SPECIAL REPORT: TPLF’s Fall from Grace – The Economics of Power Redistribution in Post-EPRDF Ethiopia

By Abebe Yirga, Senior Political Correspondent
Ethiopian Tribune, 15 May 2025

ADDIS ABABA — The corridors of power in Ethiopia have witnessed a seismic shift in recent years, fundamentally altering the nation’s political and economic landscape. At the heart of this transformation lies the dissolution of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) and the subsequent marginalisation of its once-dominant member, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF).

This special report—based on extensive research and interviews with government officials, political analysts, and economic experts—examines the historical arc of the EPRDF, the economic disinheritance of the TPLF, and the potential pathways that lie ahead for one of the Horn of Africa’s most influential political organisations.

The Rise and Fall of a Political Behemoth

For nearly three decades, the EPRDF coalition ruled Ethiopia with a firm hand. Formed in 1989 as a coalition of ethno-nationalist parties, it was designed, engineered and led by the TPLF, which had been fighting the Derg regime since the 1970s. What began as a guerrilla movement in the northern highlands of Tigray transformed into the architect of modern Ethiopia following the coalition’s military victory in 1991.

“The TPLF wasn’t merely a member of the EPRDF—it was its heart, brain and muscle,” says Dr Mekonnen Haile, a political historian at Addis Ababa University. “They created the other member parties, controlled the military and security apparatus, and established the ideological framework that would govern Ethiopia for decades.”

The coalition comprised four major parties: the TPLF representing Tigray, the Amhara National Democratic Movement (ANDM, later ADP) representing Amhara, the Oromo People’s Democratic Organization (OPDO, later ODP) representing Oromia, and the Southern Ethiopian People’s Democratic Front (SEPDF) representing the Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples’ Region.

Under Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, a TPLF stalwart who led Ethiopia from 1995 until his death in 2012, the country pursued a distinctive model of “Revolutionary Democracy”—marrying aspects of Marxist economic policy with centralised party control. The results were impressive yet controversial: Ethiopia achieved sustained economic growth whilst maintaining tight political control.

The Economic Empire Behind the Political Façade

The EPRDF era witnessed the construction of a complex party-business network that blurred the lines between state, party and private enterprise. Each member party operated its own endowment fund—ostensibly non-profit entities established to support regional development.

The TPLF’s economic arm, the Endowment Fund for the Rehabilitation of Tigray (EFFORT), emerged as the largest and most powerful of these conglomerates. By 2018, EFFORT controlled an estimated 66 companies spanning manufacturing, construction, mining, transportation, textiles, and media sectors, with total assets valued between $2.5 billion and $3 billion.

“EFFORT wasn’t just a business entity—it was the economic muscle behind TPLF’s political dominance,” explains Fekadu Bekele, an independent economic analyst. “Tax-exempt, enjoying preferential access to state contracts, and operating with minimal transparency, it exemplified the intertwining of political power and economic wealth under EPRDF.”

Other regional parties operated similar, albeit smaller, endowment funds: Tumsa (Oromia), TIRET (Amhara), and others affiliated with the SEPDF. Together, they formed a party-controlled economic ecosystem that dominated Ethiopia’s formal economy.

The Prosperity Party and Economic Redistribution

The winds of change began blowing through Ethiopia following the death of Meles Zenawi. Years of simmering discontent erupted into widespread protests, particularly in Oromia and Amhara regions. By 2018, the EPRDF was forced to select a new leader—Abiy Ahmed from the OPDO—who quickly initiated sweeping reforms.

In 2019, in a move that reshuffled the political deck, Prime Minister Abiy dissolved the EPRDF and formed the Prosperity Party (PP), merging all former coalition members except the TPLF, which refused to join. This dramatic restructuring ended nearly three decades of TPLF dominance.

“The dissolution of EPRDF wasn’t merely a political rebranding—it was a fundamental redistribution of economic power,” says Eleni Gabre-Madhin, a prominent Ethiopian economist. “The Prosperity Party effectively inherited the combined assets of all regional parties that joined it, excluding TPLF and its economic apparatus.”

What followed was a systematic economic disinheritance of the TPLF. The federal government:

• Froze EFFORT bank accounts following the outbreak of conflict in November 2020
• Placed more than 20 EFFORT companies under federal management in 2021
• Nationalised key assets in strategic sectors
• Designated the TPLF as a terrorist organisation (though this was later revoked under the Pretoria Peace Agreement)
• Restricted the operation of TPLF-affiliated NGOs, including the Relief Society of Tigray (REST)

The economic isolation of TPLF coincided with a broader restructuring of Ethiopia’s state-owned enterprises. The government established Ethiopian Investment Holdings (EIH), managing public enterprises worth over $38 billion, and initiated privatisation processes for several state-owned companies, including Ethio Telecom and Ethiopian Shipping and Logistics.

“The TPLF was completely shut out from this economic restructuring,” notes Getachew Reda, a former TPLF official speaking on chis recent interview. “What took decades to build was dismantled within a matter of months.”

