Egypt – Ethiopian Tribune https://ethiopiantribune.com የኢትዮጵያ ትሪቢውን Thu, 03 Sep 2026 13:22:14 +0000 en-GB hourly 1 https://wordpress.org/?v=7.0.2 https://i0.wp.com/ethiopiantribune.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/EthiopianTribune.jpg?fit=32%2C32&ssl=1 Egypt – Ethiopian Tribune https://ethiopiantribune.com 32 32 213632640 https://ethiopiantribune.com/2026/09/5078/ https://ethiopiantribune.com/2026/09/5078/#respond Fri, 04 Sep 2026 13:22:00 +0000 https://ethiopiantribune.com/?p=5078
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የናይል ውዝግብ — ሃድሊ ጋምብልና የግብፅ የውጭ ጉዳይ ሚኒስትር በስዕል፣ ከመካከላቸው ግድብ

የኢትዮጵያ ትሪቡን · ረጅም ንባብ

በኢ. ፍራሺ

ሁሉም ነገር ዘላለማዊ ነበር፣ ግድቡ እስኪመጣ ድረስ

በነሐሴ ወር መጨረሻ አካባቢ አንዲት አሜሪካዊ ጋዜጠኛ በካይሮ ከግብፅ የውጭ ጉዳይ ሚኒስትር ፊት ለፊት ተቀምጣ፣ በአረቡ ዓለም ትልቁን ጦር ኃይል የያዘ አገር ይህን ኃይል በኢትዮጵያ ላይ ሳይጠቀም ለምን እንደሚቀር ጠየቀችው። ንግግሩ አዲስ አበባ ውስጥ ፍንዳታ ፈጠረ። የመንግሥት መገናኛ ብዙኃን የክልሉን ሰላም አደጋ ላይ የጣለ ቁማር ሲሉ ጠሩት፤ ተንታኞችም ጋዜጠኛዋ ጦርነትን በንግግር ልትቀሰቅስ እንደሞከረች ከሰሱ። ለአንድ ሳምንት ያህል ግን ቃላቱ ራሳቸው በእጅ የሚጨበጡ አልነበሩም። ቃለ መጠይቁን ያስተላለፈው ጣቢያ — በጋዜጠኛዋ ራሷ የተጻፈ — የጦር ኃይሉን ጥያቄ ሙሉ በሙሉ ያስቀረ የጽሑፍ ዘገባ አወጣ፤ የጥያቄው ቃል በቃል ቅጂ የተገኘው ግን በውዝግቡ በሌላኛው ወገን ካለ አንድ ተኮትኳች የመንግሥት ጣቢያ ብቻ ነበር። ከዚያም ሙሉው ቅጂ ጉዳዩን ደመደመው። ቅስቀሳው እውን ነበር፣ ልክ በእነዚያ ቃላት አካባቢ ተጠይቆ ነበር። ጣቢያው ራሱ ያደረገው ነገር ቢኖር ጥያቄውን ከመዝገቡ ጸጥ ብሎ ማጥፋት ነበር።

ይህ ለቀውሱ የግርጌ ማስታወሻ አይደለም። ቀውሱ ራሱ በጥቃቅኑ ነው። በናይል ውኃ ላይ ያለው የግብፅና የኢትዮጵያ ግጭት ወደ አንድ ሁኔታ ደርሷል — የውዝግቡ ትወና ከይዘቱ ሙሉ በሙሉ ተለይቷል፤ ማስጠንቀቂያዎች ተግባራዊ እንዲሆኑ ሳይሆን እንዲሰሙ ይሰጣሉ፤ የዓመታት ድርድር የሚቀጥለው ማንም ውጤት እንደማያመጣ ስለሚያውቅ ነው፤ በሳምንቱ ውስጥ ከሁሉ የበለጠ ወሳኝ ሰነድ ጣቢያው ራሱ ሊያጠፋው የሞከረው የቴሌቪዥን ጥያቄ ሊሆን ይችላል። ለዚህ ሁኔታ ስም አለው፣ አጀማመሩም ከናይል አልነበረም።

ለተቆጣጠሩት ሐሰተኛ እውነታ የተሰጠ ስም

አንትሮፖሎጂስቱ አሌክሲ ዩርቻክ (Alexei Yurchak) “ሃይፐርኖርማላይዜሽን” የሚለውን ቃል የፈጠረው የሶቪየት ኅብረትን የመጨረሻ አሥርተ ዓመታት ለመግለጽ ነበር። እሱ እንደሚለው በ1980ዎቹ ሁሉም ሰው — ዜጎችም ሆኑ ባለሥልጣናት — ሥርዓቱ ባዶ መሆኑን ተረድተው ነበር። ነገር ግን ሌላ አማራጭ መገመት ስለተሳነ ሁሉም ሰው የእምነትን ሥነ ሥርዓት እውን እንደሆነ አድርጎ መተወኑን ቀጠለ፤ ትወናውም ራሱ እውነታ ሆነ። ሐሰቱ የተደበቀ አልነበረም፤ የተጋራ፣ የተለመደ፣ በመለመዱም ዘላለማዊ የሚመስል ነበር። ከዚያም ያለ ማስጠንቀቂያ ፈረሰ።

ፊልም ሠሪው አዳም ከርቲስ (Adam Curtis) ቃሉን ለ2016 የድርሰት ፊልሙ ተውሶ ከሶቪየት ቡድን ወደ መላው ከ1970ዎቹ በኋላ ወዳለው ሥርዓት አስፋፋው። የእሱ መከራከሪያ፦ ሊቆጣጠሩት የማይችሉት ውስብስብ ዓለም ስለገጠማቸው፣ ሥልጣን ላይ ያሉት — ባለሀብቶች፣ የቴክኖሎጂ ሰዎች፣ ፖለቲከኞች — ወደ ቀለል ያለና ወደ ተረጋጋ ሐሰተኛ ሥሪት አፈግፍገው እሱን ለማቆም ሠሩ። እውነተኛ ችግሮች አልተፈቱም፤ ወደ ሊነበቡ የሚችሉ ታሪኮች፣ ወደ ክፉ ገጸ ባሕርያትና ወደ ተቆጣጠሩ ግንዛቤዎች ተለወጡ። የከርቲስ የመካከለኛው ምሥራቅ የዚህ የሙከራ ቤተ ሙከራ ነው፦ እውነተኛ ቅሬታዎች ደጋግመው ተራኪውን ወደሚጠቅም ቀለል ያለ ትረካ የሚጨመቁበት፣ ዋናው ውስብስብነት ግን ሳይነካ እስኪፈነዳ ድረስ የሚብላላበት አካባቢ።

ናይልን በዚህ መነጽር ተመልከቱት፣ ሥዕሉ ራሱን ያስተካክላል። ጥያቄው “ግብፅ ትወጋለች?” መሆኑ ቀርቶ የበለጠ የሚያስጨንቅ ይሆናል፦ ሁሉም ሰው ስክሪፕቱን ሸምድዶ ሳለ ይህን ቀውስ ለምን መተወኑን ቀጠለ?

ማስጠንቀቂያዎች እንዲሰሙ እንጂ ተግባራዊ እንዲሆኑ አይሰጡም። ድርድሩ የሚቀጥለው ሁሉም ነገር እንደማይፈታ ስለሚያውቅ ነው።

ሰላምም ጦርነትም የሌለበት

በዚያው ቃለ መጠይቅ መጀመሪያ አካባቢ ስለ ኢራን ሲናገር ሚኒስትሩ ሰላምም ጦርነትም የሌለበትን ሁኔታ ገለጸ — መቀዛቀዝ፣ ምንም የማይራመድበትና የማይሰበርበት የድካም ሁኔታ። ከደቂቃዎች በኋላ ወደ ናይል ሲዞር የ13 ዓመታት ድርድርን ለመግለጽ ተመሳሳዩን ቃል ተጠቀመ፦ መቆም (deadlock)። ውዝግቡ በአንድ ቃል ውስጥ ይህ ነው። ታላቁ የኢትዮጵያ ሕዳሴ ግድብ በሴፕቴምበር 2025 (እ.ኤ.አ.) ተመረቀ — ካይሮ የጠየቀችው አስገዳጅ ስምምነት ሳይደረስ ከአሥር ዓመት በላይ ከቆየ የሦስትዮሽ ድርድር በኋላ። በማርች 2026 አዲስ አበባ በጥቁር ዓባይ ላይ ተጨማሪ ሦስት ግድቦችን እንደምትሠራ አስታወቀች። ግብፅ የመለሰችው በወታደራዊ ማሰለፍ ሳይሆን በተለመደው ሥነ ሥርዓት ነው፦ ለተባበሩት መንግሥታት የፀጥታው ምክር ቤት አቤቱታ፣ የህልውና ስጋት ማስጠንቀቂያ፣ የውጭ ሽምግልና አቅርቦት፣ እና በተባበሩት መንግሥታት ቻርተር አንቀጽ 51 መሠረት የራስን የመከላከል ሕጋዊ መብት ጥንቁቅ ጥሪ። እያንዳንዱ እርምጃ ብዙ ጊዜ የተተወነ ስክሪፕት አንድ መስመር ነው።

