The Ethiopian Tribune · Reflective Essay

Why Do Some Amhara Elites Collaborate Against Their Own People?

Political Opportunism, Elite Co-optation, and Political Self-Sabotage in Ethiopia

Professor Girma Berhanu

Department of Education and Special Education, University of Gothenburg

Abstract

Why do some Amhara political elites cooperate with authorities whose policies are perceived by many Amharas as threatening their collective interests and security? This paper examines elite collaboration in Ethiopia from the establishment of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF)-led government in 1991 to the political transition following Abiy Ahmed’s rise to power in 2018 and the subsequent conflict in the Amhara region.

Drawing on scholarship on ethnic federalism and authoritarian governance, comparative political theory, and conversations with two former senior Amhara regional officials, the paper explores five explanations for elite collaboration: political and economic opportunism, elite co-optation, fear and coercion, ideological divergence, and the pursuit of political survival. It also examines the psychological mechanisms of obedience, conformity, and moral disengagement, alongside the historical and institutional conditions that may contribute to political fragmentation.

The paper asks whether recurring patterns of elite accommodation reflect individual choices, institutional incentives, historical experiences, or broader social and political dynamics. It rejects the assumption that collaboration demonstrates an inherent cultural disposition toward self-sabotage. Instead, it argues that elite behaviour must be understood through the interaction of personal interests, political institutions, social networks, and unequal power relations. Ultimately, the paper seeks to explain the apparent divergence between the priorities of some political elites and the security, rights, and aspirations of the communities they claim to represent.

1. Introduction: The Problem of Political Collaboration

Why do some Amhara political elites collaborate with political authorities whose actions are perceived by many Amharas as harmful to their community?

This question concerns the relationship between individual ambition, political power, collective identity, and public responsibility. It became particularly significant following the establishment of the EPRDF-led government in 1991 and the political transition associated with Abiy Ahmed’s rise to power in 2018.

The 1995 Constitution reorganised Ethiopia around ethnolinguistically defined regional states and recognised the self-determination rights of nations, nationalities, and peoples. Supporters viewed ethnic federalism as a means of addressing historical inequalities and accommodating diversity. Critics argued that it institutionalised ethnic divisions, weakened shared citizenship, and generated new forms of exclusion.

For many Amharas, concerns included political representation, territorial administration, and the security of Amhara communities living outside the Amhara regional state. Scholarship by Jon Abbink and Ketemaw Muluye provides useful starting points for examining these debates.

Expectations that the 2018 political transition would address longstanding grievances gradually gave way to renewed tensions between the federal government and Amhara political movements. In 2023, fighting escalated following the government’s decision to integrate regional special forces into the national security structure. Fano forces resisted this process, and the conflict intensified. The International Crisis Group and Human Rights Watch have documented the conflict’s political and humanitarian dimensions. The reported atrocities against civilians are deeply appalling and demand urgent international attention. Yet the scale of the humanitarian crisis affecting the Amhara population remains insufficiently recognised in international discourse. Reports that approximately six million children have been out of school over the past four years, alongside allegations of widespread discrimination against Amhara people, raise profound concerns about the protection of fundamental rights, access to education, and equal treatment. These claims warrant rigorous documentation and sustained international scrutiny.

This raises a fundamental moral question: how can individuals and institutions committed to human dignity, justice, and equality justify collaborating with political forces accused of contributing to the persecution and suffering of a vulnerable population? At a time when civilian protection and the prevention of mass atrocities should be paramount, silence, indifference, or uncritical collaboration risks undermining the very principles that international solidarity and human rights are meant to uphold. The suffering of the Amhara people deserves serious attention, impartial investigation, and recognition grounded in evidence—not neglect or selective concern.

Within this context, allegations that some Amhara political figures have cooperated with federal authorities against Fano or other Amhara political movements have generated intense controversy. Their motivations remain important questions for investigation. Do they seek personal advancement or material benefits? Are they motivated by fear, ideological conviction, or political survival? Do they believe accommodation offers a more effective route to peace and influence than resistance?

This paper examines these questions without assuming that every political alliance constitutes betrayal or that Amhara political opinion is uniform. Its central concern is why some elites accommodate powerful authorities even when their decisions may conflict with the interests of significant sections of the communities they represent.

The suffering of the Amhara people deserves serious attention, impartial investigation, and recognition grounded in evidence — not neglect or selective concern.

2. Historical and Institutional Context

The political order established after 1991 reshaped the incentives facing Ethiopia’s political elites. Regional institutions were organised substantially around ethnic identity, while the EPRDF maintained extensive influence over political competition and regional administrations.

As Abbink’s analysis suggests, ethnicity became central to political discourse and institutional practice. This arrangement sought to recognise historically marginalised identities but also generated disputes over representation, territorial boundaries, and competing conceptions of citizenship.

Critics of the federal system argue that Amharas were sometimes treated as representatives of historical domination rather than as a diverse population with distinct political interests and rights. Such claims require examination against constitutional provisions, historical records, and the experiences of affected communities. A balanced analysis must distinguish the stated objectives of ethnic federalism from its institutional operation and consequences. The transition of 2018 did not automatically eliminate established political networks, habits of governance, or patterns of elite accommodation. Yohannes Gedamu’s work on ethnic federalism and authoritarianism provides a framework for investigating how institutions and elite relationships can persist across changes in political leadership.

The relevant question is whether dependence on central authority, access to state resources, and restricted political competition create incentives for some Amhara elites to accommodate the government rather than challenge its policies. This possibility deserves systematic investigation rather than an assumption that collaboration reflects a distinctive cultural weakness.

3. Elite Co-optation and Political Opportunism

Elite co-optation occurs when powerful authorities incorporate influential individuals or groups into governing structures to secure cooperation, weaken opposition, or neutralise challenges to their power. The incentives may include public office, political recognition, access to resources, personal protection, and influence over local administration.

Under authoritarian or highly centralised political systems, accommodation may be individually advantageous even when it imposes costs on the wider community. Resistance can lead to imprisonment, dismissal, economic hardship, or physical danger, whereas cooperation may preserve an individual’s position and influence. Yet similar political behaviour can reflect different motivations: personal ambition, ideological conviction, strategic calculation, or fear and coercion.

This framework offers a useful analytical lens for examining political alignments in Ethiopia. Among the public figures whose political conduct and relationships with political power may warrant closer scrutiny are Professor Alemayehu G. Mariam, the late Professor Endrias Eshete, Professor Dagnachew Assefa, Deacon Daniel Kibret, Demeke Mekonnen, Dr. Degu Andargachew, Genet Zewdie, Dawit Yohannes, and former Fano leaders who have defected or surrendered to government forces. This list is not exhaustive, and space does not permit a discussion of all the individuals who might merit consideration.

These individuals occupy different positions and have distinct political histories. Their inclusion in this discussion should not be interpreted as a conclusion that they have all been co-opted by the authorities. Rather, each case requires independent and evidence-based examination of public statements, political appointments, relationships with government officials, and actions following changes in political allegiance. Such an approach is essential to distinguish documented conduct from political interpretation, speculation, or accusation.

Dr. Degu Andargachew, for example, is perceived by some observers as having sought to reconsider, or even atone for, aspects of his previous political conduct. This interpretation, however, should be assessed critically against his own public statements, documented actions, and subsequent political engagements. Ultimately, the objective should not be to condemn individuals on the basis of their affiliations alone, but to examine their conduct, the principles they uphold, and the consequences of their political choices for the pursuit of justice, accountability, and the protection of the Amhara population.

I find it difficult to reconcile what I perceive as instances of personal advancement taking precedence over collective political interests. Nevertheless, political disagreement or cooperation with the government does not, by itself, establish betrayal, opportunism, or personal enrichment. The task is to determine whether, and under what circumstances, elite co-optation helps explain particular political decisions.

Nor is my inquiry dependent on establishing the ethnic identity of every individual mentioned. I have not sought to verify anyone’s ancestry, nor do I regard ethnic identity as a prerequisite for analysing political conduct. My concern is with the broader dynamics of elite accommodation, political alignment, and the incentives shaping individual choices within Ethiopia’s political system. Ultimately, the central question is how personal ambition, political survival, institutional dependence, and access to state resources influence elite behaviour across successive administrations—and whether these incentives create a persistent gap between the interests of political elites and the communities they claim to represent.

A useful investigation would ask:

• What benefits, if any, followed an individual’s political realignment?
• Did the individual change their public position after entering government?
• Did their decisions weaken independent political organisation?
• What consequences did their actions have for the communities they claimed to represent?
• Did they remain accountable to those communities?

Political opportunism also extends beyond appointments. Material incentives may include access to public contracts, business opportunities, or preferential treatment. Establishing such connections requires documentary evidence, including procurement records, asset disclosures, and beneficial ownership information. Wealth or political association alone does not prove corruption.

Status and recognition can be equally influential. Former opposition figures may find renewed authority attractive after losing influence within their original movements. Conversely, defections and surrenders by Fano members may reflect military exhaustion, internal divisions, disillusionment, fear, strategic calculation, or genuine changes in political conviction.

The central analytical task is to distinguish these explanations rather than treating every change of allegiance as evidence of selfishness.

4. Fear, Coercion, and Political Survival

Political collaboration may also occur under conditions of coercion. Threats, detention, surveillance, intimidation, economic pressure, and risks to family members can limit an individual’s freedom to oppose those in power.

Human Rights Watch has documented serious abuses and restrictions affecting civilians and political actors in Ethiopia, including during the conflict in the Amhara region. This broader context makes coercion a relevant explanation, although it does not establish the motives of any particular individual.

Three overlapping categories can help clarify the issue:

1. Voluntary collaboration: Cooperation based primarily on personal interests, political convictions, or anticipated benefits.
2. Strategic accommodation: Cooperation based on the belief that resistance is ineffective, unsustainable, or likely to cause greater harm.
3. Coerced collaboration: Cooperation shaped primarily by credible threats or severely restricted choices.

These distinctions matter morally as well as analytically. An individual who cooperates under threat should not automatically be judged in the same way as someone who voluntarily exchanges political support for personal advancement. Without reliable evidence about individual circumstances, however, these explanations remain hypotheses rather than established conclusions.

5. Ideological Divergence and Elite Detachment

Shared ethnic identity does not guarantee shared political priorities. Some Amhara elites may prioritise national unity, constitutional continuity, or the avoidance of civil war, while others emphasise regional autonomy, protection from state violence, territorial claims, or support for armed resistance. For example, a politician opposing Fano may believe that armed struggle will prolong instability and endanger civilians. A supporter of Fano may argue that resistance is necessary because existing institutions have failed to provide security and accountability. Neither position, by itself, proves loyalty or betrayal.

A deeper problem emerges when political elites develop interests that diverge from those of the wider population. Their careers, security, economic opportunities, and influence may depend on institutions that ordinary people experience differently. Under such conditions, preserving elite access to power may take precedence over public accountability. This concern is particularly serious when Amhara communities experience violence, displacement, and insecurity while some of their political representatives appear more concerned with maintaining their positions than addressing those conditions.

Achille Mbembe’s concept of necropolitics offers a possible framework for examining how political power shapes whose lives are protected, whose populations are exposed to violence, and whose suffering receives inadequate recognition. Applied cautiously to Ethiopia, the framework could help investigate state protection, political vulnerability, and accountability during the Amhara conflict.

The key questions are whether political institutions adequately protect Amhara communities, how political elites respond to threats against their constituents, and whether their decisions reinforce or challenge existing patterns of vulnerability. Decades of political marginalisation and recurring violence have left many Amhara feeling increasingly insecure in their own ancestral homeland—as though they were “dead men walking” in a land to which they have deep historical ties. This situation raises difficult questions about the role of individuals of Amhara origin who, through their political affiliations, decisions, or actions, may have contributed to or legitimised conditions that perpetuate the vulnerability of their own communities. Addressing these questions requires careful examination of documented evidence, individual responsibility, and the distinction between political disagreement and complicity in practices that undermine the safety and dignity of a population.

Ian Buruma’s (2023) The Collaborators: Three Stories of Deception and Survival in World War II provides a valuable point of departure for exploring the complex moral and political dilemmas associated with collaboration under oppressive conditions. Through historical accounts of individuals navigating occupation, deception, and survival during the Second World War, Buruma invites readers to reflect on the often-blurred boundaries between accommodation, complicity, opportunism, and self-preservation. These dilemmas also resonate with contemporary Ethiopia, where the political conduct of individuals of Amhara origin who align themselves with state authorities merits critical and evidence-based examination.

Nevertheless, historical comparisons must be approached with caution. Political alignment alone does not establish complicity, just as opposition to a government does not automatically demonstrate moral integrity. Rather, the central questions concern individual agency, the constraints under which political choices are made, and the consequences of those choices for vulnerable communities. Of particular importance is the extent to which individuals enable, legitimise, resist, or challenge practices that threaten the security, dignity, and fundamental rights of their own communities. Ultimately, the issue is not simply whether individuals collaborate with those in power, but how their decisions should be understood in relation to political responsibility, moral accountability, and the protection of human life.

6. The Psychology of Collaboration

Political psychology offers additional explanations for why individuals may cooperate with authorities whose actions conflict with their stated moral commitments. Stanley Milgram’s research on obedience to authority, Solomon Asch’s experiments on conformity, and Albert Bandura’s theory of moral disengagement provide useful conceptual starting points. Although these studies cannot directly explain Ethiopian political behaviour, they identify mechanisms that merit investigation.

Obedience to authority. Individuals operating within hierarchical institutions may defer responsibility to superiors or justify their actions as official duties. Such reasoning can weaken their sense of personal responsibility for harmful consequences.

Conformity and group pressure. Political actors may align with colleagues, party leaders, or influential networks to preserve professional advancement, social belonging, or personal safety. Others may genuinely share the prevailing position, making it important to distinguish conformity from conviction.

Moral disengagement. Individuals may justify harmful conduct by presenting it as necessary, minimising its consequences, transferring responsibility to superiors, or portraying opponents as undeserving of protection. These mechanisms can operate among government officials, opposition leaders, armed groups, and their supporters.

These theories should generate research questions rather than serve as diagnoses of particular individuals. Establishing their relevance requires examining public statements, decision-making processes, institutional pressures, and the consequences of political choices.

