Ethiopian Prime Minister might maneuver to remain in power for additional 18 years!

The legal and political obstacles he may face, and whether a constitutional shift (to a presidential system and/or the removal of ethnic federalism) is both necessary and advisable. This discussion also draws comparisons with his predecessor Meles Zenawi’s long tenure and governing methods.

Extending a Prime Minister’s Rule: Possibilities and Methods

In any political system, the possibility for a leader to extend his rule beyond what may be considered a “normal” term rests on the ability to change the constitutional or legal framework. In Ethiopia’s case, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s apparent ambition to secure power for 18 years could be facilitated by one or a combination of these strategies:

Constitutional Amendments: The current Ethiopian constitution, adopted in 1994, originally provided an unlimited term for the prime minister. However, Abiy himself pledged early on to institute term limits and champion democratic reforms. Reversing or amending those provisions to allow a prolonged term especially when converting from a parliamentary to a presidential system is a legally viable route if passed with the requisite supermajority in parliament and possibly, in some interpretations, ratified by a national referendum. This would mirror trends seen elsewhere where executive power is extended through constitutional reform.

Shifting Governance Structures: Reports have indicated that Abiy is reportedly considering a move toward a presidential system a change from Ethiopia’s current parliamentary model. In theory, a presidential system can centralize executive power and make it easier for the head of state to remain in office if term limits are modified or removed. Such a transformation might be seen as a natural evolution if the government argues that it is part of ensuring greater national unity or pursuing more decisive economic reforms. Using National Emergencies or Election Postponements: The COVID-19 pandemic previously served as a legal pretext for delaying elections and effectively extending the prime minister’s mandate without immediate, direct constitutional amendments. Future crises or emergencies could similarly be invoked to justify extended rule on the grounds of national stability or public health.

Legal Legitimacy and Challenges

Even if the technical process for constitutional amendment or systemic change is available, several legal challenges and obstacles remain manifested in the following:

Constitutional Rigor: Many of the articles that govern fundamental political rights and institutional arrangements in Ethiopia require broad consensus often two‑thirds majorities in both houses of Parliament or input from regional state councils. An amendment to change the system’s framework (especially one that curtails democratic accountability) could be challenged as unconstitutional or illegitimate if key stakeholders are excluded.

Federal and Ethnic Considerations: Ethiopia’s current model of ethnic federalism allegedly designed by TPLF led coalition to balance the country’s more than 80 ethnic groups. Any attempt to drop or dilute ethnic federalism in favor of a unitary or presidential system carries the risk of alienating several regional governments and ethnic communities. This could trigger political unrest or even armed opposition similar to how tensions erupted between the federal government and the Tigray led TPLF after opposing moves on elections.

Precedents and Democratic Backsliding: Critics point to the history of democratic backsliding observed under Abiy’s administration the suspension of elections and detention of opposition figures have drawn accusations of authoritarian consolidation. Even if amended by legal means, such changes would likely be seen as part of a broader erosion of democratic institutions rather than genuine reform.

Lessons from Meles Zenawi’s Tenure

Comparing Abiy’s potential maneuver to extend his rule with the long tenure of former Prime Minister Meles Zenawi (who ruled from 1995 until his death in 2012) offers several instructive contrasts and parallels:

Concentration of Power: Meles Zenawi, though he governed in a system that on paper did not have fixed term limits, managed to consolidate power by controlling party structures and state institutions. His model of a “developmental state” was inherently authoritarian and centralized, which allowed him to rule effectively without facing open electoral challenges. Abiy, in contrast, initially emerged as a reformist figure promising democratization and openness. However, if he follows a similar trajectory using constitutional changes to shift the system in his favor it could be seen as a return to the methods of past autocrats.

Reform vs. Consolidation: Meles’s policies were defended as necessary for Ethiopia’s rapid economic growth despite criticisms of repressive tactics. Abiy’s challenge lies in reconciling his reformist image with any moves that extend his tenure. Even if extending power appears “legitimate” under constitutional reform, doing so might alienate domestic stakeholders and international partners who expect a genuine break from the past.

Institutional Legacies: The TPLF dominated structures left by Meles have proven resilient. even when political reforms were attempted. Abiy’s administration now confronts both the legacy of past ethnic favoritism and the demands for genuine political pluralism. Any significant constitutional overhaul would not only need to overcome legal hurdles but also reshape these entrenched institutional patterns.

Is a Presidential System and Abandoning Ethnic Federalism the Way Forward?

Supporters of an extended rule might argue that transforming Ethiopia into a presidential system could enable more decisive governance and stability. However, several issues merit caution:

Checks and Balances: A presidential system without robust checks and balances can lead to significant concentration of power in the executive branch. While such centralization might allow for long-term projects and rapid decision-making, it also increases the risk of abuse and corruption.

Ethnic Tensions and Regional Autonomy: Ethiopia’s ethnic federalism was crafted albeit imperfectly to address historical inequities among ethnic groups. Abolishing or diluting this system might consolidate power at the center but could also marginalize certain groups, thereby fueling ethnic unrest. Such a move might undermine national unity rather than create a more efficient or “strong” state.

International and Domestic Legitimacy: Changing the political system to prolong one leader’s tenure could attract international criticism and reduce foreign aid if donors view the move as a backslide from democratic reforms. One could articulate the invalidity of such assertion perhaps the contemporary international values are no longer focusing using donations and grants to influence political entities in the developing nations like Ethiopia, evidently Americans and Europeans have become inward looking trying to resolve their domestic priorities. Domestically, however Ethiopian voters might view the change as illegitimate, sparking protests or even violent resistance in a country already scarred by ethnic conflict. The current armed struggle in Amhara and Oromia regions will be fueled by the assertion of PM seeking to rule beyond the current timeline, in fact it will shorten the legacy of the PM.

In sum, while a shift toward a presidential system might facilitate an 18-year tenure on paper, the costs in terms of political legitimacy, democratic accountability, and social cohesion could be considerable.

For Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed to remain in power for 18 years, he would likely need to initiate a series of constitutional amendments to remove self-imposed limits, restructure Ethiopia’s parliamentary system into a more presidential one, and potentially weaken the ethnically based federal structure. While these measures are legally possible if they adhere to the required amendment processes, they face formidable obstacles: deep-rooted ethnic divisions, the legacy of past autocrats like Meles Zenawi, institutional inertia, and potential domestic and international backlash.

In weighing the trade offs, any move toward extended rule through constitutional overhaul risks undermining the reform momentum that originally brought Abiy to power and could transform his reformist legacy into an authoritarian one. Instead, if genuine reform and national reconciliation are the goals, caution must be exercised so that the rule of law, democratic institutions, and genuine checks and balances remain robust ensuring that any transformation enhances rather than diminishes the freedoms of all Ethiopians.

Ultimately, while the legal machinery exists to extend a leader’s tenure, doing so in Ethiopia would require not only a technical constitutional revision but also careful management of ethnic and political realities that continue to challenge the nation’s stability and democratic evolution.