Red Sea Storm Clouds: A Complex Web of Power Struggles Threatens Regional Stability

By E Frashie, Foreign Affairs Correspondent
Ethiopian Tribune | May 30, 2025

The Red Sea, once a vital trade artery connecting Africa to the world, has transformed into a chessboard where global and regional powers maneuver for strategic advantage. Recent developments suggest that the Horn of Africa finds itself at the epicenter of a geopolitical storm that could reshape the region’s future with profound implications for Ethiopia’s own aspirations and security.

Ethiopia’s Strategic Exclusion: A Telling Omission

Perhaps most striking in the current realignment is Ethiopia’s conspicuous absence from key regional forums. Despite being the Horn’s economic powerhouse, Ethiopia was denied membership in the Council of Arab and African Coastal States of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, formed by Saudi Arabia and seven other Red Sea states in January 2020. This exclusion appears deliberate, reflecting broader anxieties about Ethiopia’s quest for sea access—a national priority that has gained urgency under Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s administration.

The timing of this exclusion is particularly significant. As Ethiopia pursues various avenues for maritime access, from the controversial Somaliland agreement to renewed discussions with Eritrea, regional Arab states seem determined to limit Addis Ababa’s influence in Red Sea affairs. This strategic marginalisation could force Ethiopia to seek alternative partnerships, potentially drawing it closer to non-Arab actors like Turkey, Iran, or even Russia.

Trump’s Gulf Tour: Silence on the Horn

President Donald Trump’s recent three-country Gulf tour from May 16-19 revealed much through what was left unsaid. While Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman mentioned restarting the Jeddah process for Sudan, Trump remained notably silent on Somalia and Ethiopia—two countries where American interests and influence have traditionally been significant.

This diplomatic silence comes as the United States reportedly considers significantly reducing its military presence in Somalia, potentially creating a vacuum that other powers are eager to fill. For Ethiopia, this American retrenchment could mean both challenges and opportunities: reduced Western pressure on governance issues, but also decreased security cooperation in a region where Al-Shabaab remains a persistent threat.

The Military Buildup: A New Arms Race

The militarisation of the Red Sea region has accelerated dramatically, with multiple powers establishing or expanding their presence. Djibouti continues to serve as the primary hub, hosting French, American, Chinese, Japanese, and German military facilities—a remarkable concentration of global military power in a nation smaller than most Ethiopian regional states.

More concerning for regional stability is the emerging pattern of proxy militarisation. Turkey’s deployment of 300 special forces and 200 technicians to Somalia, with 2,000 more troops expected, represents a significant escalation. These forces are managing advanced Bayraktar drones that have already proven decisive in Sudan’s civil war, where similar Turkish drones helped government forces reclaim territory from the Rapid Support Forces.

Iran’s return to Sudan after diplomatic relations were restored in July 2024 adds another layer of complexity. With Iranian military experts now stationed near Port Sudan and training Islamist militias, the potential for sectarian proxy conflicts has increased substantially. For Ethiopia, which shares a border with Sudan and has its own internal security challenges, this Iranian presence represents a potential threat that could complicate border security and internal stability.

The Gulf Divide: Saudi-UAE Rivalry Intensifies

Perhaps the most significant development is the growing rift between Saudi Arabia and the UAE—traditional allies whose competition is reshaping regional dynamics. This rivalry has direct implications for Ethiopia, as both powers have historically influenced Ethiopian policy through different channels.

Saudi Arabia’s frustration with UAE policies is evident in multiple theaters. In Sudan, while the UAE backed the Rapid Support Forces, Saudi Arabia increasingly supports the military government. In Somalia, Riyadh views the UAE’s aggressive policies as counterproductive, arguing they indirectly benefit Al-Shabaab by destabilizing the region. Most tellingly, Saudi statements suggest that the UAE, “as a non-riverine state, should abandon plans for a permanent military presence in Bossaso or Berbera.”

This Saudi criticism of UAE maritime ambitions could actually benefit Ethiopia’s own sea access aspirations. If regional Arab powers are questioning the UAE’s right to establish naval bases along the Horn’s coastline, this precedent could be used to legitimize Ethiopia’s own maritime agreements, particularly with Somaliland.

