A Dialogue Between Two Minds

By Ms Leeshan Kuratey, Ethiopian Tribune Columnist

In an Ethiopian coffee house just off Bole Road, the air carries the familiar rich scent of roasted beans, mixed with the faint diesel fumes from the traffic outside. The jebena has been refilled twice already this morning. Two old men sit across from one another, not as adversaries in conflict, at least not today, but as companions in a long intellectual journey.

They are Dr Bira Hodu and Professor Akalu Merew. Though both are septuagenarians, their conversations are lively, sometimes acerbic, always thoughtful. What they share today is not just coffee but a deeper attempt to understand Ethiopia’s evolving strategic position a nation with growing aerial capabilities, deep internal fissures, and an enduring aspiration to regain access to the sea.

I. Two Men and a Question of Power

Dr Bira Hodu, an Oromo activist in his early seventies, has been an ardent voice in diasporic Oromummaa circles. In earlier conferences across Europe and North America, he argued passionately for the dismantling of the Ethiopian state in order to invent an independent Oromia. These days, he is a devoted supporter of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed. His social media accounts are awash with government videos, patriotic manifestos, and paeans to Ethiopia’s rising military capabilities.

Professor Akalu Merew , Amhara by ethnicity but cosmopolitan in outlook, is a retired economist. He served as a consultant to the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the United Nations over several decades. He supports a modern, democratic Ethiopia where all ethnic groups, including Amharas, are treated as full citizens, not villains in a teleological narrative of oppression.

Today, their conversation part dialogue, part intellectual sparring revolves around a set of strategic questions:

What does it mean for Ethiopia to pursue air dominance? How do external powers exploit states that hold such dominance without internal consensus? And crucially, what happens when a landlocked nation aspires to reach the sea?

II. Deterrence, Hegemony, and the Sky Above

Bira stirs his coffee, eyes gleaming with the certainty that has characterised his recent writings.

“Look at us now,” he says with unrestrained pride. “Ethiopia controls its airspace. Drones, satellites, advanced aircraft, we are no longer begging. No longer passive. We are powerful.”

Professor Akalu leans back, hands folded. There is a moment’s pause a pause born not of disagreement but of depth of thought.

“Air dominance,” Akalu begins gently, “is not, in itself, a guarantee of stability. It is a capability. What transforms it into strategy is how it is embedded in politics and consensus.”

Bira’s response is immediate, confident: “Deterrence. Simple as that. No one will dare attack us.”

But Akalu’s point is more nuanced. “Deterrence assumes symmetry,” he replies. “It assumes there is a rival with enough capability to pose a threat. Yet, look around our region. Eritrea, fractured; Somalia, fragile; Sudan, fractured; Kenya, cautious. When one state dominates the skies across a region without peer competitors, others stop asking, ‘Will you strike us?’ and start asking, ‘What will you permit?’”

In other words, air dominance has the potential to become not merely deterrence but hegemony, a structural condition where Ethiopia becomes the default reference point for regional security calculations.

Bira, in characteristic fashion, counters that this is precisely the point: a strong Ethiopia that imposes no mischief but commands respect. But Akalu sees what Bira does not yet concede: strength in the sky does not automatically translate to political coherence on the ground. The key difference lies between vertical power (force from above) and horizontal consensus (consent from within).

III. Power Before Unity: The Fragile Architecture

The conversation deepens as the jebena is refilled yet again. Akalu gently presses his point.

“Vertical power, air dominance, is seductive,” he says. “It feels decisive, clean, controlled. But political legitimacy grows sideways through shared consent, mutual recognition, social contracts. When you build dominance in the air before you build unity across your society, you create a fragile structure: powerful externally but brittle internally.”

He goes on, without rancour, to expand the idea: “A state that expands its aerial capabilities without settling its internal political differences creates not deterrence, but suspended conflict. It freezes contestation without resolving it.”

Bira listens, and for the first time in their discussion, his expression softens rather than defends. “You speak as if strength is the problem.”

“No,” Akalu replies, looking into the dark coffee. “Strength without restraint is the problem and restraint is not technical, it is political.”

The distinction matters. Ethiopia’s pursuit of drones, satellites, and advanced aircraft could place it on par with mid-tier global powers in terms of technology. But technology does not reconcile narratives; it does not mend historical grievances. It does not solve issues of identity, memory, or legitimacy. In fact, without political consensus, these technologies can magnify grievances rather than diminish them.

IV. The Sea Aspiration: Renewal or Risk?

Bira brightens. The subject shifts to Ethiopia’s enduring aspiration to regain access to the sea an aspiration older than either man.

“All this talk is academic,” he says, leaning forward. “The real issue is the sea. Ethiopia must regain access. It is not just economic it is historical and existential. We were a maritime civilisation once. Why should we be landlocked forever?”

Akalu nods. “I agree on the importance of sea access. But I disagree on the timing.”

This is where their conversation becomes especially rich and complex.

Bira sees urgency in sea access as a strategic imperative: to reduce dependence on neighbours’ ports; to lower trade costs; to assert Ethiopia’s rightful place in East African commerce. The logic sounds compelling: a strong Ethiopian state should control its destiny, including access to the sea.

Akalu, however, warns of a geopolitical and strategic paradox: urgency is the most exploitable weakness in international relations.

V. Urgency as Leverage: A Quiet Mechanism of Power

“Ethiopia’s need for sea access,” Akalu explains carefully, “is well understood internationally. But international actors do not care about Ethiopia’s urgency in the same way Ethiopia does. When a state signals it cannot wait, it invites mediation, brokerage, and, ultimately, leverage.”

Here he outlines a pattern that has recurred throughout history: states that exhibit urgency in securing strategic goals whether territorial, economic, or military often do so at the cost of sovereignty over the terms of those goals.

In diplomatic terms, Akalu says, this is called asymmetric need. The Ethiopian state needs sea access more than any external power needs Ethiopia to have it. This asymmetry creates leverage for the latter. Rather than imposing terms directly, external powers offer facilitated access with conditions attached. These conditions can range from port management arrangements to security guarantees and intelligence-sharing frameworks.

“It is not that others are hostile,” Akalu continues. “They are not. But they are not neutral either. Every facilitator expects something in return.”

Bira’s initial discomfort at this observation gives way to contemplation. He had assumed that Ethiopia’s growing aerial capabilities would strengthen its negotiating position for maritime access. Akalu suggests the opposite: air dominance raises regional anxiety, and anxiety invites external management.

Suddenly, the sea once a symbol of sovereign aspiration feels more like a diplomatic minefield.

VI. Maritime Access: Pathways and Their Consequences

Akalu outlines three general pathways Ethiopia might pursue to gain maritime access, and the strategic implications of each:

1. Multilateral, Regional, Rules‑Based Access

In this pathway, Ethiopia negotiates access through regional agreements that are open, inclusive, and governed by treaty. The purpose is to avoid exclusive deals with any single power, and to emphasise cooperation among neighbours.

Advantages:

Preserves greater autonomy Encourages shared ownership of outcomes Reduces the risk of dependency on a single external actor

Challenges:

Requires time and deep political negotiation Depends on internal consolidation before external engagement May delay tangible access but strengthens sovereignty

2. Facilitated Access via a Great‑Power Broker

This involves negotiating a port lease or security arrangement with the assistance of a major power for example, the United States, China, or a coalition thereof. The facilitator acts as a guarantor of stability and may provide military backing.

Advantages:

Faster access Security backing Large investment potential

Risks:

Access becomes tied to the strategic interests of the broker Sovereignty over port usage may be compromised Ethiopia’s foreign policy flexibility could be constrained

3. Coercive or Quasi‑Coercive Drift

Here, Ethiopia’s urgency, combined with regional competition, leads to a situation where neighbours and external powers impose solutions that suit their own interests and Ethiopia is left with minimal say in the terms.

Outcomes:

Loss of strategic autonomy Port access under foreign control or heavy influence Erosion of sovereignty over time

Akalu stresses that urgency is the trigger that moves a situation from voluntary cooperation (Pathway 1) to managed or mediated access (Pathways 2 and 3). The more Ethiopia signals that it must have access immediately, the more external parties believe they can and should shape the terms.

VII. The Interaction of Air Power and Maritime Ambition

What makes this particularly complex and consequential is the interaction between Ethiopia’s aerial ambitions and its maritime aspirations.

Air dominance gives a state the illusion of freedom of action. The skies, whether through drones, satellites, or advanced fighters, feel like a domain that belongs to the state itself. It is sovereign space.

But control of airspace does not insulate a landlocked state from strategic dependencies. The sea and access to it, is governed by different physics: geography, logistics, and regional dynamics. These domains cannot be conquered; they must be negotiated.

Akalu puts it simply:

“Air power scares neighbours. Maritime dependence invites management.”

It is one thing to deter a hypothetical military threat from above. It is another to walk a diplomatic tightrope between neighbours, external powers, and economic imperatives to secure a port that functions on Ethiopia’s terms.

Moreover, urgency exacerbates this tension: while air power can be showcased and argued as deterrent or stabilising, the need for the sea is tangible, measurable, and time‑sensitive. External actors capitalise on that urgency.

VIII. Internal Consensus as a Pillar of Sovereignty

Bira listens intently as Akalu moves into what feels like the core of his argument: internal political consensus is the anchor on which all external negotiating power ultimately rests.

“The greatest vulnerability in Ethiopian strategy,” Akalu asserts, “is not air dominance, nor landlocked geography. It is political incompleteness.”

By this he means:

Deep unresolved divisions between ethnic groups Narratives that reduce complex histories into simple culprits and victims Weak mutual trust among communities Centralised governance that has yet to build robust democratic legitimacy

Without such consensus, external powers do not see a unified partner; they see a set of interests that can be balanced against each other.

“In diplomacy,” Akalu explains, “others do not negotiate with potential. They negotiate with certainty. They do not trust a state they believe cannot trust itself.”

For Bira, who has spent much of his life critiquing the Ethiopian state as oppressive and illiberal, especially towards Oromo communities,this is a challenging idea. His journey from advocating state dismantlement to supporting the current government is personal as well as ideological. But Akalu’s argument is structural, not tribal: a state that lacks internal consensus is vulnerable to external influence, regardless of its ethnic composition.

Importantly, Akalu also rejects narratives that vilify any one ethnic group as the singular source of oppression. He insists that Ethiopia’s future depends on integrating identities, not extracting blame. This idea resonates less forcefully with Bira at first, but over the course of their conversation, it becomes harder for him to dismiss.

IX. Ethiopia at the Crossroads: Sovereignty, Access, and Patience

Akalu’s final point, the most sobering , is that sovereignty cannot be rushed. It must be earned, not demanded. This is not a call to delay progress indefinitely, but rather to sequence strategy intelligently.

