Ethiopia’s Naval Ambitions: Between Dreams and Diplomatic Realities

A landlocked nation’s quest for sea access meets stiff regional resistance

By Ethiopian Tribune Columnist
June 23, 2025

The Horn of Africa has witnessed unprecedented diplomatic turbulence since January 2024, when Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed signed a controversial memorandum of understanding with Somaliland that promised to transform Ethiopia from a landlocked nation into a maritime power. Yet eighteen months later, Ethiopia’s dream of establishing its first naval base in decades remains mired in regional opposition, international mediation, and the harsh realities of geopolitical chess.

The Somaliland Gambit: A Deal That Shook the Region

The January 1, 2024 agreement between Addis Ababa and Hargeisa was ambitious in scope and audacious in execution. Under the memorandum, Ethiopia would lease a 20-kilometer coastline near Luqhaye and Saylac (Zeila) towns in Somaliland’s Awdal region for 50 years to build its naval base, with Somaliland receiving a stake in Ethiopian Airlines and formal recognition as a sovereign country.

The deal represented a dramatic shift in Ethiopia’s sea access strategy. For over three decades since Eritrea’s independence in 1993, Ethiopia has relied heavily on the port of Djibouti for 95% of its trade, paying approximately $2 billion annually in port fees and logistics costs. The Somaliland agreement promised to break this dependency while simultaneously achieving Prime Minister Abiy’s declared goal of securing naval access through “unconventional means.”

However, the details remained closely guarded secrets, with Somaliland appearing to grant Ethiopia a lease on a 25-kilometre stretch of coastline to build a naval base in return for official recognition. The variance in reported coastline lengths, from 20 to 25 kilometres, itself indicated the preliminary nature and ongoing negotiations surrounding the deal.

Regional Backlash and Somalia’s Fierce Opposition

The agreement immediately triggered fierce resistance from Somalia’s federal government, which firmly declared it would never accept Ethiopia’s plan to build a naval base in its breakaway region of Somaliland, though it would consider granting Ethiopia commercial port access if discussed bilaterally.

Somalia’s response was swift and comprehensive. The federal government condemned the agreement as illegal and a threat to the integrity and unity of Somalia. Mogadishu’s reaction reflected deeper concerns about Ethiopian territorial ambitions and the potential precedent of recognizing Somaliland’s independence.

The crisis escalated beyond diplomatic protests. Somalia threatened war over the agreement, while simultaneously seeking international support to block Ethiopian naval expansion. The African Union, Arab League, and several regional powers rallied behind Somalia’s position, viewing the Ethiopia-Somaliland deal as a violation of established principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity.

The Turkish Mediation: Ankara’s Balancing Act

As tensions reached dangerous levels, Turkey emerged as the key mediator, leveraging its strong relationships with both Somalia and Ethiopia. Turkey began mediating talks between the east African neighbours, whose ties became strained when Ethiopia agreed to lease 20 km of coastline from Somaliland in exchange for recognition of its independence.

Turkey’s mediation efforts were part of its broader strategic engagement in the Horn of Africa. In February 2024, Turkey signed a deal to provide training and equipment to the Somali Navy to better safeguard its territorial waters from threats such as terrorism, piracy and “foreign interference.” This Turkish-Somali naval cooperation agreement was widely interpreted as a direct response to Ethiopian naval ambitions.

The mediation process has proven complex and ongoing. Under a new Turkey-backed deal, Somalia confirmed that Ethiopian troops would remain in the country, with the situation further complicated by Somaliland’s recent presidential elections, which shifted the political landscape. The election of Somaliland’s new president, Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi, reportedly less enthusiastic about the Ethiopian deal than his predecessor, has added another layer of uncertainty.

Djibouti’s Firm Rejection: “Not the Crimea of Africa”

While Ethiopia pursued the Somaliland option, it simultaneously explored alternatives with Djibouti. However, President Ismail Omar Guelleh’s response was unequivocal and colorful. In rejecting Ethiopian proposals for a naval base, Guelleh declared that Djibouti would not become “the Crimea of the Horn of Africa,” referencing Russia’s controversial annexation of the Ukrainian peninsula.

The Djiboutian president’s rejection was comprehensive, covering both military and quasi-sovereign arrangements. While Djibouti remained open to commercial port cooperation, any form of extraterritorial Ethiopian presence was categorically refused. This position reflected Djibouti’s careful balancing act in hosting military bases from the United States, France, China, Japan, and Italy a strategic arrangement that provides security guarantees while generating substantial revenue.

Ethiopia’s Naval Revival: Building a Fleet Without a Shore

Paradoxically, Ethiopia has proceeded with naval development despite lacking secure sea access. The Ethiopian Navy, known as the Imperial Ethiopian Navy until 1974, was disbanded in 1996 following Eritrea’s independence in 1991, which left Ethiopia landlocked without direct access to the sea.

Recent intelligence indicates significant Ethiopian investment in naval capabilities. Russia has agreed to rebuild the Ethiopian Navy after France failed to do so, marking a major shift in Ethiopia’s defense partnerships. This development suggests that Addis Ababa remains committed to its naval ambitions despite diplomatic setbacks.