ሥነ ሥርዓቱ የራሱ የተረጋጋ ሰዋስው አለው። ካይሮ ጉዳዩን ወደ ደኅንነት ስጋት ትለውጠዋለች፤ አዲስ አበባ ሉዓላዊነትን ታረጋግጣለች፤ ዋሽንግተን ለማሸማገል ታቀርባለች፤ ሽምግልናው ይፈርሳል፤ በተመድ ደብዳቤዎች ይለዋወጣሉ፤ ግድቡ ግን ይሞላል። የዚህ ሥነ ሥርዓት መምህር መደጋገም ነው። ሥነ ሥርዓቱ በግልጽ የማያመነጨው ነገር — የተቀናጀ የሙሌት መርሐ ግብር፣ የድርቅ አያያዝ ፕሮቶኮል፣ የመረጃ መጋራት ሥርዓት፣ የጋራ የአሠራር ማዕቀፍ — በሁሉም ወገን ያሉ የውኃ መሐንዲሶች አደጋውን እንደሚያረግቡ በሰፊው የሚስማሙበት የቴክኒክ መሣሪያዎች ስብስብ ነው። መፈታት የሚችለው ችግር ሳይፈታ ይቀራል፣ የማይፈታው ትወና እንዲቀጥል ተብሎ።

የካይሮ ማቅለል፦ የህልውና ማዕቀፍ

የግብፅ ሚኒስትር ውኃን የህልውና ጉዳይ ብሎ ሲጠራው — ከብሔራዊ ደኅንነት እንኳ በላይ የቆመ ነው ሲል — የፖለቲካ ሳይንቲስት ወዲያውኑ የሚያውቀውን ነገር እያደረገ ነበር። የኮፐንሃገን ትምህርት ቤት ይህን “ሴኩሪታይዜሽን” (securitisation) ይለዋል፦ አንድን ጉዳይ ከተለመደውና ሊደራደሩበት ከሚችሉት ፖለቲካ አውጥቶ የመኖር ጉዳይ ብሎ በማወጅ ልዩ እርምጃዎችን የሚፈቅድና ስምምነትን የሚዘጋ ድርጊት። ውኃ የህልውና ጉዳይ ከሆነ በኋላ እያንዳንዱ ኪዩቢክ ሜትር የማይደራደር ይሆናል፤ እያንዳንዱ የላይኛው ተፋሰስ ተርባይን የጥቃት ድርጊት ይሆናል፤ የቴክኒክ ልውውጥ የሚያቀርብ እያንዳንዱ ዲፕሎማት የክህደት ዕጩ ይሆናል። ሴኩሪታይዜሽን የሃይፐርኖርማሉ የቋንቋ ሞተር ነው፦ ውስብስብ፣ የተጋራ፣ ሊስተናገድ የሚችል ወንዝን ወደ ቀላል፣ ሙሉ፣ ዘላቂ አደጋ ይለውጠዋል።

ሚዛን ደግሞ የግብፅን መሠረታዊ ተጋላጭነት በቁም ነገር እንድንመለከት ይጠይቃል፣ ምክንያቱም የተፈጠረ አይደለም። በሚኒስትሩ ራሱ አገላለጽ፣ ግብፅ ንጹህ ውኃዋን 98 በመቶ ያህል ከናይል ታገኛለች፤ ከተፋሰሱ አጠቃላይ ዝናብ ውስጥ ትንሽ ድርሻ ትቀበላለች፤ 10 ሚሊዮን ስደተኞች ከዚያው አቅርቦት እየተጠቀሙ ሕዝቧ በዓመት 2.5 ሚሊዮን ያህል ሲያድግ ትመለከታለች። ፍርሃቱ እውነተኛ ነው። የተቆጣጠረው ግን የፍርሃቱ አቀራረብ ነው። የ“ሃይድሮ-ሄጅሞኒ” (hydro-hegemony) ተመራማሪዎች እንደሚያስተውሉት ግብፅ ለአንድ ምዕተ ዓመት በተፋሰሱ የኃይል ተዋረድ አናት ላይ ተቀምጣለች፣ ይህ ሥፍራዋም በቅኝ ግዛት ዘመን ስምምነቶች — በ1929 እና በ1959 — ተመዝግቦ ወንዙን አብዛኛ ድርሻ ለካይሮ ሲሰጥ የላይኛ ተፋሰስ አገሮችን ሙሉ በሙሉ ገልሎ ነበር። ሕዳሴ ግድብ የሃይድሮሎጂ ጥያቄ ብቻ አያነሳም፤ አንድን ሄጅሞኒ ያፈርሳል። ከዚህ የህልውና ቋንቋ ውስጥ የተወሰነው የጥም ፍርሃት ሳይሆን ለጠፋ ሥርዓት የሚደረግ ሐዘን ነው — ሐዘን ደግሞ እንደ ጥም በሙሌት መርሐ ግብር አይፈታም።

የአዲስ አበባ ማቅለል፦ የልማት ማዕቀፍ

ኢትዮጵያም የመስተዋት ሥነ ሥርዓት ትተውናለች፣ እሷም ተመሳሳይ ምርመራ ይገባታል። ስክሪፕቷ ከሁለቱ በሕግ ደረጃ የበለጠ ጠንካራ ነው፦ ሕዳሴ ግድብ ውኃን በመስኖ እንደሚጠቀም ሳይሆን ተርባይን ለማሽከርከር የሚያከማችና የሚለቅ የኃይል ማመንጫ ፕሮጀክት ነው፤ ኢትዮጵያ የ1959ን ክፍፍል ፈራሚ ስላልነበረች በእሱ ልትገዛ አትችልም፤ የዘመናዊ ዓለም አቀፍ የውኃ ሕግ መሪ መርሆዎች — ፍትሐዊና ምክንያታዊ አጠቃቀም እና ጉልህ ጉዳት ያለማድረስ ግዴታ — ከካይሮ ይልቅ ወደ አዲስ አበባ አቋም ይቀርባሉ። ልማት መብት እንጂ የጠላትነት ድርጊት አይደለም የሚለው ክርክር ትክክለኛ ነው — እናም፣ በሚያስገርም ሁኔታ፣ የግብፅ ሚኒስትር ራሱ አምኖበታል፣ የግብፅን የመኖር መብት እያጎላ ሳለ የኢትዮጵያን ፍትሐዊ የልማት መብት ያለምንም ማመንታት ተቀብሏል።

ነገር ግን አንድ ትረካ እውነተኛ ሆኖም እንደ ተቆጣጠረ ማቅለል ሊሆን ይችላል። ግድቡ በሀገር ውስጥ በቦንድና በደመወዝ ቅናሽ ተደገፈ፣ በአገር ውስጥም እንደ ታላቁ የኢትዮጵያ ብሔር አንድነት ፕሮጀክት ተሸጠ — መንግሥት በትግራይና በአማራ የስብራት መስመሮች እየተሰነጠቀ ሳለ የቆመ ሐውልት። በዓባይ ላይ ያለው ሉዓላዊነት ሕጋዊ መርሕ ብቻ አይደለም፤ የሕጋዊነት መሣሪያ ነው፣ መንግሥት ለዜጎቹ ስለሚለምን ሳይሆን ስለሚገነባ ብሔር የሚነግረው ታሪክ ነው። ከግድቡ ምልክት እንዲህ ያለ ትርፍ የሚያገኝ መንግሥት ደግሞ ከአስገዳጅ ስምምነት ይልቅ የተቆጣጠረ አሻሚነትን ለመምረጥ የራሱ ምክንያቶች አሉት — ምክንያቱም ማንኛውም ተፈጻሚ የአሠራር ማዕቀፍ አሁን ያስታወቀችውን የግድቦች ሰንሰለት ይገድባል። በመጨረሻ፣ ሁለቱም ዋና ከተሞች ከውዝግቡ መፈታት ይልቅ ከውዝግቡ ትወና የበለጠ ትርፍ ያገኛሉ። ይህ የሃይፐርኖርማል ሥርዓት ምልክት ነው፦ የኃያላኑ ማበረታቻዎች ቀውሱን ከማብቃት ይልቅ በማስቀጠል ዙሪያ ይሰለፋሉ።

