From Debt Whisperer to Development Banker: The Mamo Mihretu Chronicles
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By E. Frashie, Ethiopian Tribune Correspondent
When Mamo Mihretu tendered his resignation as Governor of the National Bank of Ethiopia on 3 September 2025, citing a rather poetic desire to “pursue other passions,” those familiar with the Byzantine workings of Ethiopian political theatre knew better than to take such pronouncements at face value. Within a fortnight, those mysterious “passions” had crystallised into a rather comfortable Vice President post at the African Development Bank, a lateral move that felt less like career progression and more like a well-orchestrated strategic withdrawal.
African Confidential’s diplomatically coded observation that Mamo “may have been asked to stand aside” if he wasn’t outright sacked tells us everything we need to know about the circumstances surrounding his departure. In the rarefied air of Ethiopian technocratic circles, such euphemisms are the equivalent of neon signs flashing “internal disagreement” in the local political vernacular.
The irony, of course, is delicious. Here was a man who had spent the better part of three years attempting to convince skeptical economists that his legal background and brief stint as an economic adviser qualified him to steer Ethiopia’s monetary policy through some of the most turbulent economic waters in recent memory. Critics led most vocally by former IMF and World Bank economist Yonas Biru, had warned from the outset that appointing someone without deep economic expertise to helm the central bank during a period of profound structural reform was rather like asking a solicitor to perform brain surgery simply because they’d once watched a medical documentary.
“No question that Mamo has an impressive background,” Biru had observed with characteristic diplomatic restraint, “but the central bank is a critical position requiring not only deep economic and financial knowledge but also cerebral professionalism to maintain institutional integrity.” The subtext, for those fluent in academic politesse, was unmistakable: this appointment was a category error of the highest order.
The subsequent three years proved the critics prescient. Whilst Mamo’s defenders point to technical achievements, a narrowed parallel market gap following the birr’s float, securing $10.5 billion in external financing, and shepherding Ethiopia through WTO accession negotiations, the lived reality for ordinary Ethiopians told a rather different story. The birr lost approximately a third of its value against the dollar, inflation soared despite repeated promises of single-digit figures, and the cost of living increases sparked domestic criticism that grew increasingly difficult to dismiss as mere opposition grandstanding.
Speaking at the IMF’s Spring Meetings in Washington this past April, Mamo had confidently predicted that inflation would fall to 10% by the 2025-26 fiscal year, a target that seemed optimistic even to sympathetic observers, given that Ethiopia hadn’t seen inflation below that level since November 2018. By September, he was gone, leaving his successor to grapple with the consequences of reforms that, whilst earning plaudits from international partners, had proven rather less popular on the ground.
Now comes the rather fascinating question of succession, and here the plot thickens considerably. According to sources within government circles, the succession battle has crystallised around three primary candidates: State Minister of Finance Dr Eyob Tekalign Tolina, Deputy Governor Solomon Desta, and Chief Economist Fikadu Digafe. Each represents a different strand of thinking about where Ethiopian monetary policy should head next.
Dr Eyob Tekalign, perhaps the most prominent of the three, brings genuine economic credentials to the table, a refreshing change from the previous appointment. His experience shepherding Ethiopia’s engagement with Eurobond holders, his work on the G20 Common Framework for debt treatment, and his role in promoting the Homegrown Economic Reform Agenda suggest someone with both technical expertise and political sophistication. Should he ascend to the governorship, it would signal a commitment to continuity with the reform agenda, albeit hopefully with greater economic competence in its execution.
But imagine, for a moment, if the government were to shock everyone by reaching outside this predictable triumvirate. Picture, if you will, Professor Birehanu Nega, currently serving as Minister of Education but possessing a PhD in economics and decades of academic experience, being tapped for the role. The sheer audacity would be breathtaking. Here is a man who spent years as one of Ethiopia’s most prominent opposition figures, was imprisoned following the 2005 elections, fled into exile, and only returned to join Abiy’s government in 2021. His appointment would represent either the ultimate vindication of reconciliation politics or a desperate attempt to co-opt intellectual credibility possibly both simultaneously.
Birehanu’s trajectory from opposition firebrand to government minister has already earned him considerable criticism from former allies who view his current role as a betrayal of democratic principles. One recent commentary described his transformation as evolving “from champion of liberal democracy to puppet of an ethnonationalist regime”harsh words that reflect the bitter disappointment of those who once saw him as a principled voice for democratic reform. Appointing such a controversial figure to head the central bank would send a rather mixed message about the government’s priorities and perhaps reveal more about internal power dynamics than officials might wish to broadcast.
The alternative scenario, promoting someone like Dr Eyob from within the existing financial technocracy, whilst less dramatic, carries its own set of implications. It would suggest a commitment to policy continuity, which might reassure international partners but could prove problematic if the underlying approach remains unchanged. The fundamental question isn’t merely about personnel but about whether Ethiopian monetary policy requires a complete rethink or simply more competent execution of existing strategies.
What makes this succession drama particularly rich is how it reflects broader tensions within Ethiopian governance. The departure of a key Abiy ally like Mamo suggests either that the Prime Minister is willing to sacrifice personal loyalties for policy effectiveness or that internal pressures have become impossible to ignore. Either interpretation reveals a government under considerable strain, attempting to balance international expectations with domestic realities whilst managing an increasingly complex set of economic challenges.
The diaspora intelligentsia, naturally, are having a field day with the spectacle. Social media platforms buzz with variations of “we told you so” from economists who had questioned Mamo’s credentials from the beginning. The same voices that had warned against appointing a lawyer to run monetary policy are now offering unsolicited advice about successor qualifications, creating a running commentary that oscillates between vindication and schadenfreude.
Yet perhaps the most telling aspect of this entire episode isn’t who gets appointed next, but how the appointment process itself reveals the persistent gap between technocratic rhetoric and political reality in Ethiopian governance. The country’s economic challenges, from inflation management to foreign exchange shortages, from debt sustainability to private sector development, require sustained technical expertise and political independence. Whether the next governor possesses both qualities remains to be seen.
Mamo’s transition to the AfDB, meanwhile, represents a familiar pattern in African governance: the soft landing for departing officials who maintain good relations with international partners. His fintech expertise and reform credentials, whatever their domestic limitations, translate neatly into continental development speak. One can already envision the press releases about “leveraging digital financial inclusion” and “promoting innovative regulatory frameworks across Africa.” It’s a comfortable sinecure that allows everyone involved to maintain the fiction that his departure represents career advancement rather than political necessity.
As Ethiopia awaits the announcement of Mamo’s successor, the broader questions raised by his tenure remain unresolved. Can a country successfully implement complex economic reforms without genuine technical expertise at the helm? Do international partnerships compensate for domestic policy failures? And perhaps most importantly, will the next governor possess both the economic competence and political independence necessary to navigate Ethiopia’s challenges without requiring another “pursuit of other passions” in three years’ time?
The answers to these questions will likely determine not just the success of Ethiopia’s economic reform programme, but the credibility of its technocratic governance model more broadly. For now, though, we’re left with the rather satisfying spectacle of critics being proven right, reformers being quietly shuffled offstage, and a succession drama that promises to reveal as much about Ethiopian politics as it does about monetary policy. In a country where such revelations are rare treats, one can hardly ask for more entertaining fare.