The recently revived Ethiopian Navy is making preparations to establish a naval facility in Somaliland, with the Navy identifying land chosen by the government as one of the potential locations for a future operational base. This indicates that despite political obstacles, military planning continues behind the scenes.

Strategic Implications and Intelligence Assessment

Multiple intelligence sources point to the Ethiopia-Somaliland agreement being part of a broader Ethiopian strategic vision. The controversial deal with Somaliland to access the Berbera port for commercial and naval uses has stoked tensions with the federal government of Somalia.

The agreement’s strategic value extends beyond immediate naval access. Ethiopia had the option to exercise a 19% stake in the Berbera concession project alongside the Somaliland government (30%) and DP World (51%), though by mid-2022, Ethiopia had failed to take up its stake, which was absorbed by DP World and Somaliland. This earlier missed opportunity may have motivated the more assertive approach seen in the 2024 memorandum.

Intelligence assessments suggest that Ethiopia’s naval ambitions are intertwined with Prime Minister Abiy’s broader political project. The pursuit of sea access serves multiple objectives: reducing dependency on Djibouti, asserting regional power status, and potentially consolidating domestic political support through nationalist appeals.

The Eritrean Alternative: A Closed Door

Ethiopia’s relationship with Eritrea, despite the 2018 peace agreement, offers limited prospects for naval access. While the 2018 peace deal between Abiy Ahmed and Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki allowed for commercial port access, it firmly rejected any military base proposal.

Eritrea’s position reflects President Isaias Afwerki’s deep suspicion of Ethiopian intentions and his determination to maintain Eritrean sovereignty. The brief warming of relations following the peace agreement has given way to renewed tensions, making Eritrean ports an unlikely solution to Ethiopia’s naval aspirations.

Current Status and Future Prospects

As of mid-2025, Ethiopia’s naval base project remains in diplomatic limbo. Turkey continues efforts to meet separately with Somalia and Ethiopia as part of resolving the dispute over the coastline lease deal, but progress appears limited.

The shifting political landscape in Somaliland adds further uncertainty. The new administration in Hargeisa appears less committed to the Ethiopian deal than its predecessor, potentially requiring renegotiation of terms or even abandonment of the agreement.

Meanwhile, political tensions remain high in the Horn of Africa following the signing of the memorandum between Ethiopia and Somaliland, which provides sea access to landlocked Ethiopia in exchange for recognition of the breakaway territory as a sovereign state.

Intelligence Indicators and Warning Signs

Several intelligence indicators suggest the situation remains fluid and potentially volatile:

1. Military Preparations: Despite diplomatic obstacles, Ethiopian naval planning continues, indicating sustained commitment to the project regardless of international opposition.
2. Regional Alliance Building: Somalia’s success in garnering African Union, Arab League, and international support against the Ethiopian deal demonstrates effective diplomatic countermeasures.
3. Economic Pressures: Ethiopia’s continued reliance on Djibouti’s expensive port services maintains pressure for alternative arrangements, regardless of diplomatic costs.
4. Turkish Mediation Limits: While Turkey’s mediation efforts have prevented military escalation, they have not resolved fundamental disagreements about sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Economic Dimensions of the Naval Quest

The economic imperatives driving Ethiopia’s naval ambitions cannot be understated. As Africa’s second-most populous nation with over 120 million people, Ethiopia’s economic growth depends heavily on trade access. The current arrangement with Djibouti, while functional, represents a significant drain on foreign currency reserves and limits Ethiopia’s trade diversification options.

Ethiopia’s controversial deal with Somaliland aimed to reduce dependence on Djibouti’s ports while providing naval access, addressing both commercial and security concerns simultaneously. However, the economic benefits must be weighed against the diplomatic costs and regional instability the agreement has generated.

Dreams Deferred but Not Abandoned

Ethiopia’s quest for naval access represents one of contemporary Africa’s most complex geopolitical challenges. The collision between Ethiopian ambitions and regional sovereignty concerns has created a diplomatic crisis that extends far beyond bilateral relations.

While the immediate prospects for Ethiopian naval base establishment appear dim, the underlying drivers remain powerful. Ethiopia’s demographic weight, economic needs, and strategic ambitions suggest that sea access will remain a priority regardless of current diplomatic setbacks.

The role of external mediators like Turkey, and the broader international community’s response to sovereignty challenges, will likely determine whether Ethiopia’s naval dreams can be achieved through negotiated compromise or remain indefinitely deferred by regional resistance.

As this story continues to unfold, the Horn of Africa faces a fundamental question: Can legitimate Ethiopian economic and security needs be accommodated without undermining the sovereignty principles that underpin regional stability? The answer will shape the geopolitical landscape of this strategically vital region for years to come.

Intelligence sources indicate ongoing diplomatic activity behind the scenes, suggesting that while public positions remain entrenched, private negotiations may offer pathways toward eventual compromise. However, any sustainable solution must address both Ethiopian sea access needs and regional sovereignty concerns, a balance that remains elusive in mid-2025.

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