7. Is Political Self-Sabotage Embedded in Amhara Culture?

Recurring political divisions may create the impression that self-sabotage is embedded in Amhara culture or collective psychology. Such a conclusion, however, risks confusing the behaviour of particular elites with the characteristics of an entire population. Political fragmentation, factionalism, and collaboration with powerful authorities occur across societies. Moreover, elite conduct is not necessarily representative of popular values. Where institutions reward accommodation and punish opposition, similar behaviour can recur without requiring an explanation based on an inherent cultural disposition.

Family histories and inherited political narratives may influence loyalties, social networks, and expectations of leadership. They do not establish that collaboration or moral weakness is biologically or culturally inherited. A more productive approach would investigate how historical experiences, institutional incentives, political networks, and social expectations shape elite behaviour. Relevant questions include how communities understand political loyalty, what consequences follow from opposing powerful authorities, and whether institutions reward accountability or personal access to state power.

My concern is not that Amharas possess an inherent tendency toward self-destruction, but that recurring patterns of elite accommodation and political fragmentation may undermine collective security and political representation. Explaining these patterns requires evidence about specific decisions and their consequences, not generalised judgments about a people’s character.

My concern is not that Amharas possess an inherent tendency toward self-destruction, but that recurring patterns of elite accommodation and political fragmentation may undermine collective security and political representation.

8. Conclusion

Why do some Amhara political elites collaborate with authorities whose policies are perceived by many Amharas as harmful to their collective interests? This paper identifies several plausible explanations: personal ambition, material incentives, elite co-optation, fear and coercion, ideological divergence, political survival, and psychological mechanisms such as obedience, conformity, and moral disengagement. These explanations are neither mutually exclusive nor equally applicable to every individual. Collaboration may represent opportunism in one case, coercion or strategic accommodation in another, and genuine political disagreement in a third. Distinguishing among these possibilities requires case-specific evidence and careful attention to the consequences of political decisions.

Drawing on scholarship, comparative perspectives, and conversations with two former senior Amhara regional officials, this paper proposes an institutional and historically grounded approach to understanding elite behaviour in Ethiopia. Its central argument is that recurring political fragmentation should not be attributed to an inherent cultural defect. Instead, it should be investigated through the interaction of political institutions, historical experiences, social networks, individual incentives, and unequal power relations.

Ultimately, the critical question is whether political elites remain accountable to the communities they claim to represent. Understanding why that accountability sometimes breaks down is essential to explaining elite collaboration and identifying the political conditions under which representation can better protect public security, rights, and collective interests.

References

Abbink, J. (2011). Ethnic-based federalism and ethnicity in Ethiopia: Reassessing the experiment after 20 years. *Journal of Eastern African

Studies, 5*(4), 596–618.

Asch, S. E. (1956). Studies of independence and conformity: I. A minority of one against a unanimous majority. *Psychological Monographs:

General and Applied, 70*(9), 1–70.

Asmamaw, B. T. (2026). Half a knife: An Amhara resistance writer’s reckoning. Baye Asmamaw.

Bandura, A. (1999). Moral disengagement in the perpetration of inhumanities. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 3(3), 193–209.

Buruma, I. (2023). The collaborators: Three stories of deception and survival in World War II. Atlantic Books.

Gedamu, Y. S. (2021). The politics of contemporary Ethiopia: Ethnic federalism and authoritarianism. Routledge.

Human Rights Watch. (2024). World report 2024: Ethiopia. https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2024/country-chapters/ethiopia

Human Rights Watch. (2024). “If the soldier dies, it’s on you”: Attacks on medical care in Ethiopia’s Amhara conflict. Human Rights Watch.

International Crisis Group. (2023, November 16). Ethiopia’s ominous new war in Amhara (Africa Briefing No. 194).

Milgram, S. (1974). Obedience to authority: An experimental view. Harper & Row.

Muluye, K. (2020). The formation of Ethiopia’s federation and its implications for the Amharas’ quest for recognition and boundary demarcations. Modern Africa: Politics, History and Society.

Mbembe, A. (2003). Necropolitics. Public Culture, 15(1), 11–40.

Olson, M. (1965). The logic of collective action: Public goods and the theory of groups. Harvard University Press.

Epilogue

The poem captures the tragic fate of a rural Ethiopian woman, particularly an Amhara woman, whose life is consumed by endless labour—from the strength of youth to the frailty of old age. She grinds grain day after day, sustaining others while her own dreams, dignity, and aspirations remain buried beneath the dust of the grinding stone.

Like Sisyphus, she is condemned to an endless cycle of toil, with no meaningful reward, no recognition, and little hope of escape. She does not even know the name of the prime minister, while political elites who claim to represent her rise to power, enjoy privilege, and live in luxury in her name. The distance between her suffering and their prosperity exposes a painful contradiction between political representation and the lived realities of ordinary people. Perhaps the poem’s most devastating revelation is that, while she spends her life grinding grain, time quietly grinds her down. By the time she looks into the mirror, she can no longer distinguish the flour in her hair from the gray of old age. She has spent a lifetime feeding others, only to discover that life itself has consumed her. And those who speak in her name have risen, while she remains where she has always been—beside the grinding stone, forgotten by the very world her labour sustains.

The epilogue is a reflection on Bewketu Seyoum’s Amharic poem “ስትፈጭ የኖረች ሴት” (“The Woman Who Spent Her Life Grinding”).

Professor Girma Berhanu is a professor in the Department of Education and Special Education at the University of Gothenburg and a regular contributor to The Ethiopian Tribune. The views expressed are the author’s own. Individuals named in this essay are invited to respond; replies will be considered for publication in full.

THE ETHIOPIAN TRIBUNE

Conclusion — A Mirror to the Nation

Past, Present and the Future

Unite and Reclaim the Sea, Secure the Dam, Fight Poverty Not Each Other

Mefkereseb G. Hailu (PhD) · Final article of the series

Editor’s Foreword

In March, Dr Mefkereseb G. Hailu opened his series in these pages with “The Spirit of Adwa” and a premise that has run through every article since: when a new generation speaks, a nation must listen. Seven months and fourteen articles later, he closes it with the longest and most ambitious piece we have published from him.

The length is deliberate. A conclusion has to gather fourteen arguments into one and answer the questions they left open. Readers who followed only part of the series will find the whole of it here: the Abraham Accords and the “permissive disorder” of the Red Sea, the June election, the racket of four estates, the drones over Amhara, the Oromummaa debate and the case for Assab. Each is set against what has happened since. Readers who followed all of it will find the author testing his own forecasts against the record, and changing his view where eight years of evidence have changed it.

When the powers of the region redraw the map around us, will Ethiopia be a party to the drawing or a line on someone else’s page?

Dr Hailu does not ask to be agreed with. He sets out what would prove him wrong and invites his critics to show it. Many will disagree, some fiercely. His inbox through this series is testimony enough to that. We publish him because the questions he asks are the ones Ethiopia cannot avoid: what holds a nation together, what the sea is worth, and what kind of constitution 130 million citizens deserve.

As with every contribution, the views expressed are the author’s own and not those of The Ethiopian Tribune. Replies are welcome, and we will publish the serious ones.

We thank Dr Hailu for the series, for his patience with our edits, and for the reminder in his covering letter that the time to mature as a nation is now.

— The Editor

Synopsis

The final article of the series asks one question: how does a nation of 130 million, at war with itself and cut off from the sea, stop fighting its past and start building its future? It answers in five parts.

Part I — The Fourteen Articles as a Mirror

The author restates the series as a single architecture: national unity and Red-Sea sovereignty as the foundations, broad-based development anchored in democracy as the means, and GERD as the engine. He checks the series’ spring forecasts against the autumn’s events — the Houthi hold on the Bab al-Mandeb, the rupture with Asmara, the seven-party Alliance for Survival and the New Alamein declaration on Red-Sea governance. He sets out the documented record of the Abiy years, traces how a narrative casting the Amhara as the nation’s offender passed from Cairo and the liberation fronts into the 1995 Constitution and has since turned on its authors, and examines FANO’s place inside the new alliance, proposing six commitments any coalition must meet before victory, not after.

Part II — Red-Sea Sovereignty and the Constitution

He reconstructs the legal chain by which Ethiopia lost its coast between 1991 and 2018, weighs the case for and against the claim to the Doumeira–Rehyto–Beilul–Tio Corridor, and states plainly where it is strong and where it is not. He sets out four courses open to the nation and their price. He then turns to the 1995 Constitution: why Article 39 cannot be amended away, three routes to a replacement, the guarantees a citizens’ constitution must offer every community, and eleven safeguards against a new tyranny of unity.

Part III — Democracy and Development

Sovereignty is not prosperity. Using a binding-constraints method, the author follows Ethiopia’s productive chain and identifies where it actually breaks: land tenure, the industrial parks, a dam with too little grid behind it, a tax take of around seven per cent, and a school system that enrols almost every child but teaches too few of them. Each is given a target, a timetable and a measure.

Part IV — The Obligation to Our Citizens

Thirteen obligations, and the order in which they must be met: peace at home and a new constitution first, the sea claim reserved and codified at once, and its recovery last.

Part V — The Responsibility of the Intellectuals

Drawing on Zera Yacob, Benda, Said, Sen and Locke, he calls Ethiopia’s educated class to peace, the rule of law and development, names the only two wars he believes an intellectual may defend, and closes with an appeal to the young Ethiopians who will inherit the outcome.

Ethiopia’s Cycle of Self-Destruction: A Crisis of ‘Collective Intelligence’?

Professor Girma Berhanu

Editorial Foreword

There is a particular kind of grief that belongs to those who have watched the same tragedy unfold more than once. It is not only the grief of loss, but the grief of recognition: the knowledge that what is happening now has happened before, that its causes were visible, and that its costs were foreseeable. It is from within that grief that Professor Girma Berhanu writes.

The Tribune is pleased to publish his latest essay at a moment that hardly needs describing to our readers. With the Pretoria settlement in ruins and war returned to Tigray, with the insurgency in Amhara unresolved, with tensions rising along the Eritrean frontier, and with Sudan’s catastrophe burning to the west, Ethiopia once again finds itself counting the dead of a war it has fought, in one form or another, for most of living memory.

Professor Girma’s question is deceptively simple: why does a nation that has known the full cost of war keep choosing it? His answer declines the easy exits. He does not blame a single leader, a single movement or a single community, and he explicitly rejects the culturalist claim that Ethiopians are somehow predisposed to violence — an argument which, as he rightly observes, turns a contingent political failure into a supposedly permanent national characteristic. Instead he offers a different diagnostic lens: collective intelligence, the capacity of a political elite, and of the society from which it springs, to learn from experience, anticipate consequences, and convert that understanding into institutions that make coexistence possible.

It is a framing that carries the particular authority of a scholar whose own discipline is learning. Ethiopia, he insists, does not lack intelligent people. What it lacks is a political order that rewards foresight over cunning, negotiation over conquest, and long-term responsibility over short-term control.

“Ultimately, the measure of a nation’s intelligence is not how effectively it fights its enemies, but how wisely it prevents disagreements from becoming wars.”

Readers will notice that the essay names few names. This is deliberate, and it is both the essay’s strength and its challenge. By refusing to assign the cycle to any one administration or faction, Professor Girma obliges every reader to apply his diagnosis honestly to their own side before reaching for the failings of the other. That is no small demand in a political culture where, in his words, opponents are treated “as enemies to be eliminated rather than citizens with whom a common political future must be negotiated.”

The Tribune has long held that accountability and peace are not rival goods but conditions of one another. Professor Girma’s closing question — if Ethiopia cannot learn from the devastation of its past, what reason is there to believe its future will be any different? — ought to sit uncomfortably with every reader, in Addis Ababa and across the diaspora alike. We commend it to you.

— The Editor, The Ethiopian Tribune

Synopsis

In this essay, Professor Girma Berhanu asks why Ethiopia, after generations of war, famine and displacement, continues to reproduce the conditions of its own suffering. Setting aside explanations that rest on history, ethnicity or culture alone, he argues that the country’s recurring violence reflects a deeper deficit of “collective intelligence”: the failure of political elites, and the society that shapes them, to learn from experience, anticipate the consequences of their decisions, and build institutions capable of managing disagreement peacefully.

He traces how repression, exclusion and coercion — instruments of short-term control — manufacture the grievances that fuel the next conflict, and how a zero-sum political culture turns every contest for power into an existential struggle in which compromise is read as weakness. Military victory, he contends, may shift the balance of power, but it cannot settle competing historical narratives or confer legitimacy.

Turning to the present war in northern Ethiopia, he warns of its regional consequences and of inconsistent international attention, citing Sudan as a cautionary parallel, while insisting that foreign interference cannot absolve domestic actors of responsibility for their choices. He closes with four prescriptions: protected political participation; credible truth-seeking and accountability; negotiation as an ordinary instrument of politics rather than an admission of weakness; and a political culture that rewards long-term thinking over the mere acquisition of power.

✦✦✦

Ethiopia’s Cycle of Self-Destruction: A Crisis of ‘Collective Intelligence’?

By Professor Girma Berhanu

Why does a nation repeatedly resort to war despite having experienced its devastating consequences for generations? Is Ethiopia’s predicament rooted in its political traditions, historical grievances, cultural attitudes, or, more fundamentally, a failure of collective intelligence? By collective intelligence, I refer not to political intelligence in the narrow sense of strategic or tactical political acumen, but to the collective capacity of political elites to interpret information, integrate diverse perspectives, deliberate, and make decisions that shape political outcomes. This capacity must also be understood in relation to the broader population from which political elites emerge and with which they remain interconnected. The distinction is therefore analytical rather than absolute: political elites occupy specific positions of influence and decision-making, but their collective intelligence is shaped, directly and indirectly, by the knowledge, experiences, values, and aspirations of the wider society.

Ethiopia’s recurring cycles of war, famine, displacement, and human suffering raise a fundamental question: why does a country continue to reproduce the very conditions that have brought it so much misery? For decades, successive generations of Ethiopians have witnessed the destruction of lives, communities, and livelihoods, yet the country seems unable to escape the vicious cycle of violence. One conflict ends, another begins; one humanitarian catastrophe subsides, another emerges. The faces of the victims change, the political actors shift, and the justifications for violence evolve, but the underlying tragedy remains remarkably persistent.

Having witnessed this suffering throughout a significant part of my life, I find it increasingly difficult to understand why Ethiopia continues to pursue such a self-destructive path. I have seen friends, neighbours, and relatives suffer or lose their lives, either directly through armed conflict or indirectly through its devastating consequences. These experiences have convinced me that Ethiopia’s predicament cannot be explained simply by the existence of competing political interests or historical grievances. The more fundamental problem may be our collective inability to learn from experience, anticipate the consequences of our actions, and develop peaceful mechanisms for managing our differences.

