This article was inspired by a question posed by two young students during my läxhjälp (homework support) activities. They asked me a simple but profound question about friendship and whether I had many friends. In response, I spoke at length about friendship, family, and community. I also reflected on my own situation regarding friendships within the Ethiopian diaspora. This essay therefore focuses primarily on my relationships with fellow Ethiopians rather than on my social networks among Swedes or other communities in Sweden.

Over the course of my academic work and public engagement with Ethiopian affairs, I have learned that speaking openly about injustice often carries significant personal costs. One of those costs has been the gradual loss of friendships, professional relationships, and social networks.

My involvement in public debate began with a series of articles examining structural inequalities under the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). In particular, I analysed what I regarded as the disproportionate political influence exercised by members of the Tigrayan ruling elite and the preferential access to opportunities enjoyed by individuals connected to the governing establishment. Among the issues I raised was the allocation of international scholarships, which, in my assessment, reflected broader patterns of political patronage and ethnic favouritism.

I subsequently wrote about human rights abuses within Ethiopian prisons, including allegations of sexual violence, sodomy, and the mistreatment of political prisoners and activists. These interventions attracted criticism and hostility from individuals who preferred silence or denial. It became increasingly clear that my work had rendered me unwelcome in certain political and intellectual circles. At times, even some of those closest to me appeared uncomfortable with my public positions.

The political transition that followed did not alter my commitment to critical inquiry. On the contrary, I found myself equally compelled to scrutinise the policies and conduct of the new administration. While many observers initially celebrated the promise of political reform, I became increasingly concerned about the persistence of ethnic polarisation, large-scale displacement, atrocities against civilians, and the erosion of democratic norms. My criticism of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed was based not on allegiance to any political faction but on a commitment to evidence, accountability, and universal principles of justice.

The reaction was often revealing. Some supporters of the government, including individuals within certain religious communities associated with Pentecostal and prosperity-gospel movements, appeared to regard criticism of political leadership as illegitimate or even sacrilegious. In such environments, rational debate became difficult, and personal loyalty frequently replaced critical analysis. As a consequence, some acquaintances and friends distanced themselves from me. Over time, I also withdrew from certain community gatherings and church activities because I perceived a troubling degree of opportunism, conformity, and hypocrisy.

One of my most widely discussed essays, The Many Faces of Abiy Ahmed, generated particularly strong reactions. Yet over time, some of its most vocal critics acknowledged that several of the concerns raised in the article had proven justified. A number of Ethiopian intellectuals who initially dismissed my arguments later expressed agreement with aspects of my analysis as the country’s political trajectory became clearer.

Over the past seven years, I have written approximately eighty articles addressing issues of governance, human rights, conflict, displacement, and ethnic politics in Ethiopia. Much of this work has sought to amplify the voices of communities affected by violence and marginalisation, particularly among the Amhara population, while maintaining a broader concern for the suffering of all Ethiopians regardless of ethnicity or political affiliation.

At the time of writing, reports continue to emerge of severe violence against Orthodox Christian communities in parts of Oromia, including the Arsi Zone. According to local accounts, civilians have been killed, displaced, and deprived of their homes and livelihoods. What I find particularly troubling is the limited international attention devoted to these events. The relative absence of sustained media coverage raises important questions about whose suffering receives global visibility and whose does not. These concerns motivated my recent article, The “New Auschwitz”? Targeted Atrocities against Orthodox Amharas in Arsi, Oromia, Ethiopia.

The cumulative effect of this engagement has been a growing distance between myself and many members of the Ethiopian diaspora. While some relationships were lost because of political disagreements, others dissolved because they were rooted more in convenience, conformity, or shared ethnic loyalties than in genuine intellectual exchange. I have increasingly concluded that meaningful scholarship and principled activism often require a willingness to stand apart from prevailing social pressures.

Rather than viewing solitude as a burden, I have come to regard it as a condition of intellectual independence. It provides the space necessary for reading, reflection, research, and writing. Equally important, it has allowed me to invest my energy in relationships and projects that I find genuinely meaningful, including my engagement with young people from socially disadvantaged backgrounds. These interactions have been among the most rewarding aspects of my professional and personal life.

The experience has reinforced a simple lesson: public intellectual engagement is rarely without cost. Those who challenge entrenched interests, dominant narratives, or collective myths should not expect universal approval. Friendship, professional advancement, and social acceptance may all be sacrificed in the pursuit of truth as one understands it. Whether this should be described as the cost of activism, the burden of intellectual honesty, or the price of dissent is ultimately a matter of interpretation. What remains beyond dispute is that openness carries consequences, and those consequences must be accepted by anyone committed to speaking freely.

After reading an earlier draft of this essay, a friend residing in the United States—a neurologist by profession, whom I have never met in person—offered a thoughtful observation:

“This is not unique to Ethiopia. Even in the United States, whether one is Republican or Democrat, speaking uncomfortable truths can sometimes lead to criticism, isolation, or the loss of friendships. The challenge is universal. What should guide us is not political affiliation, ethnicity, or personal loyalty, but the truth as best as we can discern it. As a professor and public intellectual, the responsibility is not to please one side or another, but to follow the evidence wherever it leads and to remain consistent in applying the same standards to everyone.

In the end, reputations come and go, political winds change, and governments rise and fall. What endures is integrity. Let truth guide the analysis, and let intellectual honesty be the legacy.”

His remarks capture an important reality. The tension between truth and belonging is not confined to Ethiopia. It is a universal feature of public life. The question each of us must answer is whether we value comfort and acceptance more than honesty and intellectual integrity. For my part, I have chosen the latter, despite the costs.

GIRMA BERHANU
Professor 

GOTHENBURG UNIVERSITY

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By Professor Girma Berhanu

Editorial Foreword

On Dehumanisation, Imagery, and the Long Shadow of Scientific Racism

The Editors  •  Ethiopian Tribune  •  April 2026

There are moments when an act of casual cruelty illuminates, with terrible clarity, the architecture of a deeper malice. When the sitting president of the United States shares an image depicting a Black former president and his wife as primates, the instinct of many is to reach for the vocabulary of aberration: reckless, impulsive, beyond the pale. The Ethiopian Tribune does not share that comfort. What such an act reveals is not an anomaly but a continuity the latest expression of a visual and rhetorical tradition whose roots run through the slave ships, the colonial exhibitions, and the pseudoscientific lecture halls of the 19th century.

It is in that spirit that we publish this essay by Professor Girma Berhanu, a scholar whose career has been devoted to the intersection of education, identity, and political violence. Writing from Sweden, where a social services department recently deployed imagery of apes in hijabs as a pedagogical tool for marginalised youth, Professor Berhanu asks the question that polite discourse prefers to skirt: not merely that such representations are offensive, but why the ape, and why it retains its power to wound across centuries and continents.

The answer, as Professor Berhanu traces with care and rigour, lies in the particular violence done to Darwin’s theory of evolution by those who required a scientific patina for their politics of hierarchy. Evolution taught that humans and apes share common ancestry; Social Darwinism translated that into a ladder, with some peoples assigned rungs closer to the animal kingdom than others. The insult, in this reading, is not merely abusive, it is a claim about ontological status, about who belongs fully within the category of the human.

For readers of this publication, the stakes are not abstract. Ethiopia and the broader Horn of Africa have endured their own encounters with the racialising gaze of empire, their own experience of being rendered primitive and pre-modern in the visual and textual archives of colonialism. The dehumanising logic that Professor Berhanu analyses is the same logic that framed African sovereignty as inconceivable and African suffering as natural. To understand it is to understand something essential about how power legitimises itself.

Professor Berhanu closes with a challenge that is also an obligation: legal remedy is insufficient. What is required is a transformed pedagogy, one that equips young people, and particularly those most targeted by such imagery, to read the visual world critically. The Ethiopian Tribune endorses that challenge unreservedly. Journalism, at its most purposeful, is itself a form of that literacy: naming the structure behind the slur, refusing to let cruelty pass as comedy.

“The insult carries no scientific weight. Its power lies elsewhere: in centuries of conditioning, in the grammar of empire, in the persistent human will to construct a hierarchy of the human.”

— The Editors, Ethiopian Tribune • April 2026

Synopsis

Pictures, Pejorative Discourse, and the “Ape” Insult

Girma Berhanu  •  9 April 2026

This essay examines the historical and cultural origins of the “ape” insult as applied to racialised groups, tracing a line from the misappropriation of Darwinian evolutionary theory through 19th-century scientific racism to the visual propaganda of the present day. The author’s inquiry is prompted by three concurrent incidents: a social media post by the US president deploying primate imagery against a Black former head of state and his wife; a legal complaint in Sweden over educational material depicting marginalised youth as apes; and the persistent reality of monkey chants directed at Black footballers in European stadiums.

Berhanu situates these incidents within a broader argument about visual culture and power. Drawing on bell hooks, Jason Stanley’s How Fascism Works, and Stephen Jay Gould’s The Mismeasure of Man, he argues that the biological falsity of the insult is precisely the point: its force derives not from science but from centuries of cultural conditioning that deliberately confused the shared common ancestry of humans and apes with a racial hierarchy in which some peoples were placed “closer to the animal.”

The essay addresses the Swedish school curriculum’s emphasis on visual literacy, argues that images are neither neutral nor trivial particularly when directed at already marginalised communities and calls for an educational and institutional response that goes beyond legal prohibition. Berhanu’s conclusion is that dismantling the cultural infrastructure of dehumanising representation requires historical awareness, critical visual literacy, and a deepened public commitment to human dignity.

