ESSAY

The Rise of Destructive Leadership in Ethiopia

Identity, Personal Grievances, and the Toxic Triangle of Political Power

By Professor Girma Berhanu

Editor’s note: A revised and edited version of this essay has since been published. Readers are directed to the updated text the-toxic-triangle-of-ethiopian-politics.-the-rise-of-destructive-leadership-and-the-decline-of-a-nation-edited-2.docx

Editor’s Foreword

Fifty-two years have passed since the fall of Emperor Haile Selassie. In that time Ethiopia has been governed by three men whose names now stand for three distinct ways of ruling: Mengistu Haile Mariam’s revolutionary terror, Meles Zenawi’s disciplined party-state, and Abiy Ahmed’s personalised premiership. Each came to power promising deliverance. Each, in his own way, has left the country more divided than he found it.

Professor Girma Berhanu, a long-standing contributor to these pages, asks the question that this record forces on any honest observer: how does a nation of such depth, history and talent keep placing its fate in the hands of leaders who damage it? His answer draws on the Toxic Triangle model of Padilla, Hogan and Kaiser, which holds that destructive leadership is never the work of one man alone. It also requires followers who are willing to follow, and an environment that offers no resistance.

That emphasis matters. It is tempting to explain Ethiopia’s suffering entirely through the character of whoever happens to hold power. Professor Girma takes the harder path. He insists that leaders bear personal responsibility for their decisions, but he also asks what in our institutions, our political culture and our own habits as citizens allowed them to rise and to remain.

The essay arrives at a sombre moment. This year’s general election and the renewed fighting in Tigray since August have shown once again how fragile Ethiopia’s political settlement remains, and how little the country’s institutions have done to restrain those who hold power.

His proposals, shaped by several decades of life in Scandinavia, are deliberately unglamorous: civic education that begins in school, youth organisations that teach dissent as well as loyalty, and a gradual apprenticeship in public responsibility. Readers may reasonably debate how far Nordic practice can travel to the Horn of Africa. But his central claim deserves to be taken seriously. The task is not to find a perfect leader. It is to build a political system in which no leader can easily become destructive.

The Ethiopian Tribune publishes this essay as a contribution to that debate, and welcomes responses.

— The Editor, The Ethiopian Tribune

Synopsis

This essay examines the rise of three of Ethiopia’s most consequential and controversial leaders: Mengistu Haile Mariam, Meles Zenawi and Abiy Ahmed. It asks how each reached and held the highest office despite the presence of highly educated, capable and politically experienced alternatives.

Drawing on Padilla, Hogan and Kaiser’s (2007) Toxic Triangle model, it traces the interaction between destructive leaders, susceptible followers and conducive environments. It sets the militarisation of power under the Derg beside the party-centred authority of the EPRDF era and the move from reformist promise to authoritarian consolidation since 2018. The essay considers whether personal identity, contested family backgrounds and grievance may have shaped each leader’s conduct, while separating documented biography from speculation. It also offers a comparison between Abiy Ahmed and the Roman Emperor Caligula.

The essay concludes that Ethiopia’s crisis is, at root, a crisis of political selection, institutional accountability and leadership development. Drawing on Scandinavian experience, it argues for civic education from childhood, genuinely democratic youth organisations, mentorship and progressive responsibility, so that leaders are cultivated rather than left to emerge from upheaval, armed struggle or personal ambition.

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Introduction: Ethiopia’s Leadership Paradox

Ethiopia presents a profound paradox in African political history. Its ancient civilisation, historical independence, cultural diversity, intellectual traditions and demographic weight make it one of the continent’s most consequential nations. Yet despite enormous human potential and generations of educated and capable citizens, the country has repeatedly experienced political leadership associated with repression, institutional instability, national fragmentation and profound human suffering.

This essay examines the rise and political legacies of three controversial Ethiopian leaders, Mengistu Haile Mariam, Meles Zenawi and Abiy Ahmed, through the theoretical framework of the Toxic Triangle of destructive leadership. It asks how these men ascended to national power despite the availability of alternative political and intellectual talent, what characteristics enabled their success, and how the surrounding institutional and societal environments facilitated their emergence and consolidation.