My central argument is that Ethiopia’s recurring political violence reflects not merely a crisis of leadership or governance, but a profound deficit of collective intelligence: the failure of political elites and society at large to translate historical experience into a more peaceful and sustainable political order.

Beyond History and Political Tradition

There is no shortage of explanations for Ethiopia’s persistent conflicts. Some point to historical grievances, others to ethnic divisions, political exclusion, authoritarian traditions, or competition over power and resources. Still others attribute the problem to cultural attitudes that glorify military strength and view political compromise as weakness. These explanations have merit, but none is sufficient on its own.

Historical grievances, for instance, are real and cannot simply be dismissed. Communities carry memories of dispossession, marginalisation, political repression, and violence across generations. When such grievances remain unaddressed, they become sources of mistrust and resentment. However, history alone cannot explain why grievances repeatedly culminate in armed conflict rather than negotiated settlements. Many societies have experienced deeply traumatic histories without remaining permanently trapped in cycles of civil war.

The critical distinction, therefore, is between having historical grievances and being unable to resolve them peacefully. The former is a feature of Ethiopia’s complex past; the latter is a political failure. Similarly, cultural traditions and political attitudes may help explain why violence becomes normalised, but culture should not be treated as an immutable explanation for national tragedy. Ethiopians are not inherently predisposed to violence, nor is war an inevitable consequence of the country’s diversity. Such arguments risk turning a historically contingent political problem into an allegedly permanent national characteristic. The more useful question is how political institutions, leadership incentives, and prevailing attitudes interact to make violence more likely than compromise.

If the same destructive patterns persist across different governments and political generations, we must look beyond individual leaders and examine the structures and assumptions that reproduce these patterns.

The Failure to Anticipate Consequences

At the heart of Ethiopia’s recurring conflicts lies a striking failure to anticipate the consequences of political decisions.

I understand intelligence not simply as the possession of knowledge, academic ability, or political cunning, but as the capacity to anticipate the consequences of one's actions and adjust one's behaviour accordingly. By this definition, intelligence requires more than the ability to gain power or defeat an opponent. It requires an appreciation of how decisions made today shape the political, social, and economic realities of tomorrow.

Consider the repeated use of political repression, exclusion, and coercion to maintain control. Governments may initially perceive these measures as effective instruments of political survival. Suppressing dissent, marginalising particular communities, or forcibly displacing populations may temporarily weaken opposition and consolidate authority. Yet such measures also generate resentment, deepen social divisions, undermine institutional legitimacy, and create new grievances that may eventually fuel resistance. The apparent short-term benefits of repression can therefore produce devastating long-term consequences.

This is not a particularly complicated principle. A political system cannot indefinitely deny people meaningful participation, dignity, and security while expecting lasting stability in return. Nor can a government reasonably assume that communities subjected to injustice will remain permanently passive. Repression may silence grievances temporarily, but it rarely eliminates them.

The fundamental contradiction is that political actors often pursue immediate control through methods that undermine the long-term stability they claim to defend. This pattern raises an uncomfortable question: after decades of political upheaval, why have our leaders repeatedly failed to recognise that the subjugation of one group can become a source of insecurity for the entire country?

A failure to anticipate such consequences is not merely a leadership deficiency. It is a failure of political reasoning itself.

“The fundamental contradiction is that political actors often pursue immediate control through methods that undermine the long-term stability they claim to defend.”

Why Do We Keep Choosing War Over Negotiation?

The persistence of armed conflict also demands an examination of why peaceful alternatives repeatedly fail to take root.

Negotiation, compromise, and tolerance are often portrayed as signs of weakness in political environments shaped by mistrust and zero-sum competition. When political actors believe that losing power means losing their security, freedom, or even their lives, they have powerful incentives to resist compromise. Likewise, when communities believe that political defeat will expose them to domination or persecution, they may regard armed resistance as their only guarantee of survival.

Under such conditions, politics becomes an existential struggle. The objective is no longer simply to govern or influence public policy; it is to prevent the other side from gaining power.

This is one of the most destructive features of Ethiopia’s political predicament. When opponents are treated as enemies to be eliminated rather than citizens with whom a common political future must be negotiated, peaceful coexistence becomes increasingly difficult.

Yet this dynamic is not inevitable. It is reinforced by political institutions, leadership choices, and the absence of credible guarantees that disagreements can be resolved without violence.

A durable peace requires more than calls for unity or appeals to national solidarity. It requires institutions that protect political participation, safeguard fundamental rights, provide credible mechanisms for resolving disputes, and reassure competing groups that they need not resort to arms to secure their future.

Without these safeguards, appeals for peace can sound hollow, particularly to communities that have experienced repression or exclusion.

The argument, therefore, is not that Ethiopians simply need to become more tolerant. It is that tolerance must be translated into political arrangements that make coexistence both possible and worthwhile.

Collective Intelligence: Ethiopia’s Missing Political Resource

If historical grievances, political exclusion, and the struggle for power help explain Ethiopia’s recurring conflicts, the concept of collective intelligence may offer a broader framework for understanding why these problems remain unresolved. Collective intelligence is the capacity of individuals and institutions to combine knowledge, learn from experience, recognise shared interests, and make decisions that are wiser than those produced by isolated actors pursuing narrow objectives.

A society can contain highly educated individuals, sophisticated intellectual traditions, and politically astute leaders while still making collectively disastrous decisions. Individual intelligence does not automatically produce collective wisdom. Indeed, a political system can reward individuals for strategic brilliance while encouraging decisions that are harmful to society as a whole.

I hope readers understand that, when I use the term collective intelligence, I am referring specifically to the collective capacity of political elites to interpret information, deliberate, make decisions, and shape political outcomes. However, I do not intend to suggest that this intelligence exists independently of the broader society. The relationship between political elites and the masses is complex and reciprocal: although elites occupy positions of political influence and decision-making, they emerge from the wider population and are shaped by its knowledge, values, aspirations, and collective experiences. Thus, the distinction I draw is not between two entirely separate groups, but between different positions and roles within a broader social and political system.

A leader may be highly skilled at defeating political opponents but incapable of building a sustainable political settlement. A government may successfully suppress an insurgency in one region while creating conditions for future instability elsewhere. A political movement may achieve its immediate objectives while weakening the institutions necessary for long-term peace. In each case, narrow success becomes a source of broader failure.

Ethiopia’s challenge is therefore not necessarily an absence of intelligent people. It is the inability to organise political life in ways that reward foresight, cooperation, accountability, and learning. A society demonstrates collective intelligence when it can acknowledge the mistakes of the past without becoming paralysed by them, address historical injustices without reproducing new ones, and pursue competing interests without treating every disagreement as a justification for violence.

By contrast, a society that repeatedly revisits the same conflicts without developing more effective ways to resolve them displays a troubling inability to learn collectively. This distinction matters because it shifts the discussion away from blaming a particular ethnic group, political movement, or generation. It directs attention instead to the incentives, institutions, and political behaviours that allow destructive patterns to persist across different administrations and historical periods.

The central question becomes not whether Ethiopians are intelligent enough to understand their problems, but why their political systems have so often failed to convert that understanding into lasting solutions.

The Human Cost of Political Myopia

The consequences of this failure are measured not only in political instability but also in human suffering. War destroys more than lives and infrastructure. It tears apart families, disrupts education, undermines livelihoods, deepens poverty, and weakens the social relationships upon which communities depend. Displacement deprives people of their homes and livelihoods, while the fear and trauma generated by violence can endure long after the fighting subsides.

The economic costs are equally destructive. Resources that could support education, healthcare, infrastructure, and productive investment are diverted towards military expenditure and the management of humanitarian emergencies. Repeated conflict weakens public institutions, discourages investment, and makes economic recovery increasingly difficult. These consequences, in turn, create conditions that may contribute to further instability.

The result is a self-reinforcing cycle: conflict weakens institutions and livelihoods; weakened institutions struggle to manage political and economic pressures; unresolved grievances deepen mistrust; and mistrust makes future conflict more likely. What makes this cycle particularly tragic is that its consequences are neither mysterious nor unforeseeable. The relationship between political exclusion, repression, instability, and human suffering is evident enough that any serious assessment of Ethiopia’s past should take it into account.

And yet, political actors continue to behave as though military victory or the consolidation of power can provide permanent solutions to fundamentally political problems. They cannot. Military force may alter the balance of power, suppress an immediate challenge, or produce a temporary victory. It cannot, by itself, resolve competing historical narratives, establish political legitimacy, or create the trust necessary for peaceful coexistence. A victory that leaves the underlying grievances of a conflict unresolved may simply postpone the next confrontation.

A Neglected War and the Regional Consequences of Inaction

As I write this reflection, renewed or continuing conflict in northern Ethiopia raises once again the possibility of prolonged suffering and wider regional instability. The situation demands serious attention, not only because of the immediate humanitarian consequences but also because unresolved conflicts rarely remain confined to the communities in which they begin.

The risk of regional destabilisation makes it even more troubling when international attention is limited or inconsistent. The suffering of ordinary Ethiopians should not become less urgent simply because another crisis dominates the international agenda.

External actors also have a responsibility to examine the consequences of their involvement. Foreign governments and other powerful interests may pursue strategic, economic, or security objectives within the Horn of Africa. Their actions can influence the course of internal conflicts, sometimes reinforcing the incentives of domestic actors to continue fighting.

The experience of Sudan provides another stark reminder of how internal political struggles, armed competition, and external interests can interact to prolong devastation. Nevertheless, external interference should not become a convenient explanation for every Ethiopian failure. Domestic political actors retain responsibility for their own decisions. Foreign involvement may aggravate a conflict, but it does not erase the responsibility of those who choose repression, reject meaningful negotiations, or pursue political objectives through violence. Equally, international actors should recognise that prioritising short-term strategic interests over durable peace can have consequences far beyond the immediate conflict.

A more consistent international commitment to civilian protection, humanitarian access, accountability, and credible peace initiatives is essential. But lasting peace cannot simply be imported from abroad. It must also be built through political choices and institutional reforms within Ethiopia itself.

Breaking the Cycle Requires More Than Changing Leaders

If Ethiopia’s predicament is partly a crisis of collective intelligence, then replacing one leader with another will not, by itself, resolve the problem.

Leadership matters enormously, but the repeated recurrence of similar patterns suggests that the challenge is also institutional and societal. A political system that rewards coercion, concentrates power, discourages dissent, and treats compromise as defeat will continue to generate destructive outcomes, even when individual leaders change.

Breaking this cycle requires a fundamental shift in the conduct of politics.

First, political participation must be protected, and communities must have credible means of pursuing their interests without resorting to armed struggle. Political institutions must be sufficiently inclusive and accountable to ensure that losing a political contest does not mean losing one's basic rights or security.

Second, historical grievances must be addressed through credible processes of truth-seeking, accountability, reconciliation, and institutional reform. Peace cannot be built by demanding that victims simply forget their suffering. Nor can it be sustained by allowing historical injustices to justify new acts of collective punishment or revenge.

Third, negotiation must become an accepted instrument of political problem-solving rather than an admission of weakness. Compromise does not require abandoning fundamental principles. It requires recognising that a diverse society cannot be governed sustainably by imposing the will of one group upon all others.

Finally, Ethiopia needs a political culture that rewards long-term thinking. Political leaders should be judged not merely by their ability to acquire or retain power, but by their capacity to prevent conflict, strengthen institutions, protect citizens, and leave future generations with a more stable country. These changes are difficult, but the alternative is far more costly: the continued destruction of human lives and national potential in pursuit of political outcomes that remain inherently fragile.

Conclusion: How Much More Must We Suffer Before We Learn?

After decades of recurring violence, the most disturbing question is no longer simply why Ethiopia experiences war. It is why the lessons of war have failed to produce a more peaceful political order.

How many more lives must be lost before we recognise that no lasting national future can be built through the subjugation of one community by another? How many more generations must endure displacement, poverty, trauma, and the loss of loved ones before we acknowledge that military victory is not a substitute for political settlement? I find this recurring cycle of destruction both heartbreaking and intellectually perplexing. Ethiopia possesses a rich history, a remarkable cultural diversity, and enormous human potential. Yet these strengths cannot protect the country from the consequences of political choices that repeatedly undermine its stability.

The answer cannot be reduced to culture, historical grievances, political tradition, or individual leadership alone. These factors interact, but their destructive effects are amplified by the failure to learn collectively, anticipate consequences, and establish institutions capable of managing disagreement peacefully. Perhaps the deepest tragedy is that the consequences of our collective failures are borne disproportionately by ordinary people, while those who make consequential political decisions may remain insulated from much of the suffering they produce.

A nation that repeatedly sacrifices its people to resolve political disagreements must eventually confront the possibility that the problem lies not only in the disagreements themselves, but also in the way it chooses to resolve them.

For Ethiopia, the way forward requires more than a change of government, a new political slogan, or another promise of national unity. It requires a transformation in political reasoning: from domination to coexistence, from revenge to justice, from short-term calculations to long-term responsibility, and from narrow individual or group interests to a genuine commitment to the common good. Ultimately, the measure of a nation's intelligence is not how effectively it fights its enemies, but how wisely it prevents disagreements from becoming wars.

If Ethiopia cannot learn from the devastation of its past, what reason do we have to believe that its future will be any different?

Girma Berhanu is Professor in the Department of Education and Special Education at the University of Gothenburg, Sweden, and a regular contributor to The Ethiopian Tribune.

From the Editor

The Solvent and the Shore

An editorial foreword to Dr Mefkereseb G. Hailu’s “Medemer, Oromummaa and Red-Sea Sovereignty: Is Abiy Making Ethiopia an Island of Enemies?”

On 5 October the Prime Minister’s Office announced that the administration sworn in that morning would be known as the “Medemer Government”. Our contributor had already finished asking what Medemer is for. The coincidence is not his doing, but it tells the reader why this instalment matters: the word that names the government is the word this essay sets out to examine.

Dr Mefkereseb G. Hailu warned us, in the note that accompanied the manuscript, that his argument kept being overtaken by the news it was trying to describe. He was not exaggerating. Between the first draft and the last, war resumed in the north on 23 September; on 1 October Addis Ababa closed its embassy in Asmara, declared ten Eritrean diplomats persona non grata and expelled an Egyptian diplomat, and Asmara severed relations; Mekelle changed hands again; and on 4 October the leaders of Egypt, Eritrea, Somalia and Sudan met at New Alamein and declared the governance of the Red Sea the exclusive business of its littoral states. Every one of those events now sits inside the essay, and each strengthens the question in its title.