Approx. 1,050 words  •  Academic essay / Op-ed  •  Author: Prof. Girma Berhanu, University of Gothenburg  •  Cleared for publication

Essay

Pictures, Pejorative Discourse, and the “Ape” Insult

Girma Berhanu  •  9 April 2026

A few weeks ago, two boys who are enthusiastic about football asked me a difficult question: why are Black footballers insulted in stadiums with monkey chants, images of apes, or even by fans throwing bananas? Why apes of all animals? At the time, I struggled to respond. I tried to explain, in my own way, the role of history, human hierarchies, the theory of evolution, and scientific racism. Yet I felt inarticulate, as if I had not fully captured the depth and cruelty of the issue.

Since then, I have reflected more deeply. One recent incident involved a social media post by the president of the United States, who shared an image depicting a former president and his wife as apes or monkeys. After pressure from members of his own party, the post was deleted. But what was the intended message? That they look like apes, think like apes, or are somehow less evolved?

Public reaction followed a familiar pattern: initial shock, followed by quick dismissal. Many people brushed it aside as a childish or impulsive act, ignoring the deeper structural, institutional, and historical precedents behind such imagery. Yet we know that presidential communication is rarely accidental; it is often carefully crafted within inner political circles.

Around the same time, I revisited How Fascism Works by Jason Stanley, which examines how authoritarian politics divide societies into “us” and “them.” While I cannot explore his full argument here, his framework helps us understand how dehumanising language and imagery function politically.

A third incident occurred closer to home, Sweden. The newspaper Göteborgs-Posten reported that Lars Arrhenius was pursuing a legal case concerning educational material used by a social services department in north-east Gothenburg. The material, titled Angry Apes, was intended as a pedagogical tool for young people facing social challenges. It included images such as an ape wearing a hijab and other apes in a sweater labelled “Orten” (the neighbourhood).

The material was widely criticised and later withdrawn. A complainant argued that it “clearly contains racist and discriminatory images” and risks creating an exclusionary environment for children and youth. It is difficult to understand how associating already marginalised young people with apes could be considered educational. My purpose here is not to enter the legal debate, but to examine the cultural message embedded in such representations. Where does this deeply pejorative association between certain groups and apes originate?

We live in a visual culture. Images shape how we perceive the world, others, and ourselves. Yet many people lack the tools to critically interpret visual representations. As bell hooks observed, it is troubling that mass media increasingly uses powerful imagery for specific effects, whilst simultaneously encouraging us to believe that these images are insignificant.

Even the Swedish curriculum (Lgr 2011) emphasises that images play a crucial role in how people think, learn, and understand the world. Visual literacy is essential for democratic participation. Whilst powerful images can serve as effective pedagogical tools, degrading representations — particularly those targeting marginalised groups such as ethnic minorities, women, disabled individuals, and LGBTQ+ communities — can reinforce harmful stereotypes and produce lasting damage.

To understand the enduring power of the “ape” insult, we must turn to history. Many of us learned about racism and colonialism in school, often alongside the ideas of Charles Darwin. Although Darwin’s work in On the Origin of Species and The Descent of Man revolutionised biology, his ideas were widely misunderstood and misused.

Evolution does not claim that humans descended from modern apes. Rather, it posits that humans and apes share a common ancestor. However, this nuance was lost in public discourse. The simplified claim that “humans came from apes” made it easier to weaponise the comparison. Calling someone an “ape” came to imply that they are primitive, less intelligent, or less civilised.

During the 19th and early 20th centuries, these distortions merged with scientific racism and Social Darwinism. Thinkers misused evolutionary ideas to construct racial hierarchies, falsely claiming that some groups were “closer to apes” than others. As The Mismeasure of Man by Stephen Jay Gould demonstrates, such pseudoscientific claims were used to justify colonialism, slavery, segregation, and the dehumanisation of non-European peoples.

This history helps explain why the “ape” insult persists today. Biologically, humans are primates; the insult has no scientific basis. Its power lies instead in centuries of cultural conditioning, visual propaganda, and racial hierarchy. The question, then, is not only why the insult exists, but how we confront it. How can we protect new generations — especially Black, Indigenous, and other racialised communities — from such deeply dehumanising representations? What role should schools play? What responsibilities do media and political institutions carry?

Legal measures alone are not enough. What is required is a broader transformative agenda: one that promotes historical awareness, critical visual literacy, and a deeper understanding of human dignity. Only then can we begin to dismantle the cultural foundations that allow such insults to persist.

Girma Berhanu is Professor of Special Education at the University of Gothenburg, Sweden.

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By Professor Girma Berhanu

Introduction

The ongoing violence directed against Christian Amhara communities in the Arsi Zone raises serious concerns regarding the protection of vulnerable populations in Ethiopia. Recent reports indicate an intensification of targeted attacks, including killings, abductions, and the destruction of civilian property, particularly in districts such as Shirka, Guna, and Aseko. Investigations by the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission have documented incidents since late 2025 in which armed groups carried out attacks that resulted in deaths, injuries, and displacement of local residents, severely undermining the security and basic rights of affected communities.

These developments must be understood within the broader context of Ethiopia’s complex and evolving conflict dynamics. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights has documented widespread human rights violations in multiple regions of the country, including Oromia and Amhara. In 2023 alone, thousands of civilians were killed in violent incidents across these regions, while thousands were subjected to abuses such as arbitrary detention, torture, and forced displacement. Such patterns indicate that the current violence is not an isolated phenomenon but part of a broader cycle of armed conflict and intercommunal tensions orchestrated by the system.

Historically, Amhara communities living in parts of Oromia have periodically faced episodes of mass violence and forced displacement. Several documented incidents—including massacres targeting civilians identified as ethnically Amhara—illustrate the recurring nature of such attacks. One example occurred in 2020 in western Oromia, where hundreds of Amhara civilians were killed in an attack widely reported by international media and human rights observers. These events underscore the vulnerability of minority communities residing outside their region of ethnic majority.

In recent months, observers and human-rights organizations have expressed concern over what appears to be a renewed escalation in violence. Reports describe killings, kidnappings, and large-scale displacement in parts of Oromia, with civilians caught between insurgent groups, local militias, and government forces. The insurgency involving the Oromo Liberation Army has contributed to a deteriorating security environment in which civilians are frequently exposed to abuses by multiple actors. However, the group claimed the violence aimed to fracture collective opposition by pitting communities against one another, including along Oromo–Amhara and Christian–Muslim lines. The OLA further stated that “whether in uniform or without, whether carrying a gun or a pen,” any actor who “weaponizes innocent civilians for political ends” would be considered its enemy, adding that it would confront such forces decisively.

Despite the gravity of these developments, the international response has often been perceived as limited compared with the scale of the humanitarian and human rights concerns involved. Scholars and policy analysts have noted that Ethiopia’s overlapping conflicts—spanning regions such as Tigray, Amhara, and Oromia—have complicated international engagement and reduced sustained attention to localized patterns of violence against minority communities.

Given these conditions, the situation warrants sustained monitoring, systematic documentation, and deeper international engagement. Strengthening mechanisms for independent investigation, accountability, and civilian protection remains essential for mitigating further violence and ensuring that vulnerable communities are afforded the protections guaranteed under international human rights and humanitarian law.

Atrocities in Arsi: A Human Rights Crisis in Ethiopia’s Oromia Region

The country of Ethiopia has been engulfed in war, massacres, and displacement at an alarming rate since Prime Minister Abiy came to power. The victims are mostly Amharas, particularly those who belong to the Orthodox Church. Such incidents have become increasingly common in the Oromia region. The perpetrators are often described as state-sponsored paramilitary groups and the so-called OLF, with each side blaming the other. This situation has continued for approximately eight years. Millions of people have lost their lives, properties have been destroyed, and displacement has become a defining feature of the new Ethiopia. The crimes being committed against Ethiopia and the defenseless Amharas are unbelievably horrifying and multifaceted. Yet both national actors and the international community remain largely silent.

The current spree of massacres in Arsi is telling. It took now over 6 months unabated. Many known media and newspapers have reported the atrocities. A good gesture is that three major Ethiopian religious bodies condemned the killing of 21 civilians in Shirka Woreda, East Arsi, urging swift investigations, accountability and stronger protection to prevent further inter-religious tensions. The Permanent Synod of the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church, the Inter-Religious Council of Ethiopia, and the Ethiopian Islamic Affairs Supreme Council have each issued statements condemning the killing of 21 civilians in Shirka Woreda, East Arsi Zone of Oromia Region. They urged authorities to take immediate action to bring the perpetrators to justice and strengthen protection for residents. In their statements, the religious institutions denounced the attack and called for swift, transparent investigations, warning against attempts to exploit the incident to incite further violence. The known Borkena news outlet has reported the massacres continuously.

Violence in Arsi Zone and Competing Narratives

The Oromo Liberation Army has accused what it described as “mercenaries” of moving through the Arsi Zone and deliberately targeting Orthodox Christian civilians in order to inflame inter-religious and inter-ethnic tensions. The group has denied responsibility for attacks against civilians and instead alleged that unidentified armed actors are attempting to provoke conflict between communities.

In a statement dated 1 March 2026, the Permanent Synod of the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church reported that it had received information from its dioceses indicating that at least 21 civilians were killed in an attack in East Arsi. According to the statement, several survivors were abducted and their whereabouts remain unknown, while homes and property belonging to more than ten households were burned. The Synod emphasized that the victims were Orthodox Christians with no involvement in any armed conflict and stated that perpetrators who invoke religion to justify violence do not represent the teachings of any faith tradition. It further warned that such attacks risk creating divisions among religious communities that have historically coexisted in relative harmony and called upon Muslim and Christian leaders to jointly condemn the violence.