ጠያቂዋ ጦርነት አቀረበች። ሚኒስትሩ ደጋግሞ እምቢ አለ። መባባሱ የነበረው በጥያቄዎቹ ውስጥ እንጂ በመልሶቹ ውስጥ አልነበረም።

ቃለ መጠይቁ እንደ ማስረጃ

ወደዚያ የካይሮ ስቱዲዮ እንመለስ፣ ምክንያቱም ማሽኑ የሚታየው በቃለ መጠይቁ ውስጥ ነው — ሙሉው ቅጂ ደግሞ ኮሪዮግራፊውን ከመዝገቡ ጋር እንድናመሳክር ያስችለናል። ይጣጣማል። ጥያቄው ሆን ተብሎ የተሠራ መሰላል ይወጣል፦ ግድቡ የግብፅ የሕይወት መስመር ከመሆኑ፣ ወደ ብሔራዊ ደኅንነትን ያሰጋል ወደሚል ቀጥተኛ ማረጋገጫ፣ ወደ ዲፕሎማሲ ጊዜው አልፎበታል ወደሚል ሐሳብ፣ ከሁሉ ወደ ስለታማው ደረጃ — “ትልቁን የአረብ ጦር ኃይል ይዞ አለመጠቀም ምን ፋይዳ አለው?” — ወደ ኢትዮጵያ ግብፅን እያስራበች ነው ወደሚል ክስ፣ በመጨረሻም ዲፕሎማሲ አልቆ አሁን መፍትሔ ጠቁም ወደሚል ጥያቄ። የ“ፍሬሚንግ” (framing) ንድፈ ሐሳብ እንደሚያስተምረው ጥያቄዎች በጭራሽ ገለልተኛ አይደሉም፦ በጥያቄ ውስጥ የሚሸጎጠው መነሻ ሐሳብ ሊነገሩ የሚችሉ መልሶችን ወሰን ያጠባል፣ መልሱ የሚኖርበትንም ዓለም ጸጥ ብሎ ይገነባል። ጦር ኃይል ለምን ሳይጠቀም ቀረ ብሎ መጠየቅ አጠቃቀሙ ጠረጴዛ ላይ እንዳለ አስቀድሞ መወሰን ማለት ነው።

እዚህ ላይ ቅጂው እውነተኛውን አስገራሚ ነገር ያመጣል — ንጹሑ ዘገባም ሆነ ቁጡው ምላሽ ትኩረት ያልሰጡት ክፍል፦ ሚኒስትሩ መሰላሉን ለመውጣት ፈቃደኛ አልነበረም። ጦሩ ለምን ዝም ብሎ እንደተቀመጠ ሲጫኑት መነሻ ሐሳቡን አረመ፣ ጦር ኃይሉ የግብፅን ድንበር ለመከላከል እንጂ በናይል ላይ ለማዋል እንዳልሆነ አጥብቆ ተናገረ። ወዲያውኑ ወደ አንቀጽ 51 እና ወደ ዓለም አቀፍ ሕግ ቋንቋ አፈገፈገ፣ የኢትዮጵያን የመልማት መብት አመነ፣ ደጋግሞም ጉዳዩ የዲፕሎማሲ ነው ወደሚለው ተመለሰ — ወታደራዊ መፍትሔዎች ወደ ስቃይና ጥፋት ብቻ እንደሚያመሩ የታሪክ ትምህርት እስከመስጠት ደረሰ። በሌላ አነጋገር መባባሱ የነበረው በጥያቄዎቹ ውስጥ እንጂ በመልሶቹ ውስጥ አልነበረም። ጠያቂዋ ጦርነት አቀረበች፤ ተጠያቂው ግን ደጋግሞ አስቀመጠው።

ቃላቱ ተነግረዋል፤ ይህ አሁን የተረጋገጠ ነው። ግን የተረጋገጠው እውነታ የሚገልጠውን ልብ በሉ። በዚህ ዓመት በናይል ቀውስ ውስጥ ከሁሉ የበለጠ ቀስቃሽ ቅጽበት የተተኮሰ ጥይት ወይም የተዘጋ የውኃ በር አልነበረም። ጥያቄ ነበር — መልሱም እምቢታ ነበር። ዣን ቦድሪያር (Jean Baudrillard) በቴሌቪዥን የሚተላለፍ ጦርነት “ሃይፐርሪል” ሊሆን ይችላል ብሎ ተከራክሮ ነበር፦ በመገናኛ ብዙኃን በኩል የሚለማመዱት ክስተት፣ ነገሩን ራሱ ፈጽሞ ባልነኩ ሕዝቦች እንደ ትርኢት የሚበላ። ናይል ወደዚህ ሁኔታ ደርሷል። አንድ ሚኒስትር ቃለ መጠይቅ ሙሉ ጦርነት ከማስፈራራት እየተቆጠበ ያሳልፋል፣ የሚዘዋወረው መገናኛ ክስተት ግን — ተቆራርጦ፣ ተቀርጾ፣ በአንዱ እጅ ነጽቶ በሌላው ተሳልጦ — ቢሆንም የጦርነት ስጋት ነው። ትርኢቱ ከባለቤቱ ተለይቶ የራሱን ሕይወት ያገኛል። ጣቢያው ንግግሩን ከራሱ የጽሑፍ መዝገብ ማጥፋቱ ትንሽ የጋዜጠኝነት ስህተት አይደለም፤ የግንዛቤ አስተዳደር (perception management) ውስጠት በንጹህ መልኩ ነው — መዝገቡ ሊጠብቀው የሚገባውን ታሪክ ለማስማማት መዝገቡን ራሱ ማረም።

መድረኩም ራሱ ገለልተኛ አይደለም። ፕሮግራሙ በባሕረ ሰላጤ ባለቤትነት ባለው መድረክ ላይ ይሠራል፣ የባሕረ ሰላጤ አገሮች ደግሞ በአፍሪካ ቀንድ ተመልካቾች አይደሉም — ኢትዮጵያ ልትደርስበት በምትሞክረው የቀይ ባሕር ኮሪዶር ውስጥ የሚያልፉ ወደቦች፣ የጦር ሰፈር መብቶችና ፉክክሮች አሏቸው። በሌላ አነጋገር ሦስተኛ የጥቅም ስብስብ የመጀመሪያዎቹ ሁለቱ የሚታዩበትን ማዕቀፍ ለመገንባት ይረዳል። የግንዛቤ አስተዳደር፣ “የስምምነት ማምረት” (manufacturing consent) ትውፊት ከረጅም ጊዜ ጀምሮ እንዳስተዋለው፣ ራሱን አያስተዋውቅም፤ እንደ ተራ የዜና ታሪክ ቅርጽ ይመጣል።

በሐሰቱ ውስጥ ያለው አደጋ

ባለቤቶቹ መባባስን ደጋግመው ስለሚያምቁ ቀውሱ አስተማማኝ ነው ብሎ መደምደም ምቹ ቢሆንም፣ የከርቲስ ማስጠንቀቂያ — እና የዩርቻክ ታሪክ — ወደ ተቃራኒው አቅጣጫ ይሄዳል። ሃይፐርኖርማሉ የተረጋጋ የሆነው እውነት ስለሆነ አይደለም፤ የተረጋጋ የሆነው በድንገት እስኪያቆም ድረስ ነው። የሶቪየት ሥርዓት በመጥፋቱ ዋዜማ ዘላለማዊ ይመስል ነበር። የተቆጣጠረ አለ-ጦርነት ማንም ለማብቃት ሳይወስን ሊሰበር ይችላል፦ በሶማሊያ ወይም በምሥራቅ ሱዳን በተኪ ግጭት፣ ካይሮ በኢትዮጵያ ዙሪያ ያገኘቻቸውን ሰፈሮች በሚያሳይ የከበባ ዲፕሎማሲ፣ ከሙሌት ወቅት ጋር በሚገጣጠም ድርቅ፣ ወይም ረጅም ጊዜ ቆራጥነትን ተውነው ያለ ዋጋ መውረድ በማይችሉ መሪዎች የተሳሳተ ስሌት። አደጋው በትርኢቱና በባለቤቱ መካከል ባለው ልዩነት የበለጠ ስለታም ይሆናል እንጂ አይረግብም፦ ሕዝቦችና ሦስተኛ ወገኖች የሚመልሱት ለሚዘዋወረው የጦርነት ስጋት እንጂ ሚኒስትሩ በእውን ለተናገረው መገታት አይደለም። የጦርነት ንግግር ትወና ነው — ትርኢቱ እስኪቃጠል ቅጽበት ድረስ ብቻ። የሐሰቱ አካላዊ መሠረተ ልማት — የባሕር ኃይል መዳረሻ፣ የጦር ማሰለፍ፣ የጥምረት ግንባታ — እውነተኛ ነው፣ እውነተኛ መሠረተ ልማት ደግሞ ያጸደቁትን ትረካዎች ተርፎ የመኖር ልማድ አለው።

ማንም የማይጠቀምበት መውጫ

ጭካኔው በአደባባይ ተቀምጧል። ከህልውና ቋንቋውና ከሉዓላዊ ትእቢቱ ሥር፣ በዓለም አቀፍ ውዝግቦች መስፈርት፣ በሚያስደንቅ ሁኔታ ሊፈታ የሚችል ችግር አለ። ኢትዮጵያ ኤሌክትሪክ ለማመንጨት የምትጠቀመው የውኃ መጠን እዚህ ግባ የሚባል አይደለም፤ እውነተኛዎቹ አደጋዎች የሚመለከቱት በደረቅ ዓመታት የውኃ ማጠራቀሚያውን የመሙላት ጊዜንና የልቀትን ማስተባበር ናቸው — የመርሐ ግብር፣ የማሳወቅና የመረጃ ጥያቄዎች እንጂ የመኖር ጥያቄዎች አይደሉም። በፍትሐዊ አጠቃቀም፣ በድርቅ ፕሮቶኮሎችና በተጋራ ቴሌሜትሪ ላይ የተገነባ የተፋሰስ ዙሪያ ማዕቀፍ ከሁለቱ መንግሥታት አንዳቸውም ክብራቸውን እንዲሰጡ አይጠይቅም። የሚጠይቀው ሁለቱም ቀውሱን መፈለጋቸውን እንዲያቆሙ ብቻ ነው። ይህ ደግሞ በሃይፐርኖርማል ሥርዓት ውስጥ አሁን አንዳቸውም ሊገዙት የማይችሉት ብቸኛ ነገር ነው፣ ምክንያቱም ትወናው ለእያንዳንዳቸው ከሰላም የበለጠ ዋጋ ኖሮታል።

