትር ማዕረግ የፖሊሲ ጥናት እና ምርምር አማካሪ እና የኢትዮጵያ ንግድ ባንክ የዳይሬክተሮች ቦርድ ሰብሳቢ አቶ በረከት ስምኦን ነው።

– ግንባታውን ለማካሄድ ረጅም ጊዜ ጥናት የተደረገ ሲሆን ቦታውን ለማግኘት እራሱን የቻለ ጊዜ ወስዷል ፤ 18,308 ሜትር ስኩዌር መሬት ለህንፃው ከተሰጠ በኃላ በርካቶች የተሳተፉበት የዲዛይን ውድድር ተካሂዶ አሁን ያለው ተመራጭ ሊሆን ችሏል።

– የህንፃውን ዲዛይ እና ግንባታ ተቋም ለመለየት 7 ዓመታት ወስዷል።

– ህንፃው እጅግ ዘመናዊ የሆነ እና በኢትዮጵያ ከዚህ በፊት ያልተለመደ አሰራርን አካቶ ነው የተሰራው።

– የህንፃው ግንባታ በአዲስ አበባ ዩኒቨርሲቲ ቴክኖሎጂ ኢንስቲትዩት (AAiT) ተቆጣጣሪነት በቻይና መንግስት ኮንስትራክሽን ኢንጂነሪንግ ኮርፖሬሽን አማካኝነት ነው የተካሄደው።

– 4 የምድር ውስጥ እና 49 ከምድር በላይ በድምሩ ባለ 53 ወለል ከፍታ ያለው ርዝመቱ 209.15 ሜትር የሆነ ታወር ሲሆን ሁለት ባለ 11 እና ባለ 13 ወለሎች ግዙፍ ህንፃዎችን አካቷል። በድምሩ ከ165 ሺህ ካሬሜትር በላይ ስፋት ላይ የተገነባ ነው።

– ባለ 11 ወለሉ ህንፃ ለኮንፈረንስ ነው፤ በአንድ ጊዜ 2500 ሰዎችን ማስተናገድ የሚችል ዘመናዊ የስብሰባ አዳራሽ ፣ 300 ሰዎችን የሚይዙ እና 200 ሰዎች የሚይዙ 5 መለስተኛ የስብሰባ አዳራሾች አሉት (ሁሉም እርስ በእርሳቸው መገናኘት ይችላሉ) ፤ የሰራተኞች መመገቢያ እንዲሁም የባንክ ቅርንጫፍ አሉት።

– ባለ13 ወለሉ ህንፃ ለንግድ ስራ ማዕከልነት የሚያገለግል ነው። 5 ክፍሎች ያሉት እጅግ ዘመናዊ የሲኒማ አዳራሽ ፣ የንግድ ማዕከላት፣ ጂምናዚየም ፣ የውበት መጠበቂያ ስፓ፣ የልጆች መዝናኛ ማዕከል ጌም ዞን ፣ ሬስቶራንቶች ፣ ፉድ ኮርት አካቷል።

– የዋናው ህንፃ አንደኛ ፎቅ ቋሚ የአውደርእይ ማሳያ ነው፣ ከ2ኛ እስከ 46ኛ ፎቅ የባንኩ የዋና መስሪያ ቤት ሰራተኞችን ቢሮ ይይዛል። 47ኛ እና 48ኛ ፎቆች የካፍቴሪያ እና የመዝናኛ ቦታዎች ናቸው።

– 24 አሳንሰሮች፣ 26 ስኬሌተሮች አሉት። 4ቱ የምድር ውስጥ ወለሎች 1500 መኪና መያዝ የሚችል ዘመናዊ የመኪና ማቆሚያ መካኒካል ፓርኪንግ ጨምሮ የያዘ ፣ ሌሎች ልዩ ልዩ አገልግሎት የያዙ ክፍሎች የያዘ ነው።

– ሙሉ ህንፃው ዘመናዊ የእሳት መከላከያ እና የ CCTV ካሜራዎች ፣የሚዲያ ፋሲሊቲ፣ በረጅሙ ህንፃ 3 የአደጋ ጊዜ መቆያ ሪፊውጂ ወለሎች አሉት። ዘመናዊ የደህንነት መጠበቂያ ሲስተም የተገነቡለት ነው።

– ውሃ እና መብራት በቁጠባ ለመጠቀም IBM የተሰኘ ልዩ ቴክኖሎጂ ተገጥሞለታል።

– ህንፃው በአዲስ አበባ ረጅሙ ህንፃ በምስራቅ አፍሪካ እና በመላው አፍሪካ ሰማይ ጠቀስ ህፃዎች መካከል በግንባር ቀደምትነት የሚጠቀስ ነው።

– ግንባታው 303.5 ሚሊዮን ዶላር ፈጅቷል።

– የኢትዮጵያ ንግድ ባንክ የዋና መስሪያ ቤት ህንፃ የካቲት 6 ቀን 2014 ዓ/ም በኢትዮጵያ ጠቅላይ ሚኒስትር ዶክተር ዐቢይ አህመድ ከፍተኛ የሀገሪቱ ባለስልጣናት በተገኙበት ተመርቋል።

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