The Ethiopian Islamic Affairs Supreme Council similarly expressed deep sorrow over the killings of what it described as innocent Orthodox Christian civilians in Shirka Woreda. In its statement, the council stressed that the attack does not represent any religious teaching and warned that such incidents threaten long-standing traditions of inter-religious coexistence and mutual respect. Independent reporting and advocacy sources have also highlighted the severity of the violence in the region. According to reports cited by the media outlet Borkena, districts including Shirka, Merti, Guna, and Holonto have experienced repeated attacks in which civilians were killed or injured, property was destroyed, and communities were displaced. These reports characterize the situation as a significant escalation of violence in the Arsi Zone.

The Ethiopian Human Rights Commission (EHRC) has documented a pattern of attacks affecting civilians in the area in its March 2026 reporting. According to the commission, recent incidents resulted in dozens of deaths, including multiple killings in Shirka and Merti districts, alongside cases of injury, abduction, and missing persons. The EHRC also noted broader patterns of insecurity in parts of Oromia since 2025, where recurring attacks on civilians have contributed to a wider humanitarian and human rights crisis. Eyewitness accounts collected by investigators and journalists describe highly coordinated attacks in which armed assailants targeted households and villages, leading to civilian deaths and widespread displacement. These testimonies indicate that communities have been subjected to intimidation, destruction of homes, and forced migration, contributing to a deteriorating humanitarian situation in the region.

At the same time, responsibility for the violence remains contested. Federal and regional authorities have repeatedly attributed many attacks to the Oromo Liberation Army, while the OLA has denied involvement and accused government forces or affiliated militias of staging or exploiting violence in order to justify security operations. This cycle of mutual accusations has complicated efforts to establish accountability and has hindered independent verification of events on the ground. The resulting climate of uncertainty underscores the need for impartial investigation. Without credible and transparent inquiries into the perpetrators of these attacks, the persistence of violence risks normalizing impunity and further undermining social cohesion in Ethiopia’s ethnically and religiously diverse society. Strengthening mechanisms for independent investigation, civilian protection, and accountability therefore remains critical to preventing further atrocities and restoring trust between communities.

Borkena. (2022, September 27). Ethiopia: Attack in Horo Guduru Wollega, Oromia region. https://borkena.com/2022/09/27/ethiopia-horo-guduru-wollega-oromo-region/

The ‘New Auschwitz’? Mass Violence and the Targeting of Civilians in Arsi Zone

Many years ago, I visited the Auschwitz-Birkenau Memorial and Museum, located on the grounds of the former Auschwitz concentration camp, the largest Nazi concentration and extermination camp during World War II. Several years later, I also visited a Jewish cultural center and museum in Riga, Latvia, which similarly commemorates the persecution and destruction of Jewish communities during the Holocaust. Today, Auschwitz-Birkenau and other Holocaust memorial institutions serve as powerful sites of remembrance, preserving the memory of immense human suffering and reminding visitors of the catastrophic consequences of hatred, discrimination, and systematic dehumanization.

The Auschwitz-Birkenau Memorial and Museum provides a detailed historical account of the camp complex and the atrocities committed there. It stands as a solemn warning about what can occur when prejudice, exclusion, and ideological extremism are allowed to escalate unchecked. The enduring message of such memorials was eloquently articulated by Ellen Germain during the 75th anniversary of the museum on 13 July 2022. She emphasized the responsibility of future generations to safeguard historical truth:

“We must safeguard your testimony, their testimony, so that truth will never die. The world must never forget. The world must never deny. The world must never downplay the Holocaust. We must remain ever on guard, and we must do far more to teach the lessons of the Holocaust and apply them in our own time. We must counter hate and lies with tolerance and truth. And we must stand up for human dignity and freedom wherever they are imperiled.”

These reflections underline a critical principle: remembrance is not solely about honoring the victims of the past, but also about recognizing warning signs in the present. The lessons of the Holocaust compel societies to remain vigilant when patterns of discrimination, dehumanization, and targeted violence begin to emerge. When communities are singled out because of their identity—whether ethnic, religious, or cultural—the risk of escalating persecution becomes real.

It is within this broader moral and historical framework that contemporary reports of violence against civilians in the Arsi Zone must be considered. While historical contexts differ, the persistence of attacks against vulnerable populations raises urgent questions about protection, accountability, and the international community’s responsibility to respond when civilians become targets of systematic violence.

More than seventy-five years after the crematoria ceased their inhuman work, the Auschwitz-Birkenau Memorial and Museum continues to preserve the former camp complex as a permanent site of memory. The preservation of this Holocaust memorial serves an essential purpose: to help future generations understand the consequences of hatred, racism, and systematic violence, and to ensure that such atrocities are never repeated. The site also stands as enduring evidence against those who attempt to deny or distort the historical reality of the Holocaust.

Yet the lessons of these memorials are not confined to the past. The warning they convey—that societies must remain vigilant against hatred, persecution, and mass violence—remains deeply relevant today. Reports from several contemporary conflicts suggest that civilians continue to face grave abuses, including in the ongoing war in Ukraine and in parts of Ethiopia.

Particularly troubling are reports of attacks against civilians in the Arsi Zone of the Oromia Region. Accounts from religious institutions, local sources, and human-rights observers describe killings, abductions, and the destruction of homes affecting vulnerable communities. These reports raise serious concerns about the protection of civilians and the ability of affected populations to seek safety during episodes of violence. While historical contexts differ greatly from those of the Holocaust, the recurrence of violence against civilians underscores the enduring importance of remembering past atrocities and applying their lessons to contemporary crises. Memorials such as Auschwitz remind the world that indifference to suffering, denial of abuses, and failure to protect vulnerable populations can have devastating consequences. Ensuring accountability and safeguarding human dignity therefore remain essential responsibilities for governments, civil society, and the international community alike.

Violence, Silence, and Moral Responsibility

Reports emerging from parts of Oromia Region, particularly in areas such as Arsi Zone and Wollega, describe widespread violence against civilians, including killings, displacement, and the destruction of homes and livelihoods. Observers and advocacy groups have raised concerns that armed actors operating in the region have targeted vulnerable communities and that humanitarian access has at times been restricted, making independent verification and relief efforts extremely difficult. Allegations have also surfaced that bodies of victims have been burned and that attacks on civilians have been carried out with extreme brutality—imagery that evokes memories of some of the darkest chapters of twentieth-century violence.

This paper seeks to draw attention to what many observers describe as a deeply underreported humanitarian tragedy unfolding in these regions. While the historical contexts differ greatly from those of the Nazi concentration camps, the scale of civilian suffering and the persistence of violence raise urgent moral and political questions. Reports indicate that armed groups operating in the region, sometimes in environments where security institutions have failed to provide adequate protection, have created conditions in which communities live under constant fear of attack. As a result, thousands of civilians have reportedly been displaced and forced to flee their homes, creating a growing humanitarian crisis.

The failure of state institutions to adequately protect citizens exacerbates this tragedy. When attacks occur repeatedly without credible investigation or accountability, communities lose confidence in the ability of authorities to safeguard their security and basic rights. Observers have therefore called for independent investigations into allegations of mass killings, human rights abuses, and other violations in order to establish the facts and ensure that perpetrators are held accountable under the rule of law.

Ethiopia today faces immense human suffering and a profound national crisis. Many citizens feel that the country’s political future is increasingly shaped by competing ethno-nationalist movements and armed actors. In such an environment, atrocities—including killings, arrests, and the mistreatment of civilians—risk becoming normalized. The silence of political leaders, humanitarian actors, and international institutions in the face of such reports has raised troubling questions among many Ethiopians about whether the suffering of their communities is receiving adequate attention.

Religious and moral leaders may have an especially important role to play in such circumstances. Ethiopia is a deeply religious society in which spiritual institutions often serve as sources of moral guidance and social cohesion. Leaders from all faith traditions—Christian, Muslim, and indigenous spiritual traditions—can help promote reconciliation and emphasize the shared humanity of all Ethiopians. Their voices are particularly important in reminding communities that violence committed in the name of religion or ethnicity contradicts the ethical principles that faith traditions claim to uphold.

Periods of national crisis also highlight the importance of collective moral responsibility. Philosophical discussions of responsibility emphasize that institutions and leaders bear a duty to prevent harm when they possess the power to do so (Risser, 1996). Silence in the face of injustice can enable further abuses, while moral leadership can help mobilize societies toward peace and accountability. As the writer Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn warned in The Gulag Archipelago, ignoring evil allows it to grow and ultimately undermines the foundations of justice.

Understanding why societies sometimes fail to respond to mass atrocities has also been explored by scholars. Psychologist Paul Slovic describes the phenomenon of “psychic numbing,” in which large-scale human suffering paradoxically leads to reduced emotional engagement and weaker public action (Slovic, 2007). People often respond strongly to the suffering of a single identifiable victim, yet become increasingly indifferent when confronted with statistics describing thousands of victims. This dynamic may help explain why some humanitarian crises fail to receive sustained international attention.

Political scientists have also highlighted how ethnic identity can be mobilized by political elites in ways that intensify violence. According to James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, ethnic violence is frequently linked to strategic political mobilization in which elites frame conflicts in ethnic terms in order to consolidate power or mobilize supporters (Fearon & Laitin, 2000). Such narratives can generate fear, deepen divisions, and ultimately legitimize violence against perceived out-groups.