He offers a final framing:

Consolidate internal political consensus Build trust across regions and identities Strengthen democratic institutions Clarify how power is shared and defended Build economic alternatives Enhance land‑based trade corridors Strengthen internal infrastructure Reduce reliance on single routes Negotiate maritime access from confidence, not desperation Avoid signalling urgency Use internal resilience as leverage Engage neighbours in transparent frameworks

This sequence, Akalu argues, transforms Ethiopia into a state that is prepared, not pressured. Prepared states shape terms. Pressured states accept them.

Bira, for all his habitual confidence, admits this challenges his assumptions. There is a moment of real reflection, not defensiveness, as he considers the possibility that Ethiopia’s strength is not simply a matter of technology or symbolic assertion, but of patience and strategic timing.

X. The Silence After Words

The jebena is empty for the final time. Outside, Addis Ababa continues its restless rhythm, indifferent to the high ideas discussed within the coffee house.

Bira and Akalu rise from their seats. They have debated aerial dominance, maritime aspiration, urgency as leverage, and the necessity of internal consensus without rancour, without simplification.

As they depart in opposite directions into the bustle of the city, their conversation lingers in the air like the last wisp of coffee smoke: Ethiopia stands between the sky and the sea, and its future belongs not to those who shout the loudest, but to those who understand time, patience, and the art of negotiation.

Epilogue: Strategy Before Sovereignty

In Ethiopian politics and, indeed, in the politics of most states with complex internal identities the rush to assert power too quickly often precedes the very thing it seeks to secure.

The central insight of this dialogue is not pessimistic; it is structural:

Power without consent is brittle; urgency without resilience invites leverage.

Air power can deter external foes.

Maritime access can transform economies.

But internal consensus a shared sense of belonging, legitimate governance, and mutual trust is the only foundation on which true sovereignty can be built.

Ms Leeshan Kuratey, is Investigative Journalist, Writer, and Poet. The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author, Ms. Leeshan Kuratey, and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of any publication, organisation, or institution. This piece is a work of political commentary, intended to provoke thought and dialogue regarding contemporary Ethiopian politics and diplomacy. 

About Post Author

Ethiopian Tribune editor

editor@ethiopiantribune.com

https://ethiopiantribune.com

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By E Frashie Ethiopian Tribune Columnist

There is a particular sound a civilisation makes when it is being hollowed out. It is not the noise of tanks or the crack of gunfire. It is quieter. It sounds like processions redirected, sanctuaries bypassed, authority diluted, assets questioned, and traditions politely “updated” until they no longer anchor anything at all.

That sound is now audible across Ethiopia.

Much has been written about violence, persecution, and instability in the country, and rightly so. Blood has been spilled, churches attacked, civilians displaced. But violence, for all its horror, is rarely the final stage. It is usually the blunt instrument that accompanies something more methodical: the slow dismantling of institutions that once stood between power and the individual. In Ethiopia, the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church, one of the world’s oldest continuous Christian institutions, is beginning to look less like a protected faith community and more like a structure being patiently taken apart, beam by beam.

Human rights analysis often struggles with such moments because no single act appears decisive. Instead, there is accumulation. And accumulation, when ignored, becomes inevitability.

The Colours of Humiliation

In Addis Ababa this January, Orthodox believers came out for Epiphany only to be warned that wearing green, yellow, and red, the colours that once wrapped both nation and faith, could invite harassment, detention, or worse. Some complied. Others did not. The police response was not symbolic. It was physical. Meanwhile, in Gondar, senior state officials appeared in the same colours, smiling for cameras, untroubled by consequence. Law, it seems, has learnt to recognise rank.

Human rights law calls this differential treatment. Ordinary people call it humiliation.

Epiphany is not merely a festival. It is a public confession of belonging. To constrain how it is celebrated, or who may embody it safely, is to signal that faith has become conditional. Even more telling was what did not happen: the Patriarch of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church did not appear publicly to bless his flock in the capital. His words were delivered at a distance, filtered, mediated, contained. Absence, in such moments, speaks louder than speech.

Human rights frameworks tend to catalogue abuses: unlawful killings, arbitrary detention, restrictions on assembly. But they often miss what communities instinctively understand—that when religious leadership is constrained, public expression policed, and symbolism selectively punished, the issue is no longer security. It is control.

The question then becomes: control to what end?

Blood in Arsi: When Selection Replaces Chaos

The answer begins to emerge not in Addis Ababa, but in the fields and villages of Arsi.

In late October and early November 2025, civilians in Ethiopia’s Arsi and East Arsi Zones were hunted, not caught in crossfire. According to statements issued by the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church, more than twenty-five Orthodox Christians were killed in a series of coordinated attacks. Churches were assaulted. Villages were emptied. Families fled with nothing but what they could carry. Survivors did not describe chaos; they described selection.

International observers often hesitate at such claims, asking for verification in active conflict zones. Yet what followed was telling. The World Council of Churches, not known for impulsive declarations, issued a pastoral letter expressing grave concern, explicitly noting that those killed were believed to be members of the Orthodox Christian community. The letter acknowledged the difficulty of independent verification, but did not dismiss the reports. On the contrary, it treated the lack of access itself as part of the danger.

When verification is impossible because fear has emptied the village, uncertainty becomes evidence of failure, not innocence.

U.S. government human rights reporting has already documented unlawful killings, arbitrary detention, and collective punishment across Ethiopia’s conflict-affected regions. What the Arsi attacks add is specificity. They show how violence, when paired with impunity, acquires direction. Communities reported little or no effective protection. Appeals went unanswered. Perpetrators were not held to account. The message to the faithful was unmistakeable: faith had become a liability.

This is not conjecture. It is now part of the congressional record in Washington.

For decades, the United States has embedded religious freedom into law, most notably through the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998. That law does not require perfection from partner states, but it does require accountability when credible evidence of abuse emerges. In response to the Arsi killings and related patterns, members of Congress have introduced a resolution condemning Ethiopia’s current trajectory and calling for targeted accountability.

The resolution does not sever ties. It does not punish the Ethiopian people. It follows a well-established principle: sovereignty cannot be invoked to shield gross violations of fundamental rights.

Yet what makes this moment particularly revealing is the reaction it has provoked. Rather than addressing the substance of the concerns, civilian killings, targeted attacks, impunity, official responses have leant heavily on deflection. Conflict is complex. Ethiopia is fragile. Stability must come first.

History offers a colder lesson. Where faith communities are targeted and the state hesitates, instability does not recede. It compounds.

Schism as Strategy: Fragmentation Along Ethnic Lines

The violence in Arsi is not an outlier. It is the visible edge of a broader process. In recent years, the Ethiopian Orthodox Church has been shaken by schisms that would once have been unthinkable. A breakaway synod in Oromia, formed outside canonical procedures, emerged amid allegations of political encouragement. A separate Tigrayan Orthodox structure declared itself autonomous following war and devastation, citing betrayal and exclusion. Both remain unrecognised by the wider Orthodox world. Both reflect something deeper than theology: the ethnicisation of faith and the politicisation of spiritual authority.

Schisms are often explained away as internal disputes. But when the state repeatedly inserts itself as mediator, arbiter, or quiet facilitator, the line between internal disagreement and external interference blurs. International human rights law is clear: freedom of religion includes the right of religious communities to govern their own affairs without state manipulation. Ethiopia’s constitution says the same. Practice, however, tells a different story.

When a prime minister’s office becomes a venue for resolving doctrinal crises, the sanctuary has already been breached.

International human rights law protects not only individuals, but communities, their ability to govern themselves, preserve continuity, and transmit belief across generations. Fragmentation imposed or encouraged from outside corrodes that right as surely as overt repression.

A Church divided against itself does not need to be banned. It can be managed.

This is where the Arsi killings matter most. They anchor the argument in blood. Without them, concerns about ideological dilution, spatial displacement, and asset vulnerability might be dismissed as paranoia. With them, the pattern sharpens. Violence clears space. Fear silences resistance. Division weakens defence. Administrative intervention finishes the job.

The Sanctuary Without Walls: Spatial Displacement and Ideological Erosion

Yet the most unsettling developments are not always the most visible. They occur not through bans, but through redirection. Increasingly, Orthodox believers are encouraged, sometimes subtly, sometimes explicitly, to leave consecrated spaces for worship, teaching, fundraising, and “spiritual programmes” held in hotels, conference halls, and public squares. These are presented as inclusive, modern, accessible. But accessibility can also be erosion.

In the Orthodox tradition, worship is inseparable from place. The Tabot, the Eucharist, incense, iconography, canon these are not aesthetic choices but theological boundaries. To relocate faith life away from them is not neutral adaptation; it is transformation.

A believer who learns to pray without the sanctuary will eventually learn to live without it.

This is where the human rights conversation must widen. International law protects not only belief, but practice, community, and continuity. When a state environment normalises the displacement of religious life from its sacred architecture, it quietly weakens a community’s ability to resist future encroachment whether legal, financial, or administrative.

Overlaying this spatial shift is an ideological one. Motivational movements, leadership seminars, and so-called “New Age” philosophies increasingly intersect with Orthodox spaces and personalities. Their language is seductive: unity, inclusivity, common values, transcendence beyond doctrine. All religions are presented as variations of the same truth, all traditions as interchangeable paths.

Dialogue between faiths is not the problem. Ethiopia has long lived such coexistence. The problem arises when particularity itself is treated as an obstacle, when doctrinal boundaries are reframed as intolerance, and sacramental discipline as backwardness.

Human rights discourse often celebrates pluralism, but pluralism that erases difference is not pluralism. It is homogenisation. And homogenisation is a gift to any state that prefers manageable spirituality to rooted faith.

Once a Church is reduced to values, it can be regulated like an NGO.

Assets and Appropriation: The Material Foundations of Independence

This brings us to the most sensitive, and most avoided issue: assets.

The fears circulating amongst Orthodox believers about financial interference and asset vulnerability must be understood in this context. Institutions are rarely stripped of resources before they are morally and socially weakened. Fragment first. Normalise detachment next. Reallocate later.

Across Ethiopia and its diaspora, Orthodox believers increasingly voice fear that the Church’s material base is being targeted, or at least prepared for targeting. These fears are often dismissed as rumours. Yet history teaches that institutions are rarely stripped of assets before they are weakened socially and morally.

The Ethiopian Orthodox Church has historically derived its independence from its material footing: land, endowments, schools, social institutions, and the financial contributions of millions of believers. A fragmented Church, divided into competing synods and ideologically diluted communities, is ill-equipped to defend that inheritance.