One of the most troubling questions in Ethiopia’s modern history is precisely this: why have individuals with authoritarian tendencies, revolutionary ambitions or highly centralised conceptions of power managed to rise to the highest political positions? And how have they maintained authority despite the existence of capable intellectuals, experienced administrators, respected community leaders and alternative political actors?

Although these three leaders emerged from different historical circumstances, ideological traditions and political organisations, their periods in office invite comparative investigation into political domination, institutional weakness, coercive governance and the consequences of concentrated authority.

The central argument of this essay is that Ethiopia’s recurring leadership crisis cannot be explained merely by the personalities of individual rulers. It must also be understood as a structural problem involving political institutions, social conditions, leadership selection, ideological mobilisation and the absence of effective mechanisms of accountability. The essay explores the possible relationship between personal identity, perceived social marginalisation, grievance, ambition and destructive behaviour, while taking care to distinguish biographical evidence from psychological speculation.

It also raises a broader question about Ethiopia’s future: what institutional and educational arrangements might prevent the emergence of another generation of destructive leaders? Leadership, it argues, should be cultivated rather than left to political opportunism, revolutionary circumstance, military dominance or personal ambition. Drawing on Scandinavian political traditions, it proposes early civic education, youth political participation, mentorship, institutional accountability and merit-based selection as foundations for Ethiopia’s political renewal.

Ethiopia’s future depends not only on identifying destructive leadership after it has emerged, but on building institutions capable of producing, selecting and holding accountable responsible leaders.

The Toxic Triangle

The Toxic Triangle of Destructive Leadership, developed by Padilla, Hogan and Kaiser (2007), offers an analytical framework for this inquiry. Rather than treating destructive leadership as an isolated psychological defect, the model emphasises the interaction of three interdependent elements:

• Destructive leaders: individuals marked by authoritarian tendencies, excessive ambition, narcissism, manipulation or a hunger for power, who place personal interests above collective welfare.
• Susceptible followers: people who support such leaders out of fear, insecurity, ideological loyalty, self-interest, dependency, or a desire for belonging and protection.
• Conducive environments: political or organisational conditions that enable destructive leadership, including institutional weakness, instability, fear, polarisation and inadequate accountability.

The Toxic Triangle of destructive leadership, after Padilla, Hogan and Kaiser (2007).

The model’s essential insight is that destructive leadership is not merely the product of a bad leader. It emerges when destructive leaders, susceptible followers and enabling environments reinforce one another. This allows a fuller account of how political leaders acquire authority, why their followers support them, and how institutions become vulnerable to destructive political behaviour.

The Historical Context of Destructive Leadership in Ethiopia

Mengistu Haile Mariam and the militarisation of political power

Mengistu Haile Mariam emerged from the military establishment during the Ethiopian Revolution of 1974, which overthrew Emperor Haile Selassie. The revolution initially reflected widespread demands for political reform, social justice, land redistribution and the dismantling of entrenched aristocratic privilege. The revolutionary process, however, rapidly became a struggle for supremacy within the military committee known as the Derg. Mengistu eventually consolidated power and presided over a highly centralised military state characterised by ideological repression, political violence and the systematic elimination of opponents.

The Red Terror, particularly during 1977–78, became one of the most devastating episodes in modern Ethiopian history. Political opponents, suspected dissidents and civilians associated with rival movements were subjected to mass arrests, executions and other forms of state violence. The regime’s coercive approach to opposition left deep societal trauma and destroyed political trust. From the perspective of destructive leadership theory, Mengistu’s rule illustrates how revolutionary environments can enable leaders who transform legitimate demands for reform into instruments of domination.

The revolutionary crisis weakened established institutions while failing to build durable democratic mechanisms. Military authority, ideological conformity and coerced loyalty became the central instruments of governance. This raises an important question: did the revolution produce destructive leadership, or did destructive leadership exploit the revolution?