What distinguishes the piece is not its anger, which is considerable, but its method. Faced with the charge, now common across the opposition, that Medemer is the civic dress of an Oromummaa project, MGH does not chant it. He traces where the narrative came from, lays the case against the charge at full strength, and insists that the political entrepreneurs who trade in Oromummaa are not the Oromo people. Nor does he spare the history: on the authority of Oromo historians themselves, he names the sixteenth-century record of assimilation, domination and elimination for what it was, ethnocide, while refusing to make it an indictment of any people. He concludes that the remedy is the same whichever reading is right. His sharpest pages are on how this government actually works: a cabinet assembled for dependence rather than competence, a decision-making circle that appears on no organigram, and a Prime Minister who tells Parliament his own ministers have been under surveillance. His prescription is institutions first, with democracy as their capstone, and he spells it out in six commitments that no election could deliver on its own.

Changing the ruler changes a stone. Judge every proposal by one question: does it change the ingredients and the process, or only who stands at the fire?

Readers will find the second pillar, on the sea, the most consequential and the most contested. MGH argues that Ethiopia’s claim to the Doumeira–Rehyto–Beilul–Tio corridor rests on history and on a right never lawfully surrendered; that it expressly does not extend to Massawa; and that Eritrea’s continuing military presence on Ethiopian soil has already engaged Ethiopia’s right of self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter. From that he draws a sequence that ends, failing a treaty, in securing and incorporating the corridor. Many readers, Eritrean readers above all, will reject that conclusion, and international lawyers will dispute its premises. We publish it because it is argued rather than asserted, because it is sourced and bounded, and because the author himself names the precondition Ethiopia does not meet: a settled house. A state that moves without one, he writes, opens a fifth front rather than recovering a corridor. As always, the views are the author’s own, and our pages are open to a reasoned reply.

MGH writes that he can find only three explanations for a nation that quotes, as its operating manual, a constitution designed to divide it: that we are lying to ourselves, that we are deluded, or that we are quite mad. He will return next week with the fifteenth and final instalment of this series, which promises to gather the parts and set out what is to be done. We are grateful, once again, that he has chosen these pages to discharge what he calls the obligation of a citizen to say what he sees.

— The Editor, The Ethiopian Tribune

Synopsis

Medemer, Oromummaa and Red-Sea Sovereignty

Is Abiy Making Ethiopia an Island of Enemies? — Mefkereseb G. Hailu (PhD), October 2026

The question

The preceding instalment documented what Abiy Ahmed’s government does. This one asks what it is for, and what it has done to Ethiopia’s place in the world. The argument stands on two pillars that the author holds to be inseparable: national unity, which he argues the government has dismantled at home, and Red-Sea sovereignty, a just claim he argues it has squandered abroad. Measured against the four interests this series has defended throughout — national unity, Red-Sea sovereignty, development anchored in democracy, and the GERD as the engine of industrialisation — he finds the government has damaged every one.

The first pillar: Medemer, Oromummaa and the soul of the state

MGH sets out the unionist charge that Medemer’s civic language conceals an ethno-national project, then states the opposite case with equal force: Asafa Jalata and other Oromo nationalists regard Abiy as an enemy of Oromummaa, and his army has fought the OLA and bombed Oromo farmers since 2018. Both readings cannot be literally true. He is precise about his own position, which is neither. He does not say this government serves the Oromo people; he says it was built on one regional machine, governs through it, and is licensed by the Constitution. The common factor is personal power rather than an ethnic programme, and it hardly matters which reading wins, because an ethnic-based Constitution will reward whoever captures the centre.

His target, he insists, is a racket that farms in the name of a people, not the people in whose name it farms. Anyone who moves from “this machine governs through an Oromo political network” to “the Oromo are the problem” has, he writes, “abandoned the argument of this series and joined the other side of the racket”. The Oromo farmer bombed in Wollega stands on his side of that argument, not the government’s.

The political entrepreneurs who trade in Oromummaa are not the Oromo people, and the Oromo people are not their property.

That distinction is not, however, an absolution of history. MGH traces the making of Oromummaa through Asmarom Legesse’s anthropology of Gadaa and the popular narrative fixed by Tesfaye Gebreab’s fiction, and sets the benign textbook account of moggaasaa (adoption before the Abbaa Gadaa, protection for the weak) against the fuller record documented by Mohammed Hassen, the leading Oromo historian of the expansion. That record is “a sequence of assimilation, domination and elimination”. Those who submitted were adopted and then held as gabbaro, clients and serfs on land they had owned; Damot, Bizamo and Gafat were broken; the Gafat language is extinct; and the Gaturi survive “only as an entry in Mohammed Hassen’s pages”. His verdict is a single word: “That is not a migration. It is assimilation enforced by conquest, and the modern name for the deliberate extinction of peoples as peoples — language, lineage, memory — is ethnocide.”

What keeps this analysis rather than slander, he argues, is that it runs in both directions and ends in a remedy rather than a grievance. The same historian wrote of Conquest, Tyranny and Ethnocide against the Oromo; Mekuria Bulcha writes of genocidal violence in the making of the Ethiopian state. “Everybody’s ancestors are victims; everybody’s ancestors are perpetrators; and under this Constitution every one of those graves earns a dividend.” That dividend is the racket. His remedy is legal and prospective: that forced assimilation, ethnic cleansing and incitement to either be crimes “whoever commits them and whichever people they are committed against — the Gafat in the seventeenth century, the Amhara and Somali of Wollega in ours”. It is a law against conduct, not against Gadaa or any people’s heritage.

On Gadaa itself his position is one of symmetry. It is “heritage, not a constitution”, and it “belongs in the museum, the university and the community — not in the ministry”. A state of 130 million cannot be governed by age-sets any more than by the Fetha Nagast, and financing that pretence from the national budget is “as objectionable as the old state’s making one church and one language the condition of belonging”, just as treating the national flag as a provocation is. It is that symmetry which keeps the argument out of the ethnic quarrel altogether.

The most original section examines how the government works. The Prime Minister’s statement to Parliament that his ministers were under classified surveillance is read not as a quirk but as the signature of a structure: a cabinet that represents rather than governs, a shadow chain of command first built by the TPLF, and a ruler who must watch ministries that answer to someone else. The cabinet purge since 2019, he argues, selected for dependence rather than ethnicity or faith, removing everyone with a base from which to refuse. Hence his prescription: not “remove the man”, not “hold an election”, but institutions first, and he offers six commitments — a cabinet that is the government, a merit civil service, intelligence under statute, courts that can rule against the state, secure property, and independent numbers.

You cannot beat a man you have not studied.

An island of enemies

A table lists nine fronts open simultaneously as the article went to press, five of them armed and three turned into diplomatic ruptures within a week. MGH revisits his earlier essay on “chaotic equilibrium” and concludes that September and October 2026 have settled the question: the method did not master chaos, it manufactured it. A credible sea strategy, he argues, would have begun with a settlement at home and a published legal case; what exists instead is rhetoric that has turned a legitimate interest into a regional alarm. He offers, explicitly as inference rather than proof, the observation that this government has profited politically from every war it has fought while the nation has lost by each.

The second pillar: the legitimacy of Red-Sea sovereignty

The longest part of the essay sets out the historical record from Aksum to 1890 in two tables, and argues that the coast was lost in 1991–93 without the consent of the Ethiopian nation. It takes the Eritrean counter-case from its most serious authors, conceding Massawa outright and confining the claim to the Doumeira–Rehyto–Beilul–Tio corridor, with Assab at its centre. It then turns to security: the former Emirati base at Assab, the 2024 Asmara summit, and the El Alamein Joint Declaration of 4 October, which MGH calls the most important sentence written about the Red Sea in a decade because it defines Ethiopia out of the sea without ever naming it.

On the law, he argues that Eritrea’s continuing military presence on Ethiopian soil is an armed attack that has already engaged Article 51, that the proxy case must be argued second and proved with a published dossier, and that, failing a treaty, Ethiopia would be entitled to secure, hold and incorporate the corridor. He is equally clear that force confers no title, that Massawa is not claimed, and that one of six preconditions is unmet: a settled house. “Five of six is not a plan,” he writes; “it is a temptation.”

Resistance, objections and the conclusion

Invoking Adwa, MGH calls for resistance to the constitutional order rather than to any people, under three rules: national not ethnic, lawful and evidential, and siding with none of the ethnic entrepreneurs — a category in which he places Abiy, Zemene Kassie, Debretsion Gebremichael and Jal Marro alike. Arms, he insists, are reserved for the defence of the nation and its outlet to the sea, never against fellow Ethiopians. He then states seven objections at full strength, in his critics’ own voice — among them the charge that his analysis of Oromummaa is ethnic slander dressed as analysis, that Eritrean independence closed the matter, and that this is Amhara nationalism in a citizen’s vocabulary — concedes what is true in each, and answers the rest.

The conclusion meets the government’s economic defence on its own ground. The reform is real — the float, IMF and World Bank support, falling inflation — but the development is theatre: a birr that has lost three-fifths of its value, rising poverty, debt service more than three times the education budget, and corridor projects that evict without compensation. The deepest cost, he argues, appears on no ledger: the belief that an Ethiopian is an Ethiopian before he is anything else.

A nation can be invaded and remain itself. It cannot be taught that it never existed and remain itself.

The fifteenth and final instalment, to follow next week, will set out the road from here.

The full article, with its three tables and 111 references, follows below. ↓

Analysis

The Red Line That Moved

Abiy Ahmed says the ministers he dropped this week were under scrutiny for a year. The public record supports part of the case against them. What it does not yet show is a single referral to a prosecutor.

By E. Frashie ·October 2026

When Abiy Ahmed presented his first cabinet in April 2018, he drew a line. Graft and maladministration, he told lawmakers, were “a red line that has to be enforced.” Eight years and several reshuffles later, he returned to the House of Peoples’ Representatives on 8 October to begin his second full term with a new Council of Ministers, and with his own account of why some of the old one had gone.

The House approved the new cabinet unanimously: twenty-two ministers and a returning Deputy Prime Minister, Temesgen Tiruneh. Seven ministers kept their portfolios and ten newcomers joined. Among those who did not return were four whose departures now carry more than routine significance: Belete Molla at Innovation and Technology, Muferiat Kamil at Labour and Skills, Kassahun Gofe at Trade and Regional Integration, and Alemu Sime at Transport and Logistics.

The Prime Minister was unusually candid about how he had arrived at the list. “ሌብነትን በሚመለከት ሁሉም ሚኒስትሮች እና ሚኒስትር ዴኤታዎች ቢያንስ ላለፈው አንድ ዓመት ከፍተኛ ሚስጥራዊ ክትትል ሲደረግባቸው ነበር,” he told the House, according to the transcript published by Tikvah Ethiopia. On the matter of theft, every minister and state minister had been under top-secret surveillance for at least the past year. The monitoring, he said, was backed by intelligence and covered their activities at home and abroad, their children, their wives, their uncles and every wealthy person they dealt with. “The reshuffle,” he added, “was not done for nothing.”

Each minister was then made to defend himself against what was said about him, and the Prime Minister read the charges out as they had been put: you are suspected; you drink; you have improper ties with the rich; you scheme rather than support; you do not follow things up; you are never in the office. A minister need not be a thief himself, he said. Failing to control theft around him, ignoring tip-offs, or clinging to an attitude of “don’t come near me, don’t touch my area” had counted against him too.

Then came the most revealing passage of the session. Some of the complaints, he acknowledged, might have been nothing more than grievance or accusation, and in some cases sufficient evidence had not been found. “But those with any tendency of suspicion,” he said, “whether in themselves or around them, we did not make cabinet members.”

It was a remarkable admission, twice over. A head of government told Parliament that the state’s intelligence services had spent a year watching not only his ministers but their wives, their children and their uncles. On whose legal authority, under what oversight and with what safeguards that was done is a question in its own right, and one the House did not ask. And he conceded, in the same breath, that some of those left out were left out on suspicion where the evidence fell short.

He named none of the ministers who had failed. He did not need to. Within days, Meseret Media, citing government sources, had published a detailed account of the grounds for removing four of them, and it maps onto the Prime Minister’s own list almost point for point: improper ties to the rich, failure to police theft and, in one case, drinking.

The Tribune has tested Meseret’s claims against the public record. A consistent pattern emerges. In every case there is a documented failure that Parliament, the Auditor General or the press had already recorded. In every case, the alleged conduct that would turn a failure into a crime rests, for now, on unnamed sources. And in no case has any authority announced a charge.

The audit nobody prosecuted

The case against Belete Molla is the best documented. Parliament’s Standing Committee on Public Expenditure Management and Control found a budget gap of more than half a billion birr at his ministry, together with unauthorised reallocations, payments outside legal provisions and inflated salaries, and gave the ministry fifteen days to account for them. Belete conceded before the committee that audit deficiencies had occurred. The Federal Auditor General separately found that the ministry had completed only eleven per cent of its planned projects.

The ministry also administered the World Bank’s $200 million Digital Foundations project, and it is there that Meseret Media’s government sources place the gravest charges. According to Meseret, money from the facility was used to pay high monthly advisory fees, in dollars, to individuals whose qualifications bore no relation to the sector. It cites a veterinary doctor retained on an annual salary as a digital consultant, and another adviser paid $120,000 a year who, Meseret says, spent most of his time in the United States.

▶ Watch Meseret Media’s report on the Digital Foundations fees (from 08:07)

Meseret further reports that the ministry awarded a contract worth 21 million birr, without a tender, to a company whose owner had drawn public attention for importing a Tesla Cybertruck free of duty. None of these specific allegations has been publicly confirmed by the ministry, the World Bank or any investigating body, and the Tribune has not independently verified them. The audit findings, by contrast, have been public for months.

▶ Watch Meseret Media’s report on the 21 million birr contract (from 08:58)

The brokers’ bill

Under Muferiat Kamil, the Ministry of Labour and Skills drafted an overseas employment bill that would have required recruitment agencies to lodge bonds of between $50,000 and $250,000 in blocked accounts, prompting open resistance from the agencies’ own federation. A separate ministry directive confining agencies to four named banks was challenged as straying into territory reserved by law for the National Bank. In Parliament, one MP told the minister plainly that overseas employment was in crisis.