Even unproven allegations of interference with Church bank accounts resonate because they align with a recognisable pattern. When public trust in state institutions is low, and when the state has already demonstrated willingness to intervene in religious governance, fear becomes rational.

Human rights observers often ask for proof of intent. But intent is rarely documented in memos. It is inferred from sequence.

First the sanctuary empties. Then the account is frozen.

Human rights analysis should not ask only whether looting has occurred, but whether conditions have been created in which it could occur with minimal resistance.

Meskel Square: The Sacred Made Neutral, the Neutral Made Managed

Symbolism matters here. Meskel Square, once a consecrated civic heart, has been reimagined as a neutral space where all religious rituals are equally hosted by state design. On paper, this sounds inclusive. In practice, it dissolves the distinction between sacred memory and administrative convenience. Inclusivity is the language. Desacralisation is the effect. A sacred square turned neutral today becomes a regulated venue tomorrow. A regulated venue becomes state property.

The danger is not that other faiths gather there. It is that no faith truly owns it anymore.

What is at stake here is not privilege. It is survival survival of a religious community as a self-governing, materially independent, spiritually coherent body.

The Convergence: From Accumulation to Trajectory

What is unfolding, then, is not a single human rights violation but a convergence: restrictions on expression, politicised schisms, ideological dilution, spatial displacement, targeted violence, and creeping asset vulnerability. Each on its own can be debated. Together, they form a trajectory.

This is what many Ethiopian Orthodox believers mean when they speak of “the writing on the wall”. Not prophecy in the mystical sense, but pattern recognition born of history. They remember emperors and regimes that tried to subordinate the Church and failed. They also remember quieter moments when compromise preceded collapse.

The Arsi killings force the question that polite diplomacy avoids: how many warnings must accumulate before action is taken? How many pastoral letters, congressional resolutions, and documented deaths are required before the international community acknowledges that something structural is under way?

Human rights law was not written for comfortable cases. It exists for moments like this when violence, repression, and institutional erosion converge, and when waiting for absolute certainty becomes a moral failure.

Human rights institutions tend to intervene when blood is visible. By then, the deeper work is often done.

What Now? Silence as Permission

The question now facing Ethiopia and those who claim partnership with it is whether religious freedom will be treated as a living principle or as a rhetorical relic. International law does not require perfection. It requires good faith, non-interference, and accountability. What it does not tolerate is the systematic weakening of a faith community under the guise of modernisation, security, or inclusivity.

Silence in the face of targeted killing is not neutrality. Silence in the face of slow dismantling is complicity.

For Ethiopian Orthodox Christians, the fear is not merely of persecution, but of replacement, replacement of sacrament with sentiment, canon with conference, inheritance with managed spirituality. For human rights observers, the danger is missing the moment because it does not yet fit the familiar template of repression.

By the time the sanctuary stands empty, the blood will have dried, the assets will have moved, and the language of concern will sound quaint.

The writing is already on the wall. The question is who is still willing to read it.

E Frashie is a columnist for the Ethiopian Tribune, writing on human rights, religious freedom, and institutional integrity in the Horn of Africa.

About Post Author

Ethiopian Tribune editor

editor@ethiopiantribune.com

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By Sewasew Teklemariam

In the intricate theatre of Horn of Africa diplomacy, where ancient civilisations clash with modern statecraft and where water, land, and maritime access converge into existential questions, a particularly sophisticated strategy has emerged that demands careful examination. Egypt’s contemporary approach towards Ethiopia represents what might best be described as diplomatic “cooking” a patient, multi-layered process of combining regional anxieties, historical grievances, and strategic alliances into a coherent campaign designed to contain Ethiopian ambitions on two critical fronts: the Nile River and access to the Red Sea. This is not hasty improvisation but rather a carefully calibrated recipe, where ingredients are selected for maximum effect, temperatures are precisely controlled, and the intended outcome, Ethiopian strategic isolation, is pursued with methodical determination.

The metaphor of cooking proves remarkably apt when examining Cairo’s approach because, like any complex culinary endeavour, this strategy requires patience, precise timing, an understanding of how different elements interact, and the skill to adjust temperatures and ingredients as circumstances evolve. For those of us observing from Addis Ababa, the smell emanating from Egypt’s diplomatic kitchen has become impossible to ignore, particularly as the heat has been dramatically increased in recent weeks with the convening of an extraordinary tripartite summit in Cairo and the stunning announcement from Washington regarding Somaliland’s status. The implications of this particular meal extend far beyond the immediate bilateral relationship into questions that will shape the Horn of Africa for generations to come.

The foundation of Egypt’s strategy rests upon two fundamental components that serve as the base ingredients for everything that follows. The first, and certainly the most historically entrenched, concerns the Nile River and specifically the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, a project that represents vastly different things depending on one’s vantage point. For Ethiopia, the GERD embodies developmental aspirations, energy independence, and the exercise of sovereign rights over resources within our own territory. The dam, with its 6,450 megawatt generating capacity, promises to transform Ethiopian lives, providing electricity to the roughly 60 per cent of our population currently without reliable power access, spurring industrial development, and generating revenue through power exports to neighbouring countries. From this perspective, the GERD is not merely infrastructure but a tangible manifestation of Ethiopia’s determination to emerge from poverty through its own resources and efforts.

From Cairo’s perspective, however, the narrative could not be more different. Egypt depends upon the Nile for approximately 97 per cent of its freshwater needs, supporting a population that has now surpassed 105 million people in a country where arable land comprises barely 4 per cent of total territory. The Nile is not simply important to Egypt; it is, in the most literal sense, the difference between habitability and desert. Egyptian officials, with considerable historical precedent, have long maintained that any significant diminution of Nile flows would constitute an existential threat justifying extraordinary responses. When Ethiopian engineers began diverting the Blue Nile in May 2013 to commence GERD construction, it represented, from Cairo’s view, a fundamental shift in regional power dynamics upstream control over a resource Egypt had dominated for millennia.

The second core ingredient in Egypt’s diplomatic recipe emerged more recently but has proven equally potent: Ethiopia’s determined push to secure sovereign access to the Red Sea. Ethiopia’s landlocked status, a consequence of Eritrean independence in 1993, represents a profound economic vulnerability for a nation of approximately 120 million people. Our economy depends entirely upon Djibouti’s port infrastructure for 95 per cent of our international trade, creating both a logistical bottleneck and a strategic dependency that successive Ethiopian governments have found increasingly intolerable. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has been particularly vocal about this issue, declaring in October 2023 that Ethiopia’s maritime access is not merely desirable but essential, and suggesting that Ethiopia would pursue this objective “by any means necessary” rhetoric that, whilst perhaps intended for domestic consumption, sent alarm bells ringing throughout regional capitals.

The situation reached a critical juncture on 1 January 2024, when Ethiopia signed a memorandum of understanding with Somaliland, the self-declared independent region that broke away from Somalia in 1991 but lacks international recognition. The agreement, whose precise terms remain somewhat opaque, reportedly grants Ethiopia access to a 20-kilometre stretch of Red Sea coastline for the establishment of a naval base and commercial port facilities, in exchange for Ethiopian recognition of Somaliland’s sovereignty a recognition that would make Ethiopia the first nation to formally acknowledge Somaliland’s independence claim. The reaction from Mogadishu was swift and furious, with Somalia’s federal government declaring the agreement a violation of its territorial integrity and sovereignty, recalling its ambassador from Addis Ababa, and appealing to the international community for support in defending its territorial claims.

For Egypt, this Somaliland controversy represented something approaching a diplomatic gift, a catalytic ingredient that could transform the entire regional dynamic. Suddenly, Cairo possessed not merely a bilateral water dispute with Ethiopia, a matter where international sympathy has proven difficult to mobilise, but rather a compelling regional narrative: Ethiopia as a revisionist power threatening the territorial integrity of a fellow African Union member state, undermining the sacrosanct principle of colonial borders, and destabilising an already fragile region. This narrative proved far more potent in regional and international forums than arguments about historical water rights and treaties signed during the colonial era to which Ethiopia was never party.

Egypt’s response demonstrated both the sophistication of its diplomatic apparatus and the extent of its preparation for precisely such an opportunity. Within weeks of the Somaliland announcement, Cairo had deployed a comprehensive counter-strategy. In August 2024, Egypt and Somalia signed a comprehensive defence cooperation agreement, with Egyptian officials pledging military equipment, training, and support. Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi hosted Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud for high-level consultations, with joint statements emphasising shared commitment to Somali sovereignty and territorial integrity. Egyptian military advisers began appearing in Mogadishu, Egyptian weapons shipments increased, and Cairo announced plans to contribute significant troop numbers to the African Union peacekeeping mission in Somalia, a mission from which Ethiopia, notably, would be excluded under the new arrangements.

The Egypt-Somalia axis, however, represents only one element of Cairo’s coalition-building efforts. Simultaneously, Egypt has deepened its strategic relationship with Eritrea, tapping into one of the region’s most enduring rivalries. The Ethiopia-Eritrea relationship remains profoundly complex, oscillating between the euphoria of the 2018 peace agreement, which earned Prime Minister Abiy the Nobel Peace Prize, and the subsequent cooling of relations as border demarcation stalled and mutual suspicions resurfaced. Eritrea, which fought a brutal independence war against Ethiopia from 1961 to 1991, followed by a devastating border war from 1998 to 2000 that killed an estimated 70,000 to 100,000 people, maintains a permanent defensive posture towards its larger neighbour. For Egypt, Eritrea represents a natural partner in any endeavour to check Ethiopian power, and Cairo has accordingly increased military cooperation, economic assistance, and diplomatic coordination with Asmara.

Egyptian Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry’s multiple visits to Asmara, coupled with Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki’s rare trips abroad to Cairo, signal the depth of this coordination. Egypt has reportedly established a military presence at Eritrean ports, gaining forward positioning along the Red Sea coastline and the ability to monitor maritime traffic through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. From Ethiopia’s perspective, this represents a troubling development, the transformation of our northern neighbour from a peace partner into a potential security threat, backed by a major regional power with both the resources and motivation to complicate Ethiopian strategic calculations.

The simmering tensions reached a dramatic crescendo last week when Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed addressed the Ethiopian Parliament in what can only be described as a defiant and uncompromising speech that laid bare the depths of regional antagonism. Speaking to a packed chamber, the Prime Minister made clear that Ethiopia would not be cowed by external pressure, would not abandon its sovereign rights to develop the GERD, and would not retreat from its determination to secure Red Sea access. His language was notably forceful, warning that those who seek to encircle Ethiopia or threaten its vital interests would find themselves facing a nation that has never been colonised and has repeatedly demonstrated its willingness to defend its sovereignty at tremendous cost. He specifically addressed the military build-up along Ethiopia’s borders, the weapons shipments to neighbouring countries, and what he characterised as a coordinated campaign to isolate and pressure Ethiopia into submission.