The answer is likely to involve both. Revolutionary instability created opportunities for domination, while the subsequent concentration of authority allowed the leadership to intensify the crisis and perpetuate destructive practices. Mengistu’s experience shows how political transitions become especially vulnerable to authoritarian consolidation when effective institutional safeguards are absent.

Beyond institutions and historical circumstance, however, the individual characteristics and background of political leaders should not be overlooked. Mengistu’s personality, military career, social origins and personal ambitions may also have shaped his trajectory. He was widely portrayed as a confrontational, volatile and authoritarian figure. His physical appearance and darker complexion were reportedly used against him in derogatory characterisations, including the Amharic term barya, associated with servitude. His military career was reportedly marked by several demotions, and speculation about his family lineage continued to circulate. Accounts of his early life point to modest circumstances: his father served as an ordinary soldier, and Mengistu reportedly had limited formal education. A number of accounts have also associated him with gambling and an unpredictable temperament.

These personal and biographical dimensions must, of course, be approached critically, distinguishing documented historical evidence from political allegation, rumour and retrospective interpretation. Nevertheless, they raise an important question about the interaction between individual agency and structural conditions. Mengistu appears to have exploited the upheaval and the institutional vacuum that followed the collapse of the imperial order. The prevailing atmosphere of uncertainty, fragmentation and disintegration created favourable conditions for a determined, power-seeking military figure to assert himself. Revolutionary constituencies, particularly those seeking rapid social and political transformation, may also have been susceptible to manipulation. In this sense, Mengistu’s rise was not simply a product of structural circumstances; it also reflected opportunities seized by an ambitious officer in pursuit of power, authority and a place in history.

Meles Zenawi and the institutionalisation of party-centred authority

Meles Zenawi emerged from the armed struggle against the Derg and became one of the principal architects of the political order established after 1991. His leadership was associated with the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), a coalition whose dominant member, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), exercised extensive influence over the state. The post-1991 system introduced a new constitutional framework that formally recognised ethnic federalism and regional self-government, and it expanded education, infrastructure and public administration in several areas.

Nevertheless, the political system became increasingly characterised by centralised party authority, restrictions on political competition, repression of the opposition and extensive control over state institutions. The ethnic federal system introduced under his leadership also generated significant tensions, contributing to internal divisions, intercommunal conflict, competing territorial claims and increasingly entrenched ethnic polarisation. Critics argue that these developments particularly disadvantaged the Amhara population, which experienced severe political marginalisation, insecurity, displacement, violence and collective trauma.

The political orientation of the TPLF leadership, including its historical antagonism towards Ethiopian nationalism and its relationship with Amhara political identity and the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church, also became a source of considerable controversy. Critics contend that anti-Amhara sentiment and hostility towards aspects of Ethiopia’s historical and religious traditions shaped the outlook of the incoming leadership. These interpretations warrant examination in the context of the TPLF’s ideological foundations, political discourse and governing practices, while distinguishing documented policies and actions from allegations about individual motives.

The 2005 elections marked a decisive turning point. After substantial electoral competition and widespread opposition gains, the government responded with repression, mass arrests and lethal violence against protesters. The consequences extended well beyond the immediate crisis, reinforcing the perception that electoral participation did not guarantee meaningful political alternation.

Meles’s leadership therefore represents a different form of destructive leadership from Mengistu’s military dictatorship. Rather than relying chiefly on revolutionary coercion, it combined party organisation, ideological discipline, administrative structures and developmental legitimacy. The distinction is analytically important. Destructive leadership can operate through military domination, but it can also work through sophisticated political organisations, bureaucratic institutions and narratives of national development.

The central issue is not whether a leader is intelligent or organised, but whether those capacities are exercised within institutions that protect citizens, distribute power and constrain authority.

The Ethiopian experience demonstrates that institutional sophistication and economic growth do not automatically produce democratic accountability. A political system may expand infrastructure, educational opportunity and administrative capacity while simultaneously restricting freedoms and concentrating power.