Meseret Media’s account goes considerably further. It reports that two senior officials serving under the minister, the chief executive of Foreign Employment, Ermias Tekle, and the head of the Labour Market Information System Project Office, Birhanu Adal, were arrested by security forces in connection with human trafficking. Meseret also describes the ministry’s draft proclamation as an attempt to make the ministry the sole registration body, reducing licensed agencies to brokers, and to double the mandatory agency bank guarantee from $100,000 to $200,000 under the ministry’s direct control. The Tribune has found no official confirmation of the arrests, and the published draft reported by Addis Fortune sets the bond on a sliding scale rather than at a single figure. If the arrests occurred, the public is entitled to know who was charged, with what, and in which court.

▶ Watch Meseret Media’s report on the proclamation (from 10:16) · the arrests (from 19:10)

A red line that ends at the door of the cabinet room is not a red line at all.

Plates from an unnamed supplier

Alemu Sime’s ministry oversaw the national switch to new vehicle licence plates. Motorists objected loudly to the price, with Addis Fortune reporting fees of around 56,000 birr at the capital’s licensing bureau. The ministry imported roughly four million plates from a Chinese manufacturer whose identity officials declined to disclose. According to Meseret Media, after the public outcry over the plates, intelligence services monitored possible direct ties between the minister and the foreign supplier. Meseret’s sources also accuse him of inappropriately close dealings with investors, alleging that he accepted holiday gifts of cattle from them and told them he expected a diplomatic posting to China. None of these claims has been confirmed, and the Tribune has not verified them. The refusal to name the supplier of four million state-mandated plates, by contrast, is a matter of record, and it should be answered whoever now holds the portfolio.

▶ Watch Meseret Media’s report on the investor ties and the plate supplier (from 17:23)

Queues, and the 658

Kassahun Gofe presided over a fuel market in chronic disorder. In December 2024, as queues stretched through Adama and Hawassa, he insisted there was no actual shortage of supply. By March this year, with Middle Eastern imports disrupted, his ministry reported that 658 people, officials among them, had been detained over illegal fuel trading. Meseret Media links him directly to the disruption. According to its sources, rather than allocating market share among distributors by logistical capacity, he favoured a single, less experienced company for personal gain, and the dispute grew heated enough to play out in front of the Prime Minister’s macroeconomic adviser, Girma Birru. Meseret also links a mid-June accident in Addis Ababa involving an excavator to widespread rumours of drinking, a point it ties to the Prime Minister’s own remarks about officials who drink. These allegations are unproven, and the Tribune has not verified them. But the contrast it draws is already on the record: hundreds detained at the pump, and no minister so much as questioned in public.

▶ Watch Meseret Media’s report on fuel distribution (from 06:22)

Removal is not accountability

The Prime Minister closed with a warning to the new cabinet. Its members, he said, had come through a month and a half of training and repeated examinations, sleeping no more than two or three hours a night, and what awaited them was “an era of suffering” in which sleep and idle joking would not be permitted. “ሥልጣን ኮፊያ እንጂ ጭንቅላት አይደለም,” he said: power is a hat, not the head. And the rule was simple: “Work, and if we do not work, leave.” It was meant as a show of resolve. It also marked the limit of his ambition. A hat is taken off; it is not put on trial. The sanction he named for failure, and for theft, was departure. He did not mention prosecution.

None of this establishes guilt, and this newspaper does not assert it. That is precisely the point. If the government has spent a year assembling evidence of embezzlement, procurement abuse and links to trafficking, that evidence belongs before the Attorney General and the Federal Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission, not in a parliamentary speech followed by briefings to friendly outlets. And where, as the Prime Minister himself conceded, the evidence fell short, a public account of misconduct by unmistakable implication is a verdict delivered without a trial.

Either way, due process is owed twice over: to the citizens whose money, fuel and livelihoods were at stake, and to the former ministers themselves, who are entitled to answer the case against them in a forum that can test it. A quiet reshuffle satisfies neither.

The Tribune is putting four questions to the Office of the Prime Minister, the Attorney General and the Federal Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission. Has any of the four former ministers been referred for investigation? Have the arrests at the Ministry of Labour and Skills been confirmed, and on what charges? Who manufactured the new licence plates, and under what contract? And what has become of the misspent sums identified at the Ministry of Innovation and Technology?

In 2018 the Prime Minister promised that corruption would not be tolerated. A promise of that kind is measured not by who leaves the cabinet, but by who is made to answer for what happened while they sat in it.

Right of reply: The Ethiopian Tribune invites Belete Molla, Muferiat Kamil, Kassahun Gofe and Alemu Sime to respond to the allegations reported by Meseret Media and referred to in this article. Any response received will be published in full and without editing.

Analysis · Ethiopia

A Cabinet for a War It Will Not Name

Executive continuity, coercive federalism and the second northern war in Ethiopia

By E. Frashie  The Ethiopian Tribune · 8 October 2026

I. Introduction: a government formed under fire

The sequence of the past fortnight tells its own story. On 23 September, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and allied armed groups from Amhara and Afar launched a multi-pronged offensive against federal forces, returning northern Ethiopia to large-scale war.^[1] On the night of 30 September, an explosion struck the headquarters of the Ethiopian National Defence Force at Tor Hailoch in Addis Ababa; its cause and authorship remain officially unexplained.^[2] On 3 October, federal and allied forces entered Mekelle without a fight, after TPLF leaders and fighters abandoned the city.^[3] On 5 October, parliament re-elected Abiy Ahmed as prime minister.^[4] Three days later, it approved his cabinet unanimously.^[5]

A cabinet formed in such circumstances is more than an administrative act. Its composition reveals how a government understands the crisis it governs, and what it prefers to leave unsaid. The list approved on 8 October is notable less for its novelties than for its silences. It places a former peace minister at Defence and an opposition leader from a war-affected region at Peace. It keeps the foreign minister who authored Ethiopia’s case against Eritrea. And it hands the national purse to a planning technocrat at the moment war begins to consume it.

This article reads the cabinet against the record. Its sources are the official appointment list as reported by The Reporter, the analytical work of the International Crisis Group, statements of the United Nations and foreign governments, wire reporting from AFP, Reuters and AP, and the coverage this publication has built since the Pretoria settlement began to unravel. Where a claim rests on a single source or remains contested, it is identified as such.

II. Context: from Pretoria to the Alliance for Survival

The Pretoria Agreement of November 2022 ended the deadliest war of the century so far, but it ended it through military pressure rather than political compromise. Crisis Group has described the settlement as leaving “open wounds”: a TPLF that regarded the deal as lopsided, an Eritrea excluded from the table, and a Western Tigray left under Amhara control with its displaced population in camps.^[1] This publication traced the deal’s slow collapse through the summer, culminating in our coverage of the August fighting.^[6]

The decisive rupture came in late April and early May 2026, when the TPLF ousted Tigray’s interim administration and reinstalled Debretsion Gebremichael. It followed with a conscription drive and open talk of removing the prime minister.^[1] Addis Ababa answered by cutting federal transfers and fuel, and with a growing drone campaign. When Ethiopians voted on 1 June, Tigray did not: the TPLF had been banned as a party and the region’s residents were excluded from the poll.^[7] Days later, the French journalist Augustine Passilly was expelled after reporting that Tigrayans were being forcibly recruited.^[7] Our election coverage, including E. Frashie’s dispatches from polling day and our analysis of first-past-the-post seat distortion, documented a contest that produced a commanding majority from a narrowed field.^[8]

On 20 September, seven armed groups announced an Alliance for Survival pledged to overthrow the government: the TPLF, the Amhara Fano National Movement, the Oromo Liberation Army, the Ogaden National Liberation Front, the Afar Revolutionary Democratic Unity Front and two organisations from Benishangul-Gumuz.^[9] For readers of these pages the development had a precedent. Our earlier work on the so-called “Tsimdo” coalition, including Dr Sosina Tadesse’s rebuttal, examined Addis Ababa’s claim that a TPLF faction and Asmara had formed a hostile alliance.^[10] The Alliance for Survival is a declared coalition; Eritrea’s role within it remains alleged by Addis Ababa and denied by Asmara.^[11]

“The Alliance for Survival is broad but shallow: its members share little beyond opposition to the prime minister.”

Crisis Group places primary responsibility for the September escalation on the TPLF, which launched the ground assaults, while recording the TPLF’s claim that it was responding to a federal drone barrage on 22 September.^[1] That attribution matters. It gives Addis Ababa a measure of diplomatic cover it lacked in November 2020, and it shapes how the new cabinet can present its mandate abroad.

III. Reading the cabinet

The security portfolios

The most telling appointment is the move of Mohammed Idris from the Ministry of Peace to the Ministry of Defence.^[5] In institutional terms, the official charged with dialogue and reconciliation now commands the war effort. One reading is pragmatic: the government wants a defence minister fluent in the political management of insurgency. Another is less reassuring. It suggests that, in the government’s own conception, peace has become a function of security.

His successor at Peace is Musa Adem, chairman of the Afar People’s Party.^[5] The choice is geographically pointed. Afar is now a front line: TPLF and ARDUF fighters reportedly took the towns of Aba-Ala and Erebti in the first week of fighting.^[9] Placing an Afar party leader in charge of peacebuilding may be read as an attempt to anchor Afar politically to the federal centre. That is an inference from timing and geography, not a stated rationale.

A further move deserves note. Abraham Belay, a Tigrayan who led the federally appointed Tigray administration during the last war and later served as defence minister, has left the ministerial ranks to head the Nuclear Commission.^[12,13] Whatever its administrative logic, the reassignment removes from cabinet one of the federal government’s most prominent Tigrayan figures at the very moment the war returns to Tigray.

Diplomacy

Gedion Timothewos remains foreign minister.^[5] It was Gedion who, in October 2025, wrote to the UN Secretary-General accusing Eritrea and a hardline TPLF faction of preparing for war, and who in February 2026 accused Asmara of deploying troops on Ethiopian soil.^[14,15] Eritrea dismissed both as fabrication.^[15] His retention signals continuity in the external narrative: that the war is the product of foreign subversion as much as domestic rebellion. On 1 October Ethiopia closed its embassy in Asmara and Eritrea severed diplomatic ties in response.^[16]

The economic team

Fitsum Assefa, for eight years Minister of Planning and Development, becomes Minister of Finance. She replaces Ahmed Shide, now Speaker of the House.^[5] Her former ministry has been renamed the Ministry of National Strategy, and logistics has been split from transport into a ministry of its own.^[12]The Reporter notes that the new finance minister inherits foreign-exchange reform, complex debt restructuring and continuing negotiations with international financial institutions.^[12]

Those negotiations now proceed in wartime. In January, Crisis Group cited Ethiopia’s need for continued IMF support as a reason to hope Addis Ababa would avoid new hostilities.^[17] That restraint has failed. The birr registered an average bid of 160 in a September central-bank auction.^[18] The new government targets a tax-to-GDP ratio of 9.62 per cent for 2026/27, a narrow base from which to finance a war.^[19] British and German travel advice both report nationwide fuel shortages.^[20,21] And American aid, on which Ethiopia long depended, was sharply reduced in 2025.^[22]

Inclusion and its limits

The government has presented the cabinet as inclusive. Nine of the 22 ministers are women, about 41 per cent. Musa Adem of the Afar People’s Party and Professor Birhanu Nega of EZEMA come from parties that contested the June election, and the cabinet includes the first federal minister from the Harari Region.^[5] These are real features of the list.

“Inclusion of those who participated is not the same as inclusion of those who contested.”

Yet the parliament that approved this cabinet was elected in a poll that The Reporter describes as marked by opposition boycotts, and in which Tigray did not vote.^[12,7] The new executive is therefore being constructed without the representatives of the region over which the war is being fought. Inclusion of those who participated is not the same as inclusion of those who contested. For a federation whose founding bargain was regional self-rule, that gap is not a technicality.

IV. The war the cabinet inherits

Militarily, the federal position has improved sharply in a week. Government forces retook Alamata on 28 September and, by 4 October, were patrolling Mekelle and guarding its key institutions.^[9,3] Residents described relief at the lull, alongside the absence of police and fear of looting.^[3] Communications and electronic banking began returning to much of Tigray the same weekend.^[23]

The precedent is not encouraging. In November 2020, federal forces also took Mekelle quickly; Tigrayan forces retook it the following year. Debretsion has already signalled a guerrilla strategy, saying the TPLF will strike “wherever we choose”.^[3] A war of attrition in rural Tigray, rather than a decisive victory, is the more plausible near-term path.

The war has also reached the capital. Beyond the Tor Hailoch blast, three diplomatic sources told Reuters of explosions overnight, and a source linked to the opposition alliance claimed drone strikes on military targets in Addis Ababa; Reuters could not verify the claim.^[24,2] The national intelligence service has banned drone flights over the city indefinitely. The UK and German governments now warn of possible attacks on military installations, including in Addis Ababa.^[20,21]

The humanitarian cost is mounting. On 7 October, the UN reported that one of its agency warehouses and several NGO depots in Tigray had been looted, with food, seed, fertiliser and water pumps lost.^[23] A week earlier, 19 aid workers trapped by the fighting reached Gondar by the only viable road; some 240 UN staff and 1,700 NGO personnel remained in Tigray.^[25] The International Rescue Committee ranks Ethiopia fourth on its 2026 Emergency Watchlist of countries most at risk of humanitarian deterioration.^[26]

Regionally, the alignments have hardened. On 4 October, Egypt’s President al-Sisi, Eritrea’s President Isaias Afwerki, Somalia’s President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and Sudan’s army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan met at El-Alamein. Their joint statement called for non-interference in the internal affairs of states and opposed “unilateral measures” harming downstream countries, an apparent reference to the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam.^[3] Addis Ababa accuses Eritrea, Sudan and Egypt of backing the rebels; all three deny it.^[11] Ethiopia and Egypt have expelled each other’s diplomats.^[3]

V. Discussion: coercive federalism and the problem the map cannot solve

Read together, the appointments and the battlefield point to a single governing logic. The federal government is consolidating its executive, retaining its diplomatic line and treating the Tigray question as a matter of security first. This is coercive federalism: the authority of the centre is reasserted by force within a constitutional order that formally guarantees regional self-rule. Its weakness is not military. It is political, because territory recaptured without a settlement must be held, and holding it requires consent the cabinet has not sought.