The Prime Minister’s parliamentary address, whilst undoubtedly intended to rally domestic support and project resolve in the face of mounting external pressure, appears to have served as the immediate catalyst for an extraordinary gathering in Cairo this week. The tripartite summit, bringing together President el-Sisi of Egypt, President Isaias Afwerki of Eritrea, and President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud of Somalia, represents the most visible manifestation yet of the anti-Ethiopia coalition that Cairo has been methodically constructing. The optics alone were striking: three heads of state, representing nations that surround Ethiopia geographically, meeting in the Egyptian capital to coordinate strategy and present a united front. The official communiqué from the summit, whilst couched in diplomatic language about regional stability and mutual cooperation, left little doubt about the gathering’s purpose, to coordinate responses to what the three leaders characterised as Ethiopian actions that threaten regional peace and established norms.

The summit’s timing, coming mere days after Prime Minister Abiy’s parliamentary speech, suggests a carefully orchestrated response designed to demonstrate that Ethiopia’s defiance would be met with enhanced coordination amongst its neighbours. Egyptian media coverage of the summit was extensive and triumphal, portraying President el-Sisi as the architect of a new regional order capable of constraining Ethiopian ambitions. Eritrean and Somali officials echoed these themes, with joint statements emphasising shared security concerns and mutual commitments to defend against what they portrayed as Ethiopian expansionism. The summit concluded with agreements on enhanced military cooperation, coordination of diplomatic positions in international forums, and what was described as “joint responses to threats against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of member states” language that, whilst not naming Ethiopia explicitly, left little room for ambiguity about the intended target.

Yet even as this tripartite coalition solidified in Cairo, an even more dramatic development was unfolding in Washington that threatens to fundamentally alter the strategic landscape. The United States government, in a stunning policy shift that caught most regional observers by surprise, announced its intention to recognise Somaliland as a sovereign state. The announcement, delivered through a combination of State Department statements and presidential remarks, represents the most significant change in American Horn of Africa policy in decades and carries implications that extend far beyond the immediate Somalia-Somaliland dispute.

The American decision appears to rest upon several converging considerations. Firstly, Somaliland’s remarkable record of democratic governance and stability in a region characterised by state fragility and authoritarian rule has long attracted admiration from Western observers. The territory has conducted multiple peaceful electoral transitions, maintained relative security in a dangerous neighbourhood, and cooperated effectively with Western counter-terrorism efforts, achievements that stand in stark contrast to the persistent instability in Somalia proper. Secondly, strategic considerations related to Red Sea security and competition with Chinese influence in the region appear to have weighed heavily in Washington’s calculations. Somaliland’s location at the southern entrance to the Red Sea, its willingness to grant basing rights to Western powers, and its resistance to Chinese port development projects that have proliferated elsewhere along the African coast all enhance its attractiveness as a strategic partner.

Thirdly, and perhaps most significantly from Ethiopia’s perspective, the American decision appears to reflect recognition that Ethiopia’s maritime access represents a legitimate interest that the international community must accommodate rather than indefinitely suppress. The memorandum of understanding between Ethiopia and Somaliland, whilst controversial, offers a potential pathway to addressing Ethiopian needs through negotiated agreement with a willing partner rather than through conflict or the permanent acceptance of complete landlocked dependence. American officials, in background briefings explaining the recognition decision, have notably emphasised that Somaliland’s three decades of de facto independence, combined with its record of governance and strategic importance, justify a reconsideration of the international community’s blanket refusal to engage with territorial realities that diverge from inherited colonial boundaries.

The American announcement has sent shockwaves through regional capitals, nowhere more profoundly than in Cairo. Egypt’s entire strategy towards Ethiopia has rested upon the assumption that the international community, and particularly Western powers, would maintain the established position that Somaliland’s status cannot change and that Ethiopian engagement with Somaliland authorities constitutes an unacceptable challenge to Somali sovereignty. The American recognition decision fundamentally undermines this assumption, potentially opening the door to a cascade of similar recognitions from other Western and African states. If Somaliland achieves widespread international recognition as a sovereign state, then Ethiopia’s memorandum of understanding transforms from a controversial challenge to territorial integrity into a perfectly normal bilateral agreement between two recognised states, a development that would deprive Egypt of one of its most potent tools for isolating Ethiopia in international forums.

The Egyptian response to the American announcement has been swift and sharply critical. Cairo issued strongly worded statements expressing “deep concern” about the implications for regional stability and African Unity principles, lobbied intensively within the Arab League and African Union for collective rejection of the American position, and reportedly engaged in urgent diplomatic consultations with European powers to discourage them from following the American lead. Egyptian officials have framed the American decision as a dangerous precedent that undermines the post-colonial African consensus on the inviolability of inherited borders, potentially encouraging secessionist movements across the continent and creating instabilities that could take generations to resolve.

Yet Egypt’s vigorous opposition to Somaliland recognition sits uneasily alongside Cairo’s own extensive historical record of pursuing policies based upon strategic interest rather than principled consistency. Egypt’s recognition of Eritrean independence in 1993, for instance, represented Egyptian support for a territorial change that created a new state through secession, precisely the precedent Cairo now claims would be so dangerous if extended to Somaliland. The difference, of course, is that Eritrean independence served Egyptian interests by creating a new, potentially friendly state along Ethiopia’s northern border and providing Egypt with opportunities to project influence into the Red Sea region. Somaliland recognition, conversely, threatens Egyptian interests by potentially legitimising Ethiopia’s maritime access strategy and depriving Cairo of a key instrument for Ethiopian containment.

The Mogadishu government’s response to the American announcement has been even more visceral, with Somali officials describing the decision as a betrayal, a violation of international law, and an unacceptable interference in Somalia’s internal affairs. President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, speaking at the Cairo summit, declared that Somalia would never accept the partition of its territory and called upon all nations to reject the American position. Somali officials have threatened to reconsider their security cooperation with the United States, to explore closer relationships with powers less committed to supporting what they characterise as secessionist movements, and to take the matter to the United Nations Security Council and International Court of Justice.

The irony, of course, is that Somalia’s federal government has exercised no meaningful authority over Somaliland territory for more than three decades, that repeated attempts at reunification negotiations have foundered on Somaliland’s absolute insistence upon maintaining its separate status, and that the Mogadishu government’s claims to sovereignty over Somaliland rest primarily upon inherited colonial boundaries rather than any contemporary reality of governance or popular legitimacy. Somaliland conducted a referendum on independence in 2001, with over 97 per cent of voters supporting separation, a level of popular support that few secessionist movements anywhere can claim. The territory has its own currency, security forces, government institutions, and democratic processes, all of which function with considerably more effectiveness than their counterparts in Somalia proper.

For Eritrea, the American decision presents a more complex set of calculations. On one hand, Asmara’s alignment with Egypt and Somalia in opposing Ethiopian regional influence would logically require Eritrean opposition to any development that serves Ethiopian interests, including Somaliland recognition. On the other hand, Eritrea’s own independence resulted from precisely the process that Somalia now claims must never be repeated, a region with distinct historical identity and popular support for separation ultimately achieving recognition despite the opposition of the state from which it seceded. Eritrean officials have thus far maintained public silence on the American announcement, a reticence that likely reflects the uncomfortable parallels between Eritrea’s own trajectory and Somaliland’s aspirations.

The sophistication of Egypt’s strategy lies not merely in bilateral relationship building but in the creation of a broader diplomatic ecosystem that is inherently hostile to Ethiopian interests. Cairo has skilfully leveraged multilateral forums to amplify its message and isolate Ethiopia. The Arab League, at Egypt’s instigation, issued strongly worded statements condemning Ethiopia’s Somaliland agreement and affirming support for Somali territorial integrity. The Organisation of Islamic Cooperation followed suit, with Egypt ensuring that Ethiopia’s actions were framed not as a bilateral dispute but as a challenge to regional stability requiring collective response. Even within the African Union, where Ethiopia hosts the organisation’s headquarters and has historically wielded considerable influence, Egypt has worked to shift opinion, emphasising principles of territorial integrity and the inviolability of borders, principles that serve Egyptian interests whilst constraining Ethiopian options.

The Cairo summit this week represented the culmination of these efforts, providing a highly visible platform for the anti-Ethiopia coalition to demonstrate unity and coordination. The summit’s agenda reportedly included detailed discussions of military cooperation, intelligence sharing, coordination of positions in international forums, and what Egyptian officials described as “joint contingency planning” for potential Ethiopian actions in the Red Sea region. Somali officials briefed regional media on Egyptian commitments to substantially increase military aid, including naval assets that would enhance Somalia’s ability to patrol its claimed territorial waters and challenge any Ethiopian military presence along the Somaliland coast. Eritrean representatives, whilst characteristically less forthcoming in public statements, reportedly committed to enhanced coordination with Egyptian forces operating from Eritrean ports and to maintaining defensive readiness along the Ethiopian border.

Yet this narrative of Egyptian strategic brilliance and Ethiopian isolation requires careful scrutiny and balance. Whilst Egypt’s diplomatic campaign is undeniably sophisticated, it also rests upon foundations that are more fragile than Cairo’s confident rhetoric might suggest. The coalition Egypt has assembled is not built upon shared values, complementary interests, or genuine strategic alignment, but rather represents a temporary convergence of grievances held together primarily through Egyptian financial inducements and the gravitational pull of Cairo’s regional influence. Somalia’s federal government, despite Egyptian support, exercises limited control beyond Mogadishu, with regional states, clan dynamics, and the persistent threat of Al-Shabaab insurgency creating an extraordinarily complex internal landscape that no amount of Egyptian military aid can resolve.

Indeed, the American recognition of Somaliland, whatever its other implications, reflects a hard-headed assessment that the fiction of Somali territorial unity has become increasingly untenable and that Western interests may be better served by engaging with the stable, cooperative territory that actually exists rather than the unified Somalia that exists primarily in diplomatic theory. Eritrea, meanwhile, remains one of the world’s most repressive states, with no elections since independence, indefinite military conscription, and a human rights record that has prompted massive refugee outflows. Egypt’s embrace of such a regime, whilst strategically logical, undermines Cairo’s attempts to position itself as a defender of international norms and regional stability.

Moreover, Egypt’s strategy contains an inherent contradiction that Ethiopian officials have been quick to highlight, particularly in Prime Minister Abiy’s parliamentary address last week. Cairo positions itself as the defender of international law and territorial integrity in the Somalia-Ethiopia dispute, yet Egypt itself has consistently rejected international arbitration mechanisms for the Nile dispute, walked away from negotiation frameworks when they proved inconvenient, and maintained positions on water rights that most international legal experts consider inconsistent with contemporary international water law. The 1959 Nile Waters Agreement between Egypt and Sudan, which Egypt continues to reference, allocated the entire Nile flow between two downstream countries whilst completely ignoring the interests of upstream riparian states, including Ethiopia, where 85 per cent of Nile waters originate.