During Meles Zenawi’s period in power, ethnic political hierarchies and forms of ethnic exclusivism became increasingly institutionalised and visible. Although these tendencies became still more pronounced under Abiy Ahmed, their roots can be traced, in part, to the preceding period. The consequences included deepening ethnic division, recurring conflict, displacement, famine and the deaths of large numbers of people. The legacies of this period continue to affect Ethiopian society, like a deeply embedded poison whose effects have yet to be overcome. Corruption and patronage also became serious features of the system. And although Tigray received considerable political and economic attention under the TPLF-led government, this did not translate into widespread prosperity: many ordinary farmers and rural communities in Tigray remained poor.

At a personal level, Meles’s background has also been discussed in relation to his family’s alleged historical associations with the Italian occupation. Some accounts suggest that his father or grandfather had links to individuals or structures connected with the Italian colonial administration. Such claims require careful historical verification and should not be treated as established fact without reliable evidence. More importantly, they must be kept distinct from an examination of Meles’s documented political decisions, ideological commitments and governing practices.

Nevertheless, many politically informed Ethiopians, particularly among older generations, argue that Meles set the country on a dangerous trajectory, one that intensified fragmentation, institutionalised ethnic division and laid the conditions for further cycles of violent conflict. In their view, the framework established during his tenure opened the door to conflicts whose consequences are still unfolding, with no clear resolution in sight. Meles was widely regarded as intellectually capable and politically astute; his critics argue that this strategic intelligence was joined to a deeply problematic political agenda and a willingness to pursue power in ways that undermined national cohesion and long-term stability.

Abiy Ahmed: from reformist promise to authoritarian consolidation

Abiy Ahmed assumed the premiership in 2018 amid widespread unrest and growing dissatisfaction with the EPRDF government. His emergence generated considerable optimism at home and abroad. His reform announcements, political openings, reconciliation initiatives and promises of democratic transformation raised hopes for a new era in Ethiopia.

Subsequent developments, however, exposed the profound contradictions of the transition. It was marked by tension between competing political organisations, unresolved historical grievances, growing ethnic polarisation, constitutional disagreement and increasingly intense struggles over the distribution of power. The outbreak of war in Tigray in November 2020, followed by spreading insecurity and armed conflict in other parts of the country, had devastating humanitarian consequences. Political repression, mass displacement, civilian suffering and increasingly contested narratives of national identity have further complicated Ethiopia’s trajectory.

Abiy’s leadership therefore raises a fundamental question about the relationship between reformist promise and political outcome: how does a leader initially associated with democratic opening become identified with centralised authority, repression and devastating conflict?

The answer cannot be reduced to personal ambition alone. It requires examining the institutional constraints, political incentives, competing elites, security structures, historical grievances and social divisions within which decisions are made. Yet structural explanations must not obscure individual responsibility. The consequences of a leader’s decisions remain central to any serious assessment of political accountability.

Taken together, the cases of Mengistu, Meles and Abiy suggest that destructive political outcomes can arise under quite different ideologies and organisational arrangements. They allow us to investigate recurring patterns of authoritarian governance, manipulation, institutional weakening and the concentration of power, without assuming that the three men were identical or that history can be explained by personality alone.

Abiy Ahmed: personality, power and political destruction

In my assessment, Abiy Ahmed’s tenure represents one of the most destructive episodes of political leadership in Ethiopia’s modern history. I regard his leadership as characterised by manipulation, calculated opportunism, ruthlessness and a troubling willingness to pursue political objectives regardless of their devastating consequences for the country. His conduct, rhetoric and governing practices raise serious questions about his relationship with democratic institutions, political pluralism and the responsibilities of national leadership.

Seven years ago, I wrote an article titled The Many Faces of Abiy Ahmed: The Nobel Laureate, Ironically Honoured for Peace. From the outset, I found him a deeply troubling and unsettling political figure. My assessment rested on his rhetoric, an analysis of his policies, and interviews and accounts concerning his upbringing, education and background. Together, these suggested to me an enigmatic leader whose political agenda appeared increasingly destructive for the nation.