በዚያ የካይሮ ስቱዲዮ ውስጥ ከተነገሩት ቃላት ሁሉ የበለጠ ሐቀኛው “ህልውና” ወይም “ጦር” አልነበረም። “መቆም” (deadlock) ነበር — ሚኒስትሩ መጀመሪያ ለኢራን፣ ከዚያም ዳር ዳር እያለ ለ13 ዓመታት የጥቁር ዓባይ ድርድር የተጠቀመበት ቃል። በወንዙ ላይ ቢቀርጸው ኖሮ ተመሳሳይ ነበር።

ማጣቀሻዎችና ተጨማሪ ንባብ

  1. Alexei Yurchak, Everything Was Forever, Until It Was No More: The Last Soviet Generation (Princeton University Press, 2005).
  2. Adam Curtis, HyperNormalisation (BBC, 2016).
  3. Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver & Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Lynne Rienner, 1998) — securitisation theory.
  4. Mark Zeitoun & Jeroen Warner, ‘Hydro-hegemony: a framework for analysis of trans-boundary water conflicts’, Water Policy 8 (2006); Mark Zeitoun, Power and Water in the Middle East (I.B. Tauris, 2008).
  5. UN Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses (1997); the 1929 and 1959 Nile Waters Agreements.
  6. Robert M. Entman, ‘Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm’, Journal of Communication 43:4 (1993).
  7. Jean Baudrillard, The Gulf War Did Not Take Place (1995) & Simulacra and Simulation (1981); Guy Debord, The Society of the Spectacle (1967).
  8. Edward S. Herman & Noam Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent (Pantheon, 1988); Christopher Clapham, The Horn of Africa: State Formation and Decay (Hurst, 2017); J. A. Allan, Virtual Water (I.B. Tauris, 2011).

የአዘጋጅ ማስታወሻ፦ እዚህ የተተነተነው የጥያቄ ቅደም ተከተል ከቃለ መጠይቁ ሙሉ የተለቀቀ ቅጂ ጋር ተመሳክሮ ተረጋግጧል። ጣቢያው ራሱ ያወጣው የጽሑፍ ማጠቃለያ ስለ ግብፅ ጦር ኃይልና ስለ ግብፅ “መራብ” የተነሱትን ንግግሮች አስቀርቶ ነበር፤ እነዚያ ክፍሎች በቅጂው ራሱና በተቀናቃኝ ጣቢያ ምላሽ ውስጥ ተጠብቀዋል። (ይህ ጽሑፍ ከእንግሊዝኛው “Everything Was Forever, Until the Dam” የተተረጎመ ነው።)

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]]> https://ethiopiantribune.com/2026/09/5078/feed/ 0 5078 Everything Was Forever, Until the Dam https://ethiopiantribune.com/2026/09/everything-was-forever-until-the-dam/ https://ethiopiantribune.com/2026/09/everything-was-forever-until-the-dam/#respond Thu, 03 Sep 2026 08:14:39 +0000 https://ethiopiantribune.com/?p=5073
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The Ethiopian Tribune · Long Read

Everything Was Forever, Until the Dam

The Nile dispute has slipped into a hypernormal state — a managed unreality that Cairo and Addis Ababa both know to be theatre, and both keep performing because neither can imagine the alternative. A television interview, and the way its own broadcaster edited it, shows us how the machinery works.

By E. Frashie  |  The Ethiopian Tribune

In late August, an American journalist sat across from Egypt’s foreign minister in Cairo and asked him why a country with the largest army in the Arab world would leave that army unused against Ethiopia. The exchange detonated in Addis Ababa. State media called it a reckless gamble with regional peace; commentators accused the interviewer of trying to talk a war into being. For a week the words themselves were oddly slippery. The broadcaster that aired the interview published a written account — authored by the interviewer — that omits the military question altogether; the only verbatim record in circulation belonged to an interested state broadcaster on the other side of the dispute. Then the full recording settled it. The provocation was real, put in almost exactly those words. What the broadcaster’s own text had done was quietly launder it out of the archive.

This is not a footnote to the crisis. It is the crisis in miniature. The Egypt–Ethiopia confrontation over the waters of the Nile has arrived at a condition in which the performance of the dispute has almost entirely detached from its substance — where warnings are issued to be heard rather than acted upon, where a decade of negotiations continues precisely because everyone understands it will resolve nothing, and where the most consequential document in a given week may be a television question that the channel airing it then tried to erase. There is a name for this condition, and it did not begin on the Nile.

The word for a managed unreality

The anthropologist Alexei Yurchak coined hypernormalisation to describe the last decades of the Soviet Union.1 By the 1980s, he argued, everyone — citizens and commissars alike — understood that the system was hollow. But because no alternative could be imagined, everyone continued to perform the rituals of belief as though they were real, and the performance itself became the reality. The fakeness was not hidden; it was shared, normalised, and, in its very normality, made to feel eternal. Then, without warning, it collapsed.

The filmmaker Adam Curtis borrowed the term for his 2016 essay-film, extending it from the Soviet bloc to the whole post-1970s order.2 His thesis: faced with a world of unmanageable complexity, those in power — financiers, technologists, politicians — retreated into a simpler, more stable fake version and worked to keep it standing. Real problems were not solved; they were converted into legible stories, villains, and managed perceptions. Curtis’s Middle East is the laboratory for this: a region where genuine grievances are repeatedly flattened into simplified narratives that serve the narrator, while the underlying complexity festers untouched until it erupts.

Read the Nile through this lens and the picture reorganises itself. The question stops being “will Egypt attack?” and becomes something more uncomfortable: why does everyone keep performing a crisis whose script they have all memorised?

The warnings are issued to be heard, not acted upon. The negotiations continue precisely because everyone understands they will resolve nothing.

Neither peace nor war

Early in the same interview, discussing Iran, the minister described a condition of neither peace nor war — a stalemate, a state of exhaustion in which nothing advances and nothing breaks. Minutes later, turning to the Nile, he reached for the very same word to characterise thirteen years of negotiation: deadlock. That is the dispute in a syllable. The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam was inaugurated in September 2025 after more than a decade of tripartite talks that never produced the binding agreement Cairo demanded. In March 2026, Addis Ababa announced a cascade of three further dams on the Blue Nile. Egypt responded not with mobilisation but with the familiar liturgy: an appeal to the UN Security Council, warnings of an existential threat, offers of external mediation, and the careful invocation of a legal right to self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter. Each move is a line in a script performed many times before.

The ritual has its own stable grammar. Cairo securitises; Addis Ababa asserts sovereignty; Washington offers to mediate; a mediation collapses; letters are exchanged at Turtle Bay; the dam fills anyway. The theologian of this liturgy is repetition. What the ritual conspicuously does not produce — a coordinated filling schedule, a drought-management protocol, a data-sharing regime, a joint operating framework — is precisely the set of technical instruments that water engineers on all sides broadly agree would defuse the danger. The solvable problem is left unsolved so that the unsolvable performance may continue.

Cairo’s simplification: the existential frame

When Egypt’s minister called water an existential issue — one standing, he said, even above national security — he was doing something a political scientist would recognise instantly. The Copenhagen School calls it securitisation: the act of lifting an issue out of ordinary, negotiable politics by declaring it a matter of survival, thereby licensing extraordinary measures and foreclosing compromise.3 Once water is existential, every cubic metre becomes non-negotiable, every upstream turbine an act of aggression, and every diplomat who proposes a technical trade-off a potential traitor. Securitisation is the linguistic engine of the hypernormal: it converts a complex, shared, manageable river into a simple, total, permanent emergency.

Balance demands that we take Egypt’s underlying vulnerability seriously, because it is not invented. By the minister’s own account, Egypt draws some 98 per cent of its freshwater from the Nile, receives a sliver of the basin’s total rainfall, and watches its population grow by roughly two and a half million people a year while ten million refugees draw on the same supply. The fear is real. What is managed is the framing of that fear. Scholars of hydro-hegemony note that Egypt has for a century sat atop the basin’s power hierarchy, its position codified by colonial-era arrangements — the 1929 and 1959 agreements — that allocated the lion’s share of the river to Cairo and excluded upstream states entirely.4 The GERD does not merely raise a hydrological question; it dismantles a hegemony. Some portion of the existential language is not fear of thirst but grief for a lost order — and grief, unlike thirst, cannot be settled by a filling schedule.

Addis Ababa’s simplification: the development frame

Ethiopia performs a mirror ritual, and it deserves the same scrutiny. Its script is legally the stronger of the two: the GERD is a hydropower project that stores and releases water to spin turbines rather than consuming it through irrigation; Ethiopia was never a signatory to the 1959 allocation and cannot be bound by it; and the governing principles of modern international water law — equitable and reasonable utilisation, and the obligation not to cause significant harm — sit closer to Addis Ababa’s position than to Cairo’s.5 The claim that development is a right, not an act of hostility, is sound — and, tellingly, the Egyptian minister himself conceded it, acknowledging without hesitation Ethiopia’s fair right to development even as he pressed Egypt’s right to exist.