Ethiopia’s consistent position has been that colonial-era agreements signed without our participation cannot bind us, a position that international law generally supports through principles of state succession and the invalidity of treaties imposed upon non-signatories. The GERD itself, contrary to Egyptian claims, operates under principles of equitable and reasonable utilisation enshrined in the 1997 UN Watercourses Convention, a convention that Egypt notably voted against. Ethiopian officials have repeatedly emphasised that the dam is designed for hydroelectric generation, not irrigation, meaning that water flows through rather than being consumed, and that Ethiopia has committed to operational protocols that protect downstream interests. Studies by international water management experts, including panels convened during the negotiations, have generally concluded that whilst the GERD will have impacts during filling periods, proper coordination can minimise downstream effects, and in the long term, the dam’s regulation of seasonal flows may actually benefit downstream countries by reducing flooding and providing more consistent water availability.

The maritime access question similarly admits of more nuance than Egypt’s absolutist position acknowledges. Ethiopia’s landlocked status represents a genuine developmental constraint. Economists have long documented the “landlocked penalty” the measurable economic disadvantages faced by countries without coastal access, including higher transport costs, reduced trade competitiveness, and vulnerability to the political stability and policy decisions of transit countries. Ethiopia’s dependence upon Djibouti, whilst generally functional, creates risks that any responsible government must seek to mitigate. The Somaliland memorandum, whatever its legal and diplomatic complications, represents an attempt to address a real problem through negotiated agreement rather than military force an approach that should, in principle, be encouraged rather than automatically condemned.

The question of Somaliland’s status itself defies simple categorisation, as the American recognition decision implicitly acknowledges. The territory has maintained de facto independence for over three decades, with functioning government institutions, its own currency, security forces, and democratic elections that international observers have generally characterised as more free and fair than those in many recognised states in the region. The international community’s refusal to recognise Somaliland has rested primarily upon the African Union’s principle of respecting colonial borders, yet this same principle has not prevented the recognition of other territorial changes, including, notably, Eritrea’s independence from Ethiopia and South Sudan’s separation from Sudan. The absolute position that Somaliland’s status cannot evolve, that Ethiopian engagement with Somaliland authorities automatically constitutes aggression against Somalia, represents a diplomatic rigidity that the American government has now explicitly rejected and that may not ultimately serve regional stability.

Egypt’s strategy also carries significant risks for regional security that extend well beyond the immediate bilateral relationship. By militarising disputes that should be resolved through negotiation, by providing weapons and military support to fragile states in an already volatile region, and by deliberately inflaming historical tensions, Cairo is not contributing to Red Sea security but potentially undermining it. The Horn of Africa represents one of the world’s most complex and dangerous regions, where state fragility, ethnic tensions, competition for scarce resources, historical grievances, and proxy conflicts have repeatedly combined to produce humanitarian catastrophes. The Ethiopian civil war in Tigray, which only formally ended in November 2022 after claiming hundreds of thousands of lives, demonstrated how quickly violence can spiral in this region and how limited the international community’s capacity to contain such conflicts proves to be.

Egyptian military support to Somalia, whilst framed as defensive capacity building, introduces new weapons into an environment where arms have an alarming tendency to migrate into unintended hands. Al-Shabaab, despite years of military pressure, retains the capacity to launch significant attacks and control territory. The group’s ability to capture weapons from Somali security forces is well documented. Egyptian arms shipments, ostensibly intended to strengthen the Somali federal government, may ultimately contribute to the armament of groups that threaten regional stability in ways that serve nobody’s interests, including Egypt’s. Similarly, the Egypt-Eritrea axis, whilst tactically advantageous for Cairo, provides legitimacy and support to one of the world’s most repressive regimes. Eritrea’s involvement in the Tigray conflict, where Eritrean forces were credibly accused of widespread atrocities, demonstrated the Isaias government’s willingness to destabilise the region in pursuit of perceived interests.

For Ethiopia, navigating this challenging diplomatic environment requires both strategic clarity and tactical flexibility. Prime Minister Abiy’s parliamentary address last week, whilst projecting necessary resolve for domestic audiences, must be balanced with diplomatic approaches that emphasise Ethiopia’s willingness to engage constructively with neighbours and the international community. The temptation to mirror Egyptian approaches, to build counter-coalitions and pursue escalatory responses, must be resisted in favour of strategies that emphasise the legitimacy of Ethiopian positions whilst demonstrating commitment to regional cooperation.

Ethiopia’s fundamental case is strong: we have the right to develop our water resources for the benefit of our people, we have legitimate economic interests in securing reliable maritime access, and we have consistently pursued these objectives through diplomatic engagement rather than military force. These positions need to be articulated clearly and consistently in every available regional and international forum. The American recognition of Somaliland, whatever complications it introduces, validates Ethiopia’s fundamental contention that our maritime access needs represent legitimate interests that the international community must accommodate rather than indefinitely suppress.

Ethiopian diplomacy must also work to diversify relationships and reduce dependence upon any single partnership or transit route. The Gulf states, particularly the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, have substantial interests in Red Sea stability and Horn of Africa development. Asian powers, notably China, have invested heavily in Ethiopian infrastructure and have their own interests in ensuring that the Belt and Road Initiative’s African components remain viable. Emerging African economies, from Kenya to South Africa, have stakes in demonstrating that African nations can resolve complex disputes through African mechanisms. These relationships, properly cultivated, can provide balance to Egyptian influence whilst avoiding the zero-sum dynamics that characterise current regional tensions.

Crucially, Ethiopia must demonstrate through concrete actions what we assert in rhetoric: that our objectives are defensive and developmental rather than aggressive and revisionist. This means maintaining transparency about GERD operations, sharing hydrological data, adhering to agreed protocols during filling operations, and demonstrating through measurable outcomes that the dam poses no existential threat to downstream water security. It means approaching the Somaliland question with sensitivity to regional concerns about territorial integrity whilst defending our right to pursue maritime access through diplomatic means. It means engaging Somalia directly and constructively on issues of mutual concern, from counter-terrorism cooperation to trade facilitation to the regulation of cross-border pastoralist movements, even as Mogadishu participates in Cairo’s containment coalition.

The broader African context cannot be ignored. How these disputes are ultimately resolved will establish precedents that extend far beyond Ethiopia and Egypt. The continent contains numerous shared river basins where upstream development rights and downstream water security must be balanced. Dozens of landlocked states face economic constraints similar to Ethiopia’s. If Egypt’s containment strategy succeeds, if pressure and isolation can deny Ethiopia’s legitimate developmental rights, the implications will be felt across the continent. Conversely, if Ethiopia can demonstrate that development and cooperation are compatible, that upstream rights and downstream security can be reconciled through good faith negotiation, this too will establish valuable precedents.

The African Union, IGAD, and other continental bodies face a critical test. Allowing one member state to systematically isolate another through coalition-building and pressure tactics, regardless of the merits of underlying disputes, undermines the principles of African solidarity and African solutions to African problems that these organisations exist to advance. The Cairo summit, with its explicit anti-Ethiopia agenda, represents a challenge to these principles that cannot be ignored. The international community more broadly must recognise that whilst Egypt’s diplomatic sophistication is impressive, sophistication should not be confused with legitimacy, and that the pressures being applied serve primarily Egyptian interests rather than regional stability or international legal principles.

Egypt’s “cooking” strategy continues, the diplomatic pot now boiling vigorously with this week’s Cairo summit turning up the heat to maximum levels. The carefully combined ingredients of water anxiety, territorial disputes, and historical rivalries simmer together, producing an acrid smoke that obscures rather than illuminates the path towards regional stability. The intended outcome remains unchanged: an Ethiopia sufficiently isolated and pressured to abandon its developmental aspirations and accept a subordinate regional position. Yet strategies built upon containment rather than cooperation, upon pressure rather than partnership, carry within themselves the seeds of their own failure.

They fail because they fundamentally misread the determination of peoples who have tasted development’s promise and will not willingly return to perpetual poverty. Prime Minister Abiy’s parliamentary address, whatever one thinks of its diplomatic wisdom, captured a sentiment that resonates deeply across Ethiopian society: we will not be contained, we will not abandon our sovereign rights, we will not accept permanent developmental subordination to accommodate Egyptian anxieties rooted in colonial-era entitlements. They fail because they create instabilities that, once unleashed, cannot be controlled by their instigators. The weapons flowing into Somalia, the military build-up along Eritrean borders, the escalating rhetoric from all sides, these dynamics, once set in motion, develop their own momentum that even sophisticated diplomats in Cairo may find impossible to contain.

They fail because the interests they seek to suppress, development, sovereignty, economic viability, are not negotiable preferences but existential necessities. Ethiopia will continue to fill and operate the GERD because we must, because our people deserve the electricity and development opportunities it provides, because abandoning our sovereign rights over resources within our own territory is simply not an option any government could accept whilst retaining legitimacy. We will continue to pursue legitimate maritime access because our economy cannot indefinitely bear the constraints of complete landlocked dependence, because 120 million people require economic integration with global markets, because geographical accidents of history need not permanently determine national trajectories.

The American recognition of Somaliland, whatever its broader implications, represents an acknowledgement of realities that the international community has too long ignored. The question facing the region is not whether Egypt’s cooking strategy will ultimately force Ethiopian capitulation, it will not. The question is rather how much diplomatic capital will be expended, how much regional instability will be generated, how much potential for genuine cooperation will be sacrificed before all parties recognise that Ethiopia’s development cannot be indefinitely contained, only accommodated within frameworks that respect legitimate interests on all sides.

The pot boils, temperatures rise to unprecedented levels as evidenced by this week’s Cairo summit, pressures build in ways that threaten to crack the vessel itself, but the meal Egypt is cooking will ultimately prove indigestible. The only remaining question is how much damage will accumulate before this reality is universally acknowledged and diplomacy returns to the essential task it should never have abandoned: not the containment of legitimate aspirations but their accommodation within frameworks of mutual benefit and regional stability. The ingredients have been combined, the heat applied, but the recipe produces only bitterness. Perhaps it is time to return to the kitchen and consider an entirely different approach, one based not on cooking but on genuine partnership, not on containment but on cooperation, not on zero-sum competition but on the recognition that all nations of the region share interests in stability, development, and mutual prosperity that no amount of diplomatic maneuvering can indefinitely suppress.