More recently, after watching a documentary on the Roman Emperor Caligula (Gaius Caesar Germanicus), his cruelty and his eventual descent into madness, I was struck by what I perceived as parallels with Ethiopia’s prime minister, and explored them in a short article. The historical context, methods of governance and instruments of power are, of course, vastly different. The comparison nonetheless operates on two levels: the first concerns perceived similarities in leadership style and political conduct; the second concerns the lessons history offers, and in particular what societies repeatedly fail to learn from earlier experiences of authoritarian rule.

A central theme is the relationship between power, personal image and political legitimacy. Caligula’s reign is frequently associated with claims to divine status and attempts to raise the emperor above ordinary political authority; ancient accounts describe the heads of statues of the gods being replaced with his own likeness. Critics of Abiy Ahmed argue that aspects of his leadership similarly reflect an effort to cultivate an image of exceptional, almost sacred authority through public symbolism, religious narrative, monumental initiatives and saturation media coverage.

A second theme is the use of grand projects and symbolic acts to project power. Ancient sources describe Caligula ordering his soldiers to gather seashells from the shore after his abortive campaign against Britain and presenting them as the spoils of war, an episode traditionally read as theatrical power and symbolic domination. Critics of Abiy argue that some of his monumental projects likewise prioritise spectacle, personal legacy and image-building while the country faces extraordinary humanitarian challenges, including armed conflict, displacement, poverty and economic hardship.

Caligula’s reputation is also bound up with cruelty, financial extravagance and the abuse of authority. Ancient writers describe lavish expenditure, costly construction and the confiscation of property through politically motivated accusations. Critics of Abiy’s government draw comparisons with these patterns, raising concerns about the allocation of public resources, prestige-oriented development, forced displacement and the concentration of decision-making. Several broader characteristics of Caligula’s reign offer a comparative framework:

• Cult of personality: ancient sources portray Caligula as demanding extraordinary reverence and blurring the boundary between ruler and deity. Modern authoritarian leaders similarly present themselves as uniquely qualified, indispensable or historically destined to lead. Critics argue that Abiy’s political communication and public symbolism increasingly reflect this tendency.
• Unchecked executive power: Caligula ruled with few effective institutional constraints. In contemporary authoritarian settings, executive power is consolidated by weakening or subordinating courts, legislatures, independent media and other institutions capable of limiting authority. The erosion of institutional accountability in Ethiopia raises serious concern in this regard.
• Arbitrary decision-making: historical accounts depict Caligula as unpredictable in his appointments, punishments and decisions. Arbitrary governance allows authoritarian leaders to create uncertainty, discourage opposition and make political actors dependent on the ruler’s discretion. Critics of Abiy’s administration raise comparable concerns about unpredictability and the personalisation of authority.
• Fear as an instrument of governance: accounts of executions, confiscations and public humiliation under Caligula show how fear can function as a mechanism of control. In contemporary authoritarian systems, coercion, intimidation and repression serve the same purpose of deterring dissent. Allegations of political repression and violence in Ethiopia warrant serious independent investigation and accountability.

Critics of the government contend that these characteristics are increasingly evident in Ethiopia’s contemporary political trajectory: that the concentration of power, the weakening of institutional constraints, arbitrary governance and the coercive treatment of perceived opponents have fuelled polarisation, widespread violence and a severe humanitarian crisis. Continued insecurity and renewed armed confrontation in different parts of the country further demonstrate the fragility of Ethiopia’s political order.

Personal background, identity and the psychology of political leadership

Beyond institutional arrangements and historical circumstance, the background and personal characteristics of political leaders may also warrant examination. In Abiy Ahmed’s case, questions about his family background, religious upbringing, identity and personal trajectory have featured frequently in Ethiopian political discourse. Accounts of his family history describe a mixed religious background, with a Muslim father and a Christian mother, and there has also been public discussion and speculation about his paternal lineage.