These dynamics underscore the importance of resisting propaganda, rejecting narratives that dehumanize other communities, and reaffirming the shared dignity of all citizens. Throughout history, attempts to manipulate ethnic identity for political purposes have produced devastating consequences. Divide-and-rule strategies and discourses of ethnic superiority can create cycles of resentment and retaliation that undermine national cohesion and long-term stability.

Ethiopia’s future therefore depends on a renewed commitment to accountability, justice, and reconciliation. Independent investigations, protection of civilians, and responsible leadership are essential steps toward breaking cycles of violence. Equally important is the willingness of citizens, community leaders, and institutions to confront injustice openly and to reject the normalization of cruelty and hatred.

As writer E. A. Bucchianeri observed, “It’s not unpatriotic to denounce an injustice committed on our behalf; perhaps it’s the most patriotic thing we can do.” Speaking out against violence and defending the dignity of all human beings is not an act of division—it is a necessary foundation for a just and peaceful society.

In conclusion, I argue that the Abiy regime’s leadership incompetence, systemic cruelty, and moral vacuum have directly fueled Ethiopia’s current crises—the result of a leadership class lacking fundamental moral intelligence. Beheshtifar, Esmaeli, and Moghadam (2011) define moral intelligence as the “central intelligence for all humans,” distinct from both cognitive and emotional intelligence. Lennick and Kiel, the architects of this concept, identify its four pillars as integrity, responsibility, forgiveness, and compassion. Ethiopian ethnonationalists, particularly Oromo extremists, exhibit a profound deficit in these competencies—a legacy of moral decay inherited from their TPLF predecessors. For those lacking this essential intelligence, deception and malice become the standard, creating a pervasive political pathology that defines the current era.

References

Beheshtifar, M., Esmaeli, Z., & Moghadam, M. N. (2011). Effect of moral intelligence on leadership. European Journal of Economics, Finance and Administrative Sciences, 43, 6–11.

Cohen, S. (2013). States of denial: Knowing about atrocities and suffering. Polity Press.

Eurasia Review. (2021, May 16). The logic behind events in Ethiopia (Op-ed). https://www.eurasiareview.com/16052021-the-logic-behind-events-in-ethiopia-oped/

Eurasia Review. (2022, April 13). Victims and victimization in Ethiopian politics: Targeting the Amhara on three fronts (Op-ed). https://www.eurasiareview.com/13042022-victims-and-victimization-in-ethiopian-politics-targeting-the-amhara-on-three-fronts-oped/

Eurasia Review. (2022, July 26). Oromummaa unchained: Ethnic apartheid and territorial expansion in Ethiopia (Op-ed). https://www.eurasiareview.com/26072022-oromummaa-unchained-ethnic-apartheid-and-territorial-expansion-in-ethiopia-oped/

Fearon, J. D., & Laitin, D. D. (2000). Violence and the social construction of ethnic identity. International Organization, 54(4), 845–877.

Lind, G. (2008). The meaning and measurement of moral judgment competence: A dual-aspect model. In D. Fasko Jr. & W. Willis (Eds.), Contemporary philosophical and psychological perspectives on moral development and education (pp. 185–220). Hampton Press.

Risser, D. T. (1978). Power and collective responsibility. Kinesis, 9(1), 23–33.

Risser, D. T. (1996). The social dimension of moral responsibility: Taking organizations seriously. Journal of Social Philosophy, 27(1), 189–207.

Slovic, P. (2007). “If I look at the mass I will never act”: Psychic numbing and genocide. Judgment and Decision Making, 2(2), 79–95.

The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. (n.d.). Collective moral responsibility. http://www.iep.utm.edu/collecti/

The New Yorker. (2022, October 3). Did a Nobel Peace Laureate stoke a civil war? https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2022/10/03/did-a-nobel-peace-laureate-stoke-a-civil-war

The Washington Post. (2022, July 18). Ethiopian genocide commands attention. https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/07/18/ethiopian-genocide-commands-attention/

White, J. R. (2005). Auschwitz: A new history. History: Reviews of New Books, 34(1), 19. https://doi.org/10.1080/03612759.2005.10526737

The views, arguments, and conclusions expressed in this article are solely those of the author, Professor Girma Berhanu, and do not represent the editorial position of the Ethiopian Tribune. Readers are encouraged to consult multiple sources when forming their own judgments on the complex and evolving situation described.

Contact information:

Girma Berhanu

Department of Education and Special Education (Professor) University of Gothenburg

Box 300, SE 405 30

Göteborg, Sweden

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By Professor Girma Berhanu

Introduction

Reports of targeted violence against Amhara academics and professionals have raised growing concern about the safety of intellectual communities in Ethiopia. Some scholars trace these patterns to longstanding political tensions following the 1991 transition of power, arguing that ethnicized political structures have contributed to recurring cycles of conflict and insecurity. Although numerous atrocities have been reported over the past decades, many incidents remain insufficiently documented, and international responses have often been cautious, emphasizing allegations rather than legal determinations.

Notably, the past seven years have seen escalating reports of severe violence affecting Amhara civilians, including members of the educated elite. These developments prompt urgent scholarly inquiry into whether such acts reflect broader patterns of persecution and how they should be understood within the framework of international law — particularly in relation to debates surrounding genocide and the potential dismantling of a community’s intelligentsia.

I considered writing about this phenomenon years ago but waited until discernible patterns began to emerge. Today, the puzzle appears more complete, and the pattern more visible — though it remains in need of rigorous documentation and analysis.

My concern is not purely academic. Two years ago, I lost my cousin. He was jogging early one morning near his residence in the Bole area when he was brutally murdered. He was an accomplished surgeon who had practiced medicine internationally, including in Greece and Bulgaria. To the best of my knowledge, he was not politically active and had no known personal enemies. His killers were never identified, and the limited public information surrounding the investigation has deepened the family’s sense of unresolved grief.

Since then, additional cases have been reported involving the deaths of highly educated individuals of Amhara origin. For example, journalist Martin Plaut, a specialist on the Horn of Africa and Southern Africa, described the killing of Dr. Tsegahun Sime in an article titled “An Amhara doctor killed by the Ethiopian military” (4 February 2026). According to the report, Dr. Tsegahun — a medical professional working at the Amhara Regional Health Bureau — was allegedly detained by security personnel in Bahir Dar and killed several hours later. Colleagues stated that they were unaware of any reason he might have been targeted. Accounts cited in the article describe security forces arriving in a coordinated manner, reportedly under the pretext of receiving guests from the Federal Health Bureau. Dr. Tsegahun was detained around 9:00 a.m., taken for interrogation, and later reported dead after approximately four hours in custody. Witnesses familiar with the events stated that authorities searched his residence, confiscated electronic devices, and subsequently returned his body to the family. The motive for these actions remains unclear based on publicly available information. Commentators have further suggested that, over the past two years, several young Amhara health professionals have been killed under suspicious circumstances. Some reports allege that detainees have later been found deceased, sometimes with their hands bound, in different parts of urban areas. These claims underscore the urgent need for independent investigation and systematic documentation.

Taken together, such cases raise difficult but necessary questions: Are these incidents isolated manifestations of insecurity, or do they indicate a more deliberate pattern of violence against a particular social group? Addressing this question requires careful empirical research, methodological rigor, and restraint from premature conclusions. Only through sustained scholarly and legal scrutiny can the nature and scope of these acts be properly understood.

Targeting of Amhara Intellectuals, Doctors, and Scholars in Ethiopia

The reported targeting of Amhara intellectuals, doctors, and scholars must be examined within the broader context of Ethiopia’s protracted political instability, ethnic polarization, and armed conflict. Multiple human rights reports, media accounts, and survivor testimonies document killings, arbitrary detention, intimidation, and professional marginalization affecting Amhara professionals. While patterns of violence are evident, analysts caution that individual incidents vary in motive, perpetrator, and context, underscoring the need for rigorous, case-specific investigation rather than generalized attribution.

This analysis is informed by long-term observation, original documentation, and sustained engagement with associates of victims. It seeks to differentiate between empirically documented incidents, evolving conflict dynamics, and interpretive or advocacy-based claims. Nonetheless, the cumulative evidence suggests that violence against Amhara civilians—particularly members of the intelligentsia—constitutes a distinct and troubling dimension of Ethiopia’s wider ethnic and political violence.

The targeting of intellectuals warrants particular analytical attention. Comparative genocide and mass-atrocity scholarship demonstrates that systematic attacks on educated elites often function to erode a group’s social cohesion, institutional memory, and capacity for political organization. In this regard, reported killings and intimidation of Amhara professionals raise serious concerns regarding intent and pattern, even as questions of coordination and central direction remain contested and require independent verification.

This study proceeds from the hypothesis that violence against Amhara intellectuals forms part of a broader campaign of persecution against the Amhara population. While definitive conclusions regarding genocidal intent demand careful legal and empirical scrutiny, the repeated nature of the attacks, their concentration in specific regions, and their apparent focus on professional and community leaders warrant further investigation under international human rights and atrocity-crime frameworks.

As Peebles (2023) argues in Ethiopia: Amhara People, Betrayed, Persecuted and Ignored, Ethiopia’s political landscape has increasingly been shaped by ethnic nationalism and exclusionary ideologies. According to his analysis, Amhara communities residing in the Oromia region have faced sustained violence attributed to Oromo nationalist actors, including the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA), Oromo Special Forces (OSF), and affiliated youth groups. He further contends that these actions have occurred in an environment of state tolerance or acquiescence, though such claims remain subject to debate and require corroboration through independent investigations.