Sewasew Teklemariam is a regular columnist for The Ethiopian Tribune, focusing on regional geopolitics and Ethiopian foreign policy.

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By Ethiopian Tribune | 29 September 2025

In the vast echo chamber of the United Nations General Assembly, where nations routinely posture, preen, and occasionally prostrate themselves, Ethiopia once more seized the microphone. But this time, not to beg. Rather, to remind. The provocation? Egypt’s latest theatrical attempt to internationalise its opposition to the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). The riposte? A withering, historically erudite rebuttal delivered by Ethiopia’s Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN, Ambassador Yoseph Kassaye.
Yet this was rather more than a diplomatic dust-up. It was a moment of symbolic reckoning, one voice rising with crystalline clarity, another floundering in befuddlement.

Ambassador Yoseph’s intervention was forensic, assertive, and magnificently unapologetic in its nationalism. Exercising Ethiopia’s Right of Reply with the precision of a surgeon wielding a scalpel, he systematically dismantled Egypt’s “unfounded and misleading” assertions, exposing their roots in colonial-era treaties that rather conveniently excluded most Nile Basin countries. “Whilst Ethiopia seeks to develop the Nile to uphold the basic human rights of its people,” he declared, “Egypt insists on denying these necessities through outdated claims of monopoly.” The moral weight was unmistakable: clean water, food security, and electricity as inalienable rights, not privileges to be rationed by downstream hegemons.
His tone transcended mere diplomacy, it was genuinely global. Fluent, firm, and steeped in historical literacy, Yoseph’s delivery carried the rhetorical DNA of Ethiopia’s finest envoys. No hedging. No dilution. No death by a thousand qualifications. He spoke as though the Nile itself had summoned him to its defence.

Yoseph drew a stark, and frankly devastating, contrast between Ethiopia’s inclusive approach to GERD and Egypt’s decidedly unilateral construction of the Aswan High Dam, which displaced entire communities and erased ancient civilisations beneath its waters. “There is no parallel comparison,” he observed, with just the faintest hint of understatement. “Our determination to cooperate stems from the inherently just nature of our cause.” This framing, development as justice, cooperation as strength, has become the hallmark of Ethiopia’s diplomatic posture. It’s not merely about water. It’s about memory, dignity, and the steadfast refusal to remain shackled by colonial shadows that grow longer the further Cairo tries to cast them.

In a refreshingly rare move, Ambassador Yoseph accused Egypt of fuelling regional instability through arms shipments and political interference. This wasn’t simply a defence of GERD it was a broader indictment of systematic sabotage. Ethiopia’s message rang clear as a bell: peace cannot be constructed atop coercion, and diplomacy must not serve as an elaborate smokescreen for subversion. One rather suspects the Egyptian delegation wasn’t expecting quite so much candour with their morning coffee.

Contrast this with the address delivered by Ethiopia’s current president himself a former UN ambassador, which makes the comparison all the more poignant. He began in Amharic, a gesture that might have stirred pride, before pivoting into a hesitant, meandering English delivery. The tonal shift proved jarring. The cadence lacked conviction. The phrasing felt bureaucratic rather than galvanising. And the message? A rather impenetrable fog of platitudes, utterly devoid of the moral clarity Ethiopia’s position demands and deserves.

Most strikingly, when referencing Ethiopia’s principled stance in the early 1950s, the president seemed almost allergic to invoking the name of Emperor Haile Selassie I. Yes, that Haile Selassie, the very man who, in 1936, electrified the League of Nations with a speech that still reverberates through the annals of anti-colonial resistance. The Emperor’s UN addresses weren’t merely diplomatic, they were declarations of moral warfare. They named injustice. They summoned history. They pierced through institutional apathy like a clarion call. This president, by painful contrast, tiptoed around legacy as though it were radioactive. His reluctance to channel Ethiopia’s storied defiance, its refusal to be colonised, its historic role as Africa’s moral conscience—was palpable, even embarrassing. The speech fell miles short of the rhetorical lineage it ought to have inherited by birthright. In a moment that desperately called for thunder, we received drizzle. Tepid drizzle at that.

From Emperor Haile Selassie’s searing 1936 denunciation of fascist invasion to Ambassador Yoseph’s 2025 rebuttal of neo-colonial hydropolitics, Ethiopia has consistently wielded the UN platform not to plead, but to proclaim. Each ambassador, whether permanent or deputy, has carried the torch of Ethiopian nationalism, not as mere slogan, but as calculated strategy. Yoseph Kassaye now joins that distinguished lineage—not simply as a diplomat, but as a prospective leader whose voice carries both the gravitas of history and the clarity of vision. In a world drowning in scripted ambiguity, he speaks with the precision of a surgical instrument and the resonance of traditional drums echoing across the highlands.

Despite the fire in his rhetoric, Ambassador Yoseph concluded with an olive branch, albeit one proffered with considerable dignity: “Hostility only breeds division and squandered opportunities… Ethiopia remains steadfastly committed to building a future of shared prosperity with all Nile Basin countries.” It served as a timely reminder that Ethiopian patriotism isn’t isolationist, it’s principled. It seeks peace, certainly, but never at the expense of dignity. It offers cooperation, but emphatically not under duress. Rather refreshing, wouldn’t you say?

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An investigative report on the emerging coalition challenging TPLF dominance

By Ethiopian Tribune Columnist
Published: 21 June 2025

In the complex aftermath of Ethiopia’s devastating two-year war, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has embarked upon a calculated political strategy that could fundamentally alter the balance of power in the northern Tigray region. Through the cultivation of what observers term his “young Tigrayan guard” a disparate coalition of emerging regional voices Abiy appears determined to challenge the decades-long dominance of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) through political diversification rather than military force.

This investigation examines the key figures, motivations, and implications of a strategy that represents both an ambitious reconciliation effort and a high-stakes gamble with Ethiopia’s fragile peace.

The Architecture of Alternative Leadership

The Prime Minister’s approach centres on three distinct but interconnected political factions, each representing a different pathway away from traditional TPLF hegemony.

Getachew Reda: The Federal Standard-Bearer

At the helm of this alternative coalition stands Getachew Reda, whose political trajectory embodies the complexity of post-war Tigrayan politics. Appointed by the federal government as Chief Administrator of Tigray’s interim administration from March 2023 to April 2025, Reda now serves as Minister-Advisor for East African Affairs, a testament to his continued influence within federal circles.

Reda’s political metamorphosis from TPLF spokesperson to federal ally following the November 2022 Pretoria peace agreement marks him as Abiy’s most significant Tigrayan acquisition. His appointment represented more than administrative convenience; it signalled an ideological shift from traditional TPLF leadership towards what the federal government characterises as reform-oriented governance.

However, Reda’s tenure proved fraught with challenges. His administration struggled to assert real authority over key issues including the withdrawal of Eritrean forces and the repatriation of internally displaced persons. More critically, tensions between his interim administration and Debretsion Gebremichael’s TPLF faction culminated in what observers described as a coup-like power grab in March 2025, with strategic towns including Adigrat falling under Debretsion’s control.

The Tigray Peace Force: Armed Alternative

Perhaps the most provocative element of this emerging coalition is the Tigray Peace Force (TPF), championed by Tegadalay Shewit Bitew of the Tigray Independent Party (TIP). Bitew’s explicitly calls for armed resistance to remove the TPLF’s established leadership represent a dramatic escalation in anti-TPLF rhetoric.

The TPF promotes what it terms a “democratic reset” in Tigray, advocating for the complete dismantling of TPLF control through organised resistance. This rhetoric indicates that some elements within Abiy’s young guard may be preparing for potential confrontation rather than purely political competition.

The TPLF Dissidents: Internal Opposition

The third component comprises senior TPLF officials aligned with Getachew Reda who were expelled by Debretsion’s wing following the TPLF Congress in August 2024. Led by figures such as Kindeya Gebrehiwot, these dissidents represent a federally-endorsed counterbalance to Debretsion’s leadership whilst retaining some regional administrative influence.

Their expulsion from the TPLF proper creates an interesting dynamic: former TPLF members now positioned as the federal government’s preferred alternative to their former party colleagues.

Federal Strategy and Its Discontents

Abiy’s cultivation of these alternative voices reflects multiple strategic imperatives beyond simple power politics. The approach represents recognition that military victory alone cannot secure long-term stability in a region where ethnic solidarity and historical grievances run deep.

The reconciliation imperative drives much of the federal narrative surrounding these appointments. Symbolic inclusion of Tigrayan voices aims to address grievances of marginalisation since 2018 whilst fostering national unity. This proves particularly crucial given the estimated 600,000 deaths during the two-year conflict and the displacement of millions, primarily in Tigray.

Politically, the strategy exploits the TPLF’s internal weaknesses whilst building potential Tigrayan support ahead of the 2026 national elections. The TPLF’s recent deregistration by federal authorities for failing to hold a general assembly provides additional leverage for promoting alternative Tigrayan political organisations.

The Fragility of Alternative Authority

Despite federal backing, the young guard’s grip on power remains tenuous. The March 2025 seizure of key towns by Debretsion’s faction exposed the limitations of federal support when confronted with organised TPLF resistance. Getachew Reda’s public demands for federal intervention to counter what he characterised as Debretsion’s “coup-type moves” underscore the coalition’s dependence on external support.

The TPLF’s response has been predictably hostile. The organisation condemns both the party deregistration and Abiy’s cultivation of alternative leadership as serious threats to the Pretoria Agreement. TPLF leaders have appealed to the African Union for mediation, framing federal actions as undermining the delicate balance established by the peace deal.

Tigrayan Responses: Between Hope and Scepticism

Within Tigray itself, responses to the young guard phenomenon remain mixed. Some war-weary residents express cautious optimism about the potential for reduced tensions if genuine dialogue addresses historical marginalisation. The promise of fresh leadership distinct from both the TPLF’s “old guard” and the traumatic recent past holds appeal for those seeking political renewal.

However, scepticism predominates amongst many Tigrayans who view the initiative as a cynical divide-and-rule tactic. Slow implementation of peace agreement provisions , particularly delayed returns of internally displaced persons and stalled reconstruction efforts, fuels disillusionment with federal promises. The young guard risks being perceived as Addis Ababa proxies rather than authentic Tigrayan representatives.

International Dimensions and Implications

The strategy’s success carries implications beyond Ethiopia’s borders. International partners, including the African Union, United States, and European Union, monitor developments closely given concerns about democratic backsliding and the potential for renewed conflict.

The TPLF’s appeal to the African Union for mediation reflects recognition that the initiative could destabilise the interim administration and potentially reignite conflict. International actors face the delicate task of supporting peace implementation whilst avoiding actions that could be perceived as endorsing either side’s maximalist positions.

Future Trajectories: Stabilisation or Escalation?