It is important, however, to distinguish verifiable biographical information from politically motivated speculation. Claims about his parentage, ancestry or an alleged identity crisis should not be treated as established fact without credible evidence. Nor should complex political decisions be explained through presumed psychological traits or family circumstances alone.

A more productive approach is to investigate how personal identity, political socialisation, ambition, self-presentation and perceptions of legitimacy interact with institutional opportunities and constraints. The relationship between personal insecurity, image-building and the exercise of authority is a legitimate subject of political and historical inquiry, provided that interpretations are supported by evidence rather than conjecture.

My central concern, however, is not Abiy Ahmed’s personal background or temperament, but the political consequences of his leadership. Under his premiership, Ethiopia has suffered an extraordinary deterioration in security, social cohesion, institutional trust and humanitarian conditions. The country has been brought dangerously close to fragmentation and state collapse.

Of particular concern is the scale of violence, displacement, discrimination and reported atrocities affecting Amhara communities. Allegations of targeted persecution, civilian killings, the destruction of livelihoods, arbitrary detention and systematic discrimination demand serious international attention and independent investigation. The suffering of these communities must not be marginalised or treated as secondary to competing political narratives. Its scale, alongside the wider crisis affecting other Ethiopian communities, raises fundamental questions about the state’s capacity and willingness to protect all its citizens equally.

Ultimately, Abiy Ahmed’s legacy must be judged not by the promises that accompanied his rise, his international recognition or the monumental projects associated with his administration, but by the consequences of his decisions for the Ethiopian people and the country’s future. The contrast between the democratic expectations of 2018 and the deterioration that followed is particularly stark.

Political transitions do not automatically produce democratic transformation. Without strong institutions, reformist promises can become instruments of another cycle of authoritarian consolidation.

That is the central historical lesson. In the absence of strong institutions, meaningful accountability, inclusive political arrangements and respect for human rights, revolutionary or reformist promises can become the vehicle for renewed authoritarianism. Ethiopia’s experience under Mengistu, Meles and Abiy offers three historically distinct illustrations of this recurring danger.

The Scandinavian Experience: Democratic Leadership as a Cultivated Practice

I raise this issue partly because I have lived in Scandinavia for several decades and have been able to observe how these countries identify, cultivate and invest in future political leaders from an early age. Through youth organisations, civic education, political mentorship and opportunities for democratic participation, they create pathways along which future leaders gradually acquire political competence and a sense of public responsibility. Combined with strong institutions, established traditions of accountability and effective checks and balances, these practices contribute to political stability, institutional resilience and long-term national security.

The proposal at the heart of this essay is that future Ethiopian leaders should be systematically prepared for democratic leadership. Rather than allowing leadership to emerge primarily through crises, armed struggle or internal power contests, Ethiopia could develop a structured system of civic education, mentorship and meaningful democratic participation. Such an approach would help cultivate a generation of leaders equipped not only with political and administrative competence but with democratic values, ethical responsibility and a commitment to constitutional governance.

Scandinavian countries offer useful comparative insights, although their institutions cannot simply be transplanted to Ethiopia without regard to differences in history, social structure and constitutional arrangements.

Leadership development through youth participation

In Scandinavian democracies, political participation often begins early, through student organisations, the youth wings of political parties, civic associations, local government initiatives and educational institutions. Party youth organisations offer opportunities to build political knowledge, engage in public debate, discuss policy, organise campaigns and gain practical experience of democratic processes.

Participation in youth politics should not, however, be equated with guaranteed preparation for national leadership. Many young people active in political organisations never hold national office, and the organisations themselves vary considerably in their internal democracy.

The lesson is not that Scandinavian leaders are necessarily superior because they passed through youth organisations. It is that democratic societies provide multiple institutional and civic pathways through which individuals can acquire political knowledge, develop leadership capacities, absorb democratic values and gain practical experience before assuming significant public responsibility.