But a narrative can be true and still be a managed simplification. The dam was financed domestically, through bonds and payroll deductions, and marketed at home as the great unifying project of the Ethiopian nation — a monument raised precisely while the state was fracturing along the fault lines of Tigray and Amhara. Sovereignty over the Abbay is not only a legal principle; it is a legitimacy instrument, a story the government tells its own citizens about a nation that builds rather than begs. And a government that derives such returns from the symbol of the dam has its own reasons to prefer managed ambiguity over a binding treaty — because any enforceable operating framework would constrain the very cascade it has just announced. Both capitals, in the end, extract more from the performance of the dispute than they would from its resolution. That is the tell of a hypernormal system: the incentives of the powerful align around continuing the crisis, not ending it.

The interviewer offered a war. The minister, repeatedly, declined it. The escalation lived in the questions, not the answers.

The interview as artefact

Return now to that Cairo studio, because the interview is where the machinery becomes visible — and the full recording lets us check the choreography against the record. It holds. The questioning climbs a deliberate ladder: from the dam as Egypt’s lifeline, to the flat assertion that it threatens national security, to the suggestion that diplomacy has run its course, to the sharpest rung of all — “What’s the point of having the biggest Arab military and not using it?” — to the claim that Ethiopia is starving Egypt, and finally the demand for a solution now that diplomacy is spent. Framing theory teaches that questions are never neutral: the premise smuggled inside a question narrows the range of sayable answers and quietly builds the world in which the answer must live.6 To ask why an army goes unused is to have already decided that its use is on the table.

And here the transcript delivers its real surprise — the part that neither the sanitised write-up nor the furious rebuttal dwelt upon: the minister would not climb the ladder. Pressed on why the army stood idle, he corrected the premise, insisting the military exists to defend Egypt’s borders, not to be spent on the Nile. He retreated at once to Article 51 and the language of international law, conceded Ethiopia’s right to develop, and returned, again and again, to diplomacy — even offering the historian’s lesson that military solutions lead only to suffering and ruin. The escalation, in other words, lived in the questions and not the answers. The interviewer offered a war; the interviewee kept setting it back down.

The words were spoken; that is now settled. But notice what the settled fact reveals. The most incendiary moment in the Nile crisis this year was not a shot fired or a sluice-gate closed. It was a question — and the reply to it was a refusal. Jean Baudrillard argued that a televised war could become hyperreal: an event experienced through its mediation, consumed as spectacle by publics who never touch the thing itself.7 The Nile has reached that condition. A minister spends an interview declining to threaten war, and the mediated event that circulates — clipped, framed, sanitised by one hand and weaponised by the other — is nonetheless a war scare. The spectacle detaches from its principal and acquires a life of its own. And the broadcaster’s decision to launder the exchange out of its own written record is no small journalistic lapse; it is the perception-management reflex in its purest form — editing the archive to fit the story the archive is meant to preserve.

Nor is the stage itself neutral. The programme runs on a Gulf-owned platform, and the Gulf states are not bystanders in the Horn of Africa — they hold ports, basing rights, and rivalries that run straight through the Red Sea corridor Ethiopia is trying to reach. A third set of interests, in other words, helps to build the frame through which the first two are seen. Perception management, as the manufacturing-consent tradition has long observed, rarely announces itself; it arrives as the ordinary shape of a news story.8

The danger in the fiction

It would be a comfortable conclusion that, because the principals keep declining to escalate, the crisis is therefore safe. Curtis’s warning — and Yurchak’s history — runs the other way. The hypernormal is not stable because it is true; it is stable until, abruptly, it is not. The Soviet system felt eternal on the eve of its disappearance. A managed non-war can rupture without anyone deciding to end it: through a proxy flare-up in Somalia or eastern Sudan, through the encirclement diplomacy by which Cairo has acquired footholds around Ethiopia’s periphery, through a drought that coincides with a filling season, or through a miscalculation by leaders who have spent so long performing resolve that they can no longer climb down without cost. The peril is sharpened, not softened, by the gap between spectacle and principal: publics and third parties respond to the war scare that circulates, not to the restraint the minister actually voiced. The war talk is theatre — right up until the moment the theatre catches fire. The physical infrastructure of the fiction — the naval access, the troop deployments, the axis-building — is real, and real infrastructure has a way of outliving the narratives that justified it.

The exit no one will take

The cruel irony sits in plain view. Beneath the existential language and the sovereign defiance lies a problem that is, by the standards of international disputes, remarkably tractable. The quantity of water Ethiopia consumes to generate electricity is negligible; the genuine risks concern the timing of reservoir filling during dry years and the coordination of releases — questions of scheduling, notification, and data, not of survival. A basin-wide framework built on equitable utilisation, drought protocols, and shared telemetry would not require either government to surrender its dignity. It would require only that both stop needing the crisis. And that, in a hypernormal system, is the one thing neither can presently afford, because the performance has become more valuable to each than the peace.

The most honest word spoken in that Cairo studio was not “existential” and not “army.” It was “deadlock” — a term the minister used first for Iran and then, almost in passing, for thirteen years of talks on the Blue Nile. He might as well have carved it above the river.

References & Further Reading

  1. Alexei Yurchak, Everything Was Forever, Until It Was No More: The Last Soviet Generation (Princeton University Press, 2005).
  2. Adam Curtis, HyperNormalisation (BBC, 2016).
  3. Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver & Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Lynne Rienner, 1998) — on securitisation theory.
  4. Mark Zeitoun & Jeroen Warner, ‘Hydro-hegemony: a framework for analysis of trans-boundary water conflicts’, Water Policy 8 (2006); see also Mark Zeitoun, Power and Water in the Middle East (I.B. Tauris, 2008).
  5. UN Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses (1997) — on equitable and reasonable utilisation and the no-significant-harm rule; and the historical 1929 and 1959 Nile Waters Agreements.
  6. Robert M. Entman, ‘Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm’, Journal of Communication 43:4 (1993).
  7. Jean Baudrillard, The Gulf War Did Not Take Place (Indiana University Press, 1995) and Simulacra and Simulation (1981); cf. Guy Debord, The Society of the Spectacle (1967).
  8. Edward S. Herman & Noam Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media (Pantheon, 1988); on the Horn’s international relations, Christopher Clapham, The Horn of Africa: State Formation and Decay (Hurst, 2017); on virtual water, J. A. Allan, Virtual Water (I.B. Tauris, 2011).

Editorial note: the questioning analysed here has been verified against the full published recording of the interview. The broadcaster’s own written summary of the interview omitted the exchanges concerning Egypt’s military and the ‘starving’ of Egypt; those passages survive in the recording itself and in a rival broadcaster’s rebuttal.

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Ethiopian Tribune editor

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]]> https://ethiopiantribune.com/2026/09/everything-was-forever-until-the-dam/feed/ 0 5073 The Art of Diplomatic “Cooking”: Egypt’s Strategic Containment of Ethiopia https://ethiopiantribune.com/2025/11/the-art-of-diplomatic-cooking-egypts-strategic-containment-of-ethiopia/ https://ethiopiantribune.com/2025/11/the-art-of-diplomatic-cooking-egypts-strategic-containment-of-ethiopia/#respond Tue, 04 Nov 2025 17:04:29 +0000 https://ethiopiantribune.com/2025/11/the-art-of-diplomatic-cooking-egypts-strategic-containment-of-ethiopia/
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By Sewasew Teklemariam

In the intricate theatre of Horn of Africa diplomacy, where ancient civilisations clash with modern statecraft and where water, land, and maritime access converge into existential questions, a particularly sophisticated strategy has emerged that demands careful examination. Egypt’s contemporary approach towards Ethiopia represents what might best be described as diplomatic “cooking” a patient, multi-layered process of combining regional anxieties, historical grievances, and strategic alliances into a coherent campaign designed to contain Ethiopian ambitions on two critical fronts: the Nile River and access to the Red Sea. This is not hasty improvisation but rather a carefully calibrated recipe, where ingredients are selected for maximum effect, temperatures are precisely controlled, and the intended outcome, Ethiopian strategic isolation, is pursued with methodical determination.

The metaphor of cooking proves remarkably apt when examining Cairo’s approach because, like any complex culinary endeavour, this strategy requires patience, precise timing, an understanding of how different elements interact, and the skill to adjust temperatures and ingredients as circumstances evolve. For those of us observing from Addis Ababa, the smell emanating from Egypt’s diplomatic kitchen has become impossible to ignore, particularly as the heat has been dramatically increased in recent weeks with the convening of an extraordinary tripartite summit in Cairo and the stunning announcement from Washington regarding Somaliland’s status. The implications of this particular meal extend far beyond the immediate bilateral relationship into questions that will shape the Horn of Africa for generations to come.