Turkey and Qatar: The Islamist Alliance

The Turkey-Qatar partnership represents another significant factor in the regional equation. Turkey’s military expansion across the Horn—from drone operations in Sudan to special forces in Somalia—is largely funded by Qatari investment. This arrangement allows Qatar to maintain influence while avoiding direct confrontation with Gulf neighbors since the 2021 Al-Ula Declaration.

For Ethiopia, this Turkish-Qatari axis presents both opportunities and challenges. Turkey has historically maintained good relations with Ethiopia and could serve as a counterweight to traditional Arab powers. However, Turkey’s support for Islamist movements and its military cooperation with Somalia could complicate Ethiopia’s own security calculations, particularly regarding the Somali region and relations with Somalia proper.

Russia’s Calculated Gambit

Russia’s pursuit of a military base near Port Sudan since 2017 represents a calculated effort to expand its global military footprint. Despite Sudanese officials’ public denials, the reality of Russian warships docking in Port Sudan harbor suggests Moscow has achieved at least temporary access to Red Sea waters.

This Russian presence is particularly concerning for conservative Arab states. Saudi Arabia’s reported refusal to accept a Russian base within 300 kilometers of Jeddah demonstrates the depth of regional concerns. For Ethiopia, Russian military presence in Sudan could complicate the security environment along its eastern border, particularly if Russian-backed forces become involved in cross-border activities.

Ethiopia’s Strategic Response

As these regional dynamics unfold, Ethiopia finds itself in a complex position requiring careful navigation. The country’s exclusion from key regional forums suggests that traditional diplomatic channels may prove insufficient for securing its maritime and security interests.

Several strategic considerations emerge from this analysis:

Maritime Access: The Saudi criticism of UAE naval ambitions could provide diplomatic cover for Ethiopia’s own sea access agreements. If the principle is established that non-coastal states should not maintain permanent naval presence, this could legitimize Ethiopia’s partnerships with coastal nations like Somaliland.

Security Partnerships: With American withdrawal from Somalia and increasing militarisation by other powers, Ethiopia may need to reconsider its security partnerships. Turkish cooperation, despite its complications, might offer more reliable support than traditional Western partners.

Regional Alliances: The Saudi-UAE rivalry creates opportunities for Ethiopia to play different Gulf powers against each other, potentially securing better terms for investment and cooperation agreements.

Border Security: The militarisation of Sudan, particularly Iranian involvement in training militias, requires enhanced border security measures and potentially closer cooperation with Sudanese military authorities to prevent spillover effects.

Implications for Regional Stability

The current trajectory suggests that Red Sea geopolitics are entering a more volatile phase. Multiple factors contribute to this instability:

The proliferation of advanced military technologies, particularly drones, has lowered the barriers to effective military action while increasing the potential for devastating strikes. The involvement of multiple external powers with competing interests makes diplomatic resolution increasingly difficult. The weakness of regional organisations like the African Union and the Gulf Cooperation Council leaves individual states to pursue bilateral arrangements that may conflict with broader regional stability.

For Ethiopia, this environment demands strategic patience combined with tactical flexibility. The country’s size, population, and economic potential ensure it cannot be permanently marginalised from Red Sea affairs. However, securing Ethiopia’s interests will require sophisticated diplomacy that leverages the rivalries and competitions now reshaping the region.

Conclusion: Navigating the Storm

The Red Sea’s transformation from a trade route into a military theater reflects broader shifts in global power dynamics. For Ethiopia, the challenge lies in securing national interests while avoiding entanglement in conflicts that could destabilise the entire region.

The exclusion from regional forums may prove temporary if Ethiopia successfully demonstrates that Red Sea stability cannot be achieved without the Horn’s largest economy and most populous nation. The key lies in positioning Ethiopia as an indispensable partner for regional stability rather than a potential threat to existing arrangements.

As storm clouds gather over the Red Sea, Ethiopia’s leadership must chart a course that secures the nation’s maritime ambitions while contributing to rather than detracting from regional peace. The stakes could not be higher: failure risks not only Ethiopia’s development aspirations but the stability of one of the world’s most strategically important waterways.