Mentorship and gradual responsibility

Leadership development should involve a gradual progression towards greater responsibility. Young people may begin in school councils, student associations, civic initiatives and community organisations. As they gain experience and maturity, they can move on to municipal governance, policy development, parliamentary work and public administration. Such progression allows them to acquire practical experience, demonstrate their abilities and become accountable to the public. Leadership thus becomes a matter of demonstrated commitment and competence rather than the sudden acquisition of authority.

Ethiopia, unfortunately, has not developed comparable pathways for identifying, preparing and nurturing future leaders. Political figures frequently arrive in positions of national power without having been widely known or publicly scrutinised beforehand. Their backgrounds, political trajectories, qualifications and intentions often remain unclear, leaving considerable room for speculation; at times even basic questions about their backgrounds and affiliations have become matters of public debate. Ordinary Ethiopians are left to guess whether an emerging leader represents a genuine opportunity for national transformation or a continuation of existing patterns of instability and institutional weakness. This uncertainty underlines the importance of transparent leadership selection, public scrutiny and the systematic development of democratic leadership.

Political pluralism and institutional restraint

Scandinavian political systems also illustrate the importance of arrangements that prevent the excessive concentration of power. Parliamentary democracy, independent media, judicial institutions, political competition and strong civic organisations together ensure that leaders remain subject to public scrutiny. These arrangements matter more than the personal virtues of any individual leader.

The objective should not be to identify a perfect leader. It should be to establish a political system in which no leader can easily become destructive.

A democratic society should not depend on the assumption that its leaders will always be benevolent. It should instead build institutions capable of restraining leaders who become authoritarian, incompetent or destructive. This principle is particularly relevant to Ethiopia.

Grooming Ethiopia’s Future Leaders: From Political Opportunism to Democratic Preparation

The recurring problem of destructive leadership raises a fundamental question: can a nation deliberately cultivate better leaders? This essay argues that Ethiopia must move beyond the assumption that leadership emerges naturally through political competition, revolutionary struggle, military service or individual ambition. Leadership should instead be understood as a developmental process involving education, ethical formation, practical experience and institutional accountability.

Constitutional monarchies offer an interesting comparative perspective on the early preparation of future leaders. In the Scandinavian countries, heirs to the throne are identified from birth and undergo a long process of education, preparation and gradual familiarisation with public duties. Succession is institutionally established, and the public knows who the future monarch will be, often decades in advance. Although these monarchs exercise primarily constitutional and symbolic functions rather than direct political authority, the continuity of succession provides a measure of predictability and stability. Absolute monarchies operate differently, since hereditary succession there may also transfer substantial executive power. These distinctions matter. The lesson is not that Ethiopia should adopt a monarchical system, but that deliberate, long-term preparation for public responsibility offers a useful point of comparison. In a democratic republic, similar principles can be applied through civic education, mentorship, transparent selection and progressively greater public responsibility.

Early democratic education and youth leadership development

The cultivation of democratic leadership should begin in childhood and continue through adolescence into early adulthood. Schools are an important starting point, not merely for teaching democratic principles in theory but for giving children practical experience of democratic participation. School councils, student elections, debating clubs, civic projects and collaborative decision-making help young people develop leadership skills and understand that leadership is fundamentally a responsibility to serve others rather than an entitlement to command.

Such experiences should cultivate respect for human dignity, acceptance of the legitimacy of political disagreement, an appreciation of compromise and an understanding of the duties of public service. Equally important is an awareness of the dangers of authoritarian power and of the relationship between individual rights and civic responsibility. Embedded in everyday educational practice, these principles allow democratic habits to take root long before young people join political organisations or assume public office.

This foundation should be strengthened through democratic youth organisations. Ethiopia could develop and support the youth wings of political parties, civic associations and other voluntary bodies that provide policy education, leadership training, public debate, community engagement and practical participation in democratic processes. Such organisations could become important pathways through which young people acquire political knowledge, gain organisational experience and gradually take on greater responsibility.