The foundation of Egypt’s strategy rests upon two fundamental components that serve as the base ingredients for everything that follows. The first, and certainly the most historically entrenched, concerns the Nile River and specifically the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, a project that represents vastly different things depending on one’s vantage point. For Ethiopia, the GERD embodies developmental aspirations, energy independence, and the exercise of sovereign rights over resources within our own territory. The dam, with its 6,450 megawatt generating capacity, promises to transform Ethiopian lives, providing electricity to the roughly 60 per cent of our population currently without reliable power access, spurring industrial development, and generating revenue through power exports to neighbouring countries. From this perspective, the GERD is not merely infrastructure but a tangible manifestation of Ethiopia’s determination to emerge from poverty through its own resources and efforts.

From Cairo’s perspective, however, the narrative could not be more different. Egypt depends upon the Nile for approximately 97 per cent of its freshwater needs, supporting a population that has now surpassed 105 million people in a country where arable land comprises barely 4 per cent of total territory. The Nile is not simply important to Egypt; it is, in the most literal sense, the difference between habitability and desert. Egyptian officials, with considerable historical precedent, have long maintained that any significant diminution of Nile flows would constitute an existential threat justifying extraordinary responses. When Ethiopian engineers began diverting the Blue Nile in May 2013 to commence GERD construction, it represented, from Cairo’s view, a fundamental shift in regional power dynamics upstream control over a resource Egypt had dominated for millennia.

The second core ingredient in Egypt’s diplomatic recipe emerged more recently but has proven equally potent: Ethiopia’s determined push to secure sovereign access to the Red Sea. Ethiopia’s landlocked status, a consequence of Eritrean independence in 1993, represents a profound economic vulnerability for a nation of approximately 120 million people. Our economy depends entirely upon Djibouti’s port infrastructure for 95 per cent of our international trade, creating both a logistical bottleneck and a strategic dependency that successive Ethiopian governments have found increasingly intolerable. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has been particularly vocal about this issue, declaring in October 2023 that Ethiopia’s maritime access is not merely desirable but essential, and suggesting that Ethiopia would pursue this objective “by any means necessary” rhetoric that, whilst perhaps intended for domestic consumption, sent alarm bells ringing throughout regional capitals.

The situation reached a critical juncture on 1 January 2024, when Ethiopia signed a memorandum of understanding with Somaliland, the self-declared independent region that broke away from Somalia in 1991 but lacks international recognition. The agreement, whose precise terms remain somewhat opaque, reportedly grants Ethiopia access to a 20-kilometre stretch of Red Sea coastline for the establishment of a naval base and commercial port facilities, in exchange for Ethiopian recognition of Somaliland’s sovereignty a recognition that would make Ethiopia the first nation to formally acknowledge Somaliland’s independence claim. The reaction from Mogadishu was swift and furious, with Somalia’s federal government declaring the agreement a violation of its territorial integrity and sovereignty, recalling its ambassador from Addis Ababa, and appealing to the international community for support in defending its territorial claims.

For Egypt, this Somaliland controversy represented something approaching a diplomatic gift, a catalytic ingredient that could transform the entire regional dynamic. Suddenly, Cairo possessed not merely a bilateral water dispute with Ethiopia, a matter where international sympathy has proven difficult to mobilise, but rather a compelling regional narrative: Ethiopia as a revisionist power threatening the territorial integrity of a fellow African Union member state, undermining the sacrosanct principle of colonial borders, and destabilising an already fragile region. This narrative proved far more potent in regional and international forums than arguments about historical water rights and treaties signed during the colonial era to which Ethiopia was never party.

Egypt’s response demonstrated both the sophistication of its diplomatic apparatus and the extent of its preparation for precisely such an opportunity. Within weeks of the Somaliland announcement, Cairo had deployed a comprehensive counter-strategy. In August 2024, Egypt and Somalia signed a comprehensive defence cooperation agreement, with Egyptian officials pledging military equipment, training, and support. Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi hosted Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud for high-level consultations, with joint statements emphasising shared commitment to Somali sovereignty and territorial integrity. Egyptian military advisers began appearing in Mogadishu, Egyptian weapons shipments increased, and Cairo announced plans to contribute significant troop numbers to the African Union peacekeeping mission in Somalia, a mission from which Ethiopia, notably, would be excluded under the new arrangements.

The Egypt-Somalia axis, however, represents only one element of Cairo’s coalition-building efforts. Simultaneously, Egypt has deepened its strategic relationship with Eritrea, tapping into one of the region’s most enduring rivalries. The Ethiopia-Eritrea relationship remains profoundly complex, oscillating between the euphoria of the 2018 peace agreement, which earned Prime Minister Abiy the Nobel Peace Prize, and the subsequent cooling of relations as border demarcation stalled and mutual suspicions resurfaced. Eritrea, which fought a brutal independence war against Ethiopia from 1961 to 1991, followed by a devastating border war from 1998 to 2000 that killed an estimated 70,000 to 100,000 people, maintains a permanent defensive posture towards its larger neighbour. For Egypt, Eritrea represents a natural partner in any endeavour to check Ethiopian power, and Cairo has accordingly increased military cooperation, economic assistance, and diplomatic coordination with Asmara.

Egyptian Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry’s multiple visits to Asmara, coupled with Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki’s rare trips abroad to Cairo, signal the depth of this coordination. Egypt has reportedly established a military presence at Eritrean ports, gaining forward positioning along the Red Sea coastline and the ability to monitor maritime traffic through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. From Ethiopia’s perspective, this represents a troubling development, the transformation of our northern neighbour from a peace partner into a potential security threat, backed by a major regional power with both the resources and motivation to complicate Ethiopian strategic calculations.

The simmering tensions reached a dramatic crescendo last week when Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed addressed the Ethiopian Parliament in what can only be described as a defiant and uncompromising speech that laid bare the depths of regional antagonism. Speaking to a packed chamber, the Prime Minister made clear that Ethiopia would not be cowed by external pressure, would not abandon its sovereign rights to develop the GERD, and would not retreat from its determination to secure Red Sea access. His language was notably forceful, warning that those who seek to encircle Ethiopia or threaten its vital interests would find themselves facing a nation that has never been colonised and has repeatedly demonstrated its willingness to defend its sovereignty at tremendous cost. He specifically addressed the military build-up along Ethiopia’s borders, the weapons shipments to neighbouring countries, and what he characterised as a coordinated campaign to isolate and pressure Ethiopia into submission.

The Prime Minister’s parliamentary address, whilst undoubtedly intended to rally domestic support and project resolve in the face of mounting external pressure, appears to have served as the immediate catalyst for an extraordinary gathering in Cairo this week. The tripartite summit, bringing together President el-Sisi of Egypt, President Isaias Afwerki of Eritrea, and President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud of Somalia, represents the most visible manifestation yet of the anti-Ethiopia coalition that Cairo has been methodically constructing. The optics alone were striking: three heads of state, representing nations that surround Ethiopia geographically, meeting in the Egyptian capital to coordinate strategy and present a united front. The official communiqué from the summit, whilst couched in diplomatic language about regional stability and mutual cooperation, left little doubt about the gathering’s purpose, to coordinate responses to what the three leaders characterised as Ethiopian actions that threaten regional peace and established norms.

The summit’s timing, coming mere days after Prime Minister Abiy’s parliamentary speech, suggests a carefully orchestrated response designed to demonstrate that Ethiopia’s defiance would be met with enhanced coordination amongst its neighbours. Egyptian media coverage of the summit was extensive and triumphal, portraying President el-Sisi as the architect of a new regional order capable of constraining Ethiopian ambitions. Eritrean and Somali officials echoed these themes, with joint statements emphasising shared security concerns and mutual commitments to defend against what they portrayed as Ethiopian expansionism. The summit concluded with agreements on enhanced military cooperation, coordination of diplomatic positions in international forums, and what was described as “joint responses to threats against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of member states” language that, whilst not naming Ethiopia explicitly, left little room for ambiguity about the intended target.

Yet even as this tripartite coalition solidified in Cairo, an even more dramatic development was unfolding in Washington that threatens to fundamentally alter the strategic landscape. The United States government, in a stunning policy shift that caught most regional observers by surprise, announced its intention to recognise Somaliland as a sovereign state. The announcement, delivered through a combination of State Department statements and presidential remarks, represents the most significant change in American Horn of Africa policy in decades and carries implications that extend far beyond the immediate Somalia-Somaliland dispute.

The American decision appears to rest upon several converging considerations. Firstly, Somaliland’s remarkable record of democratic governance and stability in a region characterised by state fragility and authoritarian rule has long attracted admiration from Western observers. The territory has conducted multiple peaceful electoral transitions, maintained relative security in a dangerous neighbourhood, and cooperated effectively with Western counter-terrorism efforts, achievements that stand in stark contrast to the persistent instability in Somalia proper. Secondly, strategic considerations related to Red Sea security and competition with Chinese influence in the region appear to have weighed heavily in Washington’s calculations. Somaliland’s location at the southern entrance to the Red Sea, its willingness to grant basing rights to Western powers, and its resistance to Chinese port development projects that have proliferated elsewhere along the African coast all enhance its attractiveness as a strategic partner.