Three potential pathways emerge from current dynamics. A stabilisation scenario would see young Tigrayan figures facilitating dialogue between federal authorities and TPLF moderates, leading to full peace agreement implementation and credible elections in 2026.

Alternatively, an escalation pathway could unfold if the TPLF rejects federal legitimacy entirely, boycotts elections, and mobilises resistance. The involvement of Eritrean and Amhara factions in previous conflicts suggests that instability in Tigray could rapidly spiral into broader regional conflict.

Most likely, however, is a prolonged stalemate wherein the TPLF maintains de facto control over much of Tigray whilst the federal young guard lacks sufficient traction to establish alternative authority. Such a scenario would perpetuate low-intensity tensions whilst hindering post-war recovery efforts.

The Stakes of Political Transformation

Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s cultivation of a young Tigrayan guard represents a sophisticated attempt to reshape Tigray’s political landscape through co-option, legal pressure, and generational change rather than purely coercive means. Whilst framed as reconciliation, the initiative’s ultimate success depends upon addressing Tigrayans’ urgent humanitarian and political grievances more effectively than the TPLF can mobilise resistance against perceived federal overreach.

The coming months will prove decisive. The enforcement of the TPLF deregistration, the party’s response, progress on peace implementation, and the young advisors’ ability to demonstrate tangible benefits for Tigray will determine whether this strategy fosters genuine political pluralism or becomes the catalyst for Ethiopia’s next devastating conflict.

This initiative reflects Abiy’s broader vision of a centralised Ethiopia where ethnic-based parties yield to pan-ethnic federal structures. In this context, Tigray serves as the pivotal battleground for competing visions of Ethiopia’s political future-making the fate of the young Tigrayan guard a matter of national significance extending far beyond regional politics.

The success or failure of this political gambit will likely determine not only the future of Tigray but the broader trajectory of Ethiopian federalism in the post-war era. As Ethiopia approaches crucial elections in 2026, the young guard’s ability to establish credible alternative authority may well decide whether the country moves towards genuine political reconciliation or returns to the destructive patterns of ethnic competition that have defined much of its recent history.

Copyright Notice: This article is the intellectual property of Ethiopian Tribune columnist. Reproduction, distribution, or transmission of this content without explicit written permission is strictly prohibited. All rights reserved © 2025 Ethiopian Tribune.

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A critical examination of Ethiopia’s demand for social media companies to establish local offices amid Africa’s evolving digital landscape

By Ethiopian Tribune Columnist
20th June 2025

The digital revolution sweeping across Africa has reached a pivotal moment in Ethiopia, where the government is taking an unprecedented stand against the exploitative practices of global tech giants. The Ethiopian Media Authority’s (EMA) recent demand for companies like Meta, Google, and other social media behemoths to establish local offices represents more than regulatory posturing—it signals a fundamental shift in how African nations approach digital sovereignty and economic justice.

The Numbers Tell a Compelling Story

Ethiopia’s digital landscape presents a paradox that exposes the inequitable relationship between African markets and Silicon Valley corporations. With over 44 million internet users and more than 4 million daily active social media users, Ethiopia commands significant digital real estate. Yet Ethiopia has emerged as the 7th largest country in Africa for social media users, boasting approximately 24.83 million active accounts, demonstrating the country’s growing digital influence across the continent.

The disconnect becomes stark when comparing Ethiopia’s user engagement with its economic benefits from these platforms. Whilst neighbouring countries host profitable branches of major tech companies, Ethiopia—despite being one of the largest regional markets—remains excluded from direct corporate investment and revenue-sharing arrangements. This economic asymmetry reflects a broader colonial-era pattern where African resources generate wealth that flows elsewhere.

A Continental Perspective on Digital Exploitation

Ethiopia’s stance must be understood within the broader African context of digital regulation and taxation. Across the continent, governments are grappling with similar challenges of capturing economic value from digital platforms whilst managing content moderation and harmful speech. At least 213 million Africans use the internet, yet the economic benefits largely bypass local economies.

Unlike the punitive social media taxes implemented in Uganda, Zambia, and Benin—which left millions of Africans struggling to cover the costs of getting online—Ethiopia’s approach focuses on corporate accountability rather than user penalisation. This distinction is crucial: Ethiopia seeks to regulate companies, not restrict access for citizens.

The Ethiopian model contrasts sharply with South Africa’s more developed regulatory framework, where Kenya and South Africa demonstrate more sophisticated legal approaches to digital governance. However, Ethiopia’s direct demand for local presence represents a more assertive stance than even these more economically developed neighbours have taken.

The Regulatory Vacuum and Its Consequences

Tamrat Dejene’s criticism that “it is inappropriate for Ethiopia, with its significant digital user base, to be excluded from regional operations” highlights a fundamental issue of digital colonialism. The absence of local offices means Ethiopian users consume these platforms’ services whilst generating data and engagement that monetises elsewhere, with no direct economic benefit to the Ethiopian economy.

The EMA’s third annual report on internet hate speech reveals disturbing trends, with harmful content increasing rather than declining across Facebook, Telegram, and TikTok. This deteriorating situation stems partially from the platforms’ lack of local presence, which limits their understanding of Ethiopian languages, cultural contexts, and social dynamics necessary for effective content moderation.

The report’s finding that hate speech predominantly spreads through written content and animated imagery on these platforms underscores the need for locally-informed moderation strategies. Without physical presence and local expertise, global platforms struggle to distinguish between legitimate political discourse and dangerous incitement—a nuance particularly critical in Ethiopia’s complex ethnic and political landscape.

Economic Justice and Digital Sovereignty

The economic argument for local offices extends beyond mere revenue generation. When global platforms operate without local presence, they extract value whilst contributing minimally to local economic development. This extractive model perpetuates digital dependency, where African nations provide users and data whilst remaining excluded from the value chain.

Ethiopia’s preparation of new tax guidelines compelling tech companies to pay taxes on revenue generated from local users represents a sophisticated approach to digital taxation. Rather than the blunt instrument of user taxes that has backfired elsewhere in Africa, Ethiopia targets corporate revenue—addressing the source of the inequity rather than penalising citizens for digital participation.

Global Precedents and Regional Leadership

Ethiopia’s demands align with global trends towards digital sovereignty. The European Union’s Digital Services Act and similar regulations worldwide demonstrate that even the most powerful tech companies can be compelled to adapt their operations to local requirements. Ethiopia’s approach, whilst ambitious for a developing economy, follows established precedents of demanding corporate accountability from digital platforms.

Within Africa, Ethiopia’s assertive stance could establish a template for other nations seeking to balance digital openness with economic justice. Suppressing debate is not merely a PR issue for African countries; it also does fundamental long-term damage to the body politic, making Ethiopia’s focus on corporate presence rather than content suppression particularly significant.

The Path Forward

The establishment of local offices would provide multiple benefits: enhanced content moderation informed by local context, direct economic contributions through employment and taxation, improved regulatory compliance, and stronger accountability mechanisms for addressing harmful content. Most importantly, it would signal that Ethiopia demands partnership rather than exploitation in its digital relationships.

For global tech companies, Ethiopia’s market size and strategic position in East Africa make compliance economically logical. The country’s growing digital literacy and smartphone penetration create an expanding market that justifies local investment. Moreover, establishing Ethiopian operations could serve as a regional hub for the entire Horn of Africa.

Conclusion: A Digital Declaration of Independence

Ethiopia’s demand for local offices from social media giants represents more than regulatory compliance—it constitutes a declaration of digital independence. By insisting on corporate presence, regulatory transparency, and economic reciprocity, Ethiopia challenges the extractive model that has characterised Big Tech’s relationship with African markets.

The success of this initiative could redefine how global platforms engage with African nations, establishing principles of mutual benefit rather than one-sided extraction. As Africa’s second-most populous nation with rapidly growing digital engagement, Ethiopia possesses the leverage to make these demands meaningful.

The question now is whether global tech companies will recognise the inevitability of this shift towards digital sovereignty or continue clinging to extractive models that are increasingly unsustainable. Ethiopia’s patience is clearly exhausted, and its demands reflect the aspirations of a continent ready to claim its rightful place in the global digital economy.

The stakes extend far beyond Ethiopia’s borders. How this confrontation resolves will determine whether Africa’s digital future is characterised by partnership or continued exploitation—a choice that will define the continent’s economic trajectory for generations to come.

This article reflects the author’s analysis based on available public information and regulatory statements. The Ethiopian Tribune maintains editorial independence and encourages public discourse on matters of national digital policy.

© 2025 Ethiopian Tribune. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, distributed, or transmitted without prior written permission.

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Ethiopia, a nation celebrated for its ancient civilization and cultural resilience, confronts a profound moral crisis in 2025, characterised by systemic violence, institutional decay, and the erosion of communal trust. This short essay examines the intersecting drivers of this crisis escalating violence, elite corruption, tribalism, and the failure of moral institutions while proposing evidence-based solutions grounded in scholarly discourse.

Violence and Institutional Decay

Ethiopia’s moral unraveling is starkly evident in the normalisation of violence, including kidnappings, sexual violence, and extrajudicial killings. As Human Rights Watch (2024) documents, state and non-state actors perpetrate atrocities with impunity, eroding public trust in law enforcement. Terrence Lyons (2023) argues that such institutional decay reflects a broader “governance vacuum,” where security forces transition from protectors to predators. This collapse mirrors William Golding’s Lord of the Flies allegory, wherein the absence of ethical frameworks precipitates societal chaos (Golding, 1954).

Elite Corruption and Economic Exploitation

Ethiopia’s elite class, complicit in systemic corruption, exacerbates moral decline. Transparency International’s 2024 Corruption Perceptions Index ranks Ethiopia among the lowest globally, highlighting embezzlement and nepotism within political and business spheres. Messay Kebede (2022) contends that elite predation perpetuates a “culture of impunity,” where profit supersedes social responsibility. Rampant food adulteration and illicit trade, as noted by the World Bank (2023), endanger public health and stifle equitable growth, entrenching poverty-driven desperation.

Tribalism and Political Fragmentation

Ethnic polarisation, institutionalised under Ethiopia’s federal system, fuels dehumanisation and conflict. Sarah Vaughan (2021) attributes this to the politicisation of identity, which transforms tribal affiliations into tools of exclusion. The Ethiopian Human Rights Commission (2024) reports targeted violence against minorities, underscoring how tribalism corrodes empathy. Such fragmentation, as Fiseha Haftetsion (2023) warns, risks state collapse unless intergroup solidarity is revitalised.

Erosion of Religious and Social Morality

Religious institutions, once moral anchors, now face declining credibility due to leaders’ financial exploitation (Abbink, 2023). Concurrently, youth disillusionment grows as materialism displaces ethical values. Social media glorifies wealth, sidelining meritocratic principles a trend linked to rising cynicism among educated youth (Girma, 2023).