The targeting of Amhara intellectuals has become more visible in recent years, at times occurring through overt executions and, in other cases, through less transparent forms of violence. Historically, however, this phenomenon is not unprecedented. Earlier episodes—including the sudden deaths of prominent Amhara intellectuals and the summary dismissal of forty-two professors from Addis Ababa University in the early 1990s—suggest a longer trajectory of political exclusion and repression affecting Amhara academic and intellectual life.

In conclusion, while existing evidence does not yet allow for definitive attribution of a single, centrally coordinated campaign, the convergence of documented violence, historical precedent, and contemporary political dynamics indicates a systematic pattern that merits sustained scholarly attention. Further research grounded in detailed case studies, forensic documentation, and comparative atrocity analysis is essential to assess the scope, intent, and accountability of violence directed against Amhara intellectuals and professionals.

In his concluding remarks, Graham Peebles emphasizes that while sustained diplomatic and political pressure should be applied to Western governments—and particularly to the United States administration—the primary source of hope does not reside in Washington or Brussels. Rather, it lies with the people of Ethiopia themselves. Peebles argues that extremist movements such as the OLF/OLA exploit collective fear; indeed, they are sustained by environments characterized by insecurity, distrust, and social fragmentation. Such groups flourish where intercommunal suspicion and political polarization prevail.

Accordingly, Peebles contends that the most viable path toward peace and social cohesion lies in grassroots solidarity: the coming together of Ethiopia’s diverse ethnic and social groups to collectively reject division, manipulation, and hate. It is this internal process of civic unity and mutual recognition—rather than external intervention—that offers the most credible foundation for long-term stability, reconciliation, and social harmony.

Why the Atrocities Against the Amhara Have Not Been Legally Designated as Genocide

The absence of a formal legal designation of genocide in relation to the violence against the Amhara people is, in several respects, puzzling and deeply troubling. At present, major international institutions—including United Nations bodies, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and U.S. government reports—generally characterize the abuses in the Amhara region using terms such as war crimes, crimes against humanity, unlawful killings, and arbitrary detention, rather than genocide. This reluctance persists despite the scale and severity of the violations.

The distinction matters because, under international law, genocide carries a specific and exceptionally high evidentiary threshold. To establish genocide under the 1948 Genocide Convention, investigators must demonstrate specific intent (dolus specialis) to destroy, in whole or in part, a protected group defined by ethnicity, nationality, race, or religion. In practice, this requires proof not only of widespread or systematic violence, but also of intent manifested through official policies, explicit orders, coordinated actions, or consistent patterns that can reasonably be inferred as aiming at group destruction.

In many conflicts, even extreme and sustained atrocities are not legally classified as genocide unless this intent can be conclusively demonstrated. Importantly, the absence of a genocide designation does not imply that the crimes committed are minor. War crimes and crimes against humanity represent some of the gravest violations of international law. Moreover, legal classification often lags behind events on the ground, sometimes taking years and depending on the outcomes of international investigations, commissions of inquiry, or judicial proceedings.

International reporting has documented unlawful killings, drone strikes, mass arbitrary detentions, and widespread repression affecting civilians in Ethiopia’s Amhara region. While these acts unquestionably constitute serious violations of international humanitarian and human rights law, whether they meet the legal threshold for genocide remains contested within international legal discourse. This discursive hesitation has had tangible consequences: the scale of Amhara suffering has been muted in global forums, and the deaths of Amhara civilians have failed to receive the sustained international attention they warrant.

Some analysts argue that, in active conflict zones, professionals such as doctors, academics, and judges may become targets because state authorities suspect them of aiding opposing forces, even when they are providing neutral or humanitarian services. Since 2023, armed confrontations between Ethiopian federal forces and the Fano militia in the Amhara region have created an environment in which professionals are frequently accused of supporting one side or the other. There are credible reports of medical professionals being beaten, arrested, intimidated, or killed after being accused of treating wounded fighters. Hospitals have reportedly been raided, and patients detained on the basis of mere suspicion.

Human rights organizations further report that the conflict has been accompanied by an extensive crackdown on dissent. Amnesty International has documented mass arbitrary arrests targeting academics, judges, civil servants, and other influential figures, warning that such practices severely undermine freedom of expression and the rule of law. Authorities have justified these actions as necessary to “stabilize the Amhara region,” yet the selective targeting of educated and professional classes raises serious concerns about political repression and collective punishment.

Others interpret these abuses as part of a broader pattern of communal and political violence affecting multiple ethnic groups across Ethiopia. Widespread harassment and detention of journalists and human rights defenders have driven many into exile, significantly limiting independent documentation of abuses in conflict-affected areas. These conditions further complicate efforts to establish legal accountability at the international level.

Regardless of the explanatory framework adopted, there is substantial evidence of killings, attacks, arbitrary arrests, and intimidation disproportionately affecting Amhara professionals, scholars, and community leaders—often described as the “intelligentsia” or social backbone of the Amhara community. Collectively, these practices have created an exceptionally high-risk environment for educated Amhara individuals. Whether or not these acts are ultimately adjudicated as genocide, their cumulative impact is the systematic dismantling of the community’s intellectual, moral, and organizational leadership.

To date, no international court or UN body has formally declared that a genocide is occurring against the Amhara people. However, the United Nations has repeatedly warned of the presence of risk factors for genocide in Ethiopia. The UN Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide has highlighted continued ethnic targeting, credible reports of serious violations against civilians—including Amhara populations—and patterns of violence that warrant urgent preventive action. Some scholars and advocacy groups argue that the threshold for genocide may already have been met, although this remains legally unproven.

Under the Genocide Convention, genocide requires demonstrable intent to destroy a protected group, not merely large-scale or indiscriminate violence. Courts typically require compelling evidence of: (1) intent to eliminate the group, in whole or in part; (2) systematic actions directed toward that objective; and (3) a degree of coordination suggestive of policy or organized practice. Based on several years of research, documentation, and analysis, I contend that these criteria are present in the case of the Amhara. In particular, the targeting of the Amhara intelligentsia appears aimed at uprooting the educated class that serves as the voice, memory, and organizational foundation of a historically marginalized population.

The Ethno-Political Crisis in Ethiopia: Targeting Intellectuals, Cultural Erasure, Historical Revisionism, and the Psychology of Power

One explanation advanced for the targeting of Amhara professionals concerns the role of malicious envy, rooted in a widespread perception that Amhara intellectuals have historically demonstrated high levels of professional competence, ethical conduct, and moral authority within Ethiopian society. This perception, whether accurate or constructed, has rendered Amhara professionals symbolically threatening in periods of intense ethno-political competition.

As argued in my previous report, Ethiopia is currently experiencing one of the most profound socio-political and cultural crises in its modern history. The country is witnessing what may be characterized as a form of ethnic apartheid, manifested through atrocity crimes, the systematic targeting of the intelligentsia, state-led cultural destruction, and the fragmentation of Ethiopian national identity. Central to this crisis is a political order dominated by actors aligned with Oromo ethno-nationalist ideology, who exert disproportionate influence over key state institutions, including the military, political apparatus, economy, and social infrastructure.

Under the rubric of ethnic federalism and political empowerment, there has been a sustained effort to dismantle the symbolic and institutional foundations of Ethiopian statehood—particularly those associated with Amhara heritage and the broader Ethiopian national project. Historic sites have been deliberately destroyed, urban neighborhoods razed, and long-established communities forcibly displaced to the margins of major cities, including Addis Ababa. These acts constitute not only material destruction but also symbolic violence directed against collective memory, belonging, and historical continuity.

Concurrently, the Amharic language—long the lingua franca of the Ethiopian state—has undergone systematic marginalization. Cultural traditions associated with Ethiopian identity, many of which are closely linked to Orthodox Christianity and Amhara historical experience, have been either sidelined or actively suppressed. This multifaceted assault may be conceptualized as culturicide (the destruction of cultural identity), linguicide (the erosion or elimination of language), and historicide (the erasure or revision of historical narratives). These processes build upon a longer trajectory of ethnocide and have recently been accompanied by the targeted killing of Amhara intellectuals.

A particularly troubling dimension of this transformation is the appropriation and rebranding of national symbols, histories, and cultural heritage as exclusively Oromo or as belonging solely to the Oromia region—often articulated through ideological frameworks such as Kegna. This dual process of cultural dispossession on the one hand, and cultural monopolization on the other, raises important political and psychological questions regarding power, identity, and legitimacy.

One explanatory framework lies in the psychosocial dynamics of identity politics, particularly the interaction between malicious envy and collective inferiority complexes in the formation of ethno-political ideologies. Malicious envy denotes a destructive orientation in which the objective is not merely to attain parity with another group, but to strip that group of its status, achievements, and symbolic capital. An inferiority complex, by contrast, reflects deeply internalized feelings of inadequacy, often arising from perceived historical marginalization, exclusion, or unfavorable social comparison.

Both dynamics are associated with low collective self-esteem and tend to produce compensatory political behavior—such as exaggerated identity claims—or aggressive strategies aimed at displacing or delegitimizing the “other.” In the Ethiopian context, these psychological dispositions appear to inform the rhetoric and policy choices of certain segments of the Oromo nationalist elite, whose discourse reveals both resentment toward Ethiopia’s historical national identity and a determination to reconstruct the nation’s narrative through a narrowly defined ethno-nationalist lens.