Thirdly, and perhaps most significantly from Ethiopia’s perspective, the American decision appears to reflect recognition that Ethiopia’s maritime access represents a legitimate interest that the international community must accommodate rather than indefinitely suppress. The memorandum of understanding between Ethiopia and Somaliland, whilst controversial, offers a potential pathway to addressing Ethiopian needs through negotiated agreement with a willing partner rather than through conflict or the permanent acceptance of complete landlocked dependence. American officials, in background briefings explaining the recognition decision, have notably emphasised that Somaliland’s three decades of de facto independence, combined with its record of governance and strategic importance, justify a reconsideration of the international community’s blanket refusal to engage with territorial realities that diverge from inherited colonial boundaries.

The American announcement has sent shockwaves through regional capitals, nowhere more profoundly than in Cairo. Egypt’s entire strategy towards Ethiopia has rested upon the assumption that the international community, and particularly Western powers, would maintain the established position that Somaliland’s status cannot change and that Ethiopian engagement with Somaliland authorities constitutes an unacceptable challenge to Somali sovereignty. The American recognition decision fundamentally undermines this assumption, potentially opening the door to a cascade of similar recognitions from other Western and African states. If Somaliland achieves widespread international recognition as a sovereign state, then Ethiopia’s memorandum of understanding transforms from a controversial challenge to territorial integrity into a perfectly normal bilateral agreement between two recognised states, a development that would deprive Egypt of one of its most potent tools for isolating Ethiopia in international forums.

The Egyptian response to the American announcement has been swift and sharply critical. Cairo issued strongly worded statements expressing “deep concern” about the implications for regional stability and African Unity principles, lobbied intensively within the Arab League and African Union for collective rejection of the American position, and reportedly engaged in urgent diplomatic consultations with European powers to discourage them from following the American lead. Egyptian officials have framed the American decision as a dangerous precedent that undermines the post-colonial African consensus on the inviolability of inherited borders, potentially encouraging secessionist movements across the continent and creating instabilities that could take generations to resolve.

Yet Egypt’s vigorous opposition to Somaliland recognition sits uneasily alongside Cairo’s own extensive historical record of pursuing policies based upon strategic interest rather than principled consistency. Egypt’s recognition of Eritrean independence in 1993, for instance, represented Egyptian support for a territorial change that created a new state through secession, precisely the precedent Cairo now claims would be so dangerous if extended to Somaliland. The difference, of course, is that Eritrean independence served Egyptian interests by creating a new, potentially friendly state along Ethiopia’s northern border and providing Egypt with opportunities to project influence into the Red Sea region. Somaliland recognition, conversely, threatens Egyptian interests by potentially legitimising Ethiopia’s maritime access strategy and depriving Cairo of a key instrument for Ethiopian containment.

The Mogadishu government’s response to the American announcement has been even more visceral, with Somali officials describing the decision as a betrayal, a violation of international law, and an unacceptable interference in Somalia’s internal affairs. President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, speaking at the Cairo summit, declared that Somalia would never accept the partition of its territory and called upon all nations to reject the American position. Somali officials have threatened to reconsider their security cooperation with the United States, to explore closer relationships with powers less committed to supporting what they characterise as secessionist movements, and to take the matter to the United Nations Security Council and International Court of Justice.

The irony, of course, is that Somalia’s federal government has exercised no meaningful authority over Somaliland territory for more than three decades, that repeated attempts at reunification negotiations have foundered on Somaliland’s absolute insistence upon maintaining its separate status, and that the Mogadishu government’s claims to sovereignty over Somaliland rest primarily upon inherited colonial boundaries rather than any contemporary reality of governance or popular legitimacy. Somaliland conducted a referendum on independence in 2001, with over 97 per cent of voters supporting separation, a level of popular support that few secessionist movements anywhere can claim. The territory has its own currency, security forces, government institutions, and democratic processes, all of which function with considerably more effectiveness than their counterparts in Somalia proper.

For Eritrea, the American decision presents a more complex set of calculations. On one hand, Asmara’s alignment with Egypt and Somalia in opposing Ethiopian regional influence would logically require Eritrean opposition to any development that serves Ethiopian interests, including Somaliland recognition. On the other hand, Eritrea’s own independence resulted from precisely the process that Somalia now claims must never be repeated, a region with distinct historical identity and popular support for separation ultimately achieving recognition despite the opposition of the state from which it seceded. Eritrean officials have thus far maintained public silence on the American announcement, a reticence that likely reflects the uncomfortable parallels between Eritrea’s own trajectory and Somaliland’s aspirations.

The sophistication of Egypt’s strategy lies not merely in bilateral relationship building but in the creation of a broader diplomatic ecosystem that is inherently hostile to Ethiopian interests. Cairo has skilfully leveraged multilateral forums to amplify its message and isolate Ethiopia. The Arab League, at Egypt’s instigation, issued strongly worded statements condemning Ethiopia’s Somaliland agreement and affirming support for Somali territorial integrity. The Organisation of Islamic Cooperation followed suit, with Egypt ensuring that Ethiopia’s actions were framed not as a bilateral dispute but as a challenge to regional stability requiring collective response. Even within the African Union, where Ethiopia hosts the organisation’s headquarters and has historically wielded considerable influence, Egypt has worked to shift opinion, emphasising principles of territorial integrity and the inviolability of borders, principles that serve Egyptian interests whilst constraining Ethiopian options.

The Cairo summit this week represented the culmination of these efforts, providing a highly visible platform for the anti-Ethiopia coalition to demonstrate unity and coordination. The summit’s agenda reportedly included detailed discussions of military cooperation, intelligence sharing, coordination of positions in international forums, and what Egyptian officials described as “joint contingency planning” for potential Ethiopian actions in the Red Sea region. Somali officials briefed regional media on Egyptian commitments to substantially increase military aid, including naval assets that would enhance Somalia’s ability to patrol its claimed territorial waters and challenge any Ethiopian military presence along the Somaliland coast. Eritrean representatives, whilst characteristically less forthcoming in public statements, reportedly committed to enhanced coordination with Egyptian forces operating from Eritrean ports and to maintaining defensive readiness along the Ethiopian border.

Yet this narrative of Egyptian strategic brilliance and Ethiopian isolation requires careful scrutiny and balance. Whilst Egypt’s diplomatic campaign is undeniably sophisticated, it also rests upon foundations that are more fragile than Cairo’s confident rhetoric might suggest. The coalition Egypt has assembled is not built upon shared values, complementary interests, or genuine strategic alignment, but rather represents a temporary convergence of grievances held together primarily through Egyptian financial inducements and the gravitational pull of Cairo’s regional influence. Somalia’s federal government, despite Egyptian support, exercises limited control beyond Mogadishu, with regional states, clan dynamics, and the persistent threat of Al-Shabaab insurgency creating an extraordinarily complex internal landscape that no amount of Egyptian military aid can resolve.

Indeed, the American recognition of Somaliland, whatever its other implications, reflects a hard-headed assessment that the fiction of Somali territorial unity has become increasingly untenable and that Western interests may be better served by engaging with the stable, cooperative territory that actually exists rather than the unified Somalia that exists primarily in diplomatic theory. Eritrea, meanwhile, remains one of the world’s most repressive states, with no elections since independence, indefinite military conscription, and a human rights record that has prompted massive refugee outflows. Egypt’s embrace of such a regime, whilst strategically logical, undermines Cairo’s attempts to position itself as a defender of international norms and regional stability.

Moreover, Egypt’s strategy contains an inherent contradiction that Ethiopian officials have been quick to highlight, particularly in Prime Minister Abiy’s parliamentary address last week. Cairo positions itself as the defender of international law and territorial integrity in the Somalia-Ethiopia dispute, yet Egypt itself has consistently rejected international arbitration mechanisms for the Nile dispute, walked away from negotiation frameworks when they proved inconvenient, and maintained positions on water rights that most international legal experts consider inconsistent with contemporary international water law. The 1959 Nile Waters Agreement between Egypt and Sudan, which Egypt continues to reference, allocated the entire Nile flow between two downstream countries whilst completely ignoring the interests of upstream riparian states, including Ethiopia, where 85 per cent of Nile waters originate.

Ethiopia’s consistent position has been that colonial-era agreements signed without our participation cannot bind us, a position that international law generally supports through principles of state succession and the invalidity of treaties imposed upon non-signatories. The GERD itself, contrary to Egyptian claims, operates under principles of equitable and reasonable utilisation enshrined in the 1997 UN Watercourses Convention, a convention that Egypt notably voted against. Ethiopian officials have repeatedly emphasised that the dam is designed for hydroelectric generation, not irrigation, meaning that water flows through rather than being consumed, and that Ethiopia has committed to operational protocols that protect downstream interests. Studies by international water management experts, including panels convened during the negotiations, have generally concluded that whilst the GERD will have impacts during filling periods, proper coordination can minimise downstream effects, and in the long term, the dam’s regulation of seasonal flows may actually benefit downstream countries by reducing flooding and providing more consistent water availability.

The maritime access question similarly admits of more nuance than Egypt’s absolutist position acknowledges. Ethiopia’s landlocked status represents a genuine developmental constraint. Economists have long documented the “landlocked penalty” the measurable economic disadvantages faced by countries without coastal access, including higher transport costs, reduced trade competitiveness, and vulnerability to the political stability and policy decisions of transit countries. Ethiopia’s dependence upon Djibouti, whilst generally functional, creates risks that any responsible government must seek to mitigate. The Somaliland memorandum, whatever its legal and diplomatic complications, represents an attempt to address a real problem through negotiated agreement rather than military force an approach that should, in principle, be encouraged rather than automatically condemned.