Pathways to Reform

Addressing Ethiopia’s crisis necessitates multifaceted interventions. Strengthening judicial independence and accountability, per Lyons (2023), is critical to restoring institutional trust. Integrating ethics into education, as Kebede (2022) advocates, can counteract moral illiteracy. Economic reforms promoting inclusive growth, paired with anti-corruption measures, may alleviate poverty’s grip (World Bank, 2023). Civil society and religious leaders must also recalibrate their roles to model integrity.

Conclusion

Ethiopia’s 2025 moral crisis demands urgent, collective action. By confronting corruption, revitalising institutions, and fostering interethnic dialogue, Ethiopia can reclaim its ethical heritage. As Golding’s allegory reminds us, societal survival hinges on moral consciousness—a truth Ethiopia must now embody.

References

• Abbink, J. (2023). Religion and Power in Ethiopia: Crisis and Renewal. Journal of Eastern African Studies.
• Girma, M. (2023). Youth, Social Media, and Moral Disillusionment in Ethiopia. African Affairs.
• Human Rights Watch. (2024). Ethiopia: Cycles of Violence.
• Kebede, M. (2022). Moral Education and National Reconstruction in Ethiopia. Philosophy East and West.
• Lyons, T. (2023). Conflict and Governance in the Horn of Africa. Cambridge University Press.
• Transparency International. (2024). Corruption Perceptions Index.
• Vaughan, S. (2021). Ethnicity and Power in Ethiopia. Edinburgh University Press.
• World Bank. (2023). Ethiopia Economic Update: Overcoming Illiteracy and Inequality.

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Current Situation: Renewed Offensives and Government Claims

The Amhara conflict, now approaching its second year, has intensified dramatically in recent days. Fano insurgents—a coalition of Amhara nationalist militias—launched a coordinated offensive dubbed “Operation Unity” targeting Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) positions across multiple zones, including South Gondar, North Wollo, and Gojjam . The Ethiopian government has framed this escalation as part of a broader conspiracy, alleging that Brigadier General Migbe Haile, a Tigrayan military leader aligned with the TPLF’s Debretsion faction, orchestrated the campaign to destabilize both Amhara and Tigray’s interim administration .

The ENDF claims to have “crushed” the offensive, reporting 317 Fano fighters killed, 125 captured, and 15 intelligence officers detained in clashes from March 26–28 . However, Fano sources dispute these figures, asserting decisive victories and the liberation of detained civilians in towns like Merawi and Lalibela . Independent verification remains challenging due to communication blackouts and restricted media access .

Government’s Narrative: Linking Fano to Tigrayan Factions

The Ethiopian government has intensified its rhetoric, accusing Tigrayan General Migbe Haile of masterminding Fano’s operations. According to ENDF statements, Migbe allegedly smuggled gold through Eritrea to fund Fano and sought to undermine the 2022 Pretoria Agreement, which ended the Tigray War . This narrative aligns with broader government efforts to frame the Amhara insurgency as a proxy conflict fueled by Tigrayan remnants opposed to Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s administration .

Critics argue this linkage is a strategic ploy to justify harsher counterinsurgency tactics and divert attention from domestic grievances, such as Amhara’s perceived marginalization and unresolved territorial disputes with Tigray over areas like Welkait and Raya .

Civilian Toll and Humanitarian Crisis

The conflict has inflicted severe humanitarian suffering:

• Civilian Casualties: Reports of extrajudicial killings by ENDF troops, including the Merawi massacre in January 2025 where dozens were executed, have drawn condemnation from Human Rights Watch and the EU .
• Displacement and Aid Blockades: Over 2 million Amhara civilians are displaced, with aid agencies warning of food shortages and collapsed healthcare systems . The region’s status as Ethiopia’s breadbasket raises fears of nationwide famine .
• Ethnic Targeting: Amhara communities outside their homeland, particularly in Oromia and Benishangul-Gumuz, face systematic violence, with allegations of state-backed ethnic cleansing .

Geopolitical Context and Historical Grievances

The Amhara conflict stems from decades of systemic marginalization and failed federal policies:

• Post-Tigray War Fallout: Amhara militias, once allied with Abiy during the Tigray War (2020–2022), felt betrayed by the Pretoria Agreement, which ignored their territorial claims and disbanded their regional forces .
• Ethnic Federalism: The 1994 constitution’s ethnic-based federal system, designed under TPLF dominance, entrenched divisions. Amhara nationalists view it as a tool for their political and economic disenfranchisement .
• Centralization vs. Autonomy: Abiy’s push to dissolve regional militias in 2023 ignited protests, driving defections to Fano and fueling insurgency .

International Response and Future Implications

• Diplomatic Inaction: Despite calls for dialogue from the AU and EU, international actors have limited leverage. The U.S. and EU condemned atrocities but stopped short of imposing sanctions .
• Risk of Regional Spillover: Eritrea’s alleged mobilization and Sudan’s border closures after Fano seized Metemma (September 2024) hint at broader destabilization .
• Fano’s Decentralized Resilience: While Fano lacks a unified command, its grassroots support and control over 80% of rural Amhara suggest a protracted stalemate .

A Path to Escalation or Negotiation?

The Ethiopian government’s reliance on military solutions risks deepening the crisis. With Fano factions now merging to form a cohesive entity , the conflict could evolve into a full-scale civil war, further fracturing Ethiopia’s fragile federal structure. Conversely, a negotiated settlement—including lifting the state of emergency, addressing Amhara grievances, and inclusive national dialogue—remains the only viable path to peace .

As one anonymous source noted, the government’s focus on Tigrayan conspiracies may foreshadow expanded offensives, potentially reigniting tensions with Tigray and Eritrea . Without urgent de-escalation, Ethiopia’s future hangs in the balance.

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The four threats that could destroy Ethiopia

By Kebour Ghenna

Ethiopia is on the precipice of social, political, and economic disaster. The country faces a civil war, bankruptcy, famine, a shortage of foreign exchange, a lack of debt servicing capability, inflation that hit a high of 31.4% this year, and a falling public and private investment. A disaster is waiting to happen.

All these problems are no accident.  They are the result of a dedicated effort on the part of an entrenched ethnic “elite” and their stooges that weaponized ethnic politics in the service of their own interests – closing ranks, around ever-narrower conceptions of ethnic interests rather than building solidarity. 

Two weeks ago I went to Djibouti and met an old friend. The old businessman with whom I had on previous occasions discussed business matters, tells me we (Ethiopians) are irresponsible.

“What is happening to Ethiopia? You are again creating a major crisis in Amhara”, he says, “worse than 2020…. Why?”

Yes, ‘why’ is the question of the day!

Coming back to the topic of the day, here are four separate threats that could take Ethiopia into possible dissolution. Just remember that these are not predictions. I’m just adding one plus one.

1. Concentration of power

We are reviewing a ‘pivot’ in recent Ethiopian political development. A moment when the empire continues to follow the lines that divide nationalities, religions, cultures, and histories. Led by Prosperity Party elites who are principally motivated by their own interests, the political leaders work hard to erode a common Ethiopian identity and fuel fear and mistrust among different ethnic groups. 

The argument that Ethiopia can be held together only by force is historically incorrect and politically irresponsible. If Ethiopia reaches a point of no return, it is primarily because of the rise of Oromo nationalism and concentration of power from Tigray elites to Oromo elites, which is now a catalyst for the re-emergence of Amhara nationalism.

It may be that the train has left the station before schedule, but it looks like no political or economic reform will stave off the ominous breakup, unless mechanisms are put in place by this government (helped by its international partners) to resolve the current on-going crisis in an orderly fashion. 

To begin with, those immediate crises have been caused by the aftermath of the war in Tigray, the violence in Oromia, the new war in Amhara, the cost-of-living increase, and the rampant corruption.

All… are crises made in ARAT KILO.

2. Lack of accountability and the complexity of running an ethnic federal system.

PM Abye promised action…democracy…activism…love… parks and prosperity. He wanted to be a modernizer, a reformer, a philosopher. He was sent from God to make Ethiopia great again. He viewed the Prime Ministerial Office as an unaccountable institution. It operated with little transparency, and its decision-making processes were hardly subject to sufficient scrutiny (if at all).

Unfortunately, Ethiopia is not an easy country to manage. It is constructed as a multi-ethnic state. Its constitution is not primarily concerned about the individual – the citizen – who is represented in the federal, or even the regional institutions: it was the ethnic group. People have become very much aware of their ethnic group. And ethnicity has become extremely important in the affairs of the state. It is nearly impossible to solve any political problem without some kind of ‘ethnic justice’. 

And yet, such a multi-ethnic state requires collegiality and a constant give and take between the Federal and the state governments, between officials and the citizens to avoid ethnic cleavages. Take that away and you have basically a dictator!

3. The increasingly rampant corruption and financial mismanagement in Ethiopia.

The PM’s anti-corruption agenda remains confusing. There were moments when he elevated the fight against corruption, and there were moments when he did not do enough to address it. Simply put his record in this area is poor, to say the least.

And yet corruption is proving to be an irreplaceable ingredient in today’s Ethiopia, and is resulting in increase in poverty, unemployment, and hunger while tarnishing the image of the country by bringing immense miseries to our people. Indeed, it has so deeply infiltrated the socio-economic and political landscape, it is now degrading the business environment, subverting economic opportunity, and exacerbating inequality.

So yes, corruption can destroy this country. This is not an alarmist proclamation. It is happening now in Ethiopia (check out the recent news on the widespread and coordinated campaign to divert aid food from the destitute of Ethiopia.)

4. Climate change is a reality in Ethiopia.

Climate change is already impacting or is anticipated to impact nearly every facet of our economy, including infrastructure, agriculture, residential and commercial property, as well as human health and labor productivity. The climate crisis is code red for humanity, but especially so for Ethiopia, where many Ethiopians (80-85%) depend on agriculture for their livelihoods. We can already note today there is not (has hardly been) enough food, not enough water, not enough employment, not enough dollars, schools, hospitals, houses …not enough of anything. As always, those least able to least afford the impacts will be hit the hardest. In other words: We’re heading into uncharted economic territory of devastation.

So, what do our revered government suggest we do before the situation is completely and irredeemably out of control? Make war? Add new taxes, search for fresh loans, plant trees, drive electric cars, sell Ethiopian to the Chinese, export aid wheat?   Not too sure, but I doubt if these “non-solution solutions” will save Ethiopia.

Editor’s note : Views in the article do not necessarily reflect the views of Ethiopian Tribune

The article was first shared on the facebook page of the author

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