The outcome of this process is not an inclusive or pluralistic federation, but rather an emerging project of ethno-hegemony that fundamentally undermines national cohesion. Its consequences are far-reaching: the erosion of shared civic identity, intensified ethnic polarization, and the gradual dismantling of a historically multi-ethnic and culturally rich civilization.

If left unchallenged, this trajectory poses a serious threat to the long-term viability of Ethiopia as a unified political entity. It demands urgent scholarly, political, and civil society engagement—not only to address the immediate manifestations of violence, displacement, and repression, but also to confront the deeper ideological and psychological forces driving this destructive transformation.

Politics, in this sense, functions as a particularly fertile arena for the expression of malicious envy at the collective level. As power, resources, and symbolic authority are contested, ethnic identities become increasingly politicized, intensifying intergroup rivalry. In Ethiopia, political parties, ideological factions, and regional administrations are often inseparable from ethnic identity. When one group consolidates political dominance, rival groups may experience not only a desire for comparable influence, but also a destructive impulse to discredit, weaken, or erase the status of their perceived adversaries. These dynamics fuel polarization, obstruct compromise, and foreclose meaningful dialogue.

Recognizing the role of malicious envy at the group level offers valuable insights into intergroup conflict beyond conventional material or institutional explanations. It highlights the emotional, symbolic, and identity-based dimensions of rivalry, underscoring that such conflicts are driven not only by competition over resources, but also by struggles for recognition, dignity, and historical legitimacy. Acknowledging these dynamics is essential for developing conflict resolution strategies grounded in shared identity, equity, and cooperation rather than zero-sum ethno-political competition.

Contact information: 

Professor Girma Berhanu  

Department of Education and Special Education (Professor) 

University of Gothenburg 

Box 300, SE 405 30 

Göteborg, Sweden  E-mail: Girma.Berhanu@ped.gu.se

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By Professor Girma Berhanu Department of Education and Special Education University of Gothenburg

Introduction

This paper is motivated by a recently circulated video produced in Gondar that documents practices of forced religious conversion and coercive manipulation directed at members of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church. The video

[i] depicts economically vulnerable Orthodox believers being pressured by Pentecostal groups—identified as “Mulu Wongel” (“Full Gospel”)—to renounce their faith, burn their kitab, and denounce Saint Mary (Kidist Mariam) in exchange for food aid and other forms of material assistance. Such practices raise serious concerns regarding freedom of religion, informed consent, and the exploitation of poverty.

The involvement of foreign religious actors, reportedly operating in coordination with local authorities, suggests a broader structural problem rather than isolated incidents. Anti-Orthodox campaigns have historical depth in Ethiopia and cannot be understood as recent developments. These campaigns intensified during the Woyane (the other name for Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) period and appear to have become increasingly visible and institutionalized in the post-TPLF/EPRDF era. The instrumentalization of material deprivation to induce religious conversion constitutes a violation of basic human dignity and, under international human-rights norms, may qualify as coercion.

This paper does not aim to engage in theological debate, nor does it seek to adjudicate doctrinal differences. Religion is acknowledged as a sensitive domain that often elicits strong reactions. Instead, the focus is on the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church as a historical, cultural, and social institution that has played a central role in shaping Ethiopian identity, social cohesion, and political sovereignty[ii].

The Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church is among the oldest Christian institutions in the world, yet it has faced sustained external and internal pressures since the sixteenth century, beginning with Portuguese Jesuit interventions. Subsequent periods witnessed continued incursions by both Islamic powers and Western evangelical missions. These efforts often relied on direct proselytization practices that were intrusive and coercive in nature, particularly when directed at economically marginalized communities. The author has observed these dynamics firsthand over several decades.

The manifestations of these pressures are complex and frequently parallel broader colonial or neo-colonial projects. During the Italian occupation, for example, Orthodox institutions and clergy were explicitly targeted. Italian forces carried out documented massacres of Orthodox monks, recognizing the church as a core pillar of Ethiopian nationalism, cultural continuity, and resistance to foreign domination. This historical record underscores the extent to which assaults on the church have also been assaults on Ethiopian sovereignty.

Of particular concern is the role of the Ethiopian state in the contemporary period. Since the rise of the TPLF/EPRDF, there has been documented evidence of systemic discrimination against the Ethiopian Orthodox Church and its adherents, alongside preferential treatment and institutional support extended to evangelical, Pentecostal, and Protestant groups. This pattern of state alignment has contributed to religious inequality, social fragmentation, and the erosion of long-standing communal structures. The Prime Minister and his high-ranking official belong to this group. They openly use the muscle of the state institutions to suppress the Orthodox Christians.

This paper argues that these developments warrant serious scholarly and advocacy-based attention. Addressing coercive religious practices and state-sanctioned disparities is essential not only for protecting religious freedom, but also for preserving social stability and historical continuity in Ethiopia.

Ethiopia at a Crossroads: Religious Violence, Ethnic Federalism, and Regional Instability

In the article “Ethiopia, the Land of the Bible, Brutally Targeting and Killing Christians,” Blanquita Cullum (December 25, 2025), presented on The National Security Hour, examines the contemporary crisis affecting Christian communities in Ethiopia. The presentation situates the origins of Christianity in Ethiopia within the ancient Aksumite Kingdom of the fourth century, 325 CE, following the conversion of King Ezana. Ethiopia possesses one of the world’s oldest continuous Christian traditions, reflected in its extensive religious heritage, including the eleven rock-hewn churches of Lalibela, carved from a single living rock. The country is referenced more than forty times in biblical texts, and longstanding traditions identify Ethiopia as the promised land of St. Mary and as the custodian of the Ark of the Covenant.

Christianity remains a major religious force in Ethiopia, with adherents of the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church, as well as Greek Orthodox, Coptic, and other Christian denominations, numbering in the tens of millions. This enduring presence is largely attributable to Ethiopia’s historical role as a refuge for persecuted Orthodox Christian communities. Armenian and Greek Christians, fleeing persecution in the Ottoman Empire and other regions, migrated to Ethiopia and established enduring diaspora communities. Despite this substantial historical and demographic significance, Ethiopia is currently listed on several international risk assessments identifying heightened threats of armed conflict, political violence, terrorism, and kidnapping. Recent reports suggest that Christian populations—particularly members of the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church—have increasingly become targets of violence, with incidents rising in both frequency and severity. The crisis raises critical questions regarding the motivations behind attacks on Christian communities and the strategic importance of Ethiopia within the Horn of Africa. Regional instability is underscored by Ethiopia’s proximity to Somalia, a country long affected by state fragility and armed conflict. Furthermore, the involvement of external actors, Egypt, the Gulf states, Turkey etc. warrants examination in light of Ethiopia’s geopolitical significance.

In response to these developments, the United States House of Representatives introduced Resolution H.R. 937, which condemns the Government of Ethiopia for actions that threaten regional stability, violate fundamental human rights, and undermine U.S. strategic interests in the Horn of Africa. The resolution emphasizes that violence has disproportionately targeted the Ethiopian Orthodox Church and other religious institutions. Substantial evidence suggests the involvement of the Oromo Liberation Front and Oromo Liberation Army (OLF/OLA), and Islamic Oromya operating in complicity with elements of the current governing structure.

Ethiopia’s historical identity extends beyond religion. It is the site of the paleoanthropological discovery of Australopithecus afarensis (“Lucy”), the location of Lalibela’s UNESCO-recognized churches, the alleged resting place of the Ark of the Covenant in Axum, and the birthplace of coffee. These widely recognized cultural and historical markers heighten international awareness and underscore the gravity of the country’s present suffering.

Contemporary reports describe a systematic campaign of violence affecting both religious and ethnic communities. Ethiopian Orthodox clergy have been killed, churches destroyed, and entire populations forcibly displaced. Documentation includes accounts of mass killings, sexual violence, and drone strikes against civilian populations. The Amhara people, in particular, have experienced displacement on a scale involving hundreds of thousands.

This crisis is not solely a localized humanitarian emergency but is rooted in a broader political framework of ethnic federalism that has, according to numerous analyses, been instrumentalized by political elites to consolidate power. The resulting fragmentation threatens the cohesion of a state that has endured for millennia. The potential collapse of Ethiopia would have profound regional consequences, jeopardizing trade routes, exacerbating security vacuums, and enabling extremist organizations and foreign powers to expand their influence across the Horn of Africa. H.R. 937 represents a formal acknowledgment of these abuses and calls for concrete measures to protect civilian populations and ensure accountability for perpetrators. The resolution advocates targeted sanctions and the conditional provision of international assistance aimed at safeguarding civilians rather than entrenching political regimes. As such, it constitutes a normative and policy-oriented response to a crisis with significant humanitarian, regional, and geopolitical implications.

Moral Silence in the Face of Atrocity: Religious Leadership and Mass Violence in Contemporary Ethiopia

Ethiopians are currently enduring profound suffering and a pervasive, collective national grief. The country’s fate appears increasingly shaped by ethnonationalist forces, ethno-fascist mobilizations, and violent groups operating both within and outside the present political leadership. Atrocity crimes—including murder, mass killings, arbitrary detention, and other forms of inhumane treatment of civilians—have become disturbingly routine.

At the time of writing, violence continues unabated, particularly in the Amhara region, which has effectively become a war zone. Approximately six million school-aged children are out of school, state institutions are largely nonfunctional, agricultural activity has been disrupted, and access to health services is severely limited. The region has witnessed large-scale internal displacement and migration. International reporting indicates that tens of thousands—though the precise number remains undetermined—have been killed, including through drone strikes and other weaponry. Civilians endure indescribable suffering, compounded by reports of forced religious conversion and systematic abuses directed at Ethiopian Orthodox Church institutions and clergy[iii].