Youth organisations must, however, operate on genuinely democratic principles. They must not become instruments of indoctrination, partisan mobilisation or personality worship. Their purpose should be to form independent-minded citizens who can examine political ideas critically, question authority and engage constructively with opposing views. A particularly important element of democratic leadership is the capacity to disagree with one’s own party or organisation without fear of exclusion or punishment.

The ability to question one’s own leaders is not a sign of disloyalty; it is an essential element of democratic maturity.

Taken together, democratic education in schools and meaningful participation in youth organisations could create a continuous pathway from childhood civic engagement to responsible political leadership. For Ethiopia, this would mark an important shift away from leadership forged primarily in political struggle and the contest for power, towards leadership grounded in democratic experience, ethical responsibility, public service and institutional accountability.

Conclusion: Breaking the Cycle of Destructive Leadership

The political trajectories of Mengistu Haile Mariam, Meles Zenawi and Abiy Ahmed illuminate one of Ethiopia’s most persistent challenges: the emergence and reproduction of destructive political leadership in a country endowed with considerable human, intellectual and historical resources. Although the three men rose under different historical circumstances and ideological banners, their periods in power reveal recurring patterns of concentrated authority, institutional vulnerability, political exclusion, weakened accountability and threats to national cohesion.

The Toxic Triangle model is valuable precisely because it moves beyond explanations based solely on individual personality. It conceives of destructive leadership as the interaction of destructive leaders, susceptible followers and conducive environments. Leaders may possess intelligence, organisational capability and political ambition; when those qualities operate within institutions that reward domination, suppress dissent and undermine accountability, leadership becomes destructive. Followers, likewise, may support leaders out of ideological commitment, a desire for security, material interest, group identification or genuine hope for national transformation, and their participation, even when well intentioned, may sustain destructive systems.

The environment matters just as much. Revolutionary upheaval, institutional fragility, polarisation, unresolved historical grievance and the absence of effective democratic mechanisms create favourable conditions for authoritarian consolidation. Ethiopia’s experience therefore shows that destructive leadership cannot be explained through individual biography or personality alone. Personal identity, political socialisation, grievance and family background may be relevant areas of political-psychological inquiry, but explanations must rest on reliable evidence rather than speculation. The more compelling argument concerns the interaction between individual motivation, political opportunity, institutional arrangement and social condition.

A nation may possess exceptionally intelligent and capable citizens yet repeatedly suffer destructive leadership when its institutions fail to select, develop, constrain and hold leaders to account. This leads to the central conclusion of this essay: Ethiopia’s leadership crisis is fundamentally a crisis of political selection, institutional accountability and democratic leadership development.

The solution is not to wait for a better, more benevolent or more visionary leader to appear. Nor is it enough to replace one dominant figure with another. Ethiopia needs a political and institutional transformation capable of cultivating responsible leadership, limiting excessive executive authority, preventing the personalisation of power and protecting citizens from political abuse.

Scandinavian democratic traditions offer useful lessons, particularly in early civic education, meaningful youth participation, political mentorship, institutional transparency and gradual leadership development. These practices cannot simply be transplanted; they must be adapted to Ethiopia’s historical experience, cultural diversity and political realities. Nevertheless, they point towards a more inclusive, accountable and participatory political culture.

Ethiopia must move from leadership based on domination to leadership based on public service; from political loyalty to constitutional responsibility; from personalised authority to institutions that belong equally to all citizens.

The nation’s future should not depend on the character or ambitions of a single ruler. It should rest on the legitimacy of its institutions, the quality of its civic education, the integrity of its political organisations and the capacity of its citizens to hold their leaders to account.

The enduring challenge, therefore, is not merely to understand how destructive leaders have risen to power in Ethiopia, but to transform the political, institutional and social conditions that have repeatedly allowed them to consolidate and reproduce their authority. Breaking this cycle requires more than changing leaders. It requires changing the very conditions under which leadership is acquired, exercised, legitimised and sustained.

Girma Berhanu is a Professor at the University of Gothenburg and a regular contributor to The Ethiopian Tribune.

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