The question of Somaliland’s status itself defies simple categorisation, as the American recognition decision implicitly acknowledges. The territory has maintained de facto independence for over three decades, with functioning government institutions, its own currency, security forces, and democratic elections that international observers have generally characterised as more free and fair than those in many recognised states in the region. The international community’s refusal to recognise Somaliland has rested primarily upon the African Union’s principle of respecting colonial borders, yet this same principle has not prevented the recognition of other territorial changes, including, notably, Eritrea’s independence from Ethiopia and South Sudan’s separation from Sudan. The absolute position that Somaliland’s status cannot evolve, that Ethiopian engagement with Somaliland authorities automatically constitutes aggression against Somalia, represents a diplomatic rigidity that the American government has now explicitly rejected and that may not ultimately serve regional stability.

Egypt’s strategy also carries significant risks for regional security that extend well beyond the immediate bilateral relationship. By militarising disputes that should be resolved through negotiation, by providing weapons and military support to fragile states in an already volatile region, and by deliberately inflaming historical tensions, Cairo is not contributing to Red Sea security but potentially undermining it. The Horn of Africa represents one of the world’s most complex and dangerous regions, where state fragility, ethnic tensions, competition for scarce resources, historical grievances, and proxy conflicts have repeatedly combined to produce humanitarian catastrophes. The Ethiopian civil war in Tigray, which only formally ended in November 2022 after claiming hundreds of thousands of lives, demonstrated how quickly violence can spiral in this region and how limited the international community’s capacity to contain such conflicts proves to be.

Egyptian military support to Somalia, whilst framed as defensive capacity building, introduces new weapons into an environment where arms have an alarming tendency to migrate into unintended hands. Al-Shabaab, despite years of military pressure, retains the capacity to launch significant attacks and control territory. The group’s ability to capture weapons from Somali security forces is well documented. Egyptian arms shipments, ostensibly intended to strengthen the Somali federal government, may ultimately contribute to the armament of groups that threaten regional stability in ways that serve nobody’s interests, including Egypt’s. Similarly, the Egypt-Eritrea axis, whilst tactically advantageous for Cairo, provides legitimacy and support to one of the world’s most repressive regimes. Eritrea’s involvement in the Tigray conflict, where Eritrean forces were credibly accused of widespread atrocities, demonstrated the Isaias government’s willingness to destabilise the region in pursuit of perceived interests.

For Ethiopia, navigating this challenging diplomatic environment requires both strategic clarity and tactical flexibility. Prime Minister Abiy’s parliamentary address last week, whilst projecting necessary resolve for domestic audiences, must be balanced with diplomatic approaches that emphasise Ethiopia’s willingness to engage constructively with neighbours and the international community. The temptation to mirror Egyptian approaches, to build counter-coalitions and pursue escalatory responses, must be resisted in favour of strategies that emphasise the legitimacy of Ethiopian positions whilst demonstrating commitment to regional cooperation.

Ethiopia’s fundamental case is strong: we have the right to develop our water resources for the benefit of our people, we have legitimate economic interests in securing reliable maritime access, and we have consistently pursued these objectives through diplomatic engagement rather than military force. These positions need to be articulated clearly and consistently in every available regional and international forum. The American recognition of Somaliland, whatever complications it introduces, validates Ethiopia’s fundamental contention that our maritime access needs represent legitimate interests that the international community must accommodate rather than indefinitely suppress.

Ethiopian diplomacy must also work to diversify relationships and reduce dependence upon any single partnership or transit route. The Gulf states, particularly the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, have substantial interests in Red Sea stability and Horn of Africa development. Asian powers, notably China, have invested heavily in Ethiopian infrastructure and have their own interests in ensuring that the Belt and Road Initiative’s African components remain viable. Emerging African economies, from Kenya to South Africa, have stakes in demonstrating that African nations can resolve complex disputes through African mechanisms. These relationships, properly cultivated, can provide balance to Egyptian influence whilst avoiding the zero-sum dynamics that characterise current regional tensions.

Crucially, Ethiopia must demonstrate through concrete actions what we assert in rhetoric: that our objectives are defensive and developmental rather than aggressive and revisionist. This means maintaining transparency about GERD operations, sharing hydrological data, adhering to agreed protocols during filling operations, and demonstrating through measurable outcomes that the dam poses no existential threat to downstream water security. It means approaching the Somaliland question with sensitivity to regional concerns about territorial integrity whilst defending our right to pursue maritime access through diplomatic means. It means engaging Somalia directly and constructively on issues of mutual concern, from counter-terrorism cooperation to trade facilitation to the regulation of cross-border pastoralist movements, even as Mogadishu participates in Cairo’s containment coalition.

The broader African context cannot be ignored. How these disputes are ultimately resolved will establish precedents that extend far beyond Ethiopia and Egypt. The continent contains numerous shared river basins where upstream development rights and downstream water security must be balanced. Dozens of landlocked states face economic constraints similar to Ethiopia’s. If Egypt’s containment strategy succeeds, if pressure and isolation can deny Ethiopia’s legitimate developmental rights, the implications will be felt across the continent. Conversely, if Ethiopia can demonstrate that development and cooperation are compatible, that upstream rights and downstream security can be reconciled through good faith negotiation, this too will establish valuable precedents.

The African Union, IGAD, and other continental bodies face a critical test. Allowing one member state to systematically isolate another through coalition-building and pressure tactics, regardless of the merits of underlying disputes, undermines the principles of African solidarity and African solutions to African problems that these organisations exist to advance. The Cairo summit, with its explicit anti-Ethiopia agenda, represents a challenge to these principles that cannot be ignored. The international community more broadly must recognise that whilst Egypt’s diplomatic sophistication is impressive, sophistication should not be confused with legitimacy, and that the pressures being applied serve primarily Egyptian interests rather than regional stability or international legal principles.

Egypt’s “cooking” strategy continues, the diplomatic pot now boiling vigorously with this week’s Cairo summit turning up the heat to maximum levels. The carefully combined ingredients of water anxiety, territorial disputes, and historical rivalries simmer together, producing an acrid smoke that obscures rather than illuminates the path towards regional stability. The intended outcome remains unchanged: an Ethiopia sufficiently isolated and pressured to abandon its developmental aspirations and accept a subordinate regional position. Yet strategies built upon containment rather than cooperation, upon pressure rather than partnership, carry within themselves the seeds of their own failure.

They fail because they fundamentally misread the determination of peoples who have tasted development’s promise and will not willingly return to perpetual poverty. Prime Minister Abiy’s parliamentary address, whatever one thinks of its diplomatic wisdom, captured a sentiment that resonates deeply across Ethiopian society: we will not be contained, we will not abandon our sovereign rights, we will not accept permanent developmental subordination to accommodate Egyptian anxieties rooted in colonial-era entitlements. They fail because they create instabilities that, once unleashed, cannot be controlled by their instigators. The weapons flowing into Somalia, the military build-up along Eritrean borders, the escalating rhetoric from all sides, these dynamics, once set in motion, develop their own momentum that even sophisticated diplomats in Cairo may find impossible to contain.

They fail because the interests they seek to suppress, development, sovereignty, economic viability, are not negotiable preferences but existential necessities. Ethiopia will continue to fill and operate the GERD because we must, because our people deserve the electricity and development opportunities it provides, because abandoning our sovereign rights over resources within our own territory is simply not an option any government could accept whilst retaining legitimacy. We will continue to pursue legitimate maritime access because our economy cannot indefinitely bear the constraints of complete landlocked dependence, because 120 million people require economic integration with global markets, because geographical accidents of history need not permanently determine national trajectories.

The American recognition of Somaliland, whatever its broader implications, represents an acknowledgement of realities that the international community has too long ignored. The question facing the region is not whether Egypt’s cooking strategy will ultimately force Ethiopian capitulation, it will not. The question is rather how much diplomatic capital will be expended, how much regional instability will be generated, how much potential for genuine cooperation will be sacrificed before all parties recognise that Ethiopia’s development cannot be indefinitely contained, only accommodated within frameworks that respect legitimate interests on all sides.

The pot boils, temperatures rise to unprecedented levels as evidenced by this week’s Cairo summit, pressures build in ways that threaten to crack the vessel itself, but the meal Egypt is cooking will ultimately prove indigestible. The only remaining question is how much damage will accumulate before this reality is universally acknowledged and diplomacy returns to the essential task it should never have abandoned: not the containment of legitimate aspirations but their accommodation within frameworks of mutual benefit and regional stability. The ingredients have been combined, the heat applied, but the recipe produces only bitterness. Perhaps it is time to return to the kitchen and consider an entirely different approach, one based not on cooking but on genuine partnership, not on containment but on cooperation, not on zero-sum competition but on the recognition that all nations of the region share interests in stability, development, and mutual prosperity that no amount of diplomatic maneuvering can indefinitely suppress.

Sewasew Teklemariam is a regular columnist for The Ethiopian Tribune, focusing on regional geopolitics and Ethiopian foreign policy.

About Post Author

Ethiopian Tribune editor

editor@ethiopiantribune.com
https://ethiopiantribune.com
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