Amid these conditions, pressing questions arise: Where are the voices of international humanitarian organizations? Where is the collective response of the international community? Why is there such limited global condemnation of the killing of Ethiopians—young and old alike? Equally troubling is the relative silence of domestic religious leadership. Ethiopia’s religious institutions are moral centers where fundamental ethical principles are taught—most notably, that the taking of life is wrong and that inflicting suffering upon others constitutes a grave violation of divine law. Yet these principles are not being articulated with sufficient clarity or urgency in response to the current crisis.

It is widely recognized that there is no military solution to the ongoing violence and genocidal acts in Ethiopia. Religious and spiritual leaders—both within the country and throughout the diaspora—must therefore speak out forcefully, consistently, and unambiguously. They must affirm that all Ethiopians are children of God and that murder represents a profound desecration of the very faith such violence claims to defend. The ongoing silence of religious establishments in the face of mass atrocities is deeply troubling and risks becoming catastrophic for efforts to preserve Ethiopia’s unity and to protect the sanctity of human life. Forced religious conversion, moreover, constitutes a violation equal in moral gravity to physical violence.

In times of national disaster or collective trauma, religious leaders traditionally serve as frontline caregivers and trusted moral authorities. Communities look to them for comfort, healing, and guidance, and they are expected to act as the voice of the voiceless. While the primary role of religious leadership is spiritual care—providing compassion, empathy, clarity, and hope in moments of crisis—it also includes a responsibility to condemn killings, denounce inhumane treatment and forced conversion, and publicly admonish political leaders who perpetuate violence.

The current situation in Ethiopia urgently requires such leadership. Religious institutions possess a unique capacity to help halt the violence orchestrated by political elites whose actions threaten to destroy Ethiopia’s social fabric, undermine the Ethiopian Orthodox Church, and provoke prolonged civil war. Beyond condemnation, these leaders are also positioned to facilitate national dialogue, reconciliation, and the pursuit of sustainable peace. Their established social authority, extensive networks, and faith-based moral frameworks equip them to respond meaningfully to the profound suffering experienced by millions of Ethiopians.

It must be acknowledged that some courageous religious figures have spoken out against these atrocity crimes. Notably, several bishops from the Amhara region and the late Sheikh Haji Omar Idris—the Grand Mufti of Ethiopia and former president of the Islamic Affairs Supreme Council—publicly expressed grave concern regarding the deteriorating situation and the commission of mass atrocities. It is possible that other leaders have voiced similar concerns privately or within limited forums. Nevertheless, what is required now is a far stronger, unified, and unequivocal public condemnation by Ethiopia’s major religious institutions. Such moral leadership is not optional; it is imperative.

Faith Under Siege: Ethiopia’s Orthodox Church in a Changing Religious Landscape

I want to believe that the majority of Catholics, Orthodox Christians, Muslims, and Ethiopian Protestant Churches (including Pentecostals, both as organizations and as individual believers) have fought—and continue to fight—for justice, truth, and the rule of law throughout Ethiopian history. However, the forms of resistance and protest have varied significantly among these religious communities. Compared to the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church, one of the oldest Christian institutions in the world, Protestant denominations—including Evangelical, Pentecostal[iv], Methodist, Lutheran, Baptist, Episcopalian, Mennonite, Seventh-day Adventist, the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, and numerous other fragmented Protestant churches—are relatively recent arrivals in Ethiopia. Consequently, their roles and engagements in Ethiopian political life differ accordingly.

As Haustein (2014) [v]notes, a new religious factor has emerged in Ethiopia that attracts considerable public attention, invites controversy, influences social behavior, and has even generated new Amharic expressions. This phenomenon is visible in the proliferation of church signs in towns and villages bearing names such as “Full Gospel Believers Church” (ሙሉ፡ወንጌል፡አማኞች፡ቤተ፡ክርስቲያን, Mulu Wängel Amañočč Betä-Krəstiyan), “Paradise Church” (ገነት፡ቤተ፡ክርስቲያን, Gännät Betä-Krəstiyan), “Light of Life Church” (ሕይወት፡ብርሃን፡ቤተ፡ክርስቲያን, Ḥəywät Bərhan Betä-Krəstiyan), “Deliverance Church” (አርነት፡ቤተ፡ክርስቲያን, Arənnät Betä-Krəstiyan), among many others.

There are widely held—though largely unsubstantiated—claims that some Protestant sects passively collaborate with the ruling regime because the government has granted them greater space to practice their religion. Another equally contested claim suggests that, since the regime (whether under the EPRDF, the Prosperity Party, to match Oral Robert’s Prosperity Gospel) or the broader political elite) has adopted an anti-Orthodox posture and undermined Orthodox traditions, these newer religious groups have felt emboldened or even satisfied by the weakening of what they perceive as a rival religious establishment.

The expansion of Protestant denominations is undeniable. However, their relationships with long-established religious communities—particularly the Ethiopian Orthodox Church and the Muslim community—have been fraught with tension. One major point of contention is aggressive proselytization, including practices that critics argue involve materially incentivizing conversions among impoverished Orthodox believers. It is long overdue for Protestant churches, Muslim organizations, and the Orthodox Church—whose leadership has itself been manipulated by the regime—to take coordinated and principled action in condemning atrocities committed in Ethiopia, especially assaults on Orthodox believers, their ancient traditions, artifacts, and sacred relics.

Internal disputes and doctrinal rivalries over relatively minor theological differences only serve to prolong the grip of authoritarian or ethnofascist forces on power, thereby exacerbating the suffering of the faithful. While religious institutions should remain independent of political control in a just, inclusive, and democratic society, Ethiopia’s reality has been markedly different. The Ethiopian Orthodox Church was heavily controlled under the EPRDF and continues to be influenced by sympathizers of extremist and ethnicist forces, particularly those emerging from anti-Ethiopian movements in regions such as Oromia. Reports from Dire Dawa, Harar, and eastern Ethiopia are deeply alarming and warrant a separate, focused analysis.

A closer examination of the power structure within the Ethiopian Orthodox Patriarchate reveals that an estimated 90 percent of departmental leadership positions have been held by former TPLF members or current Prosperity Party affiliates (though precise figures are unavailable). This political capture explains, in part, why the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church is facing both financial hardship and severe restrictions on its religious autonomy. The regime has repeatedly violated religious freedom by intervening directly in Orthodox ecclesiastical affairs.

Ironically, historic churches such as Lalibela and Axum Zion generate substantial revenue through tourism, yet the Church itself has seen little benefit from this income. Since the TPLF came to power, the Ethiopian Orthodox Church has borne the brunt of discriminatory policies and systematic marginalization. A commonly cited explanation for the government’s hostility toward the Orthodox foundation lies in the Church’s deep-rooted tradition of Ethiopianism. The Church is famously associated with the Ethiopian flag and has long served as a custodian of national identity. Under the new regime, the situation has worsened. Abiy’s ministers, allies, and a shadow government appear influenced by the Prosperity Gospel movement—an extremely aggressive, profit-driven, and mafia-like organization—which has had a damaging impact not only in Ethiopia but across numerous African countries, often depriving the poor and vulnerable.

Several factors have historically complicated relations between successive regimes—including both the Tigrean-led and Abiy administrations—and the Church. First, for centuries, the Ethiopian Orthodox Church stood at the center of village social life. Weddings, baptisms, funerals, conflict mediation, and spiritual counseling were all conducted through the Church. Each household was spiritually connected to a priest who served as a religious “father” and presided over key life-cycle events. In this way, the Church was embedded in every community.

Second, the Church functioned as a vital link between the people and the state. It consistently aligned itself with Ethiopian emperors who, in turn, promoted the Church’s unity, expansion, and authority. Hierarchically organized from village parishes to a national center, the Church embodied both spiritual and socio-cultural life. It played a critical role in mediating conflicts—between rival groups and even between the state and rebel forces—while fostering allegiance to the Ethiopian state. Through the use of national symbols, especially the Ethiopian flag during religious and social ceremonies, the Church effectively served as a school of national consciousness, a practice mirrored by the Ethiopian military.

Third, the Church historically served as the principal legitimizing institution for Ethiopian rulers. Long-standing grievances regarding the TPLF’s hijacking of the Orthodox Church were later substantiated in Aregawi Berhe’s A Political History of the TPLF, as referenced by Getachew Redda (see: Ethiopian Semay, accessed 2018-02-08). Notably, I have never observed the Ethiopian flag being prominently displayed during ceremonies or festivities of other religious institutions in Ethiopia—though I remain open to correction on this point.

Above all, the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church has historically maintained, affirmed, and defended the just liberties of the Ethiopian people and the nation’s territorial integrity. During periods of foreign invasion, it provided moral support and spiritual inspiration to Ethiopian patriots, reinforcing its enduring role as both a religious and national institution.

Since its inception, the ruling party has clandestinely organized and operated activities that are hostile toward the Ethiopian Orthodox Church and the Muslim community. It has infiltrated and “contaminated” these foundational institutions, which are central to Ethiopian identity and the ethos of Ethiopianism. These religious establishments are perceived as threats to a ruling agenda centered on un-Ethiopian policies. The commitment and zeal of Orthodox followers—to both their faith and the integrity of Ethiopia—has been documented by international observers and researchers.