Dr Mefkereseb G. Hailu’s capstone essay for this publication carries a question for its title: Cui bono?^[27] It is the right question to ask of a war the cabinet will not name. The government gains a rally effect, a fresh mandate and a measure of international sympathy, after Crisis Group placed primary responsibility for the escalation on the TPLF and the US ambassador voiced disappointment at its offensive.^[1] TPLF hardliners, whose position this publication examined in its coverage of US visa restrictions, gain a cause that defers questions about their own governance of Tigray.^[28] Regional rivals gain leverage over Ethiopia on the Nile and the Red Sea. Those who lose are the displaced, the conscripted and the taxpayers who will fund the war.

“Territory recaptured without a settlement must be held, and holding it requires consent the cabinet has not sought.”

Nor has the war resolved the disputes that caused it. Western Tigray remains contested; our study of Carlo Conti Rossini’s cartography traced how colonial-era maps still shape that dispute.^[29] Voices for negotiation exist within the Ethiopian political class, as our analysis of Lemma Megersa’s peace appeal recorded.^[30] Crisis Group’s prescription remains the most concrete available: African leaders, including Olusegun Obasanjo, William Ruto and Uhuru Kenyatta, should press both sides towards direct talks, with Saudi Arabia restraining Asmara, Khartoum and Cairo, and the UAE restraining Addis Ababa.^[1]

VI. Conclusion: three tests for the new government

The new cabinet will be judged on three tests. The first is military: whether the defence ministry pursues the TPLF into a rural guerrilla war, with the civilian costs that northern Ethiopia knows too well. The second is political: whether the peace ministry under Musa Adem opens any channel to the armed opposition, or functions as an adjunct to the security effort. The third is economic: whether the finance ministry can keep the reform programme and its external financing intact while the state pays for war.

In November 2020 the fall of Mekelle was presented as the end of a law-enforcement operation. It proved to be the start of a two-year war. The cabinet sworn in this week has inherited that lesson, along with a recaptured city. Whether it learns from it will define the term it has just begun.

References

1. International Crisis Group, “Arresting the Dangerous Descent Back into War in Northern Ethiopia”, Statement, 25 September 2026. https://www.crisisgroup.org/stm/africa/ethiopia-eritrea/arresting-dangerous-descent-back-war-northern-ethiopia
2. AFP, “Explosion overnight at Ethiopian army HQ in capital”, Ahram Online, 1 October 2026. https://english.ahram.org.eg/News/577953.aspx
3. AFP, “Ethiopian forces take control of Tigray capital Mekelle”, Kuwait Times, 5 October 2026. https://kuwaittimes.com/article/50973/world/ethiopian-forces-take-control-of-tigray-capital-mekelle/
4. Sisay Sahlu, “Parliament Re-Elects Abiy Ahmed as Prime Minister”, The Reporter, 5 October 2026. https://www.thereporterethiopia.com/53219/
5. Sara Solomon, “Ethiopia Unveils New Cabinet Reshuffle”, The Reporter, 8 October 2026. https://www.thereporterethiopia.com/53263/
6. The Ethiopian Tribune, coverage of the August 2026 Tigray fighting and the collapse of the Pretoria Agreement, August 2026.
7. Committee to Protect Journalists, “Ethiopia expels French journalist Augustine Passilly after reporting trip to Tigray”, 12 June 2026. https://cpj.org/2026/06/ethiopia-expels-french-journalist-augustine-passilly-after-reporting-trip-to-tigray/
8. The Ethiopian Tribune, June 2026 general election coverage, including E. Frashie’s election-day dispatches and analysis of first-past-the-post seat distortion, June 2026.
9. International Crisis Group, CrisisWatch: Ethiopia, September 2026. https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/ethiopia
10. The Ethiopian Tribune, coverage of the “Tsimdo” coalition question, including Dr Sosina Tadesse’s rebuttal, 2026.
11. Associated Press, “Ethiopia’s army chief accuses Eritrea, Sudan and Egypt of supporting Tigray rebels”, 28 September 2026. https://abcnews.com/International/wireStory/ethiopias-army-chief-accuses-eritrea-sudan-egypt-supporting-136825185
12. Mintesinot Nigussie, “Government Overhauls Ministerial Mandates as Cabinet Reshuffle Looms”, The Reporter, 7 October 2026. https://www.thereporterethiopia.com/53254/
13. AFP, “Abiy replaces defence, peace ministers in new Ethiopia cabinet”, October 2021. https://pakobserver.net/abiy-replaces-defence-peace-ministers-in-new-ethiopia-cabinet/
14. Addis Standard via AllAfrica, “Ethiopian Federal Police Allege Eritrean Link in Ammunition Seizure Amid Tensions”, January 2026. https://allafrica.com/stories/202601230022.html
15. Reuters via Polity, “Eritrea calls Ethiopia’s accusations of military aggression ‘deplorable'”, 9 February 2026. https://www.polity.org.za/article/eritrea-calls-ethiopias-accusations-of-military-aggression-deplorable-2026-02-09
16. Reuters, “Eritrea severs diplomatic ties with Ethiopia after Addis Ababa orders closure of embassy in Asmara”, Daily Maverick, 2 October 2026. https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2026-10-02-eritrea-severs-diplomatic-ties-with-ethiopia-after-addis-ababa-orders-closure-of-embassy-in-asmara/
17. International Crisis Group, “10 Conflicts to Watch in 2026”: Ethiopia and Eritrea, via AllAfrica, 2 January 2026. https://allafrica.com/stories/202601020222.html
18. Bruck Getachew, “Average bid registers 160 Birr in latest Central Bank Forex Auction”, The Reporter, 10 September 2026. https://www.thereporterethiopia.com/52705/
19. Mintesinot Nigussie, “New Government Targets 9.62 percent Tax-to-GDP Ratio amid Structural Economic Reforms”, The Reporter, 6 October 2026. https://www.thereporterethiopia.com/53235/
20. UK Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, Ethiopia travel advice, updated 7 October 2026. https://www.gov.uk/foreign-travel-advice/ethiopia/safety-and-security
21. Auswärtiges Amt, Äthiopien: Reise- und Sicherheitshinweise, Stand 8 October 2026. https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/de/service/laender/209504
22. Human Rights Watch, World Report 2026: Ethiopia. https://www.ecoi.net/de/dokument/2136212.html
23. Mintesinot Nigussie, “UN Warns of Aid Disruption in Tigray Following Looting of Humanitarian Depots”, The Reporter, 7 October 2026. https://www.thereporterethiopia.com/53257/
24. Reuters, “Explosions heard overnight in Ethiopia’s capital, diplomatic sources say”, The Star, 1 October 2026. https://www.thestar.com.my/news/world/2026/10/01/explosions-heard-overnight-in-ethiopia039s-capital-diplomatic-sources-say
25. UN Department of Safety and Security, “Trapped by Fighting in Northern Ethiopia, 19 Humanitarian Personnel Make It Out by Road”, 6 October 2026. https://www.un.org/safety-and-security/en/news/trapped-fighting-northern-ethiopia-19-humanitarian-personnel-make-it-out-road
26. Mintesinot Nigussie, “Ethiopia Ranks Fourth on Global Crisis Watchlist as Conflict Threatens SDG Gains: IRC Report”, The Reporter, 3 October 2026. https://www.thereporterethiopia.com/53167/
27. Mefkereseb G. Hailu, “Cui Bono?”, The Ethiopian Tribune, 2026.
28. The Ethiopian Tribune, “A Lever, Not a Hammer” and “The Twig and the Phantom Carrot”, coverage of US visa restrictions on TPLF hardliners, 2026.
29. The Ethiopian Tribune, study of Carlo Conti Rossini’s cartographic legacy and the Western Tigray boundary dispute, 2026.
30. The Ethiopian Tribune, analysis of Lemma Megersa’s peace appeal, 2026.

E. Frashie writes long-form analysis for The Ethiopian Tribune.

THE ETHIOPIAN TRIBUNE · EDITOR’S FOREWORD

Abiy’s Drones Pouring Hell Over a Divided House

The Constitution Is Guilty of More Murder — Our Unity and Red-Sea Sovereignty

By Mefkereseb G. Hailu (PhD)

When we published Dr Mefkereseb G. Hailu’s twelfth article in September, we described it, as he had, as the close of his series. We were wrong, and gladly so. In a letter to this desk, MGH explains that each time he has set down his pen, events have handed it back to him. This month they did so with unusual force: seven armed movements allied against the government on 20 September, the north returned to war three days later, Mekelle changed hands again, and Ethiopia broke with Asmara and Cairo within a single week. A writer who has spent a year warning that a divided house cannot defend itself could hardly stay silent while the house burned.

This is the thirteenth article, and the first of three that will now conclude the series, appearing on successive Sundays. MGH tells us he may miss a church service or two to meet that schedule. We trust our readers will forgive him, and that his priest will too.

The article begins as a response to Yihenew Ewnetu’s study of drone warfare, Aerial Terror, published in Borkena. MGH welcomes it as the start of a criminal record and then does something rare in our discourse: he treats a fellow writer’s work as a case file in preparation, checking its sources, reconciling its figures and correcting its attributions, so that it can withstand the scrutiny of those paid to discredit it. Readers who care about accountability should read that section closely. It is a lesson in how evidence survives contact with a hostile reader.

“Accountability must fall on persons, not on the nation.”

But the record, he argues, names the wound and not the disease. His diagnosis is the one he has pressed throughout the series: the 1995 Constitution, which makes ethnicity the title to power, land and security, and so turns every grievance into a war. He is unsparing with everyone. The government bears the heaviest guilt, but the new alliance, the oligarchs, the clergy and above all his own class, the intellectuals, are each held to account.

The Tribune does not endorse every judgement in the essays we publish, and readers will find much here to argue with. That is the purpose of the platform. We publish this article because it insists on two disciplines our public conversation badly needs: that every civilian death be recorded, whoever caused it, and that the argument be about the rule-book rather than the latest ruler.

Synopsis

A criminal record, and the diagnosis behind it. MGH accepts that the drone strikes on markets, schools, clinics and churches are real, and that those which killed civilians are crimes whose chain of command runs to the Prime Minister. The task is to turn the record into a case file fit for international forums, and to ask the question the study does not: why a state turns its air force on its own villages.

The war that returned. He sets out the events of late September and early October, and identifies three new features: the government’s drone monopoly is gone, an internal war became an interstate crisis within days, and the political theatre continued regardless. A victory at Mekelle, he warns, settled nothing in 2020 and will settle nothing now.

From study to case file. The most technical section audits the drone study against its sources, re-anchoring expert quotations, correcting attributions, questioning cost estimates, extending the strike record to include Gedeb, Abbay Giyorgis and Hintalo, and insisting on the correct legal language: war crimes and crimes against humanity, not a genocide charge that cannot yet be proven.

Who benefits, who pays. The benefits of the drone war fall to a governing party, its command and foreign suppliers; the costs fall on the dead, millions of children out of school, destroyed clinics and a collapsing birr. He is candid about what he cannot verify, and about his own position as a diaspora investor.

The road to accountability. Ethiopia is not party to the Rome Statute, so the road to The Hague runs through a Security Council veto or a future government’s consent. Meanwhile, he urges the African Commission, a restored UN commission of experts, universal jurisdiction and targeted sanctions, on the principle that accountability must fall on persons, never on the nation.

The racket’s four estates. Returning to the framework of Cui Bono?, he indicts the political cadre, the oligarch, the pulpit and, at greatest length, the intellectual, whose “five disguises of complicity” keep every argument inside the constitutional ring.

The citizens’ Constitution and the Alliance for Survival. He proposes a constitution that makes the individual Ethiopian sovereign, with administrative boundaries, an indivisible union and one army under civilian and judicial control. He engages Yonas Biru’s assessment of the new alliance, agreeing with its warnings but arguing that a reformed ethnic federation would buy only a decade, and declines to take sides among those he calls ethnic entrepreneurs.

Objections and conclusion. He answers eight objections at full strength, closes with a reading of the comparative literature on ethnofederalism, and ends with an eight-point warning and the question that has run through the whole series: can Ethiopians stop fighting over the country long enough to build it together?

Read the full article here:

Thea13_drones_unity_mgh.pdf

next instalment, Medemer, Oromummaa and the Soul of the Nation, follows next Sunday, and the series concludes the week after.

The Editor

ANALYSIS

The War That Found the Capital

Within a single week, Ethiopia’s conflict moved from the northern front to the skyline of Addis Ababa and the desk of its Foreign Ministry. The fronts now run from southern Tigray to the Afar lowlands, and the capital is no longer insulated.

By E. Frashie
The Ethiopian Tribune · 1 October 2026

Shortly after midnight on Thursday, residents of central Addis Ababa heard what the city’s authorities had spent the previous afternoon preparing for. Diplomatic sources told Addis Standard of explosions at around 12:30 and 1:15 a.m., in areas near the headquarters of the Ethiopian National Defense Forces and the site believed to house the Meshualekia 4th Division. Residents reported ambulances and fire engines moving through the streets afterwards. An intelligence official confirmed to the Associated Press that there had been three blasts in three different locations, and declined to say more.

Hours earlier, the National Intelligence and Security Service had banned the flying of drones of any kind over the capital and its surroundings, indefinitely, and announced the deployment of anti-drone systems to protect its airspace and critical infrastructure. A source linked to the opposition alliance fighting federal forces in the north told Reuters that the alliance had struck the military’s headquarters with drones. Reuters could not verify the claim, and neither the Prime Minister’s office, the federal government nor the military has yet offered an account of what happened. If the claim is borne out, it would be the first known drone attack on the capital by forces opposed to the government.

Before the day was out, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that it was closing Ethiopia’s embassy in Asmara and declaring ten Eritrean diplomats persona non grata, with 48 hours to leave the country, accusing Eritrea of “direct and indirect acts of hostility and belligerence”. In a separate notification to the Egyptian Embassy, it ordered an Egyptian diplomat to leave within the same period. By evening, Eritrea had severed diplomatic relations with Ethiopia altogether, and Cairo had expelled an Ethiopian diplomat in return.

A drone ban, a night of explosions and diplomatic ruptures with both Asmara and Cairo, all within 24 hours. Whatever the final account of Thursday’s blasts, their political meaning is already plain. The war that Addis Ababa has long experienced as a distant affair, reported from the Amhara highlands, rural Oromia or Tigray, has arrived, at least psychologically, at the capital’s door, and it now carries a regional dimension that the government itself has chosen to make explicit.