The Price of Conflict

The political standoff between the federal government and TPLF escalated into full-scale conflict in November 2020, following TPLF’s decision to hold regional elections despite a federal postponement order and an alleged attack on federal military bases in Tigray.

The ensuing war exacted a devastating toll:

• An estimated 600,000 deaths from combat, starvation, and disease
• Over $20 billion in infrastructure damage across Tigray, Amhara, and Afar regions
• A contraction of Tigray’s regional GDP by more than 50%
• Displacement of over 2.6 million people
• Severe erosion of Ethiopia’s international standing

The conflict effectively destroyed what remained of TPLF’s economic base. Manufacturing facilities were damaged or looted, transportation networks disrupted, and banking services suspended. Agricultural production—the backbone of Tigray’s economy—collapsed as farmers fled or were unable to access inputs and markets.

“Whatever economic assets TPLF might have retained on paper became functionally worthless,” explains Dr Mehari Taddele Maru, a political analyst. “You can’t operate businesses in a war zone, especially when your bank accounts are frozen and your staff are displaced.”

Options on the Table

As Ethiopia continues its fragile recovery from conflict, the question remains: what strategic options might a delegitimised and economically disempowered TPLF pursue?

Our analysis identifies several potential scenarios, though experts caution that none offer a clear path to restoring TPLF’s former prominence.

Military Options: Diminishing Returns

Security analysts indicate that renewed military confrontation would likely yield minimal returns for TPLF while inflicting further devastation on Tigray. Though several theoretical alliance scenarios exist—including alignments with Eritrea, Sudanese factions, or even disaffected Amhara militias like Fano—each comes with significant risks and limited prospects.

“The concept of armed struggle to reclaim political and economic assets isn’t just morally questionable—it’s strategically futile,” argues Lieutenant Colonel Tadesse Woldemariam (Ret.), a former military strategist. “The 2020-2022 conflict demonstrated that military confrontation leads only to devastating humanitarian consequences with no clear political solution.”

Our analysis assigns relatively low probabilities to these military scenarios:

• Strategic realignment with Eritrea: 25% probability
• Cross-border alliance with Sudanese factions: 40% probability
• Tactical engagement with Amhara militias: 20% probability
• Proxy warfare via external powers: 30% probability

The Path of Reintegration

More promising, according to experts, is the path of political reintegration and economic reconstruction. With a probability assessment of 60%, this approach would involve:

• Rebuilding Tigray’s economy through diaspora investment, agricultural revitalisation, and small-scale industries
• Engaging with federal institutions under the framework of the Pretoria Peace Agreement
• Participating in constitutional reform discussions and regional coalitions
• Pursuing legal remedies for seized assets through constitutional mechanisms

“TPLF’s most viable future isn’t in regaining national dominance, but in securing meaningful regional autonomy within a restructured federal system,” suggests Dr Merara Gudina, a veteran opposition politician. “The political landscape has irrevocably changed, requiring adaptation rather than resistance.”

The Federal Government’s Role

The Prosperity Party-led government faces its own strategic imperatives in preventing worst-case scenarios. Political analysts suggest several key measures that could diffuse tensions and prevent renewed conflict:

1. Federal Devolution with Checks: Allowing genuine decentralisation within the federal structure whilst maintaining national unity
2. Reinstitution of Dialogue Mechanisms: Creating platforms for constructive engagement between the federal government, regional states, and opposition parties
3. Reconstruction in Tigray: Implementing the Pretoria Peace Agreement in full, including economic reintegration packages for demobilised combatants
4. Regional Diplomacy: Securing non-aggression agreements with neighbouring countries to prevent cross-border insurgencies
5. Balanced Information Strategy: Promoting national unity whilst acknowledging legitimate regional grievances

“Ethiopia can’t afford another cycle of conflict,” warns Dessalegn Rahmato, a senior diplomat. “The federal government must balance asserting central authority with accommodating the legitimate aspirations of all regions, including Tigray.”

An Uncertain Future

As Ethiopia prepares for the next chapter in its turbulent political history, the fate of the TPLF hangs in the balance. Once the unrivalled power broker of Ethiopian politics, it now finds itself struggling for relevance in a transformed landscape.

What remains clear is that there are no easy paths back to prominence. The economic empire once controlled by TPLF has been dismantled, its political networks disrupted, and its military capacity severely degraded. Any future role for the organisation will necessarily be far more modest than its former dominance.

“The story of TPLF is, in many ways, the story of post-1991 Ethiopia,” reflects Ambassador Berhane Gebre-Christos, a former diplomat. “Its rise and fall mirror the broader challenges of building a stable, inclusive political order in one of Africa’s most diverse nations.”

As Ethiopia continues its difficult journey toward peace and reconciliation, the lessons of EPRDF’s amalgamation, TPLF’s dominance, and the subsequent redistribution of power and wealth offer critical insights into the complexities of governance in this ancient yet ever-evolving nation.

Additional reporting by Tsedale Lemma in Addis Ababa and Mulugeta Gebrehiwot in Mekelle.