According to Jeff Diamant (2017)[vi], a senior writer/editor at Pew Research Center focusing on religion, Ethiopia has the largest Orthodox Christian population outside Europe. By many measures, Orthodox Ethiopians display far higher levels of religious commitment than Orthodox Christians in the faith’s historical heartlands of Central and Eastern Europe. Ethiopia, located in the Horn of Africa, has over 45 [?]million Orthodox Christians, making it the world’s second-largest Orthodox population after Russia. Nearly all Orthodox Ethiopians (98%) consider religion very important, compared with a median of 34% among Orthodox Christians across 13 surveyed countries in Central and Eastern Europe. About three-quarters of Orthodox Ethiopians attend church weekly (78%), compared with a median of 10% in Central and Eastern Europe and just 6% in Russia.

Orthodox Christians make up approximately 53%[vii] of Ethiopia’s population, with Protestants accounting for 19% and Muslims 35%. In 2010, Ethiopia’s 36 million Orthodox Christians comprised about 14% of the global Orthodox population, up from 3% in 1910. This growth is largely attributable to Ethiopia’s overall population increase, from 9 million in 1910 to 83 million in 2010. Ethiopian Orthodoxy belongs to the Oriental branch of Orthodoxy, which represents roughly 20% of the global Orthodox population and is not in communion with the larger Eastern Orthodox Church due to theological and doctrinal differences.

For these reasons, the current ruling party view the Orthodox Church as a threat to their “divide and rule” strategies. Some reports suggest that evangelical Protestantism (particularly Pentecostalism) is aggressively attempting to convert members, while fundamentalist Islam is becoming increasingly assertive in the country and the region. However, substantial empirical data is required before these claims can be definitively stated. Premature discussion risks creating divisions that only prolong the regime’s merciless attacks on Ethiopia and Ethiopian identity.

It is high time for Ethiopian youth to stop being used as cannon fodder and for religious institutions to cease acting merely as passive observers—or worse, as facilitators of burial services for unarmed citizens murdered under the regime. Religious schisms, particularly among the diaspora, must end to preserve unity in the face of persecution.

Ethiopians must have access to international platforms to present their case, including the United Nations and its judicial bodies, the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the International Criminal Court (ICC), global media outlets, religious institutions, prominent cultural figures, and independent think tanks that provide early warnings of crises. The persecution of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church—including forced conversions, derision, and systematic erasure—is part of a broader genocidal agenda. Early warning signs of catastrophic risk in Ethiopia are already evident. The international community must respond urgently to prevent the destruction of the country and the destabilization of the wider region. Failure to act will have devastating consequences for Ethiopia and beyond.

Summary and The Road Forward

At this critical moment in Ethiopian history, what do we expect from our religious leaders—regardless of denomination, sect, or doctrine? We expect courage, honesty, and moral clarity.

Political elites are manipulating divisions among religious leaders and ethnic groups. Silence from our spiritual authorities in the face of atrocities is unacceptable. Religious leaders have a moral duty to speak out, call for justice, and hold the powerful accountable. The faith community looks to you not just for guidance, but for action. Religious authority carries power. Used wisely, it can galvanize communities toward justice. Used poorly—or not at all—it allows oppression to flourish. Ethiopia’s political, social, and economic systems are infiltrated by ethnonationalist forces that marginalize the majority. It is time for religious leaders—at every level—to mobilize followers for an inclusive, just, and humane society.

Internal colonization, inequality, and domination are real. Ethiopian religious leaders have historically resisted foreign colonizers and homegrown oppressors alike. Today, despite doctrinal differences, unity is essential. Moral courage is not optional: failure to speak out against killings, repression, and persecution will be judged by the people, by history, and by God.

In some regions, extremist attacks have burned churches, killed clergy and laypeople, and forced conversions. For Orthodox Tewahedo Christians, religion is inseparable from ethnic identity, language (Geʽez), and history. Forced conversion erases heritage, tradition, and belonging. Yet, for over 1,700 years, the faith has survived and remains central to Ethiopian civilization.

The battle today is clear: good versus evil, life versus death. There is no room for doctrinal disputes when human lives, justice, and Ethiopia’s future are at stake. Religious leaders must rise together, unite communities, and act decisively. The time for moral courage is now.

“In keeping silent about evil, in burying it so deep within us that no sign of it appears on the surface, we are implanting it, and it will rise up a thousand-fold in the future. When we neither punish nor reproach evildoers, we are not simply protecting their trivial old age, we are thereby ripping the foundations of justice from beneath new generations.”

― Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, The Gulag Archipelago 1918-1956

Academic & Scholarly Sources

Ademe, S. M. (2021). Ideological violence towards the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church in the post-1960s. Politics and Religion Journal. https://doi.org/10.54561/prj1502377a

Crummey, D. (2006). Church and nation: The Ethiopian Orthodox Täwahedo Church (from the thirteenth to the twentieth century). In M. Angold (Ed.), The Cambridge history of Christianity (pp. 457–487). Cambridge University Press.

Liyew, D. M. (2024). Politics of secularism in Ethiopia: Repression or co-option towards the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church? European Scientific Journal, 20(11).

Persecution of Orthodox Tewahedo Christianity. (n.d.). Grokipedia.

Systematic persecution in Oromia: The role of militias and political actors in targeting Ethiopian Orthodox Christians. (2025). Borkena.

The shattered cross: A chronicle of state-sanctioned persecution against Ethiopia’s Orthodox Christians. (2025). Borkena.

Woybela Mariam Church incident. (2022). Wikipedia.

[i] https://youtu.be/XQZso_nY_cI?si=7ygVs7jcgfWwhPfO

[ii] https://www.americaoutloud.news/ethiopia-the-land-of-the-bible-brutally-targeting-and-killing-christians/

[iii] Insight, Addis (2023-02-15). “The Persecution of Ethiopian Orthodox Church Followers: A Comparison to Jewish Persecution Throughout History”. Addis Insight. Retrieved 2023-09-03.

[iv] Jörg Haustein (2014) argues that despite its fairly ubiquitous presence, there are hardly any academic publications about this new religious factor. The standard Amharic dictionaries do not yet include the term ጴንጤ (pänṭe) and its correct spelling is not solidified. Obviously, the word is derived from the Amharic term for Pentecost (ጰንጠቆስጤ, pänṭäqosṭe), or the English “Pentecostal,” and as such it points to the Pentecostal movement. But how did Pentecostalism come to Ethiopia in the first place? Why has it become such a notable phenomenon only now, whereas in other African countries, such as neighboring Kenya, it has been around for much longer

[v] Jörg Haustein (2014) Pentecostal and Charismatic Christianity in Ethiopia: A Historical Introduction to a Largely Unexplored Movement.Hatem Elliesie (ed.): Multidisciplinary Views on the Horn of Africa. Studien zum Horn von Afrika, 1, Köln 2014, pp. 109–127.

[vi] Ethiopia is an outlier in the Orthodox Christian world http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/11/28/ethiopia-is-an-outlier-in-the-orthodox-christian-world/

[vii] The statistical data are difficult to interpret, and precise figures remain contested. Nevertheless, the estimate cited may be plausible. Over the past five decades, large numbers of Amharas are reported to have been killed in episodes of mass violence. During a parliamentary discussion approximately twelve years ago, an expert from the national census office stated that approximately 2.5 million Amharas were unaccounted for in the census data. The fate of this population remains unexplained. It has also been openly acknowledged by some political figures that the Amhara population is underrepresented in official statistics, yet public discussion of the apparent disappearance of large numbers of Amharas remains limited. It is reasonable to infer that, among those unaccounted for, an overwhelming majority were adherents of the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church.

[1] https://www.americaoutloud.news/ethiopia-the-land-of-the-bible-brutally-targeting-and-killing-christians/

[1] Insight, Addis (2023-02-15). “The Persecution of Ethiopian Orthodox Church Followers: A Comparison to Jewish Persecution Throughout History”. Addis Insight. Retrieved 2023-09-03.

[1] Jörg Haustein (2014) argues that despite its fairly ubiquitous presence, there are hardly any academic publications about this new religious factor. The standard Amharic dictionaries do not yet include the term ጴንጤ (pänṭe) and its correct spelling is not solidified. Obviously, the word is derived from the Amharic term for Pentecost (ጰንጠቆስጤ, pänṭäqosṭe), or the English “Pentecostal,” and as such it points to the Pentecostal movement. But how did Pentecostalism come to Ethiopia in the first place? Why has it become such a notable phenomenon only now, whereas in other African countries, such as neighboring Kenya, it has been around for much longer

[1] Jörg Haustein (2014) Pentecostal and Charismatic Christianity in Ethiopia: A Historical Introduction to a Largely Unexplored Movement.Hatem Elliesie (ed.): Multidisciplinary Views on the Horn of Africa. Studien zum Horn von Afrika, 1, Köln 2014, pp. 109–127.

[1] Ethiopia is an outlier in the Orthodox Christian world http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/11/28/ethiopia-is-an-outlier-in-the-orthodox-christian-world/

[1] The statistical data are difficult to interpret, and precise figures remain contested. Nevertheless, the estimate cited may be plausible. Over the past five decades, large numbers of Amharas are reported to have been killed in episodes of mass violence. During a parliamentary discussion approximately twelve years ago, an expert from the national census office stated that approximately 2.5 million Amharas were unaccounted for in the census data. The fate of this population remains unexplained. It has also been openly acknowledged by some political figures that the Amhara population is underrepresented in official statistics, yet public discussion of the apparent disappearance of large numbers of Amharas remains limited. It is reasonable to infer that, among those unaccounted for, an overwhelming majority were adherents of the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church.

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