A National War

It is tempting to describe this as Tigray sliding back into war. That would be wrong on two counts. The country has not been at peace since the Pretoria Agreement of November 2022: the Fano insurgency in Amhara has been fighting federal forces since 2023, and the Oromo Liberation Army’s war in Oromia is older still. Nor is the fighting now under way a Tigrayan affair. The coalition calling itself the Alliance for Survival brings together the TPLF, the Amhara Fano National Movement and the OLA, alongside armed groups drawn from the Somali, Afar and Benishangul-Gumuz areas. Its fronts this week ran from southern Tigray to the Afar lowlands and the Amhara highlands, where the army claims to have killed more than 270 fighters. A war fought across half a dozen regions, with drones reportedly reaching the capital, is a national war.

Seven Days in the North

The facts on the ground, as far as they can be established through a communications blackout, are these. Telecom providers reported major disruption to phone and internet services in Tigray from Friday 25 September. Over the weekend, the Tigray Peace Force, a militia aligned with the federal government, and pro-government outlets reported that federal forces had taken Alamata, the southern Tigrayan town that serves as a supply hub for troops, fuel and food on the road towards Mekelle. ACLED, the conflict-monitoring project, recorded the takeover. The cost to civilians was severe. Hospital sources and residents told the BBC that more than 50 civilians had been killed in three days of fighting, including children only days old, and that patient numbers at the Korem and Alamata hospitals had more than doubled within 48 hours.

The alliance answered in Afar. Tigrayan forces took Erebti after heavy artillery fire on Sunday and pressed on towards Afdeera, displacing an estimated 150,000 people. The strategic logic is unmistakable: the road through Afar is the corridor to Djibouti, through which passes almost all of Ethiopia’s international trade, its fuel included. The same day, a drone struck the headquarters of Tigrai TV in Mekelle, while the TPLF’s seizure of the region’s main airport had already forced the suspension of flights. Reuters described the fighting as the largest escalation of violence in the country since the end of the 2020–22 civil war.

Almost every figure in this account is contested or unverified, and that is itself part of the story. Neither the government’s tallies of enemy dead nor the alliance’s battlefield claims can be independently tested while Tigray is cut off and its own broadcaster has been struck from the air. An information vacuum of this kind does not stay empty for long.

“The rest of the country could burn; the capital was to be insulated. This week punctured that assumption.”

The Capital Discovers Its Exposure

For much of the past three years, Addis Ababa has lived beside its country’s wars rather than inside them. The insurgencies in Amhara and Oromia brought checkpoints, sporadic road closures and periodic waves of arrests, but the capital’s official story was one of transformation: corridor projects, new boulevards and glass towers, a city remade as the showcase of a developmental state. The rest of the country could burn; the capital was to be insulated. This week punctured that assumption in three ways.

The first is the air. The drone ban is, in effect, an official admission that the authorities regard the capital’s airspace as vulnerable. A security source told the Cairo-based Mada Masr that the measure followed a 27 September attack on Harar Meda Air Base at Bishoftu, some 35 miles from the city, in which two soldiers were said to have been killed, along with strikes on Kombolcha airport and near Bahir Dar. That account rests on a single anonymous source and remains unconfirmed. But the government’s own conduct, from the ban and the anti-drone deployment to its silence after the blasts, suggests that it takes the threat seriously.

The second is the supply line. Addis Ababa is a landlocked capital whose fuel, medicines and imported goods arrive overwhelmingly by the Djibouti road. An offensive in Afar aimed at that corridor is not a peripheral manoeuvre; it is a lever on the price of petrol and bread in Bole and Piassa. For a city that has already absorbed a steep depreciation of the birr since the 2024 float, the prospect of interrupted supply is a more immediate fear than any battlefield map.

The third is information. The capital’s residents now face, in milder form, the same predicament as Tigray’s: they hear explosions and see ambulances, and are then met with official silence. Rumour fills whatever space official communication leaves empty. A government that has spent years managing the national narrative with great care now finds that narrative hard to manage in its own capital.

The Governing Elite and the Regional Rupture

Thursday’s expulsions must be read against the arc of the past eight years. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s 2018 rapprochement with President Isaias Afwerki earned him the Nobel Peace Prize the following year, and during the 2020–22 war Eritrean troops fought alongside federal forces in Tigray. The Pretoria Agreement, negotiated without Asmara, began the unravelling of that partnership. This week marked a further, formal stage in its collapse.

The ministry did not specify what the ten Eritrean diplomats had done, saying only that their activities threatened national security and breached the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. Ethiopia itself stopped short of severing relations, closing its statement by affirming the historical and people-to-people ties between the two countries. Asmara did not reciprocate the restraint. Information Minister Yemane Gebremeskel said that expelling the diplomats, among them Eritrea’s chargé d’affaires, amounted in effect to closing its embassy in Addis Ababa, and Eritrea’s foreign ministry announced that it was severing all diplomatic ties, warning of what it called “all the negative corollaries that this entails”. The two governments that signed a celebrated peace in 2018 now have no formal channel between them.

The Egyptian expulsion is narrower but no less pointed. The Foreign Ministry declared Ahmed Moharam Ahmed Soliman, a member of the Egyptian Embassy’s diplomatic staff, persona non grata, without giving a reason or identifying any conduct. Egypt answered in kind, declaring a counsellor at the Ethiopian embassy in Cairo persona non grata and giving him 48 hours to leave, according to the state-affiliated Al Qahera News. Relations between the two capitals have been strained for more than a decade by the dispute over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. What is new is that Addis Ababa has now taken concrete action against Egyptian personnel at the same moment as it accuses Eritrea, Sudan and Egypt of supporting the TPLF-led opposition alliance, accusations all three governments deny.

The ministry did not link any of the expulsions to the overnight explosions, and The Tribune draws no such link. But the measures give formal weight to accusations previously voiced by the military. Field Marshal Berhanu Jula has accused Eritrea of backing the alliance and alleged support from Sudan and Egypt, while Afar’s regional leadership has told Al Jazeera that Eritrean forces are fighting inside the region, a claim not independently confirmed. Ethiopia’s internal war is being drawn, step by step, into the rivalries of the wider Horn and the Nile basin.

For the governing elite, the dilemma is acute. Barely three months after a general election that the ruling Prosperity Party presented as a decisive mandate, the state faces a multi-front insurgency, a broken relationship with Asmara, a fresh confrontation with Cairo and an exposed capital. Washington lifted its atrocity-linked sanctions on Ethiopia and Eritrea only weeks ago, declaring the underlying national emergency over; that judgement already looks premature. Every option open to Addis Ababa carries a price. Escalation against Eritrea risks an interstate war layered on top of a civil one. A negotiated settlement would mean engaging an alliance some of whose members the government has, at various times, designated as terrorist organisations. Holding the line means a long war of attrition fought, increasingly, within earshot of the capital.

The drone ban and the silence after the blasts are themselves expressions of that anxiety.

“A state confident of its position explains what happened; a state unsure of it restricts and waits.”

The Fog of Claims

Every party to this war is now fighting partly through its claims. The government announces counts of enemy dead that cannot be checked; the alliance claims drone strikes on the capital that the government will neither confirm nor deny; regional officials report foreign troops on Ethiopian soil without independent corroboration. With Tigray cut off from phone and internet services and its broadcaster struck from the air, the gap between what is asserted and what is known has rarely been wider.

That gap carries real consequences. Civilian deaths in Alamata and displacement in Afar risk being lost beneath the louder contest over battlefield gains, while unverified claims harden into accepted fact before anyone can test them. For now, the most reliable picture is the one assembled slowly from hospital staff, residents, diplomats and conflict monitors, and it is a picture of a war that is widening rather than one approaching resolution.

What to Watch

Three questions will shape the coming days. The first is whether the government acknowledges what struck near its military installations on Thursday night; silence cannot be sustained for long in a capital that heard the explosions. The second is whether the diplomatic ruptures stay diplomatic. With the 48-hour deadlines expiring on Saturday and Eritrea warning of negative consequences, the question is whether Asmara, Cairo or Khartoum moves from words to deeds, and whether Addis Ababa does so first. The third is the Djibouti corridor. If the alliance’s push through Afar disrupts supply to the capital, the war will cease to be an abstraction for the residents of Addis Ababa and become part of their daily lives.

The capital’s governing class has long assumed that Ethiopia’s wars could be managed from a distance. This week it learned otherwise. With the fighting now reaching the Djibouti corridor, relations with Asmara and Cairo and, on Thursday night, the capital itself, the question is no longer whether the war can be contained to the periphery, but whether anyone in Addis Ababa has a plan for ending it.

Note on sources: This analysis draws on reporting by Reuters, the Associated Press, the BBC, Al Jazeera, Addis Standard, Mada Masr, Ahram Online, Radio Tamazuj and EFE, on ACLED conflict data, on statements and notifications by Ethiopia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs dated 1 October 2026 as carried by ENA and EBC, and on statements by Eritrea’s foreign ministry and Egyptian officials quoted by Al Qahera News. Claims attributed to the federal government, the opposition alliance and regional authorities could not be independently verified at the time of writing, owing to the communications blackout in Tigray and restricted access to the conflict zones. The Tribune will update this piece as confirmation emerges.

አስተያየት · ግልፅ ደብዳቤ

ለእውነተኛው የአማራ ፋኖ ታጋዮች የቀረበ ጥብቅና አስቸኳይ ግልፅ ጥሪ፦ የባርነት ካምፑን ሰብራችሁ ወጥታችሁ የሕዝባችሁን ክብርና ነፃነት አስከብሩ!

ዶ/ር ሶስና ታደሰ ቀደም ሲል በ«ፅምዶ» ጥምረት ዙሪያ ካቀረቡት ትንታኔ በመቀጠል፣ በጎንደርና በመላው አማራ ለሚገኙ የፋኖ ታጋዮች ከአፋብን አመራርና ከፅምዶ አሰላለፍ ራሳቸውን እንዲለዩ ግልፅ ጥሪ ያቀርባሉ።

ዶ/ር ሶስና ታደሰ · መስከረም 2019 ዓ.ም.

ከ፦ የታሪካዊና የህልውና ትግሉ ተቆርቋሪ (ዶ/ር ሶስና ታደሰ)

ለ፦ በጎንደርና በመላው አማራ ምድር መሬት ላይ ላላችሁ እውነተኛ የፋኖ አበጋዞችና ታጋዮች

የተከበራችሁ የአማራ የሕልውናችን አጥርና በተለይም የጎንደር ወታደራዊ አቅም ማዕከል የሆናችሁ ታጋዮች፤

ከዚህ በፊት የ«ፅምዶ»ን አደገኛነት በተለይም «ፅምዶ ፋኖን ለሕወሓት ተራ እግረኛ ቅጥረኛ ወታደር ያደርገዋል፤ ከዚህ አሰላለፍ ወጥታችሁ የድርጅት ነፃነታችሁን አስከብሩ፤ ወይም ይህንን ማድረግ ካልቻላችሁ በአስቸኳይ ከዚህ አፋብን ከሚባል መዋቅር ራሳችሁን በማግለል በራሳችሁ ዕዝና ነፃ ድርጅት ቁሙና መልሳችሁ ያጣችሁትን የሕዝብ ተቀባይነት አግኙ» የሚል ተደጋጋሚ ጥሪ ማድረጋችን ይታወቃል።

ይሁን እንጂ እናንተ አንድም እርምጃ ሳትወስዱ፦

መስከረም 10 ቀን 2019 ዓ.ም. የድርጅታችሁ መሪ ተብዬው ዘመነ ካሴ መቀሌ ላይ ሆኖ የፅምዶን ፀረ-አማራ የትብብር ኃይሎች መግለጫ ሲያነብ በትግራይ ቴሌቪዥን ከእናንተ እኩል ተመልክተናል!

መስከረም 17 ቀን 2019 ዓ.ም. የድርጅታችሁ የፖለቲካ ዘርፍ ኃላፊ ሄኖክ ኪዳኔ በሰጠው የሚዲያ ማብራሪያ፣ በራያ ዘብና በተከዜ ዘብ ዙሪያ በተነሳለት ጥያቄ ላይ፦ «የራያ ዘብም ሆነ የወልቃይት ዘብ ከሥርዓቱ ጋር ትጥቅ ይፈታል፤ የሚያስጠይቀው ወንጀል ካለ በወንጀል ይጠየቃል» ብሎ የማንነታቸውን፣ የርስታቸውንና የሕልውናቸውን አስጠባቂ የአማራ የቁርጥ ቀን ልጆችን ትጥቅ አስፈትቶ በወንጀል ተጠያቂ ለማድረግ የተዘጋጁ መሆኑን በግልጽ ተናግሯል!

የዚህ ንግግርና የፖለቲካ አቅጣጫ ዋና ትርጉም

የሄኖክ ኪዳኔ ንግግር ዋና ዓላማ በግልጽ እንደወረደ ሲተረጎም፦ ሕወሓት በአማራ ሕዝብ ላይ በተለይም በሸዋ፣ በጎንደር (ወልቃይት/ጠገዴ/ጠለምት) እና በቤተ-አማራ ወሎ (ራያ) ሕዝብ ላይ የፈጸመውን የዘር ማጥፋት ወንጀል ለማጠብና ከወንጀሉ ነፃ አድርጎ፣ የወልቃይትና የራያን አማራ ሕዝብ ትጥቅ አስፈትቶ ለጠላት አሳልፎ ለመስጠት የተዘጋጀ የፖለቲካ ወጥመድ ነው! ይህም በተደጋጋሚ ማስጠንቀቂያ የተሰጠበት አሁን ግን በይፋ የተገለጠ አስነዋሪ ሴራ መሆኑን መላው ሕዝብ ተገንዝቦታል።

ወልቃይት፣ ጠገዴ፣ ጠለምትና ራያ የይስሙላ የወሰን ውዝግብ ሳይሆኑ የአማራ ሕዝብ፣ የአማራ ህልውናና የጎንደርና የወሎ ቤተ-አማራ የፖለቲካና የወታደራዊ አቅም ማዕከላዊ ደም ስሮች ናቸው!

ጎንደር የታሪክ፣ የጀግንነትና የነፃነት አምባ እንጂ የጠላት ማስፈጸሚያና የባርነት ካምፕ ሆና አታውቅም!

ጎንደር የታሪክ፣ የጀግንነትና የነፃነት አምባ እንጂ የጠላት ማስፈጸሚያና የባርነት ካምፕ ሆና አታውቅም! ታዲያ እናንተ የዚህ ታሪካዊ ውርደትና የወልቃይት/ራያ ርስት አሳልፎ ለመስጠት የሴራ እቅድ አካል ሆናችሁ በዝምታ የምትቀጥሉት እስከመቼ ነው?

የሚቆረቆርላችሁን ማህበረሰብ ምክር ጆሮ ዳባ ልበስ ብላችሁ እንዳሳለፋችሁ ይታወቃል። ቢያንስ ግን አሁን የራሳችሁ የምትሏቸው መሪዎቻችሁ ከእናንተ ዓላማና የትግል ግብ ውጭ እየተንቀሳቀሱ መሆኑን በተግባር እያያችሁ ነው! የሊሐቃኑን ምክር ለመስማት ቢከብዳችሁ እንኳ ያላችሁበትን ሁኔታ አይቶ የሚንቃችሁ የጠላት ስብስብ እንዳለ ካወቃችሁ ሊያነቃችሁ ይገባል።

ትብብር በሚል የዳቦ ስም የፅምዶ የባርነት ካምፕ ውስጥ ተደፍቃችሁ እስከመቼ ተራ ቅጥረኛ የሕወሓት ወታደር ሆናችሁ ታደፍጣላችሁ?

እስከመቼ ከወጣችሁበት የትግል ዓላማ፣ ከጎንደር የጀግንነት ሌጋሲና ከራያና ከወልቃይት የአማራነት ጥያቄ ጋር ተጣልታችሁ ታዘግማላችሁ?

እስከመቼ ደጀን ከሆናችሁ ማህበረሰብ ጋር ተራርቃችሁ ትዘልቃላችሁ?

ይህ አፋብን የሚባል ፀረ-አማራ ስብስብ ለተከዜ ዘብ የማይራራና ትጥቅ አስፈታለሁ እያለ ሲፎክር ማን ማለት እንደሆነ ልብ ማለት ይገባል፣ እናንተም በተከዜ ዘብ መነጸር የምትታዩ የአማራ ዘቦች ናችሁ! ስለዚህ እንደ ሄኖክ ኪዳኔ አገላለጽ በፀረ-ሕወሓት ትግል ላይ በመሳተፋችሁ ትጥቅ ትፈታላችሁ፣ ብሎም የወንጀል ተጠያቂ ትሆናላችሁ ማለት ነው! ምክንያቱም አብዛኞቻችሁ የምትታወቁት ሕዝባችሁን ለመታደግ በፀረ-ፋሽስት ሕወሓት ትግል ላይ በመሰለፋችሁ ነው። ስለሆነም የአፋብን የትግል መስመር ፀረ-አማራ ብሎም የሕወሓት የሴራ ወጥመድ አስፈጻሚ መሆኑን በግልጽ ካያችሁ፣ ያላችሁበት የትግል ማዕቀፍ የጠላቶቻችሁ ወጥመድ መሆኑን ፍንትው አድርጎ ያሳያል።

ጥሪያችን

እውነታውን ተቀበሉ! የከፈላችሁትን ከባድ መስዕዋትና የመጣችሁበትን የትግል መስመር አስቡ! የወጣችሁለትን ታሪካዊ የትግል መስመር መሳቱን በድጋሚ መርምሩ፣ ከሐሰት ፕሮፕጋንዳ ራሳችሁን በማራቅ በዙሪያችሁ ያለውን የሕዝብ ትርታ አድምጡ! ተከዜ ዘብ በሕወሓት የሚመጣውን አውዳሚ ጦርነት ገድቦ የያዘ ለአማራ ሕዝብ ብሎም ለናንተ ቁጥር አንድ ጠባቂያችሁ ነው! ስለሆነም ከደጀኑና ከጠባቂው ማህበረሰባችሁ ጋር ተጣልታችሁ የጠላቶቻችሁን የፖለቲካ ቁማር መጫወቻ ካርድ ከመሆን በጊዜ እንድትቆጠቡ እና በጎንደር ጠቅላይ ግዛት ዕዝ ሐምሌ 5 ቀን 2018 ዓ.ም. ያወጣችሁትን መግለጫ መሠረት በማድረግ ግልጽ አማራዊ አቋማችሁን እንድታስፈጽሙ በጥብቅ እናሳስባለን! ከፋሽስት ወራሪ ሕወሓት ነፃ የሆኑ የአማራ ርስቶች በአማራነት በደምና በአጥንት የተገነባ የነፃነት ምድሮች እንጂ በፅምዶ ደላሎች ስምምነት የሚደራደሩበት የንግድ እቃ አይደሉም!

የአማራ ሕልውና፣ የፍትሕና የርስት ጥያቄ በፀረ-አማራና በፀረ-ኢትዮጵያ ደላሎች ቁማር አይሸጥም! ነፃነትን የሚያፃና ታጋይ ሁኑ!!

ድል ለአማራ ሕዝብ!

ፍትሕ፣ እኩልነትና ነፃነት ለኢትዮጵያ ሕዝብ!

ዶ/ር ሶስና ታደሰ

የአዘጋጁ ማስታወሻ፦ ይህ ግልፅ ደብዳቤ በአስተያየት ዓምድ ስር የቀረበ ነው። በደብዳቤው የተገለጹት አቋሞችና የቀረቡት መረጃዎች ሙሉ ኃላፊነት የጸሐፊዋ ብቻ ሲሆን የኢትዮጵያ ትሪቡንን አቋም አይወክሉም። በደብዳቤው የተጠቀሱ ወገኖች ምላሽ ለመስጠት ቢፈልጉ ዓምዳችን ክፍት ነው።

SEWASEW TEKLEMARIAM · COMMENTARY

Seven Brothers in Arms, One Blackout, and a Press Told Where Not to Look

A week after Ethiopia’s armed opposition announced its intention to topple Abiy Ahmed, the world’s newsrooms have filed story after story. At home, the regulator has filed a ban.

By Sewasew Teklemariam

26 September 2026 · Meskerem 16, 2019 E.C. · The Ethiopian Tribune

It was a Sunday-night broadcast, as these things so often are. On 20 September, Zemene Kassie of the Amhara Fano National Movement — whose fighters spent 2020 to 2022 marching beside the federal army against Tigray — sat before the cameras of Tigrai TV and read a joint statement on behalf of seven armed movements. They declared that they bore “the historic responsibility of overthrowing this regime”. They called themselves the Ethiopian Peoples’ Forces Alliance for Survival. The name is long; the ambition is short: remove the Prime Minister and install a transitional government.

Within three days, Tigrayan forces had taken the airports at Mekelle, Axum and Shire. Within four, flights to Lalibela were suspended as fighting reached the approaches to the rock-hewn churches. By Friday, the telephones of Tigray had fallen silent. Ethiopia, which spent nearly four years assuring everyone that the Pretoria Agreement had closed the book, found the book reopened — by the world’s press, if not by its own.

The world has noticed

Consider the ledger. Reuters broke the alliance story on 21 September and has since filed on the airport seizures, on Lalibela, on the overnight detention of veteran Tigrayan commanders, and on the blackout. That copy has travelled by syndication from US News in America to CNBC Africa, the Sowetan in Johannesburg, Business Recorder in Karachi and ThePrint in Delhi. Al Jazeera has published at least seven pieces in six days, from the founding statement to a question-and-answer explainer and an opinion column warning that this front may go the way of 2021’s short-lived nine-group coalition. AFP’s reporting from Afar, sourced from humanitarian workers on the ground, has run in Euronews, the Oman Observer and the Taipei Times.

The Associated Press produced a five-point explainer. CNN asked what had changed. NPR warned of a return to full-scale war. DW declared the battle lines redrawn. Foreign Policy led its daily World Brief with Ethiopia. The BBC reported panic-buying in Mekelle and noted that the region’s cash machines have not worked for months. Asharq Al-Awsat, Türkiye Today, Anadolu, Kenya’s KBC and Azerbaijan’s AnewZ all carried the story to their own audiences.

Diplomacy followed the headlines. The UN Secretary-General pronounced himself gravely concerned, named the three captured airports, and warned against a broader and more devastating conflict. The African Union Commission chairperson urged immediate de-escalation and direct talks, and dispatched Olusegun Obasanjo once more. The EU insisted differences be settled by dialogue. London condemned attacks by Tigrayan forces in Afar and southern Tigray, rejected the alliance’s stated aim of removing the federal government, and redrew its travel map. Washington’s ambassador said he was disappointed in the TPLF leadership, and the US Embassy barred its own staff from Tigray and Afar.

By this column’s count — a snapshot, not a census — at least twenty international outlets on four continents have reported the crisis in a single week. The appendix below lists them.

The world is reading about Ethiopia’s war. Ethiopians, increasingly, are reading about it in the world’s newspapers.

Darkness — and who switched it off

On the night of 24 September, telecommunications across Tigray went down. NetBlocks recorded a sub-national shutdown; Ethio Telecom services were cut entirely, while Safaricom’s smaller network limped on. It would be satisfying — and, given this government’s record in 2020–22, entirely plausible — to lay the blackout at Arat Kilo’s door. The evidence of this week does not allow it. Reuters, citing four people with knowledge of the matter including a diplomat, reports that it was the TPLF that ordered both operators to cut service, possibly to deny federal drones the mobile network. NetBlocks itself says its data cannot establish who pulled the plug. Neither the Prime Minister’s office nor the operators have commented.

Sewasew records the correction because this publication does not trade in convenient villains. But let no one mistake the point. People who lived through two years of severed lines, blocked cash and famine-like conditions are once again in the dark — and, with cash machines already dead, now cut off from the digital payments that had replaced them. A blackout ordered by self-declared liberators is exactly as dark as one ordered by the state.

Nor is the dark confined to phone masts. Reuters reports that Lieutenant General Tadesse Werede, the former commander of Tigrayan forces and former head of the interim administration, was detained overnight along with three other veteran officers who had voiced doubts about a return to war. An Alliance for Survival, it seems, does not extend survival to dissent within its own ranks.

Meanwhile, at home

The day after the announcement, the Ethiopian Media Authority suspended Tigray Television indefinitely, citing incitement and threats to national security. It went further: every digital, broadcast and print outlet in the country was forbidden to use the channel as a source or to reproduce its content, on pain of legal and administrative measures. Pause on that. The founding statement of the most consequential armed coalition in Ethiopia since 2021 was broadcast on that channel. An Ethiopian journalist who wishes to quote it from its source now does so at personal risk.

This did not arrive from nowhere. In February the same Authority revoked the registration of Addis Standard; in April its managing editor, Million Beyene, was taken from the newsroom and held incommunicado for nearly two weeks; in August its editor-in-chief, Yonas Kedir, was detained and beaten and its offices raided. Wazema Radio lost its licence. All nine of DW’s Ethiopian correspondents were suspended last October. Three Reuters journalists were refused accreditation. An AFP reporter was stopped from flying to Tigray in February. Four journalists who covered the Amhara conflict have spent close to three years in detention and, according to CPJ, could face life imprisonment or death. Reporters Without Borders places Ethiopia 148th of 180.

When readers ask why Ethiopian media show no interest in this war, Sewasew must issue a correction. Interest is not the problem. Permission is.

In fairness, the domestic record is not blank, and to say so would insult those still working. The Reporter covered the suspension of flights to Tigray and the Tigray TV ban. Addis Standard, publishing while it contests its revocation in court, reported the alliance’s formation. Ethiopia Observer carried the UN statement. Wazema reports by newsletter. Tigrayan outlets such as Kulu Media and UMD Media are documenting the blackout with commendable care about what they cannot verify. But these are narrowing spaces — increasingly online, increasingly in exile, and read by a fraction of the population.

The broadcast mainstream, where most Ethiopians actually get their news, belongs to the state and its allies. Media monitors documented earlier this year how EBC, Fana and their stablemates had settled on a single frame for Tigray: the TPLF as the sole spoiler of peace, the government as patient and dialogue-minded. The army’s claim this week of 272 Tigrayan fighters killed in Amhara arrives in that ecosystem unverified — and no domestic reporter is at liberty to go and check.

The juxtapositions write themselves. On the day the alliance was announced, the state news agency’s English service offered readers Getachew Reda’s counsel that dialogue was the only way to prevent the disintegration of — Sudan. On 24 September, as fighting spread through Afar, the Prime Minister was in Djibouti launching a petroleum infrastructure project; the President was addressing the UN General Assembly in New York. The government will say, fairly, that it has its own National Dialogue. Sewasew will observe that a dialogue is hard to hold when one side of the conversation has been taken off air.

Dialogue, it appears, is an export commodity: prescribed for Khartoum, rationed in Mekelle.

A word of caution about the brothers

Sewasew is nobody’s cheerleader, and readers deserve the other half of the ledger. This is an alliance of former enemies. Fano and the TPLF both claim Western Tigray, which Amhara forces have administered since the last war. At least one listed member, the ONLF, has reportedly denied joining. The federal government alleges Eritrean financing; Asmara denies it; the founding statement does not mention Eritrea at all. And history is not encouraging: the nine-group front proclaimed in November 2021 lost its Afar member within two months and its Benishangul member within a year, before the TPLF signed at Pretoria alone. Analysts at the International Crisis Group say it is not yet clear the groups can fight together at all.

What is clear is the price of failure. The last war cost an estimated 600,000 lives. Every party now reaching for the rifle — in Addis Ababa, in Mekelle, in the Amhara highlands and the Oromia forests — knows that number. None of them will be among the civilians who pay it.

Following the smoke

Tonight the Demera will be lit across the country, and tomorrow is Meskel. We tell our children that Empress Eleni found the True Cross by following the smoke. This week the world followed the smoke — from Mekelle’s airport to the hills above Lalibela — and reported what it found. Ethiopia’s own newsrooms have been told to watch the bonfire in the square and nothing beyond it.

እንኳን ለመስቀል በዓል በሰላም አደረሳችሁ።

May you reach the Feast of the Cross in peace. This year, the words “in peace” are doing a great deal of work.

Appendix · Media Monitor, 20–26 September 2026

A non-exhaustive snapshot of international coverage compiled by the Tribune desk. Syndicated wire copy is grouped under the originating agency. Dates are publication dates as shown by each outlet.

Domestic and diaspora coverage noted this week includes The Reporter, Addis Standard, Ethiopia Observer, Wazema, Kulu Media, UMD Media and The Habesha. Coverage by state broadcasters was not independently audited for this appendix.